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1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Coalition formation
In a Western democracy, political parties usually do not govern alone since no 
single party gains the majority of the seats during elections. Coalition formation is 
therefore central to politics in multi-party systems. This means that cooperation lies 
at the heart of our political system. Since the system presently in place in Western 
democracies allows us to choose and vote for our ‘favourite’ party, but not for our 
‘favourite’ coalition, it seems worthwhile to study coalition formation in an attempt 
to make this part o f the democratic life cycle more transparent.
In a nutshell, democracy in a multi-party system should run through the following 
stages. In the first stage, general parliamentary elections are held. In the second stage, 
the elections lead to a distribution of seats over the political parties in parliament. 
Then the process of cabinet formation takes place. After the formation of a govern­
ment, this cabinet’s policy is the ingredient of the next stage. O n the basis of the 
evaluation o f the government policy, the voters determine who to vote for in the 
next elections.
According to a modest interpretation o f democracy, the democratic control of the 
citizens is typically restricted to punishing bad governors and rewarding good gover­
nors at the time o f the election. This notion of democracy is often referred to as a 
liberal interpretation o f democracy and originates in Madison (Riker, 1988). 
Representation of the citizens by politicians they voted for lies at the heart of liberal 
democracy. This liberal view is often presented as the counterpart of the ‘populist’ 
interpretation o f democracy with Rousseau as its inventor. In the populist view of 
democracy, the government should act on behalf of ‘the general will of the people’ 
in all democratic stages (Riker, 1988). In the liberal view the political parties receive a 
temporary mandate to govern, whereas in the populist view the parties are supposed 
to reflect the general will.
In a two-party system, it is easy to reward or punish political parties since the 
government, consisting of one party, directly reflects the voting behaviour. If the 
incumbent party is rewarded and keeps its majority, this party will govern and the 
liberal view of democracy is satisfied. Naturally the opposite also meets Madisonian 
standards: if the incumbent party is punished and loses its majority to the opposition, 
the latter party will govern.
In a multi-party system it is very well possible for political parties to ‘win’ the 
elections, but simultaneously lose the formation. Thus, a party that is rewarded by
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the citizens during elections can lose office. A winning party can gain more votes 
than in the previous election, even become the largest party, and yet lose the forma­
tion. In this context, ‘losing the formation’ means not becoming a member of the 
coalition that is formed. The Social Democratic Party in the Netherlands, for 
instance, became the largest party in 1977, but was not included in the small majority 
coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals that eventually resulted. In cases like 
these, even though the liberal view of rewarding and punishing governors holds for 
the first democratic stage, this is ultimately not translated in the composition of the 
government. So, since the relation between elections and coalitions and thus 
governmental policy - the outcome of the democratic process - is not as straight­
forward as one might expect, studying coalition formation is a worthwhile activity.
Naturally, many researchers have acknowledged the importance of studying 
coalition formation over time. Different approaches have led to different models of 
coalition formation. A first branch of theories dates back to the early 1960’s, when 
Riker presented his Theory o f  Political Coalitions (Riker, 1962). The main argument 
in his research is that parties do not want to enter coalitions that have more members 
or, to be more precise, more parliamentary seats, than necessary. If  we view governing 
the country as the ‘catch’, it makes sense that the players want to share this catch 
with as few other players as possible. The earliest contribution to this set of so-called 
office-seeking models can be found in the Theory o f  Games and Economic Behaviour 
written by the creators of game theory, Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 
(edition 1990). These office-seeking theories, also referred to as ‘power-oriented’ the­
ories, will be presented in a formal manner in Chapter 3. In these theories, the 
weight of a political party is its resource, and a rational choice for a party is a coalition 
with small weight (see also Gamson, 1962). In the Dutch parliamentary system, the 
weight is denoted by the number of seats that a political party holds in the Second 
Chamber, and a minimal size coalition is defined as a coalition with no more seats 
than necessary in order to be winning. O ther definitions of ‘small’ coalitions are for 
instance ‘any combination o f parties with just enough players to make the coalition 
winning - it is representing a majority in parliament - (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1990), or ‘winning with as few players as possible’ (Leiserson, 1968).
These power-oriented theories do not take into account that coalition formation 
may also be driven by motives other than gaining office. Two such motives are policy- 
oriented and ideological. W ith policy motives, I refer to preferences about issues 
that the political parties and the voters care about. An issue can be almost anything, 
ranging from ‘how much money the government should spend on public transpor­
tation’ to ‘how one should deal with euthanasia’. O n the other hand, ideology is
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defined more tightly. In this research, following the footsteps of Hinich and Munger 
(1994), I refer to ideology as a group o f coherent issues that together form an idea 
about how society should be constructed and evaluated. Ideology should mean the 
same for both the citizens and the political parties. In this research, an important 
property of ideology is that it is no more and no less than a group of consistent ideas 
held by both the voters and politicians in one country at one moment in time. The 
content o f ideology however does not necessarily remain stable over time and over 
state boundaries.
In some coalition formation theories, the ideological or policy stands of the parties 
are included. The theories in this branch are denoted as ‘policy-seeking’ or ‘policy 
oriented’ theories. Axelrod (1970) was among the first to develop a policy-seeking 
coalition formation theory, namely the ‘conflict of interest theory’. Coalitions with 
as little conflict of interest as possible are most likely to be formed. Political parties 
are said to have little conflict of interest if their policy preferences are not dispersed. 
In this particular theory, coalitions are predicted that consist of parties that are adjacent 
on the main left-right economic scale. Leiserson (1966) and De Swaan (1973) also 
developed policy-seeking theories.
De Swaan’s policy distance theory is among the most famous coalition formation 
theories and the behavioural assumptions o f this theory are also deployed in the 
main theoretical contribution - the maximal satisfaction solution - of my research.
Another development in coalition formation theory is the introduction of actor- 
oriented theories. The basic idea here is that a specific actor controls coalition 
formation processes. Peleg (1980, 1981) introduced the dominant actor, which is 
powerful by her weight. This actor has the ability to control internal opposition in 
a winning coalition, and, moreover, has more opportunities to form winning coalitions 
than any other actor in the game. Another powerful actor, defined by Van Deemen 
(1991), is the centre player. This player owes its powerful position to its ideological 
position on a uni-dimensional ideological scale. The main strength of this player is her 
ability to keep balance on this dimension. It is the only player that can form a winning 
coalition with the players to its right, and simultaneously with the players to its left.
The distinction between office-seeking and policy-seeking theories has led to 
much discussion about the motivation o f politicians and political parties, and thus 
the question of what they bargain about. Downs (1957) and Riker (1962) support 
the office-seeking view. Downs (1957, p 28) states that: “parties formulate policies in 
order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies”. De 
Swaan (1973) in his policy distance theory, on the other hand, argues that foremost 
in coalition bargaining is the will to determine government policy.
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To simply assume that parties should have either office or policy motives is in my 
opinion naive. A truly office-seeking party would be forced to engage in policy bar­
gaining because it would have to convince the electorate that its policy positions are 
worth voting for. Moreover, if this office-seeking party would ‘forget’ about its policy 
proposals once it holds office, this would lead to a reputation of unreliability and 
consequently a loss of office. O n the other hand, a truly policy-seeking party cannot 
exist either. In order to influence policy, this party needs office. So, no matter what 
the ‘initial’ motivation is, political parties are both office- and policy-seeking actors.
In addition to the two main branches of coalition formation theories - office- and 
policy-seeking theories - and the actor-oriented theories, new developments have 
given rise to the development of new theories. O ne o f the new classes of theories is 
concerned with the influence of system characteristics in the process of coalition for­
mation. System characteristics can be viewed as institutional features or institutional 
constraints that influence coalition bargaining. Including these particular characteris­
tics o f a country could improve the quality of the general game theoretic coalition 
models. Examples of these characteristics can simply be formal rules such as a size 
requirement for a party, legislative rules, or the manner in which coalition formation 
proceeds in a particular country. Baron (1993) for instance applies a constraint that 
states that after the elections the largest party is allowed to make the first move in 
the formation process. The largest party can try to realize its most preferred coalition 
since it can propose its ‘favourite’ coalition first. Pridham (1986) discusses the influence 
of contextual factors in coalition formation extensively. He states that formal theories1 
“fa il to take account o f  a range o f  variables or determinants o f  coalitional behaviour 
highlighted by studies o f  party systems, where these have pointed towards the problems 
o f  decision-making processes in political parties. They include questions o f  a structural 
and societal nature, a recognition o f  the influence o f  party development or history as 
well as ofinternalparty relationships on political behaviour" (Pridham, 1986, p 2).
Note that historical factors are also important, such as the evaluation of the role 
o f parties as coalition partners based on past experience. Pridham tries to take all 
historical, institutional, motivational, and internal party considerations into 
account, and then builds an inductive theory on coalition formation.
Budge and Keman (1990b) are also interested in constraints and other structur­
al factors that influence coalition formation. They focus on an idea similar to issue- 
ownership (Budge & Farlie, 1983), namely the allocation of ministries to coalition
1 With 'formal theories' Pridham (1986) refers to the other - non-institutional - deductive theories on 
coalition formation.
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partners. Parties have pre-electoral and thus pre-coalitional preferences and alliances 
to particular ministries. In their article, Budge and Keman discuss the relation 
between specific ministries and party families and state that:
“..., parties consolidate their internal negotiating position by responding to the 
demands ofelectoral support groups and ofhistorical ideology and developing substan­
tive preferences for ministries” (Budge & Keman, 1990b, p 180).
In Voters, Parties and Government, Narud (1996) also stresses the occurrence of 
structural constraints and further observes that there are no formal exogenous 
constraints on coalition bargaining in the Netherlands. Informally, the Netherlands 
differs from for instance Norway, because of the extreme proportionality o f the 
D utch system together with the ‘automatic’ demand for majority coalitions. The 
historical tradition o f pacification can be an explanation for the occurrence o f ‘over­
sized’ coalitions.
This new focus on institutional constraints is attractive, but often leads to 
descriptive models of coalition formation. Another new trend in coalition forma­
tion research is the development of a class of multi-dimensional policy-oriented 
theories. These theories incorporate both office and policy motives, but differ from 
the policy-oriented theories presented earlier, because policy or ideological positions 
of parties are presented in a Euclidean metric space, and positions on more than one 
dimension are permitted. In this research, I shall simply refer to multi-dimensional 
policy-oriented coalition formation theories as spatial theories. The merit o f spatial 
theories is that they comply with the notion that parties and voters differ from one 
another on more than one cleavage or issue at the same time.
Policy oriented uni-dimensional theories like Axelrod’s (1970) and De Swaan’s 
(1973) theory will, for reasons of clarity, not be referred to as spatial theories. The 
distinction is that spatial theories use Euclidean distances and thus metric positions 
on their dimensions, whereas uni-dimensional policy-oriented theories apply ordinal 
orderings o f parties on one ideological or policy dimension only.
This research concentrates on coalition formation in the Netherlands. In the 
D utch political system, more than one dimension is necessary to explain political 
competition. In the times o f pacification, or pillarization, running from approxi­
mately 1917 until 1967, life in the Netherlands was organised in five religious and 
ideological ‘pillars’. Political parties were divided along these pillars, as was, in fact, 
the whole o f D utch civil society (Lijphart, 1990). Each pillar had its own schools, 
sports clubs and so forth. The - two-dimensional - division was based on economic 
status and on religious affiliation. The Catholics were organised in the catholic pillar.
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The Protestants were divided into two pillars depending on whether they were 
reformed or not. Furthermore, there were two public - non-religious - pillars, one 
o f them for the (socialist) working class and the other for the (liberal) ‘upper class’. 
So, in the years o f the pillarization, more than one dimension was necessary to 
explain voting behaviour. In the late 1960’s, the system of pillarization evanesced. 
New parties arose and voting behaviour became less predictable. Political competition 
among parties in order to win votes as well as competition during coalition formation 
were affected by new conflicts. Inglehart referred to these ‘new issues’ as post-material 
issues as opposed to the ‘bread and butter’ issues of politics (Inglehart, 1977). More 
issues influencing politics and thus coalition formation suggest that theories that 
can handle more than one ideological or policy dimension are probably more suitable 
than theories that are unable to incorporate multi-dimensional information.
Many spatial theories of coalition formation theories have been developed in the 
last decades. The theories that will be studied in this research will now be introduced. 
All spatial theories share the ‘smallest distance assumption’; this means that parties 
want to be members of a winning coalition that is as close as possible to the position 
o f the party in a multi-dimensional ideology or issue space. However, remarkable 
differences can be found in the way these theories detect which coalition(s) comply 
best with this assumption. These differences are induced by the different solution 
concepts applied by these theories2.
2 It is important to realise that a payoff preference is not the same as a coalition preference. In game 
theoretic models, players strive for the best payoff possible, whereas, in our models of coalition formation, 
we need coalition preferences. The solution concepts in this research aim to predict coalitions and not 
payoffs. Van Deemen (1997, p 6) described this discrepancy between payoff and coalitional preferences 
eloquently: "Coalition formation theories formulated within the game theoretic tradition typically ignore
the preferences of the players for coalitions.....  Game theory starts from the idea that players have
preferences with respect to payoffs and not with respect to coalitions that may be formed in order to 
get as much payoff as possible. Furthermore, the preferences are supposed to be exogenously given. 
Shifting the attention away from payoff towards coalition formation does, by itself, not necessarily lead to 
efforts of constructing theories in which the formation of coalition preferences is essential. The relevance 
of payoff preferences does not necessarily imply the relevance of coalition preferences".
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1. The first theory to be discussed is the Heart Solution. The heart searches for 
median lines in the party configuration and then predicts which coalitions might be 
formed (Schofield, 1993a). In two dimensions, a median line is a line drawn through 
two party positions, for which it holds that either on or to one side of this line, these 
parties comprise a majority. The parties on the median lines that form the heart are 
more powerful than other parties; the theory predicts coalitions that consist o f these 
parties.
2. A second theory focuses on Protocoalition Formation. This theory is a dynamic 
version of the smallest distance hypothesis (Grofman, 1982). Two parties that are 
closest to one another will form a protocoalition. If  these two parties represent a 
majority of the seats in parliament, this coalition is predicted. If not, the next two 
closest parties or a party and the protocoalition - depending on which reciprocal 
combination is closer - can join one another and form a new protocoalition. This 
process o f forming protocoalitions continues until a winning coalition is formed.
3. Another spatial theory that will be discussed is the Winset Theory. This theory 
applies the smallest distance hypothesis, but has a different point of departure than 
the other spatial theories in this research, since parties are here assumed to bargain 
about the distribution o f the main ministerial portfolios (Laver & Shepsle, 1996). The 
space is the jurisdiction space of the state secretaries and therefore bargaining is on 
portfolios instead of more general ideological positions.
4. The fourth spatial theory is the Competitive Solution (McKelvey et. al, 1978). 
This theory starts from the smallest distance hypothesis and selects viable coalitions. 
All sets of winning coalitions are compared one by one. A coalition is viable if there is 
no other coalition for which it is true that all critical players prefer the latter coalition. 
Critical players are players that are members in both coalitions under consideration.
5. The last spatial theory that will be discussed in this study is a new solution 
concept. The Maximal Satisfaction Solution also starts from the smallest distance 
hypothesis. Parties’ preferences are based on distances between parties and coalitions, 
and this solution concept searches for the coalition with the highest collective utility. 
This is innovative, since it is not common to start from a notion o f collective - as 
opposed to individual - preferences.
This last group of theories will be central to this research. In an attempt to clarify 
politics and in particular coalition formation, the main theories from the models 
above will be presented and the cardinal question that will be addressed is whether 
spatial theories perform better than those in the other three classes. In the next section, 
this research question will be elucidated and the main research topics will be intro­
duced. In the last section o f this chapter, the outline of this book will be presented.
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1.2 Research Topics
Many theories on coalition formation - including the theories that will be studied 
here - are modelled within the field of game theory and are ‘formal’-deductive in 
nature. These models are the opposite of so-called inductive models, where universal 
statements are inferred from singular statements, or in other words, where universal 
statements are obtained through ‘learning by experience’. If something happens five 
times, inductive models ‘predict’ that it will also occur the sixth time.
Deductive models work the other way around. Based on (singular) statements, 
conclusions are drawn by means of logical deduction. These conclusions, which are 
also called predictions, are deduced from the theory and can be tested, i.e. falsified. 
The domain of the prediction - the deduced statement - can logically never extend the 
domain of the statement from which it is deduced. A formal theory is a set o f coher­
ent logically derived statements. Empirical science adds to this theory the system of 
experience. Therefore, in an empirical theory - like theories on coalition formation -, 
“it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience” 
(Popper, 1975, p 41).
Game theory is a set of tools used to model strategic interaction and will in this 
research be applied to model coalition formation. In the case of coalition formation, 
the strategic interaction is between political parties attempting to make a binding 
agreement, i.e. to form a coalition. The theory of cooperative games and in particular 
that of coalitional games provides us with a set of elements that facilitates a common 
ground for studying coalition formation.
The latest development in the field of coalition formation is the appearance of 
both institutional theories and spatial theories. Institutional theories mostly add 
formal and informal constraints to the theories on coalition formation rather than 
introducing alternative theories. Since these theories lead to descriptive or inductive 
approaches, they can not easily be compared with other formal theories of coalition 
formation. Moreover, institutional theories are sometimes so descriptive - see 
Section 3.5.1 - that they can hardly be refuted. In this research, the goal is to com­
pare deductive theories of coalition formation that are at least in principle fit to also 
be applied to other multi-party systems. Therefore, emphasis will be put on the 
other recent development in coalition formation, namely the spatial coalition for­
mation theories. The following research question will be addressed in this study:
Do spatial coalition formation theories perform better empirically than non-spatial 
coalition formation theories?
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Naturally, before addressing this question, a thorough theoretical introduction of the 
theories should be given. First, non-spatial theories will be presented and after that, 
spatial theories. The emphasis on spatial theories versus non-spatial theories seems 
to be meaningful. Despite the growing number of spatial theories, this class of theory 
has not been evaluated theoretically or empirically in a systematic way yet. The classes 
of theory that will be examined are the office-seeking theories, the uni-dimensional 
policy-seeking theories, the actor-oriented theories, and the spatial theories.
Note that in this research, uni-dimensional policy oriented theories are not 
included in the class of spatial theories since they do not apply metric Euclidean dis­
tances. Furthermore, even though the aim of this research is to evaluate the different 
classes o f coalition formation theories, obviously individual theories will also receive 
attention.
Popper (1975, p 71) states that formal theories are systems of statements consisting 
of axioms and theorems that meet four fundamental requirements:
* the axioms in the theory should be internally consistent, i.e. free from contradiction,
* the system of axioms should be independent, i.e. no axiom should be deducible from 
other axioms within the theory,
* the set of axioms should be sufficient, i.e. all axioms necessary are in our theory, and
* all axioms should be necessary.
W ith respect to the theoretical part of this research it is sufficient to observe that all 
theories that will be empirically tested, except for De Swaan’s (1973) policy distance 
theory, comply with these requirements. As I said, most institutional theories are 
not formal theories and are thus hard to confront with these requirements. 
Therefore, institutional theories will not be discussed extensively and will not be 
tested empirically. All other theories in this study are formal theories and should 
comply with the requirements above.
The choice of the specific theories studied in this research is further elaborated 
upon in the introduction to the third and fourth chapter. For now, it is sufficient to 
know that not all theories ever created can and will be studied here. For the office- 
and policy-seeking theories the selection is quite straightforward. Those theories are 
selected that have had much impact in the field of coalition formation. The choice 
of spatial theories is more complicated. One important criterion is that the solution 
concepts of the theories should predict coalitions. Theories that indicate policy 
positions o f ‘good’ coalitions, or predict payoff structures, will not be investigated 
in this study.
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An empirical theory can be falsified. Therefore, the research question focuses on 
the empirical testing of the theories. Popper (1975, Ch. 6) also designed criteria for 
testing empirical theories. He distinguishes ‘the degree of falsifiabilitity’ and ‘the degree 
o f compatibility with empirical evidence’. The first criterion takes into account how 
many logically conceivable outcomes are ruled out by the theory. A theory, which is 
highly falsifiable, is considered better than a theory with a lower degree of falsifia- 
bility. But naturally not only the degree of falsifiability informs us about the empirical 
quality. The degree of compatibility with empirical evidence is also of great importance. 
A highly falsifiable theory that always predicts the wrong coalition is not considered 
a ‘good’ theory, and would not be preferred to a less falsifiable theory with perfect 
compatibility to empirical evidence. Both degrees will be measured in the empirical 
part o f this research. For evaluating the empirical quality of a coalition formation 
theory, one of the tools that will be applied is prediction efficiency. W ith this tool, 
both the degree o f falsifiability and the compatibility with empirical evidence are 
measured.
In Popper’s terms, scientific progress is the ongoing process o f testing theories 
whereby ‘bad’ theories are rejected and ‘good’ theories are retained. Popper states 
that once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested it should not be dropped out 
without good reason. “A  good reason may be for instance: replacement ofthe hypothesis 
by another which is better testable; or the falsification ofone ofthe consequences ofthe 
hypothesis” (Popper, 1975, p 54).
Lakatos (1970), a student of Popper’s, also studied rules on the foundation of scien­
tific theories and starts from the following idea: even when a theory is not completely 
compatible with empirical evidence it will not be rejected before another, ‘better’ 
theory emerges. Moreover, unlike Popper, Lakatos allows auxiliary hypotheses that 
improve the existing theory, or in other words, a theory can be saved from ‘disproof’ 
by the formulation of auxiliary hypotheses.
In this context, Lakatos proposes to study ‘research programmes’ and states that 
these programmes are required for scientific growth. A research programme consists of 
a theory together with auxiliary assumptions and a heuristic. Literally: “the negative 
heuristic specifies the ‘hard core’ ofthe programme which is ‘irrefutable’ by the methodo­
logical decision o f  its protagonists; the positive heuristics consists o f  a partially articu­
lated set o f  suggestions or hints on how to change, develop the ‘refutable variants’ ofthe  
research programme, how to modify, sophisticate, the ‘refutable’ protective belt” 
(Lakatos, 1970, p 135).
In this research, Lakatos’ view of science and emphasis on so-called research pro­
grammes and his rules for scientific progress will be followed. This view enables us to 
compare the two groups of empirical theories, the spatial and non-spatial theories
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on coalition formation. In the course of evaluating the theories, attention will be 
drawn to both the degree of falsifiability and the compatibility with empirical evidence 
as defined by Popper. But, instead of replacing ‘bad’ theories that are not completely 
compatible with empirical evidence, we allow some deviance and compare the 
research programmes.
In order to address our research question, which focuses on the empirical testing 
of theories, the empirical range o f this research should be defined. This means 
selecting cases, obtaining data and defining the main concepts such as a political 
party and a coalition.
The ideal setting for testing coalition formation in parliamentary systems is study­
ing all cases o f coalition formation in all multi-party systems. Alternatively, one can 
take a random sample from this set. Even though both options seem good strategies, 
they are problematic because multi-dimensional spatial coalition formation theories 
need data on more than one ideological dimension, and as will be concluded in the 
remainder of this section, this causes difficulties. It goes without saying that for reliable 
testing of the spatial theories, a good data set with policy or ideological positions of 
political parties is necessary.
O ne data set, which seems suitable for this purpose is the Manifesto data set. This 
data set is based on content analysis of party manifestos of political parties in a large 
number of multi-party systems. Content analysis can be defined as “a research technique 
for the objective, systematic and quantitative description o f  the manifest content o f  
communication” (Berelson, 1952, p 18). In the Manifesto data set, party manifestos of 
the main political parties in twenty countries from 1945 until 1988 are analysed. 
Scores on 54 (and later 56) issues - subdivided in seven policy domains - are given. 
The Manifesto data set will be used in this research. The manifestos o f elections 
after 1988, in the Netherlands and other countries, are also analysed and added to 
the original data set.
The types of data and correspondingly the type of data-analysis affect the selec­
tion of cases. The Manifesto coding-scheme results in scores of parties on more than 
fifty issues. Since it is preferable to reduce the number of dimensions (issues), these 
data should be analysed in order to find the party positions on the main ideological 
or policy dimensions. The method for analysing the manifesto data that will be used 
most in this research is multi-dimensional scaling. In general, multi-dimensional 
scaling is a technique that enables a researcher to find a hidden structure in the data. 
In my opinion, data analysis of this kind requires substantial knowledge about the
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political system and the political culture of the countries involved. Therefore, study­
ing all cases or taking a random sample of all possible cases of coalition formation 
available in the Manifesto data set, is problematic. This leads to the decision to 
select only one country for the empirical analysis.
Obviously, the next step is the selection of a particular country. This country 
should be an established stable democracy with a multi-party system. Most Western 
European countries, with the exception of Great Britain where one-party govern­
ments usually rule, satisfy this requirement. The country that will be used for testing 
the theories in this research is the Netherlands. The Netherlands is a stable democracy 
with a multi-party system and also has a high number of effective parties (Laakso & 
Taagepera, 1979). A large amount of effective parties means that the political system 
is rather fragmentised. This makes coalition formation interesting, because many 
combinations of parties can form winning coalitions. The Netherlands is often 
included in empirical research on coalition formation, both in studies where a large 
number of countries are included, as well as in studies with one or a few empirical 
examples (De Swaan, 1973; Van Roozendaal 1992; Browne & Dreijmanis, 1982; 
Schofield, 1993a). Further, the political culture of the Netherlands is characterised by 
Keman (1994) as ‘moderate pluralism with strong fragmentation’; a country with a 
comparatively high number of parties, and by Schofield (1993a) as ‘a fragmented 
system with a strong core party’. Even though the characterisations are not identical, 
both authors regard the Dutch system as open to many bargaining possibilities for 
coalitions, which makes it an interesting case. The last reason for choosing the 
Netherlands is that as a Dutch political scientist I am better acquainted with the 
Dutch political system and its political culture than with the political system and - 
culture o f other countries.
The next decision, namely which coalition formations should be selected, is for 
a great deal determined by the availability of data on party positions. Even though 
coalition formation in the Netherlands can be studied from approximately 1917, 
since at that moment pacification politics start and universal suffrage is on its way, 
the empirical research focuses on cabinet formation after World War II. For spatial 
theories, party positions on more than one dimension are needed. Even though it is 
easy to find data for the power-oriented theories over the 1917-1945 period, there 
are no reliable data on policy positions for these years. Therefore, this period will 
not be included here.
The theories that require most information - spatial theories - set the boundaries 
for the empirical part of this study. The Manifesto data set determines which years 
and which parties will be included in the analysis. The justification for using the
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Manifesto data in this research will be given in Chapter 4. In the empirical confron­
tation of coalition formation theories, coalition formation after World War II will be 
studied, and only parties that are ‘significant’ according to the Manifesto Research 
Group are included in the analysis. Naturally, for the ‘less demanding’ theories, it is 
possible to include more parties and more cabinet formations, but this would not 
be helpful since the aim of this research is not to test as many coalition formations 
as possible, but to compare the different classes of theories. For a fair comparison, 
the same parties and the same coalition formations will be considered for every class 
of theories. This is also the reason for including the classical theories in this research, 
despite the fact that they, unlike spatial theories, have been tested before. Testing all 
theories in this research with the same data and the same parties will lead to a valid 
comparison o f the classes of theories.
The last issue that needs to be addressed is which particular coalitions from the 
period 1946-1999 should be included in the empirical test. Only coalition formation 
directly following general elections will be studied. The coalitions that are formed 
after a breakdown of a cabinet in between elections are not included, because for 
these coalitions the same situation obtains in terms of number of seats of parties and 
their ideological or policy positions. It is not unfair to assume that ideological or 
policy positions might have changed after the breakdown o f the cabinet, but since 
the positions o f the parties will be derived from analysing the manifestos, there are 
no new data available on the positions of parties without elections.
At the time of writing, manifesto data are not yet available for the 1998 coalition 
formation. Therefore, data on policy or ideological dimensions of political parties 
for 1998 had to be obtained in a different manner. A computer-coded content 
analysis of the 1998 party manifestos produces these data.
Unfortunately, in methodological terms, the results of the empirical testing do 
not allow for general conclusions, since only coalition formation in the Netherlands 
is studied. But the results for the Netherlands are of course valuable as such. The 
D utch system is a good case for studying coalition formation and the empirical 
results do provide us with information about the quality o f the different classes of 
coalition formation theories.
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1.3 Plan of the Book
In Chapter 2, the origins of the models on coalition formation will be explained. 
This chapter starts with a description o f game theory and thus with the tool that 
will be used to study coalition formation. Also, models of party competition that 
actually precede coalition formation will be introduced. Bargaining for votes and 
bargaining in order to get into a winning coalition follow similar terms. For 
instance, the parties use their policy or ideological positions in order to receive as 
many votes as possible, and later use these positions in coalitional bargaining. This 
consideration is especially interesting for spatial coalition formation theories, since, 
in this chapter, different kinds of spatial party competition models are introduced.
Chapters 3  and 4  contain the main theoretical contribution of this research. First, 
a classification of coalition formation theories will be presented, and next the theories 
will be studied in consecutive order. In Chapter 3, the first class o f theories that will 
be presented is that of office-seeking theories, followed by uni-dimensional policy- 
seeking theories, actor-oriented theories and subsequently institutional theories. 
The last part of this chapter provides comments on these theories and discusses the 
exclusion of the class of institutional theories, which do not meet the requirements 
for a formal theory, from the empirical research.
The last class of theories, namely spatial theories of coalition formation, will be 
studied in Chapter 4. W ithin this group of theories, a new solution concept called 
the Maximal Satisfaction Solution will be introduced. For this class o f theories, a 
detailed computational example will be provided, since spatial theories are more 
complex than the other theories in this research. Finally, comments on these theo­
ries will be given.
The Dutch political system and the main procedures for coalition formation in 
the Netherlands are discussed at the beginning of Chapter 5. In this context the role 
o f the Queen in the D utch constitutional democracy will also be elaborated on.
Next, the choices that precede the empirical testing are dealt with. Data on party 
positions on more than one ideological or policy position are necessary for a test of 
spatial theories. The data selection procedure and the choice for the Manifesto data 
set will be evaluated, and the Manifesto data set will be compared with other possible 
data sources.
In the following sections, the input for the empirical test - the policy or ideological 
positions of the parties - is obtained. This is quite complex, since the manifesto data 
are not gathered to obtain information about policy positions but about policy
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saliency, which influences the choice for a data reduction method, and also since 
different theories need different kinds of input.
First, party positions are obtained for the largest part of the empirical research by 
multi-dimensional scaling o f the manifesto data. This procedure gives the political 
parties positions on two latent dimensions, and the space will be interpreted by a 
property-fitting method. The party positions on these two dimensions that are 
obtained by multi-dimensional scaling are available for 1945 until 1994, and are 
used for testing all spatial theories except for the Winset theory.
Another data reduction procedure, called Reliability analysis, will be introduced 
next. The W inset theory requires party positions on specific dimensions, i.e. the 
dimensions representing ministerial portfolios. The positions on the latent dimen­
sions that are obtained by multi-dimensional scaling do not fit the policy fields 
represented by the main portfolios. Therefore, reliability analysis will be used to 
create scales that do represent the jurisdictions o f the portfolios.
In order to test the last case of coalition formation in the Netherlands, the 1998 
formation, new data are needed. The manifesto data set for that year was not yet 
available for which reason the introduction o f another source of data became neces­
sary. So, for this year, word lists were constructed and a computer-coded content 
analysis of the 1998 manifestos performed.
At the end of this chapter, data on policy positions of parties - or more correctly 
party positions on latent dimensions based on policy scores - are available and the 
empirical comparison o f the different classes of theories can start.
The research question, which is do spatial theories empirically outperform non- 
spatial coalition formation theories, will be addressed in Chapter 6. The greater part 
o f this chapter will be devoted to simply computing which coalition(s) would be 
predicted by the theory under consideration and comparing this prediction with the 
empirical evidence, i.e. the coalition that was actually formed. This leads to a success 
rate for every theory, viz. the number of times that the coalition formation theory 
predicts the correct coalition divided by the total number o f cases. The total number 
of cases is the number of coalition formations that are tested in this research. This does 
provide information about the compatibility of the theories with empirical evidence, 
but it does not deal with the degree of falsifiability.
For this reason, the prediction efficiency o f the theories will also be computed. 
The prediction efficiency measures the number of times that a coalition is correctly 
predicted, divided by the total number o f predicted coalitions by a specific theory. 
Note that the number of predicted coalitions is often higher than the number of 
coalition formations, since many coalition formation theories predict a set of coalitions.
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This measurement tool combines the degree of falsifiability with the degree of 
compatibility with empirical evidence. Still, both measurement tools are rather 
descriptive and, since it would also be interesting to find out whether the theories 
perform better than a random chance distribution of possible coalitions, another 
statistical test will be done. This test is based on simulations of coalition formation. 
The null hypothesis states that the probability based on simulation predicts the same 
number o f historical, i.e. correct, coalitions as the theory. The chance probability in 
the simulation model is the chance that a theory would predict correctly; it is the 
number of predicted coalitions divided by the number of possible winning coalitions. 
The alternative hypothesis states that the number of historical coalitions selected by 
the theory is higher than that of probability selection. Naturally, it should be the case 
that coalition formation theories with a high success-rate and prediction efficiency 
more often reject the null hypothesis.
In the final chapter of this study, first a summary will be given, followed by the 
conclusions. There, the question ‘Do spatial coalition formation theories perform 
better empirically than non-spatial coalition formation theories’ will be answered. 
After having dealt with this question, I shall briefly discuss the contribution o f this 
research to the field of political science and add suggestions for further research.
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2.1 Introduction
The theory of games is a set of formal analytical tools that can help us understand 
conflict of interest. Any kind of decision-making based on strategic interaction can 
be studied with game theory. W hether this interaction is economical, for instance: 
what price should I ask for my goods and how much can I sell for this price, or 
political, whom should I vote for, does not matter. The main idea is that we have 
individuals who make decisions in a strategic environment. The theory of games 
will be presented in the first section of this chapter. In this section, also the main 
assumption o f game theory, which is individual rationality, will be introduced. 
Next, the difference between cooperative- and non-cooperative games is discussed. 
After that, spatial voting games will be introduced. These spatial voting games will 
be used in Chapter 4 to study spatial theories of coalition formation.
Spatial theories of coalition formation are based on a spatial notion of party 
competition. Party competition precedes cabinet formation. O ne model o f party 
competition, known as the Michigan School, focuses on party identification (Butler & 
Stokes, 1974; Campbell, et al., 1960). In this model, mostly individual characteristics 
of the voters such as social class are explanatory for party identification and thus 
voting behaviour. Another model o f party competition forms the foundation for 
spatial theories of coalition formation. This spatial model of party competition is 
based on issue preferences or ideological preferences of the voters and the positions 
of parties. The first contributor to the spatial theory of voting - although from an 
economic perspective - was Hotelling (1929), who developed a theory on spatial 
competition. Downs (1957) and Black (1958) translated this spatial competition 
concept into politics. The history and main assumptions of the classical spatial theory 
of voting will be presented in the third section.
Thinking ‘spatially’ has not ended in 1958; new findings and alternative spatial 
models have been developed and will be presented in Section 2.3. The most important 
deviation from the classical model is the directional model. In the classical model, 
voters choose and parties compete in terms of Euclidean distance, whereas in the 
directional model the direction of a policy position and the intensity of this position 
determine the competition. This and a second alternative model - the linkage model
- will be presented in Section 2.3.2.
In the fourth and last section a short summary of this chapter will be given.
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Starting point of and most famous research on game theory is the ‘Theory o f  
Games and Economic Behavior’. Von Neumann and Morgenstern set down the roots 
for game theory in this work in 1944. Game theory models strategic interaction 
between individuals. A game consists of players that have to make choices based on 
preferences over possible outcomes. The strategic interaction refers to the fact that 
what is best for player A may depend on the action of player B. Consider for 
instance the sale of a car. The salesman wants the highest price possible; the potential 
buyer wants the car for the lowest price possible, has no information about what 
other potential buyers are willing to pay, and could bid too little, ending up without 
the car she wants. A political party drawing up a programme can be described as a 
political game. The party wants as many voters as possible but is in strategic inter­
action with other parties, and like other parties, does not know what voters will do. 
A ‘real’ parlour game like Poker can also be modelled with game theory.
Luce and Raiffa (1957, p 5) state that a game consists o f the following elements: 
“There are n players each o f  whom is required to make one choice from  a well defined 
set ofpossible choices, and these choices are made without any knowledge as to the choices 
ofthe other players. Given the choices o f  each ofthe players, there is a certain resulting 
outcome, which is appraised by each ofthe players according to his own peculiar tastes 
and preferences”.
A player in game theory can be any kind o f actor; a person, a multinational coope­
ration, a political party or a state. In this research on coalition formation, the actors 
are political parties that strategically interact with each other. These parties are 
considered to be unitary actors. Furthermore, in game theoretic modelling an actor 
is required to act rationally. This covers two demands: first that actors should be able 
to order their (individual) preferences, and secondly that they should be able to behave 
in such a way that their actions lead to the best possible outcome according to their 
(individual) preferences. In order to comply with the first element - that of individual 
rationality - the preference ordering of a player should be complete and transitive. 
Complete means that all relevant alternatives should be ordered, and transitive means 
that if a player prefers alternative A to B, and B to C, he or she must also prefer A to 
C. The second element is also referred to as utility maximising: an actor should, accor­
ding to his or her own preferences, choose the option that is most likely to produce the 
best possible outcome, i.e. highest utility. This pattern o f purposeful behaviour, i.e. 
rationality, is dealt with extensively in the second chapter of An Introduction to 
Positive Political Theory (Riker & Ordeshook, 1973). Finally, note that rationality is not 
the same as egoistic behaviour. A player can act perfectly rational while intentionally 
following altruistic motives, since an altruistic goal can also maximise a player’s utility.
2.2 Game Theory and the Spatial Voting Game
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Game theoretical modelling starts with a description of the game wherein players’ 
preferences for the outcomes and possible actions are determined. The second part 
is the predictive part o f the game. Here, the maximising utility assumption is 
applied and the actual solution o f the game can be found. As we will see in the next 
chapter, maximising utility can be interpreted in different manners and therefore a 
game can be solved with several solution concepts.
An important distinction in game theory is that between decision making in 
which players can or cannot make binding agreements. In the latter case we speak 
about non-cooperative game theory. The examples of buying a car and the well- 
known Prisoner’s Dilemma1 are non-cooperative games. Coalition formation and 
the games on which they are based lie within the field of cooperative game theory. 
Players in a coalition make binding agreements about governing together. Since the 
object of research in this work is coalition formation, cooperative game theory and 
more in particular the coalitional games will be modelled in the remainder o f this 
section.
Coalitional Games
In game theory, cooperative games - the games that allow binding agreements - 
deal with payoff structures. This means that these theories study what individual 
players gain when joining a coalition. Coalitional games study coalition formation 
within the context of cooperative game theory, but add assumptions about the pre­
diction of coalitions. These coalitional games are central in our study. A coalitional 
game consists of two stages. In the first, descriptive stage, there is a profile of a player’s 
preferences over the set o f all possible outcomes. The second predictive stage leads 
to the outcome of a coalitional game, which is a specification of the coalition that 
will be formed and its possible actions (Osborne & Rubenstein, 1994).
Formally, a coalitional game is an ordered pair (N, v), where N is a non-empty 
set o f players and where v is a mapping that assigns a real number to each subset,
i.e. a coalition, o f N. This function v is called a characteristic function. The real 
number assigned to a coalition S  is called the value of S, v (S) (Aumann, 1989). The 
theory on simple games is defined by Von Neumann and Morgenstern within the 
framework of n-person game theory. A game is called a simple game if the worth of 
a coalition is restricted to {0,1}. Formally: v (N) —> {0,1}. Note that a list of symbols 
and abbreviations can be found in appendix K.
1 The famous prisoner's dilemma is an example of a two-person non-cooperative game and is treated in 
almost any game theory book. It can also be found in Games and Decisions (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, p 95).
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A characteristic function, v, satisfies the following two axioms:
1) v (0 )  = 0; the value o f an empty coalition - a coalition without members - is zero.
2) v (S c  T) > v (S) + v (T) i f  S D  T  = 0 ;  the coalition of any two disjoint coalitions 
has at least the same value as the value o f the two separate coalitions together.
For an essential game it must be true that at least for one combination of S  and T, 
the value o f the join must be larger than the separate values.
A simple game can be represented by the ordered pair G = (N, W) where W  is the 
set of winning coalitions; W  = {S j v (S) =1}. Any subset S  of N is called a coalition. 
The subset o f players from N  that are not in S, is called the complement of coali­
tion S. Coalitional solution concepts are used in order to predict a set of coalitions 
from the set of winning coalitions2. This prediction set is the solution of the game. 
For each simple game G = (N, W) it is supposed that W  satisfies the following 
assumptions:
1. Monotonicity: if S c  T  and S e  W, then T e  W, that is, any coalition that 
includes a winning coalition is itself winning. This proceeds from the criterion of 
super-additivity: a winning coalition cannot become losing by adding new members 
to that coalition (Rapoport, 1970).
2. Non-triviality: W C 0  and 0  £  W; this condition excludes trivial games. It states 
that there are winning coalitions and that an empty coalition cannot be winning 
(Rapoport, 1970).
Simple games can be further characterised by the following properties. Consider 
a game with N  players and coalition S: we refer to the group o f players that are not 
included in S  but are in N, as the complement of coalition S  (denoted as Sc ). Games 
in which the complement of every winning coalition is losing are proper games. In 
a proper game, every pair of winning coalitions has at least one player in common. 
A game is called strong if the complement o f every losing coalition is winning. I f  this 
is not the case, it is a weak game, which means that the complement of a losing 
coalition can be losing. Such a coalition is called blocking and can obstruct the for­
mation of a winning coalition. A game is called decisive if it is both proper and 
strong (Van Deemen, 1991). These characterisations will be used for the existence 
theorems in the actor-oriented coalition formation theories: the dominant- and centre 
player in Section 3.4.
2 Note that these coalitional solution concepts predict coalitions and not, like many other game theore­
tical solution concepts, pay-off vectors.
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A special kind of simple game with many applications to politics, for instance 
cabinet formation, is the weighted majority game. A weighted majority game is a simple 
game in which a weight is assigned to each player and in which a quota determines 
when a coalition becomes winning. A weighted majority game can be represented 
by the N+1 tuple [q; w1, w2 , ..., w n], where wi for N  = {1,2, ..., n } represents the 
weight o f player i, and q denotes the quota. The number of players is finite and runs 
from 1 to n. A coalition S  in a weighted majority game is winning if and only if 
X ie S wi > q (Shapley, 1962). If every player holds the same weight, this is called a 
symmetric (weighted majority) game.
Since the aim of this research is to compare spatial and non-spatial coalition 
formation theories, we should also define spatial simple games. A simple game is 
well equipped to model an office-driven coalition formation theory since in this kind 
of theory only information about the weight o f the players is needed. However, in 
spatial theories of coalition formation, preferences of players are based on the distances 
between the players and the possible coalitions; we therefore need to extend the simple 
game into a spatial game.
A spatial voting game is a simple game together with a set o f points, xi in an 
m-dimensional Euclidean space. This space is the set of policy positions that might 
be taken by a player. Spatial voting games are denoted by (N,W,RM), whereby m is 
the number of dimensions of the policy space. In this research we study coalition 
formation in spatial games with m > 2, for which reason these spatial games should 
be modelled.
A distinction can be made between ideology and policy. I refer to a space as 
ideological if the dimensions consist of coherent groups of issues that together form an 
idea about how society should be constructed and evaluated (Hinich & Munger, 1994). 
Otherwise, if the issues are not so linked, the space is a policy space. The definition 
and interpretation of ideology and policy spaces - introduced in the previous chapter - 
is further elucidated in Chapter 5.
Furthermore, in a spatial game a point x  e  RM is interpreted as a policy bundle in 
an m-dimensional space. It is assumed that each player has an ideal point, xi in RM, 
also known as his or her bliss point, which represents that player’s most preferred 
position in the policy (or ideology) space. Utility is defined in terms o f distance, d, 
from the ideal point. Let || (xS - Xt ) || denote the Euclidean distance between the 
coalitional ideal points xS and Xt . Note that we use a capital letter if we refer to the 
positions of multi-party coalitions. The Euclidean distance between the coalitional 
policy positions xS = (xS1, xS2,...,xSm)  and Xt  = (xT1, Xt2,...,xTm)  is defined as follows:
j| (xS - x T)  j| = V ( (xS1 - x T1)  2 + (xS2 - x T2) 2 +...+ (xSm - x Tm) 2).
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In the descriptive part of spatial coalitional games, where the players’ preferences 
are determined, we take the distances between the players’ preferred position and the 
coalition positions into account. A player i prefers a coalition with the expected 
policy position xS to a coalition with the expected policy position x t  if and only if 
the distance between the player’s preferred policy position, x±, and xS is smaller than 
the distance between xi and Xt  . This is called a Euclidean preference and can also be 
written as follows: a player i prefers xS to Xt  if and only if || xS - xi || < y Xt  - x± || 
The greater the Euclidean distance between a policy position and a player’s bliss 
point, the less he or she prefers that point.
We will see that most spatial theories of coalition formation are fairly similar in 
the descriptive part of the theory. However, similar preference profiles will lead to 
different coalition predictions because of significant differences between the predictive 
parts of the theories.
In summary, coalition formation can be modelled as a simple game or as a spatial 
simple game. In the spatial voting game, preferences of the players are based on dis­
tances. The preferences of players for coalitions are determined in the descriptive 
part of a coalition formation theory. In the predictive part of the theory, solution 
concepts are applied that predict a coalition or a set o f coalitions as the outcome of 
a game (De Vries, 1998).
2.3 Spatial Modelling
Party competition models have inspired theories of coalition formation. I shall 
illustrate in this section that spatial theories on coalition formation are all based on 
the classical model of party competition. In order to present the relation between 
spatial party competition models and spatial theories on coalition formation, the 
classical spatial party competition model and two alternatives will be introduced in 
this section.
The most influential model starts from the smallest distance hypothesis. We 
again assume the actors to behave rationally. Furthermore, we assume that political 
parties are driven by a desire to win as many votes as possible, and that voters are 
driven by a wish to select the party that is as close to them as possible on an ideolo­
gical scale. In a two-party system, this leads to convergence o f the parties towards 
the middle of the distribution of the voters. In a multi-party system, the behaviour of 
the parties can be both converging and diverging but the goal is still to gain as many 
votes as possible (Downs, 1957). After discussing the classical smallest distance 
model, alternatives to this model will be studied. The first and most famous alternative 
to the classical model is the ‘directional model’ (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989). In
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this type o f model the voters are not searching for the closest possible party, but are 
motivated by both the direction of their preferences - am I in favour o f or against 
this particular issue - and the intensity of their preference. The next alternative that 
I shall present is the linkage model, which emphasises the relation between ideology 
and policy positions and then applies the ‘smallest distance hypothesis’ (Enelow & 
Hinich, 1984).
2.3.1 Classical Spatial Model
Hotelling (1929) was the first academic - as far as I know - to discover the beneficial 
position o f the middle in spatial analysis. He did so when he studied the location of 
firms from an economic point of view. In an imaginary world with potential customers 
distributed along the “M ain Street in a town or a transcontinental railroad", a firm 
is likely to have most possible customers if it were positioned right in the middle of its 
customers (Hotelling, 1929, p 45). Even though Hotelling was an economist writing 
in an economic journal, he refers to applications of this spatial model to politics: 
“each party strives to make its platform as much like the other’s as possible. Any radical 
departure would lose many votes, even though it might lead to stronger commendation 
o f  the party by some who would vote for it anyhow" (Hotelling, 1929, p 54). If  we 
would position all voters on one line this platform is located in the middle o f all 
voters.
Both Downs (1957) and Black (1958) have explained voting and party competition 
from this perspective. The starting point in their models is that the political system 
can be represented by one left-right ideological dimension. This dimension is used 
by voters as well as candidates to determine their choices. Black (1958) explains that 
the best place for a party to be located on the ideological dimension is at the median 
position. He proves that the median position cannot lose in a majority contest and 
provides us with a formal definition of the median voter result in which the members’ 
optima are denoted by O 1 , O 2 , ...On and n denotes the number of members in the 
committee.
“When there are n members in a committee, all o f  whose [preference] curves are sin­
gle peaked, and n is odd, the value O1/2  (n + 1) can get at least a simple majority against 
any other, and it is the only value that can do so" (Black, 1958, p 16).
In order for the median voter result to hold, some properties must be met (Hinich 
& Munger, 1994). The first is that the underlying dimension must be uni-dimensional. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the voters or members in a committee reveal their 
sincere preferences and vote accordingly. Also important are the properties of single­
peakedness and symmetry. These determine the link between preferences, utility
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and closeness. A single-peaked preference implies that each member likes new pro­
posals more, the closer they are to her ideal point. Symmetry implies that deviations 
from the ideal point in opposite directions are evaluated equally (ibid.).
Downs’s model of party competition translates Black’s median voter result into 
an economic model of party competition. The preferences o f the voters should still 
be single-peaked and symmetrical. He also assumes an uni-dimensional continuum, 
in this case a left-right dimension representing the extent of state interference in the 
economy. The parties strive to maximise their utility by means of getting as many 
votes as possible. The voters choose the closest party on the dimension, provided 
that the party is reliable.
Briefly, the most important behavioural assumptions applied in the classical spatial 
model3 are:
- in order to maximise utility, the voter will choose from all possible alternatives that 
candidate or party whose expected policy is closest to the voter’s own desires. Voting 
behaviour is thus based on ideology or policy, which leads to choosing the closest 
party. Note that the voting behaviour is to a lesser extent also based on past record of 
the parties, which means that the party should also be reliable. The voter reaches maxi­
mal utility if a responsible candidate has policy views that are identical to the voter’s.
- parties are unitary actors; literally Downs declares that “every member ofthe team 
[party] has exactly the same goals as every other" (Downs, 1957, p 25).
- parties are vote-maximisers, i.e. parties are office seeking actors: “every government’s 
goal is to be re-elected" (Downs, 1957, p 13).
- parties, if necessary, modify their ideological position in order to gain as many 
votes as possible.
In a two-party system these assumptions lead to parties converging on the one 
dimension. The parties both want to hold the median voter position and therefore 
converge to the median, but still do not become completely identical out of fear of 
losing the more extremist voters. This leads to the same equilibrium Black described 
in his Theory o f  Committees and Elections.
3 The classical spatial model is also referred to as - the smallest distance model, - the proximity model, 
or - the Downsian model.
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In a multi-party system the parties and the voters have identical motives as in the 
two-party model, but they can lead to different patterns o f behaviour. In this kind 
of system it is more difficult to choose an effective strategy. Usually ideologies are 
more sharply defined in a multi-party system, which leads to diverging positions of 
the parties, but converging movements towards the median voter can also be 
observed. The explanation for this is that parties want to be dissimilar in order to 
receive as many votes as possible, and at the same time want to be attractive coalition 
partners, for which reason they cannot take too extreme positions. Moreover, 
Downs states that during elections in a multi-party system all parties try to be as 
ambiguous as possible about their willingness to compromise as they enter various 
coalitions. A multi-party system is also more complicated for voters; if their 
favourite party has a reasonable chance of winning they will vote for it, if this is not 
the case, the voter should act strategically and either vote for another party or 
abstain.
The role of uncertainty and information costs is often neglected when Downs’s 
theory is studied. Parties are often unsure about where the voters are positioned on 
the ideological dimension, as are voters about parties’. More knowledge would make 
decision-making more rational, but whether or not politicians or voters attempt to 
reduce this uncertainty depends on the information costs. It might for instance be 
rational for voters to abstain if the uncertainty is high and if reducing uncertainty 
is costly. The role o f ideology in this model can be portrayed as a mechanism to 
reduce information costs. For the voter, ideology makes selecting the ‘best’ party 
easier, which means that less information is needed to determine which party is closest 
to one’s own position. Communicating through ideology is also cheaper for parties. 
Parties will rather use ideology as a shortcut than verbalise and present all their policy 
preferences to the voters. The other side o f the same coin is that in a multi-party 
system, parties want to become coalition members. Due to their only using ideology, 
and thus not stating their precise preferences on all issues, they can disguise possible 
differences and thereby enhance their chances of getting into government.
Although the median voter result and thus the smallest distance hypothesis are 
important contributions to the theory on party competition, I have some doubts 
about their applicability. My main concern is that in the Economic Theory o f  
Democracy Downs assumes that parties can move freely in the uni-dimensional 
space. In my opinion, if a party would change its position in the ideological space 
in order to increase its share o f the vote, this would in reality be likely to cause a 
party credibility problems. My second consideration concerns an underlying 
assumption of the equilibrium concept. The median voter result is not an accurate
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tool to analyse politics once the number of ideological dimensions exceeds one. The 
median voter in a more than one-dimensional space exists only under harsh sym­
metry conditions (Plott, 1973).
The median voter result is, then, not applicable to more than one dimension. 
This does not imply that the behavioural assumptions of the Downsian model are 
incorrect or irrelevant. Similar assumptions, like preferences of parties for the closest 
possible coalition, are translated into spatial coalition formation theories, but in the 
predictive parts of the theories different equilibrium notions are introduced. In terms 
o f the measurement of distance between voters and parties or parties and coalitions, 
models based on the classical model usually apply squared Euclidean distance. This 
can be either based on one ideological dimension as in Downs’ research, but it can 
also be based on multiple policy issues. For the definition of Euclidean distance, I 
refer to the previous section.
Robertson (1976) has studied Downs’s model extensively and discusses the 
following three ‘missing elements’:
I. Actors: the assumption that parties are unified teams with no commitment to 
ideology but to getting elected is unrealistic. A party needs resources and therefore 
credibility. A sponsoring organisation or person may want a direct reward (jobs, 
a government contract) or a promise on the adoption of some specific policy. In 
short, the party’s strategy is constrained by the need to optimise both “member­
ship (sponsorship)” and voters. This dependency constrains the party and thus 
inhibits the so-called free movement on the ideological dimension by the party.
II. Constitutional constraints: in a country with multiple constituencies, one party 
can hold different opinions on policy proposals in order to win in different 
constituencies. Therefore, the party cannot be regarded as a unitary actor.
III. Voter: the choice of a voter does not only depend on the ideological position of 
a party, but also on the responsibility and reliability of the party, which can be 
evaluated by past behaviour. This makes determining the voting strategy compli­
cated, since a voter might prefer one party’s policy position but another party’s 
credibility.
As I stated earlier, I agree with the first point, namely that the mobility of the 
parties to move along the dimension is constrained. This could, among other 
things, - as Robertson noted - very well be caused by a trade-off between getting as 
many members and as many votes as possible.
Budge and Farlie (1977) - in their review of the Downsian model - also discuss 
the assumption of the party as a unitary actor. I agree with their empirical evidence, 
which shows that parties are not unitary actors, as well as with Robertson (1976)
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who analysed different levels o f elections - national and constituency - and argued 
that parties can not be regarded as unitary actors. Yet, the multiple constituency 
argument is not relevant for our research, since it studies coalition formation in the 
Netherlands, which is a one-constituency party system. Even though the other 
arguments about factions within political parties may hold for the Netherlands, I 
will for sake of clarity (which was also Downs’ motivation) view a political party as 
a unitary actor in the remainder o f this research.
Robertson’s last point about the past behaviour o f politicians is in my opinion not 
a missing element in the Economic Theory o f  Democracy. Downs argued that voters 
select their party based on the ideology as well as the responsibility and reliability of 
the party (Downs, 1957, p 105). Parties are therefore relative immobile and conflicts of 
interest can arise between maintaining ideological purity and winning the elections.
W hat is most interesting in Robertson’s review is not the list of ‘missing elements’ 
in Downs’ model, but his description of different mechanisms for ‘safe seats’ and 
‘marginal’ seats. Some voters are in a position where a party can be sure of their vote, 
and others are in a position where they need to be persuaded. In order to ‘win’ 
marginal seats the parties might slightly change their policy positions towards these 
voters. Finally, Robertson (1976) compares the party-identifier voter model with the 
rational economic voter model. Even though he states that ‘strong party identifiers 
are seldom attached to the ‘wrong’party in terms o f  social class’ [read in terms of their 
ideological preferences], he does not believe that these two models can be combined 
(Robertson, 1976, p 181). In the Downsian spatial model, the rational voter should 
be able to adjust his voting behaviour to moving party positions, which can lead to a 
‘new’ party identification. One cannot simultaneously rely on competition for the vote 
maximising point on the ideological dimension and thus allow voters to move from 
party to party, and believe that a voter’s preference depends on his party identification. 
So, a synergy of these models seems problematic.
In Information Participation and Choice, edited by Grofman in 1995, Downs 
reminisces on the origin of his Economic Theory o f  Democracy. The roots of the idea 
for the ‘Economic Theory’ lie in Schumpeters Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(Schumpeter, 1976; first edition 1942). The economic motivation o f politicians is 
formulated by Schumpeter as follows: even in a socialist organisation o f democracy 
a politician can say that “What businessman do not understand is that exactly as they 
are dealing in oil so am I  dealing in votes" (Schumpeter, 1976, p 285). Downs follows 
Schumpeter and argues that the main personal motivation for a politician is to 
“get elected and remain in power so as to enjoy the perquisites and privileges o f  office as 
long as possible" (Downs, 1995, p 197). Downs thus believes that politicians have
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predominantly personal and not policy motives when getting elected, and also that 
the voters are often not well informed about policy after the elections. Downs refers 
to this as “ voters who are rationally ignorant o f  government affairs” (Downs, 1995, p 
199). The reason for this is that it is costly - and probably not worthwhile - to keep 
oneself informed about government policy. Most exciting in Downs’s retrospect is 
that he declares that he finds the way information costs and thus uncertainty are 
treated in his book are the most important contribution to the economic literature 
and not the spatial analysis of parties, even though the latter became more famous.
In conclusion, the classical spatial or Downsian model is one of the models of 
party competition that can influence and has influenced or inspired theories of cabinet 
formation. In this model, the voters are utility maximising actors who choose a 
party based on the ‘smallest distance hypothesis’. In the spatial coalition formation 
theories investigated here, the ‘smallest distance hypothesis’ is translated to parties 
and coalitions. A party will prefer the coalition with the closest ideological or policy 
position. In the remainder o f this chapter, alternative models will be studied.
2.3.2 Alternative Models
As described in the previous section, voters in Downs’s model choose the candidate 
closest to them in terms o f distance in an m-dimensional issue space. In this section 
two important alternatives will be studied: the directional theory and the linkage 
theory.
Directional Model
The intuition at the basis of the directional theory is that voters do not have clear 
preferences on policies but rather have a general idea about the direction they prefer 
a policy issue to develop into. This direction is defined relative to some neutral 
point on the policy dimension. People can, for instance be in favour of or against a 
state-subsidised health care programme.
An important paper dealing with the directional theory is ‘A Directional Theory 
o f Issue Voting’ by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989). The main difference 
between the classical proximity model and the direction model is in the information 
that the theories suggest the voters are able to ingest. In the Downsian proximity 
model a voter should judge whether a candidate’s policy position on an issue lies 
close to her own preferred position - and how close compared to other positions -, 
whereas in the directional model a voter should decide the following:
* Are you - i.e. the candidate or party - on my side?
* How strong do I feel about this issue?
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In the directional model then, issues are characterised by two components: direction 
and intensity. Besides the fact that advocates of the directional theory suggest that 
this theory demands less cognitive abilities of the voters, another argument in favour 
of the directional theory is that in many surveys - for instance the American National 
Election Studies (NES) or the Dutch Election Studies (NKO) - the questions are 
‘directionally’ formulated. The essential format of questions in these surveys is to 
state a position on an issue and then ask respondents whether they strongly agree, 
agree, are not sure, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement. This implies a 
positive, neutral or negative stand on the issue , and if respondents are strongly in 
favour of or against this statement it measures intensity. Especially in fixed seven- 
point issue scales the direction and intensity can be measured well. However, note 
that in the proximity theory the centre is a real policy alternative, in contrast to the 
directional theory where the centre position reflects neutrality.
In the classical model, the voter determines the distance between her own and 
the candidate’s ideological position. This can also be done with a number o f policy 
positions. It is important that we assume that voters have knowledge about their own 
and the candidate’s positions, and that voters are able to determine the distances. As 
described in the second section of this chapter, Euclidean distance is used to measure 
for which party a voter should choose or for which coalition a party should opt, 
based on their preferences. In order to explicate the directional theory a numerical 
Figure 2.1 example will be presented, which is similar to the computation example in Hinich
D irec tiona l r  r  r  r
M odel and Munger (1997, p 185).
D irectio n al M odel
income differences 
should become larger
region of acceptability
income differences 
should become smaller
5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5
X C X A X i 1r X B
neutral point
Suppose the line above represents an issue on income differences. The point -5 
on the scale represents ‘differences should grow’, 0 is ‘keep the same level’, i.e. the 
status quo, and +5 is ‘differences should become less’. Suppose further, that we have
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three fictitious candidates, A, B, and C, with positions on the scale above, and suppose 
that we know voter i’s position, denoted as Xi. Let us consider the voter who must 
decide which candidate to support. First, she judges which candidate(s) are on the 
same side and then she studies the intensity of the candidate’s positions. Candidates A 
and C are on the same side as the voter, to the left of the neutral point, and candidate 
B is on the opposite side.
According to the directional model, the evaluation of the candidates by the voter is 
done by the following formula: (XP - SQ) X (Xj - SQ). The position of the candidate 
is denoted by XP. If  the status quo is the neutral point 0, it can be removed from 
the formula, if not, we should subtract the SQ.
If the voter and the candidate are on the same side of the S Q  the evaluation will be 
positive. The sign o f the evaluation determines the direction, and the magnitude of 
the product determines the intensity. So in our example the candidates are evaluated 
as follows:
Candidate A: (-4) X (-1) = 4 
Candidate B: ( 1) X (-1) = -1 
Candidate C: (-5) X (-1) = 5
According to the directional model, the higher the score the better. In our example 
the voter, i would like C most, and A more than B. The Downsian proximity model 
would predict that voter i prefers candidate B since this candidate is closest to i. 
Candidate A would then be secondly in i’s preference order and C last. Note that 
in Figure 2.1 a line, representing the ‘region of acceptability’, is introduced. 
(Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989). Even though a voter prefers the candidate who takes 
a strong stand on the side of the issues that she favours, the provision is made that 
the position o f the candidate should be realistic. In other words, the voter should 
perceive the position o f the candidate as responsible. This provision is introduced 
to ‘save’ the model from the absurdities to which the notion the more extreme the 
better might lead. So according to Figure 2.1 the position of candidate C lies outside 
the region of acceptability. The penalty for this candidate is that she is no longer a 
possible winner. In this version of the directional theory, where candidates who are too 
radical are penalised, the following preference order can be found: voter i prefers A to B.
The different models have different implications. In the proximity theory - see 
previous section - there is a pressure in the model favouring convergence of com­
peting alternatives towards the centre o f the voter distribution, i.e. the median voter 
result. Even if we assume that convergence to the median also holds in the directional 
theory, this leads to a candidate who takes a strong stand on the side that the median 
voter prefers, provided that this candidate is considered a responsible candidate.
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Hence, since in the directional model candidates must take relatively strong stands 
on issues to generate support, it can lead to relative extreme positions.
Complete piles of articles have been published evaluating the classical Downsian 
and the Directional models. It is striking to learn that most discussions focus on 
empirical results and not on theoretical arguments.
A theoretical argument in favour of the directional model, voiced among others by 
Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) is that the directional model is less demanding 
for the voter. Determining whether a candidate is on the same side and whether this 
candidate is responsible is said to be less cognitively demanding than determining 
the ‘precise’ distance between voter and candidate. Westholm (1997, p 879) contra­
dicts this since in his opinion voters do not perceive issues as ‘black and white”, but 
can at least distinguish some shades of grey. The idea of the centre being some kind of 
neutral point is moreover, at least problematic. W hat if, on a seven-point scale, 1 would 
denote ‘keep income differences as they are’, and 7 ‘lower the income differences’. 
Where would the neutral point be? This may sound annoying, but quite a lot of scales 
in surveys are similar to this one. Moreover, Westholm continues, the directional 
model is hard to falsify since the region of acceptability is determined empirically, 
and will therefore never contradict the results. A candidate with a lot of support will 
not be found - or in his point o f view will not be given a position - outside the 
‘region of acceptability’.
In 1997, the Journal o f  Theoretical Politics devoted an entire issue on these models. 
Advocates of the proximity theory and of new mixed models went into discussion 
with the most important defenders of the directional model (Macdonald, Rabinowitz 
and Listhaug). I shall briefly sum up the main arguments, insofar they differ from the 
argumentation above. An interested reader is referred to the journal for the complete 
debate. An important and often recurring issue is that of ‘rationalisation’, which means 
that voters are inclined to wishful thinking and hence believe positions of the parties 
they like to lie closer to their own position than they do in reality. It is common to 
determine the distance between voters and parties on the basis of the mean placement 
of the party positions by all respondents. Gilljam (1997) proposes that distance 
should instead be measured on the basis of the position of the party as perceived by 
the individual voter under consideration. Macdonald et al. dispute this idea and state 
that the proximity and directional models can only be analysed appropriately using 
an objective measure of party position, not a measure that is idiosyncratic to each 
voter (Macdonald et al, 1997, p 19). Gilljam also provided some empirical evidence to 
demonstrate that with an idiosyncratic measurement of party positions, the proxi­
mity model ‘beats’ the directional model, contrary to what Macdonald et al. argued.
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Merrill and Grofman (1997, p 44) continue with a proposal for a mixed model 
and further suggest that the support for the incumbent party is probably well 
explained by the classical model, whereas for a mixed model could have higher 
explanatory value for the challenger’s support. Literally: “The modelling o f  voter 
choice as reflecting some combination o f  proximity, directionality and perhaps also 
intensity effects, as well as the incorporation o f  Grofmans (1985) idea o f  discounting 
into a unified spatial framework, offers, we believe, an important theoretical extension o f 
the existing literature on formal models o f  voter choice. ... On the empirical side, ..., it 
appears quite clear that voter’s utilities have both directional and proximity components 
and that intensity plays a role for challengers but probably not for incumbents” (Merrill 
& Grofman 1997, p 44).
The discussion on projection of the voters, i.e. voters’ belief that the parties they 
like are close to them, is eloquently summarised by Pierce (Pierce, 1997, p 65). He 
argues that the advocates o f the use of mean locations in estimating candidates or 
parties positions “do not so much justify that practice as criticise the alternative use o f  
idiosyncratic perceptions”. More interesting is that he also wonders which of these 
methods best represents competition. He compares both the mean candidate posi­
tions and idiosyncratic perceptions in each model, and thus ends up comparing four 
distributions of voters over candidates. The main theoretical problem he notices is 
that the directional model misinterprets voters who may feel intensely about the status 
quo, as indifferent. Pierces’ conclusion, based on empirical studies on French and 
US voters’ preferences on candidates, is that the directional model is almost always 
a better predictor than the proximity model provided that the models are based on 
mean perceptions of candidate issue positions. But note that the differences in the 
explained variance of the two models are small. A corresponding conclusion, also 
based on mean party placements, derived by a comparison o f the two models for 
the Netherlands, can be found in an article by Aarts, Macdonald and Rabinowitz 
(1999).
The reverse is true - the proximity model beats the directional model - only if the 
models are based on idiosyncratic voter perception. Pierce suggests that “This means 
that the interaction between model and measurement techniques is central to the con­
tinuing debate over which model is a better representation o f  what goes on in voters’ 
minds when they evaluate candidates” (Pierce, 1997, p 73). Further, note that the dif­
ference between the models is quite small in two-party systems since in these countries 
“there are no centrist candidates to be crushed between the two [candidates] that amass 
the lion’s share ofthe public preferences” (Pierce, 1997, p 72).
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Shaffer (1996) shows that the empirical differences between the distances con­
structed by the two models are in fact rather small. Only in a few cases, is a party 
on the ‘wrong’ side o f an issue closer according to the Euclidean model, than a party 
on the ‘right’ side. Shaffer argues:
“ ...owing to the fact that when employing conventional 7-point scales, there are only 
two instances in which a party on the opposite side o f  an issue could actually be closer 
to the voter than a party on the same side ofthe issue. That condition occurs when the 
voter is at “3 ” and the party is at “5 ”, or the voter is at “5 ” and the party is at “3 ”. 
Given that less than 4  percent ofthe Dutch and American samples f i t  this condition, it is 
not at all surprising that Euclidean distance and side ofthe issue are so highly correlated. ”.
Before drawing conclusions or positioning myself in this debate, I shall present 
the last contribution, namely the linkage model of party competition.
Linkage Model
Spatial analysis of political ideological competition is not limited to one dimension. 
Unlike in Downs’ original model, the number of ideological dimensions can be 
higher than one. It is subject to statistical measurement to empirically determine the 
number of dimensions. Since the key of the linkage model is to determine the rela­
tion between issues and ideological dimensions, in this section ideology and issues 
will be defined. Downs uses ideology because he believes it is an important concept for 
cutting down uncertainty, and thus the information costs, of voters and candidates. 
Voters would find ideology useful because it removes the need to check every issue 
with their own view. In this sense, ideology would frame the dimensions o f the 
political debate. Since voters are organised around ideology it would be natural for the 
parties to follow. It is important that voters and candidates agree on their interpre­
tation of ideology, and it is because o f this that ideology is a meaningful concept.
In their Ideology and the Theory ofPolitical Choice Hinich and Munger (1994) give 
a definition o f ideology. They state that an ideology has to tell us what is ethically 
good, how society’s resources should be distributed, and where power appropriately 
resides. In our study, ideology will be used mostly as a practical device. In this 
model, voters as well as parties are required to have a similar understanding of what 
ideology means and, moreover the voters and parties should use this predictive 
dimension(s) for making choices. However, one must bear in mind that this dimen­
sion is not necessarily the classical left-right dimension but that it can be any 
(latent) group of issues that divide groups. The linkage model relates ideological 
positions to things people care about, i.e. issues. Hinich and Munger define issues 
in the policy space as follows:
“Issues. Social problems large numbers o f  citizens care about that (1) politicians talk
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about, (a) in public, (b) to contributors, or (c) among themselves, OR (2) the press talks 
about, either because some interest wants it discussed or because citizens care about i t” 
(Hinich & Munger, 1994, p 111).
A central idea in the linkage-, or also referred to as ideology-, model is that voters 
make choices based on their preferences and these preferences tend to group together, 
so that the choices can be described by an (ideological) space of much lower dimen­
sionality than the policy space of issues. This mapping from ideology to policy space 
can be represented as a linear function of the ideological dimensions. The basic 
function consists of an electorate whose parties and voters can be represented along 
one ideological dimension, denoted by I I . The policy space is denoted by D., which 
can have m dimensions. Points in the ideological space are denoted by the lower case 
7ts and in the policy space by the lower case Os. We will use subscript p  to index all 
o f the L candidates or parties, such that p  = 1, 2, ..., L. The status quo is denoted 
by 7to. If we have a voter i, on a policy dimension j, we denote voter zs perception 
o f candidates p ’s position on issue j  as GOijp. Hinich and Pollard first introduced the 
following equation in 1981:
®ijp = bij + vij 7tp (Hinich & Pollard, 1981; Enelow & Hinich, 1984)
The intercept parameter bij represents voter i’s perception of the status quo on 
issue j. The slope parameter vij is voter is perception of the way in which ideological 
distances translate into policy changes. This linkage parameter represents a linear 
transformation from ideological dimensions to issue dimensions. Suppose that we 
are dealing with one ideological dimension that represents economic liberalism, the 
far left representing state ownership and the extreme right representing laissez-faire 
capitalism, and that we are dealing with the issue of social welfare spending. In this 
case, we would expect the right to represent a lower level of spending as compared 
to the left. This leads to the assumption that in this imaginary world - with only 
one ideological dimension and one issue - the linkage parameter v will be negative. 
The mapping from ideology to the issue of social welfare spending is illustrated in 
the Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2
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The ideology or linkage model thus requires a basic understanding o f the relation 
between ideology and issues. It is necessary to statistically estimate the relationship 
between ideological dimensions n  and issues in D. that voters actually care about.
In a multi-dimensional extension o f a Downsian model, we should either believe 
that one ideological dimension is sufficient to explain all variance between the various 
policy positions of parties, or we should believe that taking the weighted average of 
policy positions of candidates and voters on the various dimensions is adequate. In the 
latter case, there is no coherence between the issues and thus no ideological message 
(Hinich & Munger, 1997).
In the ideology model, we start with a couple of latent ideological dimensions 
that are determined by the way that issues tend to cluster in the voters’ and parties’ 
minds. This can result in a uni-dimensional ideological solution which is predictive 
for issues, or in a few latent ideological dimensions. The number of dimensions and 
the content o f the dimensions can for instance be determined by factor analysis. The 
authors involved with the linkage model, i.e. Enelow, Hinich and Munger, further 
suggest that these ideological dimensions frame the political debate and can as such 
predict the position o f the parties or candidates on the political issues. Constructing 
these ideological dimensions of issues that tend to cluster and then suggesting that the 
ideological dimension is predictive for the policy positions seems circular reasoning. 
However, if we would, as Enelow and Hinich suggest in The Spatial Theory o f Voting 
apply thermometer scores in order to measure voters’ feelings towards politicians 
and then assign positions on the ‘ideological’ dimension, this flaw disappears. Based 
on this dimension, positions on issues can be predicted. In this case the ideological 
dimension is not constructed with data on issues and therefore the reasoning is not 
circular.
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Moreover, if we extend the classical proximity model into a multi-dimensional 
model and do this empirically, that is by using statistical estimates to determine the 
number and content of the latent ideological dimensions, we follow the ideas of the 
linkage model within the framework o f the proximity model. The advantage of data 
reduction in order to find the latent ideological dimensions holds in both models. If 
we apply and empirically test coalition formation theories that take policy preferences 
into account, it is easier to work with a small number of latent dimensions, than to 
work with the whole lot of issue preferences. Party positions on a couple of latent 
dimensions are easier to represent in a figure, and calculating preferences of parties 
for coalitions on a few dimensions is obviously less laborious than on many. Note 
that this is, under certain conditions, what the linkage model aims to do.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
It should be emphasised that although the origins o f the models in this chapter 
lie in theories on party or electoral competition, the purpose o f this chapter was to 
present the relation between these models and coalition formation theories. For this 
matter, the distances and preferences between voters and candidates in party competi­
tion have to be translated to distances and preferences between parties and coalitions 
in coalition formation.
First, we return to the sections on game theory and modelling coalition forma­
tion. In order to study coalition formation theories we can apply simple games. If 
coalition formation theories also include policy positions of parties, and as such 
start from preferences that are based on distances, we need spatial voting games. 
These spatial games or spatial coalitional games apply assumptions that are inspired by 
the classical Downsian model o f party competition. This leads to a first conclusion.
•  Spatial voting games are necessary to study spatial coalition formation theories, and 
moreover these games are founded upon the classical model of party competition.
In the second part o f this chapter the classical spatial model and two alternatives 
to the classical spatial model, the directional theory and the linkage theory, were 
studied and evaluated.
First, we compared the classical model with the directional model. In my opinion, 
and based on theoretical and empirical evidence, it is not possible to be conclusive 
about which theory - the classical Downsian or directional theory - refutes the other.
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Empirical evidence shows a slight advantage for the directional theory in explaining 
electoral results, but theoretical evidence points in both directions. The directional 
theory is said to utilise arbitrary assumptions in for instance ‘the measurement of 
the region of acceptability’. I agree with this complaint. The region of acceptability is 
not an assumption that is applied prior to testing the directional theory, but is mostly 
an empirical construction that is applied when testing the theory. The neutral point 
in the directional theory is also disputable. O n the other hand ‘raising to the power of 
two’ in the formula for Euclidean distance in the Downsian theory, and the assump­
tion of uni-dimensionality in the classical Downsian version are also problematic. 
The first issue - the formula used to measure distances - will be elaborated on in 
Chapter 5, and the latter concern - uni-dimensionality - can be solved easily, as we 
will see in the following discussion.
The last theory that was discussed and compared with the classical model was the 
linkage model. In our spatial theories on coalition formation as well as in theories 
on electoral competition, we assume that more than one policy issue, or even more 
than one ideological dimension, influences politics. If, in the classical proximity 
model, multi-dimensionality is allowed and data reduction is applied in order to 
reduce the number of relevant dimensions, and if the remaining dimensions are 
ideological dimensions, these dimensions are naturally predictive for the issues that 
together form the dimension(s) under consideration. Therefore, using a model that 
explicitly mentions the fact that the constructed ideological dimensions are predictive 
for policy issues, like the linkage model, may in practice not really contribute much 
to our understanding of party competition or coalition formation. The assumptions 
of the linkage theory are more or less similar to the assumptions of the classical 
model. If  applied correctly, these theories lead to the same results.
Comparing the classical theory with its alternatives leads to the following conclusion:
•  The party competition models do not refute one-another. The evaluation o f the 
classical spatial model and the directional model ends in a draw. Moreover, since I 
view the ideology model as an extension of the classical spatial model, neither one 
is preferable.
Finally, since none of these theories on party competition has proven to be the 
best theory, I shall continue with spatial theories on coalition formation and apply 
the model suggested by these theories. It appears that coalition formation theories 
are quite silent on this issue, but are for the greater part inspired by and apply the 
classical spatial or extended (that is multi-dimensional) spatial model. In these spa­
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tial coalition formation theories, parties want to maximise their utility by choosing 
the closest possible winning coalition in a Euclidean space, and not according to the 
directional assumption. Party and coalitional positions are usually derived with data 
reduction methods based on positions on issues, and thus preserve the notion of 
underlying latent ideological dimensions. For these spatial theories, a combination 
o f the classical spatial model and the linkage model will thus be applied.
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3. Coalition Formation Theories
3.1 Introduction
Since Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1990) developed the concept of minimal 
winning coalitions in 1944, a large number of scholars from different disciplines 
have studied coalition formation theories. The main goal of these theories is to predict 
which coalition will be formed. As discussed in the previous chapter, in game theory, 
a coalition can be any group of actors - people or organisations - working together 
in order to achieve some goal. In this study, coalition formation theories are applied 
to cabinet formation in the Netherlands.
In this chapter an overview of non-spatial coalition formation theories will be 
given. First, classical coalition formation theories will be classified and introduced. The 
main assumptions and the hypotheses that are derived from them will be presented. 
Then one of the latest developments in coalition formation theory - the institutional 
theories - will be studied.
These non-spatial theories will, like spatial theories in the next chapter, then be 
evaluated. In the concluding section of this chapter, theories that do not comply with 
the requirements for a formal theory will be reviewed. Spatial theories of coalition 
formation, which will be reviewed in the next chapter, will be compared with non- 
spatial theories. The comparison in this research is aimed at their empirical performance.
Non-spatial theories consist of the traditional power-oriented or as they are also 
called office-seeking theories, the uni-dimensional policy-oriented theories, the 
actor-oriented theories, and the other new development in coalition formation theory, 
namely the institutionalist approaches to coalition formation. A summary of the 
classification o f the theories can be found in Figure 3.1.
The most common important line of division among coalition formation theories 
is that between power-oriented - or as they are also called policy-blind theories - and 
policy-driven theories. In the first group, the sole motivation for political parties to 
join a coalition is their personal gain, i.e. a place in office. This means that members 
of a coalition prefer to join a coalition with as little weight as possible, since in that 
case the benefits o f the coalition will be larger for the individual members. Theories 
based on this assumption are the earliest coalition formation theories and will be 
discussed in Section 2. In that section the theory o f minimal winning coalitions 
(Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1990), the minimum size theory (Riker, 1962), and 
the bargaining proposition (Leiserson, 1968) will also be presented.
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The second group contains policy-oriented theories. In these theories both power 
and policy motivations determine the process of coalition formation. Axelrod’s 
(1970) notion of a connected coalition was the first policy-driven coalition formation 
theory. Axelrod’s theory, Leiserson’s (1966) minimal range theory and De Swaan’s 
(1973) policy distance theory will be presented in Section 3.3.
Another differentiation is that between the two classes above and actor-oriented 
theories. In the latter approach, an actor is selected that has more power in the for­
mation process than any other player. The powerful position of this particular player 
can be caused by her larger weight as compared to the other players in the game, or 
by her strategic ideological position (Peleg, 1980; Van Deemen, 1991). The coalition 
formation theories in which the characteristics of specific players are explanatory 
variables will be discussed in Section 4.
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One of the latest developments - the introduction of institutional factors that 
influence coalition formation - will be discussed in Section 3.5. Green and Shapiro 
(1994) indirectly contributed to the growth of institutionalism when they criticised 
the formal deductive approach used by the rational choice theorists. They argued: 
“Formalization, (...) cannot be an end in itself; however analytically tight and parsi­
monious a theory might be, its scientific value depends on how well it explains the rel­
evant data" (Green & Shapiro, 1994, p 10). Institutional constraints can help explain 
the relevant data, i.e. the cabinet formation. Green and Shapiro further argue that 
hardly any formal rational choice theories have ever been tested, and in the cases 
that they were tested, the results were usually disappointing.
Institutional approaches to coalition formation are said to solve the problem of 
instability occurring in many spatial representations of coalition formation. In 
multi-dimensional spatial games there is often instability: in some cases there is no 
equilibrium at all, whereas in others there are multiple equilibria. Tullock (1981), 
among others, observes that stability can result from institutional constraints. 
Institutional arrangements can induce stability in two ways:
•  First, an institutional rule can induce stability directly; for instance if, in a decision­
making situation, a party gets jurisdiction, meaning that it becomes a dictator in 
this area and that an outcome can come about.
•  Secondly, the institutional rules can reduce the number of possible alternatives, 
which enhances the chances o f finding a stable outcome.
In 1996, Rothstein argued that in rational choice and game theory institutions are 
‘rediscovered’. Institutionalists, for instance Scharpf (1990), discovered that coopera­
tion could be the result of specific historical circumstances. In short, institutionalised 
systems sometimes determine choices and sometimes constrain the range of strategies 
and thus the outcomes. Institutionalism is not only important in solving the flaws of 
rational choice theories; it is a growing sub-discipline in political science in general. 
A demonstration o f the growing importance o f the role of political institutions is 
that institutionalism is included - as one of the eight sub-disciplines - in the ‘new 
handbook of political science’ (Goodin & Klingemann, 1996).
Another development in modelling coalition formation is the growing number 
of spatial theories on coalition formation. These theories will be presented in the 
next chapter. As said above, a problem with these theories is that they do not always 
generate equilibria, or not always predict coalitions. Another drawback is that they 
have not been tested yet. Both problems will be tackled in this research. The focus 
is on spatial theories that do predict coalitions, i.e. generate equilibria. Hypotheses 
will be defined for five spatial theories, enabling us to test them empirically.
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Note that the theories that will be discussed in this and the next chapter are merely 
a selection from the whole body of coalition formation theories. Naturally, not every 
coalition formation theory or solution concept can be discussed in this chapter. I 
will, without assuming to be complete, briefly present a number of theories or solution 
concepts that are not included in the (empirical) research, yet also contribute to 
research on cabinet formation.
One group of theories that will not be studied here is that of the so-called theories 
on power indices. In these theories, the ‘actual’ power of parties is considered rather 
than the number o f seats. The two best known power indices are the Shapley- 
Shubik index (1954) and the Banzhaf (1965) index. The value o f a player in the 
Shapley-Shubik index indicates the chance that a player will be the last member of 
a coalition that turns a losing coalition into a winning coalition. This player is then 
said to be pivotal for the coalition under consideration. All possible permutations 
are considered, and the number of coalitions for which a player is pivotal divided by 
the total number of orderings is that player’s Shapley-Shubik index. Note that the 
order o f the players in the permutations determine the index (Shapley & Shubik, 
1954). The Banzhaf index depends on the number of times that a player is the swing 
player in a coalition. A player that can turn a winning coalition into a losing coalition 
is said to be a swing player. Hence, in minimal winning coalitions all players are 
swing players. All winning coalitions - and thus not all possible permutations - are 
considered and the number of times that a player can change a coalition from winning 
to losing, divided by the total number of swing players in the winning coalitions, is 
that player’s Banzhaf Index (Banzhaf, 1965). In these theories, the number of seats 
o f a party are considered to be a rough measure of its voting power, and therefore 
the authors propose to apply indices to more precisely determine the power of the 
parties. For researchers of coalition formation it is an interesting task to develop 
coalition formation theories that include the voting indices instead o f the party 
weights, and combine this with for instance the assumptions on policy distance 
used in our policy-seeking or spatial theories. Van Deemen (1997, Ch 6.) already 
combined power indices with an actor-oriented theory when he introduced power 
indices in the power-excess theory. The power-excess theory will be introduced in 
Section 4.2.
In summary, being complete is not my intention. In this research only the best 
known power-oriented and uni-dimensional policy-oriented theories will be included. 
The same holds for actor-oriented theories. Furthermore, only a small selection 
from the growing literature on institutional constraints can be included.
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3.2 Power-Oriented Coalition Formation Theories 
3.2.1 Minimal W inning Coalitions
Von Neumann and Morgenstern designed simple game theory in 1944. In these 
n-person cooperative games the value of a winning coalition is 1 and that of a losing 
coalition is 0. Hence, the value o f a winning coalition does not increase when mem­
bers are added to a winning coalition. As a result, the players in a simple game will 
try to form a winning coalition that does not contain more members than absolutely 
necessary. These coalitions are called minimal winning coalitions. Actors maximise 
their utility in a minimal winning coalition. Every subset of a minimal winning 
coalition is a losing coalition. This means that in a minimal winning coalition the 
withdrawal of one player turns the coalition into a losing one.
Definition 3.1
Let G = (N, W ) be a simple game and let S be a coalition.
S is a minimal winning coalition if S e  W  and V T  : (T  c  S => T  e  L ).
The set of minimal winning coalitions is denoted by W MIN. In the theory of minimal 
winning coalitions, preferences of the actors are based on the expected payoff in a 
coalition. In the predictive part of the theory, the solution of the game consists of the 
set of minimal winning coalitions.
Hypothesis 3.1
Let G = (N, W ) be a simple game.
Then only coalitions from W MIN will be formed.
3.2.2 Minimum Size Coalitions
In 1962, both Riker and Gamson developed a theory that restricted the prediction 
set o f the theory of minimal winning coalitions. Not only should a coalition be 
minimal winning, but it should also be minimum size. In non-symmetric weighted 
majority games, minimal winning is not equivalent to minimum size. From the set of 
winning coalitions, Riker and Gamson selected the set of coalitions with the smallest 
weight. Riker defined the size principle as follows: “In social situations similar to 
n-person, zero sum games, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will 
ensure winning and no larger" (Riker, 1962, p 47).
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Definition 3 .2
Let [ q; w1 w2..., wn ] be a weighted majority game.
A coalition S is of minimum size if
i) S e  W
ii) w (S ) < w (T  ) V T  e  W
The set of minimum size coalitions is denoted by W SIZE. A minimum size coalition 
is always minimal winning but this does not necessarily hold the other way around. 
In other words: W SIZE (Z W MIN.
An interesting difference between both contributions is the assumption Gamson 
made about the proportional distribution of the payoffs of the parties; Riker made no 
such assumption. Gamson writes the following: “any participant will expect others to 
demand from a coalition a share ofthe payoff proportional to the amount o f resources 
which they contribute to a coalition" (Gamson, 1962, p 158). Apart from this diffe­
rence, Riker (1962) and Gamson (1962) use similar behavioural assumptions and in 
both cases the prediction-set is the set of minimum size coalitions.
Hypothesis 3 .2
Let [ q; w1, w2 , ..., wn ] be a weighted majority game.
Then only coalitions from W SIZE will be formed.
3.2.3 Bargaining Proposition
In the Bargaining Proposition theory, the goal of the actors is the same as in other 
power-oriented theories. Parties want to be members of a winning coalition for 
personal gain, that is the desire to hold cabinet posts and in particular the position 
o f Prime Minister. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s notion of a minimal winning 
coalition is crucial in Leiserson’s theory. Leiserson (1968) predicts minimal winning 
coalitions with as few members as possible. The argument is that with fewer members 
it is easier to negotiate and bargain, and it is also easier for a cabinet to stay together.
The central idea of Leiserson’s theory is the following: “The proposition regarding 
bargaining is that as the number o f actors increases there is a tendency for each actor to 
prefer to form a Wmin with as few members as possible" (Leiserson, 1968, p 775).
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Definition 3 .3
Let [ q; w1 w2 , ..., wn ] be a weighted majority game.
A coalition S is in the bargaining set, denoted W BAR if
i) S e  WMIN,
ii) V T  e  Wmin, t *  S | # S < # T
where # S denotes the cardinality o f S, that is the number of elements in S.
The set of bargaining coalitions is denoted by W BAR.
Hypothesis 3 .3
Let [ q; w;, w2 , ..., wn ] be a weighted majority game.
Then only coalitions from W BAR will be formed.
Leiserson follows Gamson and argues that in a simple coalitional game, the out­
come will be a coalition in which the payoffs are divided in proportion to the weight 
of the parties. In a 1962 article on coalition formation in Japan, Leiserson also ranks 
cabinet posts. According to Leiserson, the best thing to gain in Japan is the Prime 
Minister portfolio; second best is finance minister; third best is foreign minister and so 
on. This is interesting because little attention has been given to this division of cabinet 
posts in coalition formation theories until much later. However, every researcher 
will intuitively accept that not all portfolios are o f the same importance. Browne 
and Feste in 1975, and Budge and Keman in 1990 (1990a; 1990b) developed this 
idea further. It is also o f great importance in one of the multi-dimensional policy- 
oriented theories that will be discussed in the last section of this chapter (Laver & 
Shepsle, 1996).
3.3 Policy-Oriented Coalition Formation Theories
3.3.1 Conflict of Interest Theory
Axelrod (1970) and Leiserson (1966) were among the first to acknowledge the 
influence of the policy positions o f players on the formation process. In this class of 
policy-driven theories, the behavioural assumption is that a player strives to be 
member of a coalition in order to see her preferred policy implemented. The basic 
idea in Axelrod’s theory is that if the policy preferences o f some parties are not too 
diverse, it is likely that these parties will form a stable coalition. The smaller the con­
flict of interests between players, the larger the chance that they will cooperate. 
Axelrod translates this idea into the following assumptions.
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- “The less conflict o f interest there is in a coalition, the more likely the coalition will 
form.
- The less conflict o f interest there is in a coalition, the more likely the coalition will 
have long duration i f  formed " (Axelrod, 1970, p 167).
Axelrod assigns to all players a position on a uni-dimensional ordinal policy scale, 
and predicts that only connected coalitions will emerge. By connected coalitions, 
also denoted as closed coalitions, Axelrod refers to coalitions composed of players 
that are adjacent on a scale o f policies. As said before, Axelrod uses an ordinal scale. 
This means that if we consider a game with five parties A, B, C, D, E - ordered from 
left to right -, it is feasible that the diversity between A and C is larger than between 
A and B, but the magnitude of the difference remains unknown. It is also impossible 
to compare the dispersion between coalitions ABC and BCD, but we can conclude 
that a coalition of players ABC is less diverse, and thus more likely to be formed 
than a coalition with players ABD. We can also conclude that coalition ABC is less 
diverse than coalition ABCD, even though both are connected.
For the formal formulation o f the conflict o f interest theory, I use of Van 
Deemen’s (1997) description in Coalition Formation and Social Choice. In order to 
give a formal presentation, some additional concepts should be introduced. First, 
the policy position of player, i is denoted by x±. If a player is to the left of another 
player on the policy dimension, we assume that this player’s policy position precedes 
the policy position of the other player.
Definition 3 .4
If x± is to the left of Xj and Xj is to the left o f Xk, then x± d XjQ Xk
The symbol d represents the policy order for Gq , and is a binary relation satisfying 
reflexivity, anti-symmetry, completeness and transitivity. A preference order is 
reflexive, if any alternative is at least as good as itself. Anti-symmetry states that for 
all alternatives it must be true that if Xj is at least as good as X; then it is not true that 
Xj is at least as good as Xj .A  preference order is complete if every alternative is com­
pared to every other alternative. The policy position o f player i is either to the left 
or to the right o f player j, or they prefer exactly the same position. A relationship is 
transitive, if it holds that if a player prefers A to B and B to C, he will also prefer A 
to C, and if he is indifferent between A and B and between B and C, he should also 
be indifferent between A and C. A set of preferences that satisfies these four prop­
erties is called a linear order. Now, we can define a policy game. A policy game is a 
simple game with a linear policy order.
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Consider the policy game Gq:
i) A player k is between players i and j  if (xQXk A X/QXj ) V (xQXk A X/QXj ).
ii) Two players i and j  are neighbours (connected) if there is no other player 
k between i and j .
iii) A coalition S Œ. N  is closed if for all i e  S, there is a j  e  S such that i and j  
are neighbours.
iiii) A coalition which is not closed is said to be open (Van Deemen, 1997).
Axelrod predicts a winning coalition, which is connected, and minimal in the 
sense that it can lose no member party without ceasing to be connected or winning.
Deßnition 3 .5
Let G q be a policy game.
A coalition S e  W is minimal connected if for each i e  S, S - {i} is either losing or
open. The set o f minimal connected winning coalitions is denoted by W MC
(Van Deemen, 1997).
Hypothesis 3 .4
Let G q be a policy game. Then only coalitions from W MC will be formed (ibid.).
3.3.2 Minimal Range Theory
In his thesis Coalitions in Politics: A  Theoretical and Empirical Study, Leiserson 
(1966) developed the minimal range theory. In Chapter 6, he defines ideological 
diversity as follows: “By ideological diversity, we mean the maXimum ‘distance’ 
between players in the proposed coalition in the space defined by the ... major issues” 
(Leiserson, 1966, p 314). Note that these major issues are time and place dependent. 
In the Netherlands the diversity is usually measured on a socio-economic left-right 
dimension. Furthermore, Leiserson argues that players want to be members of coali­
tions with some positive payoff — read: winning coalitions - and then will ‘find’ that 
coalition which has a minimum of ideological diversity. He suggests the use of 
Gamson’s fairness-rule according to which a player is entitled to a share of coalition’s 
winnings proportional to her share of the coalition’s resources.
For the formal representation of Leiserson’s theory, I follow De Swaan’s elaboration 
since he uses a notation similar to the one used elsewhere in this chapter. The central 
concept of Leiserson’s theory is a coalition’s range, which is defined as the distance 
between the two members of the coalition that are on the extreme of, or furthest 
apart on, a policy scale.
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Definition 3 .6
An extreme actor in a coalition S is an actor lS who has a policy position XL that is 
more to the left than the policy position of any other actor in S. An actor rS is 
an actor whose policy position is rightmost among the policy positions of the 
members of S (De Swaan, 1973). The position o f the most extreme actor on the 
left is denoted as XSL , and the policy position of the most extreme actor in S on 
the right side as XSR . Distance is denoted as d
Definition 3 .7
For extreme actors lS and rS in coalition S, it is true that:
XSL < x; for all i e  S , and XSR > x{ for all i e  S (De Swaan, 1973).
The range of a coalition S, notation DS is defined as follows:
Ds = d  (XsL, Xsr )
According to this theory, an actor prefers a winning coalition in which she is a 
member, and she selects from this set of coalitions the one with the smallest range. 
A coalition will be formed, if all members agree that the range of this coalition is 
not larger than the range of any other winning coalition.
Hypothesis 3 .5
Let Gq be a policy game and let S, Te W  and 3 S \ DS < D t V T e  W, 
then only coalitions from S will be formed.
3.3.3 Policy Distance Theory
De Swaan’s policy distance theory (1973) is another example of a policy-oriented 
theory. In this theory actors, i.e. political parties, compare their policy positions to the 
expected policy positions of coalitions. De Swaan describes the central behavioural 
assumption o f the policy distance theory as follows: “An actor strives to bring about 
a winning coalition in which he is included and which he expects to adopt a policy that 
is as close as possible, on a scale o f policies, to his own most preferred policy” (De Swaan, 
1973, p 88).
In this section, I shall first discuss the descriptive part of the policy distance theory. 
In this part, actors define preference profiles for possible winning coalitions. These 
preference profiles are based on the comparison between the actor’s own policy posi­
tions and the expected policy positions o f the coalitions. The ‘scale of policies’ in De
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Swaan’s research is a coherent scale of policy issues that together form an ideological 
socio-economic left-right dimension. After defining the preference ordering, I shall 
discuss the predictive part o f the theory. At this point a game theoretical solution 
concept is used to single out a set of coalitions that might occur. De Swaan applies 
the core solution, which selects undominated coalitions.
The assumptions of the descriptive part of the policy distance theory will be 
given in formal notation. The assumptions 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 define the rank order 
of expected policies of coalitions and of the actors’ policy positions. The other 
assumptions define the preferences of the actors for the coalitions.
The weights and policy positions of its members determine the expected policy 
position of a coalition. The distance between the expected policy position of coalition 
S, and the most preferred policy position of an actor, i, is denoted as d(xi , xS) (De 
Swaan, 1973).
The first assumption that De Swaan formulates is, that if an actor i is a member 
of two winning coalitions, the actor prefers the coalition with the expected policy 
closest to his own most preferred policy. The coalitions are ordered on an ordinal 
policy scale corresponding with the social-economic left-right dimension.
Assumption 3.1
For all i, such that i e  S and i e  T; S, 7e W  SP;T if d  (x, xS)< d  (x, ,xT)
(De Swaan, 1973).
The order of the policy positions will again be denoted by 0. The preference 
order o f the policy positions of the players is complete and transitive. Formally:
Assumption 3 .2
For all i, j  e  N; either x± Q Xj or Xj Q xi ; and for all i, j, k e  N;
if xi Q Xj and Xj Q Xk , then X; Q xk (De Swaan, 1973).
The concept of a pivotal player is of major importance in this theory. An actor k is 
pivotal in S, if the difference between the combined weights w of the members to 
the left o f this actor and the weights of the members to her right is less than the 
weight of this pivotal actor. "Within each coalition S, an actor k can be singled out as 
pivotal because it is plausible that the coalition’s expected policy will be especially close 
to k ’sposition” (De Swaan, 1973, p 94).
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Definition 3 .8
k is a pivotal actor for S, if, for all i and j, such that i, j, k e  S ,and xQ x/Q Xj :
IX wi - X wj |<  wk (De Swaan, 1973).
An actor’s most preferred policy is closer to the expected policy of a coalition in 
which she is a pivotal player than to the expected policy of any coalition in which 
she is not. Formally:
Assumption 3 .3
For every pivotal actor k, k e  N, and for S, Tç.N; if k e  S and k g T,
then d(xk , xS) < d(xk , xT) (De Swaan, 1973).
The next axiom defines an order among coalitions with the same pivotal actor. 
De Swaan defines the excess eS of coalition S, as follows: ‘X wi - Xwj ’ (De Swaan, 
1973). If  two coalitions have the same pivotal player, the coalition with the higher 
excess is positioned further to the left on the policy order than the other coalition. 
This makes sense, since higher excess means that the combined weights of the actors 
to the left of the pivotal actor are higher than the combined weights of the actors to 
her right. This concept is important for the next two assumptions.
Assumption 3 .4
For every actor k, k is pivotal in S and T, and S, TŒ. N; xS < Xt if eS > eT
(De Swaan, 1973).
Coalitions with the same pivotal player can be given a position on a policy ordering. 
In the following axiom, De Swaan describes how to compare the policy distance 
between a pivotal actor and the coalitions for which she is pivotal. If it is the case 
that for the pivotal player k the absolute value of the excess of coalition S is smaller 
than the absolute value of the excess o f coalition T, then the distance between xk 
and xS is smaller than the distance between xk and xr  Small excess means that the 
policy position of the pivotal player and the expected policy position of the coalition 
are close to each other. Hence:
Assumption 3 .5
For an actor k, k is pivotal in S and T; d  (x/, xS) < d  (x/, xT) if, \ eS \< \  eT \
(De Swaan, 1973).
The next assumption in De Swaan’s theory guarantees individual rationality of 
winning coalitions. It consists of two parts. The first part states that an actor prefers
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being a member of any winning coalition to being a member of a losing coalition. The 
second part formulates that an actor prefers being a member of a winning coalition 
to not being a member o f a winning coalition.
Assumption 3 .6
For all i, such that i £  S, i £  T, S £  W, T  Ï  W; SP-T (De Swaan, 1973).
Assumption 3 .6 ’
For all i, such that i £  S, i Ï  T, S £  W, T  £  W; SP-T (De Swaan, 1973).
The assumptions formulated so far lead to a preference on coalitions for each 
player. A configuration of coalition preferences is called a preference profile. These 
preference profiles are essential for the predictive part of the theory. In the predictive 
part of a coalition formation theory, a set of coalitions is predicted. We therefore 
need a solution concept assigning a set of outcomes, i.e. payoffs, to each game. 
Under the assumptions of the policy distance theory, solution concepts from n-person 
game theory are applicable. The solution concept that De Swaan uses is the core 
concept. To define the core, we first define domination among coalitions. A coalition 
dominates another coalition if every player in the former coalition thinks this coalition 
is at least as good as the other and if it is true that for at least one player the former 
coalition is strictly preferred to the latter. The core solution selects a set of 
undominated preference vectors. A coalition S is undominated if there is no coalition 
T in which all members are better of, and if there is at least one member i of S such 
that i prefers S to T. Formally:
For all S ,T  £  W, S dominates T, notation SA T, if:
i. for all i £  S: SR  T
ii. for at least one i £  S: SPi T  (De Swaan, 1973).
Coalition S is a core solution if there is no coalition T that dominates S:
S £  Core i f  -n3 T  £  W  TA S.
To illustrate the core concept, consider a game with three players A, B, and C and 
four possible winning coalitions AB, AC, BC, and ABC. Player As policy position is 
closer to AB than to AC. Player A therefore prefers coalition AB to AC. Player B also 
prefers coalition AB to coalition AC. Player C prefers coalition AC to coalition AB. In 
short, all members o f coalition AB prefer AB to AC. Therefore coalition AB is not 
dominated by coalition AC. The preferences o f the parties for the coalitions can be 
found in Table 3.1. The higher the numbers, the higher the preference. According to the 
core solution concept, the coalition AB is undominated and will therefore be predicted.
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A B C
AB 3 3 0
AC 2 0 3
BC 0 2 2
ABC 1 1 1
Table 3.1
Preference
profiles
Hypothesis 3 .6
Let Gg be a policy game. Then only coalitions from the core will be formed 
(De Swaan, 1973)
Unfortunately, De Swaan’s model is inconsistent. The coalitions in the policy dis­
tance theory are located on a policy dimension. Boute discovered in 1981 that this 
part of De Swaan’s theory is not without problems (Boute, 1981). For the second 
axiom, a complete ordering o f the actors’ policy positions on the policy scale is 
required. The problem lies in the fact that a coalition can be placed more than once 
on the policy ordering of coalitions. This is caused by the fact that some coalitions 
may contain more than one pivotal player. Van Deemen (1997) gives the following 
example, which displays the inconsistency. Consider the following decisive weighted 
majority game with three players with equal weight and a quota of 2: [2; 1, 1, 1] 
with players A, B, C respectively. The following coalitions with their pivotal actors 
can be formed: player A = {AB, AC}
player B = {BC, AB, ABC} 
player C = {AC, BC}
In this example, both players A and C are pivotal actors for coalition AC. Since 
player A is pivotal for coalition AC and not for coalition ABC, AC lies closer to 
player A than coalition ABC. Player C is also pivotal for coalition AC, but also not 
for ABC, so that coalition AC is closer to player C than coalition ABC. This leads 
to an ordering in which coalition AC is placed twice, once to the left of coalition 
ABC and once to the right of that coalition. The excess o f the pivotal players in each 
coalition is calculated. It appears that coalition AC is preferred to coalition ABC 
and vice versa. The policy distance theory thus rejects the first of the requirements 
for a good formal theory, namely that the axioms should be internally consistent.
A remedy, discussed by both Boute and Van Deemen, is to a priori exclude the 
possibility of more than one pivotal player for a coalition. For this reason, the ‘less
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than or equal to’ relation in the definition o f the pivotal player should be replaced 
with the strict inequality ‘less than’ relation. However, this does not lead to very 
promising results. Coalitions that can be ordered in the original situation - like the 
two-person coalitions in the above example - can not be ordered when using the 
adjustment proposed by Boute and Van Deemen. There are other inconsistencies in 
De Swaan’s model, but for these I refer to Van Deemen (1997).
In a multi-dimensional version of De Swaan’s theory, as in the descriptive part of 
most spatial theories in this research, each player is assumed to hold a policy position 
not on an ordinal scale, but in an m-dimensional Euclidean space. Distances between 
policy positions will be measured metrically by means o f Euclidean distance. This 
formulation will avoid the inconsistency o f De Swaan’s theory, as we will shall in, 
for instance the Maximal Satisfaction Solution which applies the same behavioural 
assumptions.
3.4 Actor-Oriented Coalition Formation Theories
In actor-oriented coalition formation models, coalition formation is explained by 
certain properties of political parties. These properties can be either the size or a spe­
cific ideological position of a player. Powerful actors are assumed to influence the 
formation process.
3.4.1 The Dominant Player
Peleg (1980/1981) developed a policy-blind player concept in which the size of a 
specific actor determines the course of the game. This actor is called dominant if she 
holds the power to act decisively in the formation process. A simple game with a 
dominant player is called a dominated simple game. In these dominated games, a 
single player has decision-making power within the coalition formation process. 
Note that the concepts dominant and dominated in this theory differ from that of 
domination among payoff, as used in De Swaan’s theory.
The dominant player approach is derived from a binary dominance relation 
between coalitions, called ‘desirability relation’. A coalition S is at least as desirable 
as coalition T if it is the case that if coalition T can win with player B, then coali­
tion S can also win with B.
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Definition 3 .9
Let G = (N, W) be a simple game and let S and T  be coalitions:
i) S is at least as desirable as T, denoted as S >D T, if for every nonempty 
coalition B c  N, such that B n  (S u  7) = 0 :  B u  T  e  W  =>B u  S e  W
ii) S is more desirable than T, denoted as S >D T, if S >D T  but not T >D S
iii) S is equally desirable as T, notation S ~ D T, if S >D T  and T >D S 
(Peleg, 1981).
The relation >D is the asymmetric part o f the desirability relation. In the defini­
tion above, this implies that if S >D T  coalition S can win with B, while T  cannot. 
In the symmetric part, S ~D T, if S can win with B, T  can also win with B. Peleg 
continues with defining dominance and weak dominance.
Definition 3 .10
Let G = (N , W) be a simple game and let S be a coalition:
1. i e  N  weakly dominates S, if
i) i £ S,
ii) {i } — d  S - {i }.
2. i e  N  dominates S, if
i) i e  S,
ii) {i } > d  S - {i}.
Van Deemen (1997) derived the following theorem on domination:
Theorem 3.1
Let G = (N, W) be a simple game. A player i e  S dominates a coalition S if:
i) for every non-empty coalition B ç  Sc : if Bè  (S - { i}) e  W, then B {i } G W
ii) there is a non-empty coalition B Œ. Sc
such that Bè  { i} e  W, and B u  (S - {i }) e  L.
In a simple game, player i is called dominant if there is a coalition S £ W  such 
that i dominates S. A simple game with a dominant player is called a dominated 
simple game. The set o f dominant players in G will be denoted with d  (G). A domi­
nant player can only exist in non-symmetric games.
Theorem 3 .2
Let G = (N , W) be a proper simple game and let i £ N .
If there are j e  N, j  ^  i, such that {j } >D {i }, then i d  (G) (Peleg, 1981).
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In order to describe the size o f the set o f dominant players, Peleg introduces the 
following consequences of the above definitions:
Corollary 3.1
Let G = [q w1 , ..., wn ] be a proper weighted majority game.
Then there is at most one dominant player, \ d  (G) |<  1 
Corollary 3 .2
Let G = (N  W) be a weak game.
Then there is at most one dominant player, \ d  (G) \<  1 
Corollary 3.3
Let G = (N  W) be a weak game and let veto players be denoted by V 
If  \ V  \>  2, then d  (G) = 0  (Peleg, 1981).
If there is a dominant player in a weighted majority game, this must be the player 
with the highest weight. If there is a dominant player in a weak game, then this 
player has to be a veto player. The opposite is not necessarily true; not every vetoer 
in a weak game is a dominant player. In a weak game with exactly one veto player, 
there may exist a dominant player.
In order to describe the power of the dominant player in a coalition that she 
dominates, we introduce the concept of a subgame. W ith the concept subgame, the 
internal opposition in a dominated coalition can be studied.
Definition 3.11
Let G = (N, W) be a simple game and let S C  N. A subgame G \ S associated with 
S is a simple game (S, WS), where S is the player set and WS is the set of winning 
coalitions.
A subgame is thus the game played within the coalition. Van Deemen revealed 
the powerful position of the dominant player in the subgame associated with the 
coalition in the following theorem:
Theorem 3 .3
Let G = (N , W) be a dominated and proper simple game and let i be the 
dominant player. Suppose i dominates S. Then G \ S = (S, WS ) is dictatorial 
with i as the dictator (Van Deemen, 1989).
For the proof of this theorem I refer to Van Deemen (1989, p 330).
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So far, we can conclude that the dominant player is really powerful. W ithin a 
dominated coalition the dominant player holds a strict majority and as such no 
decisive opposition can be formed against the dominant player. Since the dominant 
player is a dictator in the subgame, the other players in the subgame are dummies. 
The question rises why any player would like to form a coalition with a dictator. 
Peleg does not go into this, but it seems relevant since games with a dictator are 
inessential games. This phenomenon can only be explained by introducing new 
assumptions. One possible assumption is that parties value being a member of a 
coalition, even though they have to govern with the dominant player. Another is that 
if it is necessary to vote on legislation, a majority is needed, and although the domi­
nant player is dominant within the coalition, a parliamentary majority is needed in 
order to get a proposal to win. The dominant player is also externally more powerful.
Outside the subgame, the dominant player has more opportunities to form a 
winning coalition than any other player does.
Definition 3 .12
Let G = (N, W) be a simple game with one dominant player.
Let i be the dominant player:
1) D W (G) = {Se W  \ i weakly dominates S },
2) D (G) = {S e  W  \ i dominates S }
Peleg developed the first set: DW (G), whereas the second D (G) was introduced 
by Van Deemen. Based on the definitions above, the following hypotheses can be 
formulated:
Hypothesis 3 .7
Let G = (N, W) be a simple game with one dominant player.
Then only coalitions from D W (G) will be formed (Peleg, 1981).
Hypothesis 3 .8
Let G = (N, W) be a simple game with one dominant player.
Then only coalitions from D (G) will be formed (Van Deemen, 1989).
Van Deemen (1989) has refined the dominant player approach by introducing 
the size principle. Combining the minimum size and dominant player theory led to 
the idea that a dominant player wants to form a coalition of minimum size that she 
dominates. In such a coalition, this player would not only control the internal 
opposition but would do so with the greatest predominance possible.
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Hypothesis 3 .9
Peleg-Riker Principle Let G = [q w1, w2, ..., wn ] be a dominated and proper 
weighted majority game. Then only coalitions from D  ( g ) Pi Wsize will be formed 
(Van Deemen, 1989).
3.4.2 The Centre Player
The second actor-oriented coalition formation theory that will be discussed here is 
a policy-driven theory. In this case, the powerful player is called the centre player. 
In this section, some of the concepts that are introduced in section three will be 
applied again. We start with a policy game - see the definition in Section 3.3.2 - in 
which the preferences are linear. Once more, a player i e  N is said to be to the left of 
player j  if xi 0 Xj . If this is the other way around, Xj 0 xi ,player i is said to be to 
the right of player j . Formally:
Let Gg be a policy game and let S be a coalition, then:
Le (i, S) = {j  e  S | Xj 0 x;}
Ri (i, S) = {j  e  S I xi 0 xj}
Because we demand a linear order, a player’s position in our policy game can 
never simultaneously be i e  Le (i, S) and i e  Ri (i, S).
Definition 3 .13
A player i e  N  is called a centre player in Gq if:
i) Le (i, N) e  L and Le (i, N) u  {i} e  W  and
ii) Ri (i, N) £ L and Ri (i, N) U {i} G W  (Van Deemen, 1991).
Thus, a player i is a centre player, if the coalition o f all players who are to the 
left of i are losing without i, but winning with i, and if all the players to the right 
of i are losing without her but winning with her.
A centralised policy game is a policy game Gq with a centre player. The next theorem 
characterises a centre player in a weighted centralised policy game.
Theorem 3 .4
Let G = [ q; w1, w2, ..., wn ] be a centralised weighted majority game with relevant 
policy order 0. Let c e  N be the centre player.
Then: | w (Le (c, N)) - w (Ri (c, N)) |<  wc (Van Deemen, 1997).
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In words, the weight o f the centre player is strictly more than the absolute value 
o f the difference between the weights on the left of the centre player, and the 
weights to the right of the centre player. Therefore, the centre player has a powerful 
position: she holds the game balanced. The centre player can form coalitions with 
the players to her right or with players to her left or even with both sides.
Van Deemen (1991) developed the following two theorems about the existence 
o f the centre player.
Theorem 3 .5
Let Gq be a policy game. There exists at most one centre player.
Theorem 3 .6
Let Gq be a policy game. Then Gq has a centre player if Gq is decisive.
The powerful position o f the centre player leads to the following prediction.
Hypothesis 3 .10
In centralised policy games only coalitions with the centre player (C) will be formed.
Since the set of C - winning coalitions with the centre player - is usually large, Van 
Deemen developed a refinement of the theory. In the theory of Balanced Coalitions 
(Van Deemen, 1990) the idea is that a rational player will strive to form maximally 
balanced coalitions because in these coalitions she can best control the policy for­
mation process. A coalition with the centre player is maximally balanced if,
i) this coalition includes the centre player c and,
ii) the difference of the weights to the left of the player and the weights to the right
of c are as small as possible.
The hypothesis is that in a centralised policy game, only maximally balanced 
coalitions will be formed. This prediction set denoted B is a subset of C.
Hypothesis 3.11
In centralised policy games only maximally balanced coalitions (B) will be formed
(Van Deemen, 1997).
Another refinement - which is a combination o f the centre player and a power- 
oriented theory - is the theory of power excess coalitions (Van Deemen, 1991). The
68 G O V ERN IN G  W ITH YO U R  C LO SE ST  NEIGHBOUR
C oa l it ion  Fo rm at ion  Theories
power excess of the centre player in a coalition is the weight of the centre player 
minus the size of the internal opposition to the centre player in that coalition. If the 
centre player has positive power excess, she can control the internal opposition in 
that coalition. The hypothesis is that in centralised policy games only coalitions 
with maximal power excess for the centre player will be formed. The power excess 
theory differs from the maximal balanced coalition theory in that the latter is policy- 
driven - the position of the centre player determines if the coalition is balanced - while 
in the former the extension is power-oriented: the centre player wants maximal 
power excess.
Hypothesis 3 .12
In centralised policy games only coalitions with maximal power excess will be
formed (Van Deemen, 1997).
Both theories also have a further refinement, namely a closed version. As we saw 
in the former section, a coalition is closed if it consists only o f neighbours. In the 
first case, closed (maximally) balanced coalitions are predicted, and in the second 
case closed coalitions with maximal power excess will be formed.
Einy (1985) investigated the theoretical compatibility of Axelrod’s connectedness 
hypothesis and Peleg’s dominated simple games. In this research, Einy also intro­
duces the centre player and studies the case where the dominant player occupies a 
central position with respect to the policy order. Van Roozendaal (1992) has con­
tinued the study o f the two main player-oriented approaches: the dominant and 
central player. He tested the two theories empirically and studied the combination 
of the two approaches.
3.5 Institutional Theories of Coalition Formation
3.5.1 Introduction: Constraints on Cabinet Formation
In this section we shall study institutions that influence coalition formation. In 
the first part institutional constraints will be studied. Both formal and informal 
rules that restrict coalition formation will be discussed. After that, institutions and 
behaviour and their interaction will be studied. In that part, coalition formation 
theories that include institutional factors are discussed.
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At their core, political institutions are ‘the rules o f the game’ (Rothstein, 1996). 
These rules can be both formal and informal. Institutions enter coalition formation 
theories as constraints. Ström, Budge and Laver (1994) argue that institutions in 
coalition formation are both exogenous and endogenous constraints on the process of 
bargaining. Constraints on coalition bargaining can be defined as: any restriction on 
the set o f feasible cabinet coalitions that is beyond the short term control ofthe players 
(Ström et al., 1994).
In rational choice approaches to coalition formation, political parties are engaged in 
interaction and stabilise in equilibrium, i.e. a coalition. However, if we consider the 
search for equilibria, there are two related problems. In the first case, a dominant 
coalition in multi-dimensional policy space is often non-existent - that is, there is 
no core solution -, which means that we cannot predict a coalition. In the second 
case, if the core is non-empty, it is not necessarily unique. This can lead to multiple 
equilibria in which almost any outcome - coalition - can be predicted.
Existing institutions set constraints on parties’ choices, and therefore bring back 
the number of possible equilibria. In Constraints on Cabinet Formation in 
Parliamentary Democracies by Ström et al. (1984) and in Laver and Schofield’s (1990) 
Multiparty Government, several rules that influence cabinet formation are intro­
duced. The main point of Ström et al. is that implementation of institutional rules 
or constraints leads to better predictions than most common coalition formation the­
ories allow. Unlike other theories I discuss in this chapter, Ström et al. implement 
these institutional constraints without applying behavioural assumptions, then 
evaluate the strength of this institutional approach. In order to present an extensive 
overview of institutional constraints on coalition formation, I shall follow the 
elaboration of Ström et al.. Note however that since no behavioural assumptions are 
included, it can not be seen as a real coalition formation theory.
1. Formal Rules
The formal rules that influence cabinet formation are:
- size and composition requirements; examples are electoral thresholds, only parties 
with more than 5% of the vote share can participate in government in Germany 
and a composition requirement would be the provision that in Belgian cabinets 
the number o f Dutch and French speaking ministers should be equal.
- investiture rules; this concerns the formal rules of installation o f a cabinet. In 
many countries a new government requires an investiture vote which can privilege 
certain parties or majority coalitions.
- recognition rules; these rules can give special bargaining power to either the head o f 
state or to the status quo government. The recognition rule specifies which parties
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will be asked to form a government and in which order. An example of this rule 
is the appointment o f a formateur - who initiates coalition formation - by the 
queen in the Netherlands.
2. Cabinet Operation Rules
A second class o f rules that affect cabinet formation are cabinet operation rules. 
These rules relate to the doctrine of ‘collective cabinet responsibility’; if this is very 
strong, ideologically diverse parties can hardly join a coalition because they would 
have to defend policies that contradict their commitments to the electorate. If the 
collective responsibility is weaker, parties that lose out in cabinet are more able to 
distance themselves from cabinet policy. In these cabinet operation rules, specific 
rules of cabinet termination, which can influence the formation process and for 
instance lower the chances of minority cabinets, are also included.
3. Legislative Rules
Another kind of rules that influence formation are legislative rules. This can lead to 
oversized cabinets if a qualified majority is necessary for constitutional reform. In 
this framework, we also consider electoral rules. In some electoral systems, pre- 
electoral alliances are useful, which influences the formation process.
4. Party Rules
Rules imposed by parties themselves can influence coalition bargaining. A party 
can announce to refuse to join a cabinet with another party, or it can be an anti­
system party and therefore unwilling to enter into a coalition, or parties can form 
pre-electoral coalitions.
5. External Veto Players
Another possibility is that pressure from outside the parties influences the formation. 
An example is the American influence in Europe after World War II. No sane 
European country would allow communist parties in its cabinet because of the 
anticipated resistance of the United States (Ström et al., 1994).
These constraints are tested by Ström et al. for an unstable period (1977-1980) in 
Belgium, for five cabinet formations. The number of feasible coalitions - after taking 
the institutional constraints into account - turns out to be a fairly good prediction 
for cabinet formation. For the few cases under consideration both the success rate and 
the prediction efficiency is higher than the results for the minimal winning and mini­
mal connected winning theory. The success rate is simply the number of correctly 
predicted coalitions divided by all cases. The efficiency rate also takes into account the 
number of coalitions that are predicted by the theory. In other words, a theory that 
selects one coalition at a time can have a small success rate, but when it predicts the 
correct coalition, it is the only coalition that has been predicted. If another theory 
predicts a larger set of coalitions, the chance of predicting the right coalition is large,
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but in the latter case the prediction efficiency is smaller than the prediction 
efficiency on the former theory when predicting correctly.
None o f the five coalitions that were formed in this period (1977-1980) were 
minimal and connected, so the success rate of the conflict of interest theory is zero. 
One coalition was minimal winning so the success rate of the minimal winning the­
ory is .20. The success rate of the ‘feasible coalitions under constraints’ is .60; three 
out of five cases were predicted by this criterion. For both theories the prediction 
efficiency is small, 0.034 for the coalitions under constraints and 0.026 for the mini­
mal winning theory. However, even though the institutional constraints eliminated 
the vast majority of all possible coalitions, and the actual coalition fell - in three out of 
five cases - within the constraint set, it is a difficult task to implement these constraints 
in a behavioural theory of coalition formation.
As I said, Laver and Schofield (1990) also discuss institutional rules in their study on 
multiparty governments. They order the rules differently, but basically discuss the 
same rules as Ström et al.. Laver and Schofield stress the distinction between more or 
less formal rules and ‘ad hoc’ rules. The latter consist of very special local circum­
stances that are interesting, but very hard to build into a general model. These ‘rules’ 
can be a personality clash between party leaders, and a situation in which a party is 
considered by other parties as ‘non-coalitionable’. These rules are also found in 
Ström et al. (1994) under the headings party rules and external veto players.
The institutional constraints bring down the number of possible coalitions, but 
neither Ström nor Laver and Schofield present a comprehensive coalition formation 
theory that includes behavioural assumptions as well as institutional limitations. 
Ström et al. (1994) do acknowledge that a successful model of coalition formation 
should depend on both institutional and preference based factors. One way of 
accomplishing this is to model coalition formation on a country-by-country base. 
Another option is to explore the effects of constraints under different behavioural 
assumptions. The latter option seems to offer the best of both worlds, but so far no 
author has been able to come up with a general behavioural coalition theory that 
includes institutional constraints without leading to either horrendously complex 
mathematical models or to inaccurate simplifications o f reality. Examples o f these 
models will be discussed in the next section. For instance Romer and Rosentahl 
(1978) present a theory based on agenda setting which, in my opinion, is a too simple 
representation of coalition formation in multi-party systems. Baron and Austen­
Smith (1988) present models that do not provide sufficient information on how to 
find equilibria, whenever more than three parties and more than two policy dimen­
sions enter the model. These models will be discussed in the next section.
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3.5.2 Institutional Government Formation
The research that will be discussed in the final part of this section relates to models 
that include both common behavioural assumptions and institutional constraints. 
These comprehensive theories, for instance Baron’s and Austen-Smiths studies, are 
usually able to predict what coalition will occur in a two-dimensional policy space 
with three parties, but these models become complex if more parties or more 
dimensions enter the game. Still, since these theories are important contributions to 
the institutional approach to coalition formation, and since they might be starting 
points for theories that include both behavioural assumptions and institutional factors, 
they will be discussed in this section.
Shepsle was among the first formal theorists to acknowledge the important role 
of institutions. He is also one of the most progressive theorists in combining formal 
theory and institutional constraints. The main goal of Shepsle’s research is to solve 
social choice problems. Pure majority rule decision-making in situations with multiple 
dimensions and multiple actors often leads to cycling. For any alternative in the 
cycle, there is another alternative inside this set that can beat the former alternative 
in pure majority rule. Therefore Shepsle developed the so-called ‘structure-induced 
equilibrium’. The idea is that in bargaining situations with multiple possible out­
comes, the structure - for instance always having the status quo voted on last - will 
induce an equilibrium. The main point in Shepsle’s 1979 study is that: “institutional 
structure - in the form o f rules o f jurisdiction and amendment control - has an impor­
tant independent impact on the existence o f equilibrium and, together with the distri­
bution o f preferences, co-determines the characteristics ofthe equilibrium state(s) o f col­
lective choice processes" (Shepsle, 1979).
Structure and procedure together with preferences produce equilibria. Shepsle 
discusses various kinds o f structures and procedures that induce stability, for 
instance, the division of labour, in which every committee is allowed to decide only on 
one policy dimension (1979). This idea cannot be applied to the process of coalition 
formation, since coalition formation includes decision-making on multiple dimensions 
that should be combined in one coalition. In the final instance, this theory could 
offer one party complete power over the cabinet formation. Theoretically, this is 
possible, but naturally this does not comply with the practice of coalition formation. 
Another kind of structure described by Shepsle, is the sequence of the game. In 
coalition formation, the sequence in which parties are allowed to suggest a coalition 
determines the course of the game (Shepsle, 1989). Yet another example is a model 
in which the number of possible alternatives is reduced. This domain restriction is
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a procedural matter which leads to a lesser number o f possible equilibria (Shepsle, 
1979). Sometimes parties themselves reduce the number o f possible coalition 
alternatives, by announcing that they will not join a coalition with some other party. 
O ther institutional features are an agenda setter model, or a sequence model in 
which amendments are always compared with the status quo position. In the first 
case, the agenda setter has more than average power and influences the outcome of 
the game, and in the second case the status quo position can be very powerful. In 
coalition formation, the ‘formateur’ can be seen as the agenda setter who leads the 
formation, and the incumbent government can be seen as the status quo position. 
The latter institutional feature can lead to problems when ‘translated’ into coalition 
formation, since it can be the case that the status quo cabinet does not represent the 
majority in parliament after the elections.
Romer and Rosentahl (1978) also developed an institutional model based on the 
agenda setter idea. Their main argument is that the agenda setter is an institution 
that reduces the number o f possible equilibria. Stated more eloquently: “controlled 
agendas appear to minimize decision costs"(Romer & Rosentahl, 1978). But Romer and 
Rosentahl did not develop their model in order to solve the problem of coalition 
formation. Their model was applied to decision-making on the issue of tax expenditure 
and can be applied to other cases of collective decision-making.
Like most work on the institutional approach, research on the issue o f coalition 
formation is also mainly examined in a non-cooperative setting, which leads to 
major changes in the behavioural assumptions of the parties. Most important is that we 
should abandon simple game theory since this is developed for cooperative games. 
In a cooperative setting, preplay communication is allowed and players can increase 
their payoffs when cooperating. It is quite uncommon in institution-oriented coalition 
formation theories that the ideas are translated into a model. The research of Ström 
et al. and Laver and Schofield, discussed in the previous sections, are examples of 
research on institutional coalition formation without constructing formal models.
Shepsle (1979) has developed the following model. A position x  - whether it be 
a policy position, a social choice or a coalition - is invulnerable whenever there is no 
alternative that can beat it. If there is an alternative within the rules that can beat x, 
position x  is vulnerable. The rules can demand splitting up the committee or the 
policy space (for instance: distributing the jurisdiction among committee members). 
The position x  is a structure induced equilibrium if and only if it is invulnerable.
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For the formal definition of a structure-induced equilibrium, we need to define 
the following:
For a policy x, the set of policies preferred to it by a majority is known as the policy 
winset of x, denoted by W*(x). Let F (y) be the set of feasible points open to coalition
S, to be proposed at the given point. If we define the preference set for x  for coalition 
S (that is points that are preferred to x  by a coalition S) by PS (x)= {y \ y  RS x}; we 
can examine whether the members of S prefer any proposals from the feasible set to x 
(Shepsle & Weingast, 1981).
Definition 3 .1 4
x  is vulnerable if 3 y  such that: 
y  e  PS (x) for some coalition S 
y  G W  (x) (Shepsle & Weingast, 1981).
Definition 3 .15
x  is invulnerable if x  is not vulnerable (Shepsle & Weingast, 1981).
It is now possible to define Shepsle’s notion of an equilibrium:
Definition 3 .1 6
A point x* is a structure-induced equilibrium (SIE) if it is invulnerable 
(Sheplse, 1979; Shepsle & Weingast, 1981).
Thus, x* is a SIE iffW (x) D PS (x) = 0  V  S-. This says that a point x  is a SIE i f  and 
only i f  those points which defeat x* either can be proposed only by those who do not 
prefer to do so, or cannot be proposed at all (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981, p 512).
In order to defeat an alternative, it is necessary that there are other alternatives 
within the feasible set - FS(x) - i.e. there should exist other alternatives that can be 
proposed. Furthermore, the latter alternative(s) should also be preferred to the former. 
In this design, notions o f agenda setting and the status quo position are incorpo­
rated in the equilibrium concept, because they determine the feasible set. If  an 
amendment can only be put to a vote against the status quo, this means that the set 
of feasible alternatives is small. Likewise, if members o f a coalition S only have 
jurisdiction in one policy area, the number of possible feasible alternatives is small, 
and thereby enhances the chance of a structure-induced equilibrium (SIE).
Shepsle considers domination of alternatives in his SIE approach, and therefore 
needs an assumption on preferences. It is worthwhile to design a spatial coalition
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formation theory - in which preferences are based on distances from ideal points - 
which also includes institutional factors. If we consider the incumbent government 
as the status quo position, and compare this coalition with others, the winset of the 
status quo can be determined. Laver and Shepsle do exactly this, in their theory on 
credible proposals in 1996, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. In this theory, the 
feasible set is determined with Shepsle’s institutional approach, i.e. every possible 
coalition is compared with the status quo coalition, and then the winset of the status 
quo is determined. In this theory, called the winset theory, the notion of jurisdiction 
is also central. The state-secretaries are considered sole masters of their departments.
In 1988, Austen-Smith and Banks developed a sequential model to analyse electoral 
and legislative decision-making in a three-party proportional representation system. 
Since, the core position on the policy space is in general non-existent, an exogenous 
institutional structure is imposed. The institutional feature they applied is the 
convention of first asking the party with the largest share of the vote to attempt to 
form a government. The Austen-Smith and Banks model is a non-cooperative and 
multi-stage model. It differs from for instance the SIE approach in that it does not 
predict coalition formation as such. Rather, it is a model that describes which coalition 
would occur if this rule would be applied. Moreover, the model seems quite clear in 
a simple situation, but it does not include information about how to extend it to a 
situation with multiple issues and multiple actors.
Baron applied a similar idea in 1993. Baron proposed two coalition formation 
models with institutional features. For the sake of illustration, Baron’s models will be 
discussed at some length but without presenting all the formal definitions. In contrast 
to work as discussed in the previous section on constraints, Baron (1991/1993) does 
try to present a comprehensive coalition formation theory that takes institutional 
matters into account. We shall however see that these models do not provide equi­
libria when multiple actors and multiple policy dimensions are included.
Baron (1993) distinguishes three main stages in (multi-party) political systems:
•  the electoral system, which usually is a proportional representation system,
•  the legislative system that is said to be parliamentary, and
•  the government formation process.
He further distinguishes two main actors: parties and voters. The party’s choice of 
a policy position depends on the distribution of the voters. This position can be 
viewed as an electoral platform, and as the bargaining position during the formation. 
The set of supporters, i.e. voters is endogenous to the choice of a party’s platform 
as induced by the government formation process.
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Baron states that the government formation process should lead to equilibrium 
governments. The objectives of Baron’s analysis are to establish and characterise 
equilibrium party configurations and party positions. Baron argues that a political 
equilibrium is expected to reflect the characteristics of the government formation 
process which occurs after an election has determined the number of seats for each 
party. A political equilibrium consists o f “ (1) sets o f voters each o f whom supports the 
party with a policy position closest to his or her ideal point, (2) a vector o f party policy 
positions each o f which maximizes the average expected utility ofthe party’s supporters 
and from which the parties bargain in the context o f a government formation process, 
and (3) a government formation equilibrium in which the government and its policies 
are determined" (Baron, 1993, p 38).
As said above, Baron considers two kinds of government formation processes. 
The first is probabilistic; the probability that a party will be given authority to try 
to form a government, is equal to the proportion of seats it holds in government. In 
the second model, a fixed order or in other words a recognition rule - see Section 
5.1, a rule that gives special bargaining power to some actor - is involved. A fixed 
order, e.g. by representation of parties, can be used to select a party that first 
attempts to form a government.
Baron’s research is similar to Austen-Smith’s work, in which a rule is first applied 
and coalition formation is examined next. Testing these theories is not very useful 
since they refer to rules that are not applied in reality.
First, in the probabilistic model, Baron predicts that an equilibrium can be 
established at the centre of the policy space. He describes this in the following 
proposition, in which he explores a situation with three parties:
“For a government formation process in which the probability o f selection equals the 
proportion o f seats held, all three parties choosing policy positions at the center and one 
third ofthe voters voting for each candidate form a political equilibrium. The center is 
the only policy position that is an equilibrium with all parties choosing the same policy” 
(Baron, 1993).
This position at the centre seems plausible since if one o f the parties moves away 
from the centre it will lose a share o f the votes. If one of the other two parties is then 
selected to form a government it will invite the other party located at the centre. 
The parties thus remain ‘trapped’ at the centre by majority rule. This model leads to the 
next result: “For a government formation process with proportional selection, there is an 
equilibrium in which all three parties choose policy positions that are equidistant from the
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centre and at a distance D = .485from each other. The parties receive one-third ofthe vote” 
(Baron, 1993). Note that this idea is an extension of Downs’ idea, which is presented 
in Chapter 2, that in a multi-party system with one dimension, parties converge to 
the median position in order to receive as many votes as possible (Downs, 1957).
Secondly, government formation with ‘a fixed order’ is a different story. Based on 
institutional traditions in countries, a fixed order is used to determine which party 
may start trying to form a government. An example of a fixed order is giving the 
largest party the first opportunity. If we have two large parties and one small party, 
one of the large parties will start by negotiating a government with the small party. 
This small party will never be in the selection process, but is a good coalition partner. 
Its goal is therefore to find the optimal location as compared to the other parties. 
Equilibria are possible if the small party is equidistant from the policy positions of 
the two other parties. This leads to the following result: “In a government formation 
process with (1) selection in the order o f representation, (2) fixed and symmetric positions 
o f two parties, and (3) a party that will never be in the selection process, that party has 
an optimal location and will be in the government with whichever ofthe large party is 
selected" (Baron, 1993). For some fixed positions o f the two parties, the third party 
may have an optimal position. If the third party reaches its optimum, i.e. maximises its 
share of the vote, the political equilibrium has the property that each party maximises 
its vote share.
In the fixed order model, an equilibrium can be found at another point than in 
the probabilistic model: “I f  all three parties are in the selection process and a fixed  
order o f selection is chosen randomly when all three parties have the same vote shares, 
there is a political equilibrium in which all three parties choose policy positions equally 
distant from the centre and at a distance D = 1.375from each other" (Baron, 1993). 
The positions are further away from the centre than in the proportional selection 
model. In the latter, the parties are not vote maximising. W hen selection is based on 
size, the parties choose positions more distant from the centre than the centroids of 
their voters’ ideal points. They do so because another position would allow another 
party to gain a larger vote share and thus the opportunity to form a government.
Based on these two models, Baron concludes that electoral incentives in pro­
portional representation parliamentary systems do not necessarily lead to political 
convergence. The proportional selection model reduces dispersion of policy 
positions, but in the fixed model a party may have an incentive to choose a policy 
position that gives it the smallest vote share in order to become an attractive coalition 
partner for one o f the larger parties. In this model with equally large parties, the 
parties are positioned symmetrically around the centre and dispersed.
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To summarise, Baron presented a model based on the distribution of votes. The 
distribution of these votes and the institutional system are the main ingredients of 
his model. Baron provides examples that include three parties and two policy 
dimensions. Theoretically, some pointers are given about how to generalise and 
extend this theory. Yet, if we add more parties and more policy dimensions, the 
analysis gets extremely complex, making it hard to tell which equilibria will come 
about. Furthermore, Baron’s goal seems to be to predict policy positions of parties 
and not coalitions as such. Unfortunately, this has not led to a comprehensive 
behavioural coalition formation theory that includes institutional features.
In conclusion, Ström et al. (1994) and Laver and Schofield (1990) presented 
impressive lists o f institutional variables that can influence social choice processes in 
general and coalition formation in particular, but they did not develop a formal 
coalition formation theory. Furthermore, some of the institutional features are 
already integrated in the behavioural theories, which are discussed in this and the 
next chapter. The formal rules - such as the electoral thresholds and the majority 
requirement if investiture vote is needed - precede in formal coalition formation 
theories, since we start with simple games. In most theories, the distribution of seats 
is the point of departure and only majority governments are predicted. The cabinet 
operation rules and the legislative rules are interesting and could be included in formal 
coalition formation theories. I agree with Laver and Schofield (1990) that party 
rules and the influence of external veto players are ad hoc considerations, which are 
difficult to insert in a formal coalition formation theory. Recognition rules, that give 
special bargaining power to for instance the head of state or the status quo govern­
ment, are included in institutional theories on coalition formation.
Shepsle (1979) and Romer & Rosentahl (1978) developed coalition formation 
theories but their theories require more information on preference-formation of the 
players. The sequence model, in which the status quo and amendments are voted 
upon, might not be relevant in coalition formation since it is feasible that in weighted 
majority games the incumbent government could receive less than the quota. In that 
case, it cannot be considered as a possible winning coalition and could consequently 
not function as a feasible status quo. However, a formal theory - the Winset theory
- that includes institutional factors and behavioural assumptions, will be described 
in the next chapter. In this Section, 4.2.3, Shepsle’s notion of feasible coalitions and 
winsets is further developed in Laver and Shepsle’s theory on credible proposals 
(Laver & Shepsle, 1996).
Baron (1993) and Austen-Smith & Banks (1988) developed models that describe 
which coalition could come about if a specific rule is applied. The main problem
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with these models is that they do not provide sufficient information about how to 
apply them in situations with multiple issues and multiple actors. Moreover, Baron 
(1991, 1993) seems more concerned about predicting policy positions of parties than 
about predicting coalitions.
In conclusion, institutional theories have provided hints on how to reduce the 
number of feasible coalitions but have not led to a comprehensive theory o f coali­
tion formation. Most theories discuss constraints that are already incorporated in 
other coalition formation theories, sometimes even because they simply follow from 
the definitions o f a simple game, and therefore their added value is not large. Also, 
in the case of the division of labour, like in the Structure Induced Equilibria (SIE) 
approach, and in the sequential model of Baron (1993), the theories do not represent 
the reality of cabinet formation. It is for these reasons that these theories will not be 
empirically tested in this research. However, note that institutional constraints are 
not disregarded completely, since in some cases the constraints are already included. 
Moreover, the winset theory, which will be tested, includes an idea that is similar to 
the notion of jurisdiction of the SIE approach.
3.6 Summary
The theories and hypotheses presented here are derived for the best known ‘tradi­
tional’ coalition formation theories. We started with the ‘oldest’ coalition formation 
theories, namely office-seeking theories. Next, policy-oriented theories that apply 
ordinal uni-dimensional policy scales were presented, followed by actor-oriented 
approaches. For all formal theories in these sections, hypotheses were derived that 
will be confronted with data in Chapter 6.
As I said in Chapter 1, most institutional theories are not formal theories and are 
therefore difficult to compare with the other theories modelled in this study. This 
seems especially true for the informal theories in Section 3.5.1, which are not 
derived by deduction, and consist of constraints rather than assumptions. Ruling 
out all coalitions not obeying the constraints is not at all the same as an axiomatic 
theory predicting which coalition should be formed.
In case of the more comprehensive and predictive theories in this class, the following 
was concluded. Romer and Rosentahl (1978) designed an agenda-setter theory that 
cannot easily be applied to coalition formation. Baron (1993) and Austen-Smith & 
Banks (1988) presented theories, which apply rules that do not necessarily hold for 
coalition formation in the Netherlands. More importantly, they have not given
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insight on how to extend their models to more than three party-systems. Further, 
note that the structure-induced equilibrium does seem to fit the requirements of a 
formal theory, and can be included in the empirical research. Yet, since this theory 
is very similar to the winset theory that will be studied in the next chapter, I have 
decided not to consider it. Consequently, all institutional theories are left outside of 
the empirical analysis.
All other theories in this chapter, office-seeking, policy-seeking as well as actor- 
oriented, are simple axiomatic models that do comply with the requirements for 
formal models and can be tested easily. From the class of policy-seeking theories, only 
De Swaan’s policy distance theory is problematic because it is internally inconsistent.
Finally, the hypotheses that were derived in this chapter will be tested in Chapter
6. The evaluation will be done using the same format as used for the classification of 
the theories. We shall test the theories for every class, which will lead to a conclusion 
about what that class of theories is that performs best. The hypotheses derived in 
this chapter and the hypotheses that will be derived in the next can be found in 
Appendix A3.
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4 .  S p a t i a l  C o a l i t i o n  F o r m a t i o n  T h e o r i e s
4.1 Introduction
Spatial coalition formation theories are multi-dimensional policy-driven theories. 
These multi-dimensional theories share with the uni-dimensional policy driven 
theories the assumption that policy positions of parties are important ingredients in 
the formation process. However, instead o f having a position on an uni-dimension­
al policy scale, players hold a position in the multi-dimensional policy or ideology 
space. Moreover, and more important, they use a metric for measuring distances. 
This is a distinctive feature with respect to the uni-dimensional theories treated in 
the previous chapter. Furthermore, multi-dimensional theories are attractive 
because the placement of parties in a multi-dimensional space is more detailed than 
the placement on one dimension. The spatial theories in this section are modelled 
as spatial simple games: G = (N, W, R^).
Figure 4.1
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The spatial coalitional theories examined here are the latest development in this 
type of research, and since the goal of this research is to compare spatial theories with 
the ‘traditional’ coalition formation theories, a thorough overview of these theories 
will be presented in this chapter. Also, in order to gain more insight in these theories, 
a computation example will be provided for every theory. In addition, we also refer to 
the requirements for formal theories — namely that the assumptions are internally 
consistent, independent, sufficient, and necessary - in the discussion of the spatial 
theories. In the last section of this chapter, spatial theories will be compared 
- theoretically - with the other classes of coalition formation theories. For a summary 
of the classification of the theories I refer to the Figure 4.1
The following theories - highlighted in Figure 4.1 - will be discussed:
- Political Heart Solution (Schofield, 1993a; 1993b; 1995)
- Protocoalition Formation (Grofman, 1982)
- Winset Theory (Laver & Shepsle, 1990; 1996)
- Competitive Solution (McKelvey, Ordeshook & Winer, 1978)
- Maximal Satisfaction Solution (De Vries, 1997).
These spatial theories have in common that they have a descriptive part in which the 
preferences of the players are determined and a predictive part that applies solution 
concepts and thus selects coalitions.
A problem with spatial theories is that they often lack a core solution. Owen (1995) 
states this eloquently in the following theorem:
"A necessary and sufficient condition for a spatial game to have a non-empty core is that 
all median hyperplanes pass through the same point. That point (the intersection o f all 
median hyperplanes) is necessarily the ideal point o f at least one voter. Moreover, this point 
is not only undominated, it actually dominates all other points” (Owen, 1995, p 411). 
Owen further states that the absence of a core solution deprives us of one of the 
most appealing solution concepts. The response to this problem is introducing 
points which come as close as possible to being in the core. Examples of these solu­
tion concepts are the Copeland winner and the Yolk (Owen, 1995).
Another theoretical problem is that most spatial theories are not designed to predict 
coalitions, but to search for an undominated policy point in the space. This policy 
point does not directly refer to a particular coalition.
The last theoretical drawback is that some of the spatial theories that are concerned 
with coalition formation predict key players and not the whole coalition.
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In this research, the focus is on spatial theories that do generate equilibria, and these 
equilibria are coalitions or at least key players in these coalitions.
O f  the five theories, the Heart Solution and the W inset Theory are not designed to 
predict coalitions, but to predict key players. They have nevertheless been included in 
this research, because they introduce interesting behavioural assumptions. The Heart 
Solution is innovative, because it searches for undominated policy points based on 
studying median lines. These policy points can be associated with coalitions. The 
W inset Theory is fascinating, because it starts from the assumption that the distri­
bution o f ministerial portfolios is central to coalition bargaining.
These theories, in their pure form, are not qualified to predict coalitions. In other 
words, not all axioms necessary for predicting coalitions are present. In the first theory, 
a party or a group of parties form the heart are predicted, whereas in the second, the 
portfolio allocation on the (two) main dimensions is predicted. These theories provide 
solutions, which often do not refer to majority or winning coalitions, but to the 
‘guts’ of a coalition1. Since the behavioural assumptions of these theories are interesting, 
I have decided to add assumptions, so that winning coalitions can be predicted. 
These adjusted ‘solution concepts’ enable us to compare the prediction efficiency of 
these coalition formation theories with other coalition formation theories examined 
in this research.
The Protocoalition Formation (Grofman, 1982), the Competitive Solution (McKelvey 
et al., 1978) and the Maximal Satisfaction Solution take as point of their departure 
a distance matrix, in which distances between positions of parties and expected 
positions of coalitions are computed. Preferences are based on these distances and 
different solution concepts are applied. Protocoalition Formation uses a clustering 
strategy, the Competitive Solution selects viable coalition proposals, and the Maximal 
Satisfaction Solution predicts the coalition with the highest average aggregated satis­
faction of the players. The Maximal Satisfaction Solution is a promising concept, 
since it introduces the idea of collective satisfaction. This is favourable, since if we 
search for individual maximal satisfaction this often leads to cycles of preferences on 
the collective level. This new solution concept is the only theory that, strictly speak­
ing, abandons the assumption o f individual rationality. It predicts the coalition with 
the highest average utility of the players, but the choice of a party for the coalition 
with the highest aggregate satisfaction, can be based on an individual rationality.
1 Since most w ords referring to the centre of a coalition (core, yolk, centre, heart) have already been 
used, to refer to specific theories or solution concepts, I shall refer to the centre or essence of a coalition 
as the 'guts' o f a coalition.
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The five theories that will be discussed in this chapter, are merely a selection from 
the whole body of spatial coalition formation theories. I shall, without assuming to 
be complete, briefly present a number of theories or solution concepts that are not 
included in this research, but did contribute to developments in the field of spatial 
theory.
First of all, not included in this chapter on spatial coalition formation theories are 
a number of core-related solution concepts. The core in a spatial configuration, i.e. 
the point where all median lines or median hyperplanes intersect, is the set of 
undominated policies. Two extensions of the core concept are the Copeland W inner 
and the Yolk (Owen, 1995). The Copeland W inner selects, in absence of a core point, 
a policy point that is dominated by as few points as possible. The Yolk is also applied 
when no core point exists, and is the point(s) closest to all median hyperplanes. 
These solution concepts give an indication for the ‘best’ policy point of the coalition, 
but they do not predict which coalition should be formed. Therefore, they concepts 
are not included in this research. Other solution concepts, closely related to the core, 
the Nucleolus and the Kernel (Shubik, 1995; Owen, 1995), are , for the same reason, 
not included here.
Secondly, not discussed in this chapter is the Bargaining Set, which considers the 
payoff structures o f the players in an n-person game. In the Bargaining Set, threats 
and counter-threats are considered, and stable payoff structures are predicted as the 
outcome of the game. To put it simply, w ithout the formal definitions, a point is a 
bargaining point if any threat or objection can be met by a counter-threat or count­
er-objection (Shubik, 1995).
Another solution concept not included is the theory of ‘Uncovered Sets’ (Shepsle & 
Weingast, 1984; Cox, 1987). In uncovered sets, undominated policy points with 
respect to a cover relation are predicted; x  is uncovered if there is no y  that covers x. 
Policy point x covers y, if x  is majority-preferred to y, and if everything that is major­
ity-preferred to x  is also majority-preferred to y .
In summary, providing a complete overview of spatial theories has not been my 
intention. In the case of spatial theories, the choice for theories in this research has 
been quite selective. Spatial coalitional theories, which I believe are promising, have 
been included: they should combine a clear assumption on party behaviour, with a 
non-empty coalitional prediction set. In the next section, the spatial theories included 
in this research will be extensively discussed one by one. For these, computation 
examples will be given. They are complex theories, and an illustration improves the 
understanding of the intuition o f these theories. The Dutch party system and the 
positioning of the political parties in space will be considered in Chapter 5. A brief 
clarification, of the parties and coalitions, which might be helpful for reading the
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computation examples, is given in Appendix A. In the final section of this chapter, 
I shall briefly evaluate spatial and non-spatial theories. The hypotheses that are 
derived in this chapter, and that will be used for the test o f spatial theories, are also 
summarised in Appendix A.
4.2 M ulti-dim ensional Coalition Formation Theories
4.2.1 The Heart Solution
Schofield developed the political heart as a solution concept for spatial coalitional 
games (Schofield, 1993a; 1993b; 1995). The descriptive part of the Heart Solution is 
similar to other theories that will be discussed in this section. A party holds a position 
in a policy space, and preferences for coalitions are based on Euclidean distances. 
Schofield (1993a) refers to the convex hull of the preferred positions of the parties as 
the compromise set for a coalition. In two dimensions, we can present this as the area 
bounded by straight lines joining the bliss points (which is an ideal policy position 
o f a party) o f the parties and including all possible coalition members.
The main difference between this solution concept and the Competitive (Section 
4.2.4) or the Maximal Satisfaction Solution (Section 4.2.5) is that in the Heart Solution, 
we search for undominated policy points. The intersection of the compromise sets 
for all winning coalitions is non-empty if there is a core solution2. If there is a core, 
no other coalition can propose an alternative policy point that is preferred by all 
members of a winning coalition. Thus, a policy point is a core point if it lies in the 
compromise set of every winning coalition (Schofield, 1993a; 1993b). Next, a core party 
is a party whose ideal point is a core point. In two dimensions the core party must 
be the largest party (Schofield, 1993a). As we saw in the previous section, the core in 
multi-dimensional space is often empty. It exists only under severe symmetry condi­
tions. Hence, another solution concept must be applied. The solution theory designed 
by Schofield to solve this problem is known as the Heart Solution (Schofield, 1993a; 
1993b; 1995).
The first step in order to determine the Heart Solution is to examine whether a core 
position exists. Checking whether the median lines intersect does this. In two
2 Note that in this theory the core refers to the core point or core position in space, and not to the core 
as in section 3 .6 .4  w here it refers to the set of undom inated coalitions that are based on the preference 
profiles of the players.
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dimensions, a median line is a line through two party positions, for which it is true 
that either on or to one side of the line, these parties comprise a majority. This must 
be true for both sides of the line. If  more than two dimensions are included, the 
median lines are median hyperplanes.
If not all median lines intersect, the core is empty, and the area bounded by the 
median lines is called the cycle set (Schofield, 1993a). For a point x  in the cycle set there 
always exists another point in this set that dominates x. Cycles o f preferences thus 
exist. For a point outside the cycle set z, there is always a point inside the cycle set 
that dominates z. So, if the core is empty, there will be voting cycles, but usually 
these will not involve coalition possibilities that range all over the policy space 
(Schofield, 1995). Schofield describes the relation between the Pareto set, the cycle 
set and the core as follows:
”The Pareto set is just the compromise set o f all parties, and with our assumption o f 
Euclidean preference, this set is simply the convex set bounded by the outer party positions. 
Clearly, the Cycle set is a subset ofthe Pareto set. Given the party strengths and the party 
positions, the heart is the union ofthe core and the cycle set” (Schofield, 1993a). 
Schofield defines the political heart as the union of the core and the cycle set. We first 
define the following: the core is denoted as CH  (choice) and CY  is the cycle set of D. 
D  is defined as the family of winning (or decisive) coalitions defined by the manifesto 
profile z. This D  corresponds to our W, namely the set o f winning coalitions, but is 
a problematic concept since the Heart also predicts minority coalitions. These 
minority coalitions are not winning according to the rules for weighted majority 
games. Note that Schofield refers to the Heart as either Heart or political Heart and 
that these concepts are identical. For reasons o f clarity, I shall, in the remainder of 
this study, only use the term Heart. The relation between the core and the cycle set 
can now be defined:
H  (D (z)) = CH (D (z)) U C Y(D  (z)) (Schofield, 1993b, p 145).
The Heart is never empty since if the cycle set is empty the core is non-empty and 
vice versa. Therefore the following hypothesis, based on Schofield (1993a, 1993b, 
1995) can be defined:
Hypothesis 4.1 H eart
In a spatial coalitional game only coalitions in the Heart will be formed.
The prediction set of the Heart is thus a set o f coalitions from either the cycle set 
or the core. If a core policy point exists, and if a party represents that point, it is still 
not decided which coalition to predict. In his 1993(a) research, Schofield suggests that:
“ when the party positions are such that the core does indeed exist, then it is not ratio-
A N  A SSESSM EN T OF SPATIAL CO A LIT IO N  FORM ATION THEORIES 87
C h a p te r  4
nal for any winning coalition to exclude the core party ” (p 8). Moreover, the ability of 
a core party to control policy implies a tendency for core parties to form minority 
governments. Coalitions consisting of the core party and one or two other parties 
will be predicted.
In the absence o f a core party, a wide variety of coalitions can be predicted. An 
example, from the same study as referred to above (i.e. Schofield, 1993a), will be presen­
ted in order to demonstrate the - lack of - discriminatory power of the Heart 
Solution. The example consists of the coalition formation process in 1952 in the 
Netherlands. The party configuration that will be used, is taken form this article 
(Schofield, 1993a) and the party positions are derived form a different data set, than 
the data set that I shall use in the next Chapter. Therefore Schofield’s configuration 
o f 1952 is not identical to the configuration that will be used in the remainder of 
this research.
PARTY NAME SYMBOL SEATS
LABOUR PARTY PvdA 30
ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY PARTY ARP 12
CATHOLICS PEOPLES PARTY KVP 30
CHRISTIAN HISTORICAL UNION CHU 9
LIBERALS VVD 9
TOTAL 100
KVP
Table 4.1
T he  e lection of 
June 1952 in 
the N etherlands 
(Sch o fie ld ,1 9 93 a .)
Figure 4.2
A n  em pty  core and 
a non-em pty cycle 
set (b ounded  set) 
fo r a hypothetical 
co nfigu ratio n  of 
party positions in 
tw o  dim ensional 
policy space in 
the N etherlands 
(Schofie ld , 1993a.)
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Since the median lines (bold lines) do not intersect, we can conclude that there 
is no core party. So there must be a cycle set. In order to present Schofield’s 
approach accurately, we cite from his research: “To define this set (i.e. the Heart) for 
the configuration [of Figure 4.2], consider a line through {KVP, ARP} positions. On 
this line and to the right lies a majority coalition {KVP, ARP, CHU}, while on the line 
and to the left lies another majority {KVP, ARP, PvdA}. Such a line is called a median 
line. ... A quick inspection shows that {PvdA, ARP} and {PvdA, KVP} are also both 
medians (in the second case because the coalition of the PvdA and the KVP is itself 
a majority coalition” (Schofield, 1993 a. p 10)
Schofield further suggests that: “one interference from the model is that parties whose 
positions are in the Heart will be more powerful than those whose positions are outside it. 
The model therefore gives a quite restrictive coalition prediction:
(a) either the Heart surplus coalition {PvdA, KVP, ARP};or
(b) a minimal winning coalition {PvdA, K V }};or
(c) one ofthe two minority coalitions {PvdA, ARP} or {KVP, ARP};
(d) or one o f these minority coalitions supported (informally) by one
ofthe weak players, VVD or CHU “ (Schofield, 1993a, p 11).
Schofield presents the Heart as a restrictive solution for coalition formation. The 
Heart is said to reduce the number of possibilities substantially. Schofield states that 
in the above example there are 16 winning coalitions, “but with party positions as in 
[Figure 4.2] there are effectively only three coalitions associated with the Heart" 3 
(Schofield, 1993a, p 11).
In my opinion, this statement and the prediction set obtained by ‘steps’ (a), (b), (c) 
and (d) are contradictory. If we reconstruct the above prediction set, we start with 
selecting the Heart surplus coalition. The Heart surplus coalition is: {PvdA, KVP, 
ARP}. The next step is to select minimal winning coalitions from inside the Heart; 
only the coalition {KVP, PvdA} meets this requirement. The next step (c) selects 
minority cabinets from the Heart. These are {PvdA, ARP} and {KVP, ARP}. In the last 
step, these minority governments receive support. This leads to {PvdA, ARP, VVD}, 
{PvdA, ARP, CHU} and {KVP ARP, VVD}, {KVP ARP, CHU}. The four steps result in the 
following prediction set: {KVP, ARP, PvdA}, {PvdA, KVP}, {PvdA, ARP}, {KVP, ARP},
3 Actually, this is not correct since there are only 14 w in n in g com binations of parties. Recode: [51; 30, 
12, 30, 9, 9] as respectively [a,b,c,d,e]. There is 1 w in n in g tw o-player com bination: {AC}. From the 10 
possible three-party com binations, 7 are w inning: {A BC}, {ABD}, {ABE}, {A C D }, {A CE}, {BCE}, {CDE}. 
Further, all 5 four-party com binations and the grand coalition are w inning. This leads to 1+7+5+1 =  14 
possible w inning com binations.
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{PvdA, ARP, CHU}, {PvdA, ARP, VVD}, {KVP, ARP, CHU}, {KVP, ARP, VVD}. There are 
indeed effectively three median lines connecting two parties, but this does not, as 
Schofield states, bring down the prediction set to three coalitions, but to eight possible 
coalitions.
Refinem ent of the Heart Solution
The large prediction sets necessitated a refinement of the theory, which was pro­
posed by Schofield in Party competition in a spatial model o f coalition formation 
(1993b) and in Multiparty electoral politics (1997). The refinement starts with assign­
ing probabilities to the various coalitions inside the Heart. The coalition outcomes 
in the Heart occur with a probability a . This probability becomes smaller when the 
distance between the parties in the coalition increases. Schofield states 
that “parties assume that the probabilities associated with different coalitions are inversely 
proportional to the [squared] distance between their declarations' (Schofield, 1997).
Schofield (1997)4 has defined the probability a  as follows: a  = — ——
(d istance)2
In this refined version the hypothesis is that the coalition with the highest probability 
will be formed.
A dditional Assum ptions
Hence, the main idea of Schofield’s Heart is the following: “the proposed coalition 
theory associated with the Heart is that the governments that form will incorporate the 
parties on the boundary ofthe Heart" (Schofield, 1997, p 288). Unfortunately testing 
the Heart Solution based on the information provided by Schofield is difficult. 
Schofield suggests the following four steps (a) either the Heart surplus coalition; or
(b) a minimal winning coalition [from one ofthe median lines]; or (c) one ofthe two 
minority coalitions [which are median lines]; or (d) one o f these minority coalitions 
supported (informally) by one ofthe weak players" (Schofield, 1993a, p 11). Although 
these steps seem clear enough, there is still a lot o f uncertainty if one tries to obtain 
a prediction set.
In order to resolve the ambiguities, I propose a set o f additional assumptions. Most 
assumptions are implicit in Schofield’s work, but for reasons of clarity we need to 
make them more explicit. These assumptions are necessary if we want to compute 
the Heart Solution. The assumptions are used for the standard version o f the Heart
4 This probability definition w as designed by Schofield and Parks in an unpublished paper (1993) 
and w as also suggested by Schofield in correspondence w ith the author (July 1997).
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- see Hypothesis 4.1 - since the extra assumptions define more accurately the steps that 
we need to take to determine the coalitions inside the Heart. These assumptions are 
also required for the new versions o f the Heart, the Heart Majority and the Heart 
Distance, that shall be introduced in the remainder of this section.
The first set of assumptions refers to the support of minority cabinets. These minority 
cabinets are located on the median lines. They are said - in step d - to be supported 
(in two dimensions) by a ‘third’ party, but it is not decided which parties will support 
the minority coalitions. I therefore propose the following assumptions:
•  If there is a median line which itself represents a majority, the parties on this median 
line will not support a minority cabinet.
•  From the remaining parties - i.e. the parties that do not form a winning median 
line cabinet themselves - the party closest to the minority cabinet will join the 
coalition. Parties join this coalition until the coalition becomes winning.
This latter assumption, although not proposed by Schofield, is added not only to 
distinguish between all possible coalitions that can be formed from minority cabinets, 
but it will also be used in the “majority version of the Heart”, which will be discussed 
later in this section. In the case of minority cabinets, it is reasonable to assume in a 
policy-driven theory that parties in the policy space that are as close as possible to 
the minority coalition will join the ‘guts-coalition’.
The idea behind the first assumption is that parties which themselves form a win­
ning coalition, will prefer their ‘own’ coalition and will thus not want to support 
another. Compare, for instance, the 1952 example described above. The KVP will 
not support minority {PvdA, ARP}, since it prefers the minimal winning coalition 
{PvdA, KVP}.
In discussing the 1952 example we also said that based on step d, the minority cabinet 
{KVP, ARP} could be supported by the CH U , but also by the VVD. Even though 
Schofield is not definite about this situation, we shall interpret the refined versions 
of the Heart, based on the above assumptions, to allow support from the party that is 
closest to the minority median line under consideration. In our example, this would 
lead to removing the minority cabinets supported by the VVD from the prediction 
set. The VVD is further away from the minority cabinets than the CHU.
The following additional assumptions concern the ‘boundedness’ of the cycle set. In 
quite a few empirical examples, the median lines do not form a bounded set or area. 
In these cases there is no closed cycle set, but it is yet possible to determine median 
lines. For these configurations, I have decided to proceed with the median lines, and 
predict all coalitions that can occur from the median lines.
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•  If the median lines do not form a closed cycle set, we shall proceed with the median 
lines and follow steps a, b, c, and d.
•  If we find more median lines in the party configuration than the lines that together 
form a bounded cycle set (see in the next example), we continue predicting with 
the median lines that together form the cycle set and shall exclude the ‘unnecessary’ 
median line.
The next assumption deals with the presence of a core-party.
•  If  a core party exists, only coalitions from the median lines that naturally include 
the core party will be predicted. Again, next to the ‘heart surplus coalition’, no 
coalitions larger than minimal winning will be predicted.
Note that a ‘supported’ minority cabinet is not necessarily a minimal winning coali­
tion. It is nonetheless minimal in the ‘closeness’ sense. Consider a four-party cabinet, 
where the first two parties form the minority cabinet, the third is the closest party and 
the fourth is the next close party that turns the coalition into a winning coalition. 
In this case, it is possible that a combination of the minority cabinet and the ‘fourth’ 
party is winning. This cabinet would not include the party closest to the minority 
cabinet and would thus not be winning in the ‘closeness’ sense. This is similar to the 
Axelrod’s notion of minimal connected winning coalitions (see Chapter 3).
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, I wish to predict majority coalitions. The 
reason is mainly practical. There are neither constitutional constraints that prohibit 
the occurrence of minority coalitions, nor theoretical constraints that prohibit minority 
cabinets, but the political culture in the Netherlands is such that as a rule only 
majority, i.e. winning, coalitions are formed. Since most other theories in this chapter 
start from this winning assumption, I shall now introduce a majority version o f the 
Heart. This improves our ability to compare spatial theories with one another. 
Naturally, the prediction efficiency of a theory that predicts minority cabinets in a 
country in which only winning coalitions are formed is smaller than the prediction 
efficiency of theories that do not predict minority or losing coalitions.
I shall now present the hypothesis based on the first refined version of the Heart. In 
this version, which will be denoted as Heart Majority, the additional assumptions 
together with the demand for majority coalitions lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 .2  H eart M ajority
In spatial coalitional games only winning coalitions from the Heart will be 
formed.
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The last assumption that will be introduced is needed for a second refined version 
of the Heart. Schofield proposes this restriction in order to reduce the number of 
coalition possibilities. For a discussion about this revision o f the Heart, I refer to 
Schofield (1993b; 1997). The revision starts by assigning probabilities to the various 
coalitions inside the Heart. The coalition outcomes in the Heart occur with proba­
bility a . This probability becomes smaller if the distance between the parties in the 
coalition increases. Schofield states that “parties assume that the probabilities asso­
ciated with different coalitions are inversely proportional to the distance between their 
declarations" (Schofield, 1997). The formula Schofield uses, states that the utility of 
a coalition is inversely proportional to the squared distances within a coalition, 
namely inversely proportional to | |  Zi - Zj I I2. This is a common assumption in 
game theory; e.g. Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Riker and Ordeshook (1973) also 
assume that utility of a player is inversely proportional to the squared distance 
between that player’s policy position and the expected position of the coalition.
Schofield does not give much insight into how the distance within a coalition is 
computed. In the above formula, z{ is the policy position of party i, and the distance 
between the two parties, i and j, depends on their policy positions. A coalition of 
two parties is said to split the difference between its declarations in formulating policy 
(Schofield, 1997, p 281). Since Schofield splits the difference of the policy declarations 
when two parties are considered, I expect that he would do the same with a coalition 
consisting o f more parties. The expected policy position of a coalition would then 
simply be the weighted average policy positions of the parties inside the coalition. I 
assume that the distance within a coalition is computed by adding the distances of 
the parties to the expected policy point of that coalition. Even though Schofield 
(1993a, 193b, 1997) does not actually state that the expected policy point o f the 
coalition should be the weighted average policy point of the parties, I assume this is 
the case since it is common to determine the policy position of a coalition this way.
•  The distance of a coalition is computed by adding the individual distances of the 
parties to the expected ideal point o f the coalition. The expected policy position of 
a coalition is the ‘weighted’ ideal point o f the parties included in that coalition. 
Furthermore, Euclidean distance is used.
Schofield (1997) has defined the probability a  as follows: a  = —
(d istance)2
W ith this definition, the probability of the various coalitions occuring can be 
computed. Unfortunately, we run into problems when we try to calculate these 
probabilities. First, if some of the distances are below and others above one, squaring 
the distances leads to smaller distances if they ranged from 0 and 1, whereas greater
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distances become even larger when squared. Moreover whenever the distance of a 
coalition is smaller than 1, in the above formula we end up with probabilities greater 
than one, which is an impossibility. In short, taking the inverse of the squared distances 
can lead to problems.
These problems can be seen as simply a ‘unit of analysis’ problem, and can therefore 
be solved easily. First, we set the smallest distance at 1, and then re-scale the other 
distances. Subsequently the squared distances for each coalition can be calculated. 
This leads to numbers (distances) that are inversely related to the probability of 
forming a coalition. If we re-scale these numbers so that they add up to 1, the 
probability can be found by subtracting each number from one. We have done this 
in the following example of coalition formation in the Netherlands in 1946:
DISTANCE VVD PVDA ARP CHU KVP TOTAL RESCALE
DISTANCE
SQUARED RESCALE
SURPLUS 1.08 0.68 0.80 1 .01 0.07 3.64 4.98 24.83 0.62
PvdA/KVP 0.39 0.36 0.75 1.02 1.05 0.03
k v p /a r p 0.52 0.21 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.02
k v p /c h u 0.79 0.20 0.99 1.35 1.82 0.05
k v p /v v d 0.88 0.16 1.04 1.43 2.04 0.05
KVP/ARP/VVD 0.86 0.51 0.26 1.63 2.24 5.00 0.12
k v p /a r p /c h u 0.50 0.77 0.28 1.55 2.12 4.48 0.11
sum 40.22 1.00
It is now possible to calculate the probability of a coalition from the heart with 
the above formula. However, since we are only interested in the coalition with the 
highest probability - and this coalition is always the coalition with the smallest total 
distance - the above steps seem unnecessary. The outcome - that is predicting the 
coalition with the highest probability - is invariant with respect to distance. Hence, 
the coalition with the highest probability will always be the coalition with the small­
est aggregated distance. Based on Ockham’s razor principle, i.e. the famous princi­
ple that states that entities or essences must not be multiplied beyond necessity 
(Popper, 1974, p 350), I therefore suggest that we simply predict the coalition from 
the heart with the lowest aggregated distance.
Table 4.2
Probabilities of the 
heart coalitions
PROBABILITY
0.383
0.974
0.975
0.955
0.949
0.876
0.889
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The third hypothesis - called Heart Distance - will therefore be:
Hypothesis 4 .3  H eart Distance
In spatial coalitional games the heart coalition with the lowest aggregated distance
will be formed.
The Heart Solution, together with the additional assumptions, can be illustrated 
with a spatial representation of the parties and the Heart Solution o f 1989 in the 
Netherlands (see Figure 4.3). The weights of the four largest parties and their positions 
on the two main policy dimensions (an economic dimension based on the scores on 
the tax issue and a social dimension based on the scores on social policy) are used 
for the computation example. The total number of seats in parliament is 150; therefore 
76 seats are necessary to create a majority. The following parties are included in the 
example: PvdA, D66, CDA, and VVD. The party strengths lead to the following 
weighted majority game: [76; 49, 12, 54, 22]. Parties are portrayed in the following 
order: PvdA, D66, CDA, and VVD.
The lines PvdA-CDA, PvdA-VVD, and CDA-VVD are median lines. Each has the 
property that either on or to one side of the line, parties can be found that between 
them comprise legislative majorities. For instance, the line PvdA-CDA is a median 
line with 103 seats, and on the line and below we have PvdA-CDA-D66 represent­
ing 115 seats. The Cycle set (defined with the additional assumptions) is the area 
bounded by {PvdA, VVD, CDA}. D66-CDA also meets the requirements for being 
a median line, with on the line and to the left 115 seats, and on the line and to the 
right 88. However, this median line will not be considered, since it is not included 
in the cycle set. There is no core solution since not all median lines intersect.
The heart, which is the area bounded by median lines, is PvdA-CDA-VVD. Hence, 
PvdA-CDA-VVD is the cycle set, and coalitions from this set will be formed. The 
coalitions that can be formed according to this theory are:
(a) the heart surplus coalition {PvdA, CDA, VVD};
(b) the minimal winning coalitions {PvdA, CDA} or {CDA,VVD};
(c) one minority coalition {PvdA, VVD};
(d) this minority coalition supported by another party {PvdA, VVD, D66}.
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Figure 4.3
H eart Solution for 
the Netherlands 
in 19 89
The second hypothesis predicts only winning coalitions from the heart. The pre­
diction set of the Heart Majority is {PvdA, CDA, VVD}, {PvdA, CDA}, {CDA,
VVD}, {PvdA, D66, VVD}.
Again we predicted a large set of coalitions. Since a theory that predicts exactly one 
coalition is preferable, we will now proceed with the refinement and thus apply the 
third hypothesis5. The coalition inside the heart with the lowest aggregated distance 
will then be predicted. We can conclude from Table 4.2, that coalition {CDA,
VVD} is the Heart Distance solution.
Table 4.3
Distances and 
Squared Distances 
of H eart C o alit io n s
DISTANCE d 66 VVD CDA PvdA AGGREGATED
DISTANCE
PvdA/CDA/VVD 0.957 0.823 1.000 2.779
PvdA/CDA 0.846 0.932 1.778
c d a /v v d 0.901 0.367 1.268
PvdA/VVD 1.138 0.511 1.649
PvdA/VVD /D 66 0.729 1.746 0.110 2.585
5 Note that it is possible for more than one coalition to have the sm allest aggregated  distance, in which 
case the refined Heart Solution can and will predict more than one coalition.
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Another proposition to refine the solution set of the heart is to regard the possible 
coalitions in the prediction set as protocoalitions. Schofield (1995) suggested this, 
but has not provided information on what would then be the procedure. I suggest 
linking the Heart Solution with Grofman’s Protocoalition Formation Theory in 
such a way that only Protocoalition Formation from parties inside the heart will be 
considered. This will be discussed at more length in section 4.2.2.
Remarks
The idea of searching for undominated policy points, in order to find the core party or 
the cycle set is interesting. However, a lot o f additional assumptions were necessary 
to turn the Heart Solution into a theory that predicts coalitions. The model - as 
designed by Schofield - does not really restrict the number of possible coalitions. 
The winning coalitional version with the ‘probability’ refinement seems promising 
in this respect.
4.2.2 Protocoalition Formation
The model of Protocoalition Formation developed by Grofman (1982) is a generali­
sation o f Axelrod’s (remind section 3.3.1) connectedness to M-dimensional space. 
The model is based on ideological closeness of parties. The behavioural assumption 
is that a party prefers a coalition which is close to its ideal point, to a coalition that is 
more distance from its ideal point. The utility function of a party is the inverse of the 
square of the Euclidean distance. In other words, the larger the Euclidean distance 
the lower the utility.
The predictive part o f the protocoalition model is dynamic. In the first stage a party 
seeks the party that is its closest ‘neighbour’ in multi-dimensional space. Preferences 
are determined by ideological closeness. This closeness relation must be reciprocal 
in order for two parties to form a protocoalition. Grofman describes this stage as 
follows:
“I f  and only i f  actor i is the actor closest to actor j  and actor j  is also the actor closest 
to actor i, where closeness is defined in terms o f weighted (subjective) distance, do the 
two join together in a protocoalition" (Grofman, 1982).
Grofman assumes that in a coalition between a party with large weight and a party 
with small weight, the position of the protocoalition in M-space will reflect the relative 
weights o f the players (ibid.). Consequently, the protocoalition will be closer to the
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ideal point o f the stronger party, i.e. the party with larger weight than to that o f the 
weaker party. This is an important assumption, because we usually assume distance 
to be symmetrical. In Grofman’s definition, party A can be more distant from party 
B than vice versa, because they have different weights. This seems to be plausible 
because if one party is far stronger than the other it seems likely that the former will 
have a higher impact on the policy position of a coalition between these two parties. 
This type of distance will be referred to as subjective distance. Note that in other 
spatial theories, distance between two parties is not subjective, even though the 
weights of the parties influence the policy positions of the coalitions.
If  a protocoalition represents more than half of the seats, and thus is winning, this 
coalition will be predicted. If  not, the second stage starts. The protocoalition is 
assumed to act as a single player and the same process starts again. The 
Protocoalition Formation ends when a winning coalition is generated. This formation 
process, which is divided in different phases, is referred to as a dynamic coalition 
formation process.
The following standard definition is used to determine the Euclidean distance 
denoted d, d(xa , x^ ) between two points:
1 U (xa - xb ) 11 = V (( Xal - Xb! )2 + ( - xb2 )2) .
The Subjective Euclidean Distance from party A to party B is denoted by
SED (A, B) = d (A, B) X  W b  (Straffin & Grofman, 1984).
Wa + Wb
We illustrate the Protocoalition Formation model for the Netherlands in 1994. 
The weights of the four largest parties and their positions on the two main ideological 
dimensions are used for the computation example. In this section, we shall also use 
two ideological dimensions to determine the party positions. The first dimension is 
based on economic government activity, and the second is an immaterial dimension 
or also referred to a social values dimension in which issues such as freedom play an 
important role. The first letter o f their Dutch name will denote the parties. The four 
parties are thus denoted as follows: the Social Democrats as P the left-wing liberals 
as D the Christian Democrats as C and the Liberal Party as V. In our illustration, 
we will denote coalitions as the set of players that are members of that coalition, i.e. 
a coalition of players P and D is represented as {PD}. In the first column of Table 
4.4, the weights of the parties are given; in the second column the position of the 
parties on the first dimension, and in the last column the position of the parties on 
the immaterial dimension.
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Table 4.4
Party w e igh ts  and 
policy positions 
of the fo u r main 
parties in 
the N etherlands 
in 19 94
Table 4.5
Subjective 
Euclidean distances 
in the first stage
Table 4.6
Subjective 
Euclidean distances 
in the second  stage
WEIGHTS ECONOMIC SOCIAL
P v d A  ( p ) 37 1.02 0.53
d 6 6  ( d ) 24 0.31 0.52
c d a ( c ) 34 0.05 -1 .50
VVD (V ) 31 -1.37 0.46
P vd A d 6 6 CDA VVD
P v d A  (P ) 0.00 0.28 1.08 1.09
d 6 6  ( d ) 0.43 0.00 1.19 0.94
c d a ( c ) 1.17 0.84 0.00 1.15
VVD (V ) 1.30 0.73 1.26 0.00
In the first stage in 1994, parties P and D were closest to each other, and would
form a protocoalition. Since they do not form a majority, we must continue with
the second stage.
P D C V
P D 0.00 0.76 0.71
C 1.37 0.00 1.15
V 1.40 1.26 0.00
In the second stage, parties C and V are closer to each other than either one is to
the protocoalition. Since no two-party coalition had a majority between them in
1994, Grofman would have predicted the grand coalition, {PDCV}. This protocoa­
lition process of 1994 is represented in the following figure. The actual coalition 
that was formed after the 1994 elections, is a coalition of parties P, D, and V.
In a dynamic spatial coalition process, parties form protocoalitions if their offers for 
partnership are reciprocal. The hypothesis can therefore be defined as follows:
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C
V
Figure 4.4
Protocoalition 
form ation  in 
the Netherlands 
in 19 94
Hypothesis 4 .4
The first protocoalition that represents a legislative majority of votes will be formed.
In 1996, Grofman suggested the following refinements of his Protocoalition 
Formation theory. He redefined connectedness at different dimensions. In the original 
theory, parties are connected and form protocoalitions if they are each other’s closest 
‘neighbour’. In the 1996 extension, a distinction is made between being closest on 
both dimensions at once, and lying next to each other on each separate dimension. 
In a multi-dimensional model it is possible that players are connected in the m-space, 
(remind that the dimensionality of the space in spatial voting games is referred to with 
an m see i f )  but are at the same time not connected on every single dimension. 
Formally, the model could be extended as follows:
Definition
A (proto)coalition shall be said to be fully connected in m-space when
it is j-connected for all integers 0< j  < m (Grofman, 1996).
The idea is that, if actors are not fully connected, there exists a dimension that can 
potentially split the coalition. Note that the additional requirement of full connected­
ness is similar to the notion of a dimension by dimension median, as applied by 
Laver and Shepsle (see Section 4.2.3). W ith this new definition, it is possible to 
extend the theory and predict only fully connected coalitions. However, we shall not 
test this hypothesis. Grofman’s empirical results showed that most post-war coalitions 
in Norway, Denmark and Germany, were connected in m-space, where m was set at
2 most of the times. However, these coalitions were often not connected on each 
separate dimension, so predicting coalitions based on the notion of connectedness 
on separate dimensions would not improve our results.
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In Grofman et al. (1996) institutional facts are added to the Protocoalition 
Formation Model. Grofman et al. stress that the “diversity o f  actual coalition forma­
tion processes in different countries"should be recognised (Grofman et al., 1996). In 
this sequential model, other facts than ‘connectedness’ are included. Now, the party 
with the greatest electoral strength can for instance start the formation process, or a 
particular party can be excluded from the formation. In practice, the largest party 
offers a protocoalition to the party that is closest to it. This party joins if the centre of 
gravity of the new protocoalition is closer to it than the centre of the complementary 
protocoalition. This is an interesting extension, but it will not be included and tested 
here, because it does not comply with the rules of Dutch coalition formation practice 
(for these rules I refer to the next chapter).
In both articles, Grofman (1996) and Grofman et al. (1996), state that different 
models of coalition formation work best in different situations. In some countries, 
like Italy or Israel, cabinet formation often occurs without new elections, whereas 
in other countries elections always precede coalition formation. Naturally, in the 
first case, a model that predicts a unique coalition cannot account for the shifts in 
coalitions without changes in legislative representation.
As suggested in Section 4.2.1, the combination of the Heart Solution and the 
Protocoalition Formation theory might be a useful coalition formation theory. We 
shall illustrate this theory with the example used in the previous section. The heart, 
which is the bounded set of median lines, consists of parties P C and V. The 
subjective Euclidean distances between the parties inside the heart will be computed, 
and the process o f Protocoalition Formation will then take its course.
Table 4.7
Party w e igh ts  and 
policy positions of 
the parties inside 
the heart in the 
N etherlands in 
19 89  and  their 
Subjective 
Euclidean 
D istances (SED).
1 9 8 9 WEIGHT TAXES SOCIAL POLICY
P v d A  (P ) 4 9 -0 .6 8 -0 .6 8
C D A  (C ) 54 0 .5 6 0 .7 4
V V D  (V ) 22 1.17 -0 .4
S E D Pv d A C D A v v D
P v d A 0 0 .9 9 0 .5 8
C D A 0 .9 0 0 0 .3 7
V V D 1 .29 0 .9 2 0
A N  A SSESSM EN T OF SPATIAL CO A LIT IO N  FORM ATION THEORIES 101
C h a p t e r  4
The parties C, the Christian Democrats and V, the Liberal party are closest to 
each other and therefore join together in a protocoalition. Since this protocoalition 
is winning, the process ends and the coalition {CV} is predicted according to the 
combination of the Heart and the Protocoalition Theory. The Heart Solution with 
the highest probability is the coalition {PC}, which was the coalition that actually 
formed in 1989. Note that there is another theoretical difference between the ‘highest 
probability Heart Solution’ and the combination o f the Heart and Protocoalition 
Formation. In the latter, weighted distances, i.e. subjective Euclidean distances, are used 
to compute the distances between these parties, instead o f plain Euclidean distances.
In a spatial coalition formation process, parties form protocoalitions from parties 
inside the heart if their offers for partnership are reciprocal. This continues until a 
winning coalition is formed. The combination of the heart and Protocoalition 
Formation leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4.5
The first protocoalition from parties inside the heart that represents a legislative
majority of votes will be formed.
Remarks
Grofman (1982) discusses some interesting features o f his dynamic protocoalition 
model. The model provides unique predictions and incorporates information about 
both weights and policy positions o f parties. In general, the model has a compre­
hensible behavioural assumption, clear stages in order to predict a coalition, and is 
relatively easy to test empirically (Grofman, 1982). Special about this theory is that 
it is dynamic, which seems to follow our intuition: coalition formation in general 
takes time and viewing this process as dynamic makes sense. Grofman also takes 
account of the need for reciprocity and because of that the need for asymmetry.
4.2.3 Winset Theory
The Winset spatial coalition formation theory distinguishes itself from the other 
theories in this chapter by focusing on bargaining on ministerial portfolios and not 
on coalition membership in general. The role of the status quo government is also 
important in the Winset theory. In this respect it resembles the structure induced- 
equilibrium notion as discussed in Section 3.5.
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Laver and Shepsle‘s main hypothesis of is “that the credibility o f  proposals for alter­
natives for the incumbent government is central to coalition bargaining ... the notion 
o f  credibility depends crucially on the proposed allocation o f  cabinet portfolios in the 
new government" (1990). Their theory was first published in 1990, and was further 
developed in Making and Breaking Governments (1996). Here, the main focus will be 
on this later work, in which the theory has improved as compared to the earlier version.
In the descriptive part, the main behavioural assumption for determining prefe­
rences for coalitions is that actors try to move government policy outputs as close as 
possible to their own most preferred policies. This otherwise common assumption 
is translated into the issue o f division o f labour within a cabinet. Laver and Shepsle 
assume that a party controls a policy area if it holds the ministerial portfolio (1996). 
In the predictive part o f the theory, Laver and Shepsle (1996) examine proposals for 
coalitions in terms of particular allocations of cabinet portfolios between parties, 
and predict an equilibrium cabinet. “An equilibrium cabinet, once it is formed, stays 
formed because no political actor with the ability to act in such a way as to bring down 
the cabinet and replace it with some alternative has the incentive to do so" (Laver & 
Shepsle, 1996, p 61). The prediction set in this theory, given two policy dimensions, 
consists of one or two parties that hold the portfolios under consideration, and are 
therefore likely to become member(s) of the new government.
The central ideas of the Winset Theory will now be introduced. The political 
arena involves political parties, which are characterised by their weights and policy 
positions. In this theory, a policy position is the policy intention of a party on a key 
dimension. Furthermore, each salient policy dimension falls under the jurisdiction of 
a department, for which a cabinet minister is responsible. Finally, in the formation 
process, proposals for government consist of proposals for cabinet portfolios with 
jurisdiction over key policy dimensions.
A portfolio proposal is denoted as 0. In a two-dimensional ‘portfolio’ space, 
which represents two salient policy dimensions, a player A’s ideal point is the point 
where she controls both portfolios, 0AA. A proposal 0BA stands for a two-dimen­
sional portfolio space, in which player B controls the first portfolio and player A the 
second. A proposal for government consists of a proposed allocation of parties having 
jurisdiction over the salient policy dimensions. Preferences are based on distances 
from the ideal point of a party in the policy area considered. The points that player 
A prefers to portfolio 0BA are the points within its indifference curve; these are the 
points inside the circle centered at player A’s ideal position, 0AA and passing through
0 ba (Laver & Shepsle, 1996).
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The set of proposals that can beat this proposal - 0BA - is the winset o f this point. 
Note that a portfolio proposal is not exactly the same as a proposal for a coalition 
since a portfolio allocation, for instance 0AA can be reached with a coalition con­
taining parties A and B.
For a policy x, the set of policies preferred to x by a majority is known as the pol­
icy winset of x, denoted W*(x). For a coalition S, the set o f portfolios preferred by 
a majority to x is the portfolio winset of S, W(S). If we denote the set o f possible 
portfolio allocations by 0L, the set of majority coalitions by W  and the points y  that 
are preferred to x  by party i: {y \ y  R  x}, then the portfolio winset of x is defined as: 
W(x) = U w lO « 5 y R  x] for all x  edL
Consider a situation - see Figure 4.5 - with three parties {A, B, C}, two key policy 
dimensions, and therefore nine possible portfolio proposals, {0AA, 0AB, 0BB, 0BA,
q AC, q CA, q CB, q BC, q CC}. The proposal q BA is the status quo.
Figure 4.5
W inset of the 
Status Q u o  0 BA  
from : Laver & 
Shepsle, (1996)
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It is now possible to determine the policy winset of portfolio 0BA; W *(0BA). The 
policy winset of the status quo 0BA is the intersection o f the indifference curves from 
the three ideal points, {q AA, q BB, q CC} through q BA. Every policy position inside 
these intersections is preferred by a legislative majority to the policy of q BA. As we 
can see in Figure 4.5, not every policy proposal is a portfolio proposal. A policy pro­
posal can be an area that does cover any o f the combinations o f the ideal points of 
the parties, like the nine portfolio proposals above. In this respect, the theory dif­
fers from other spatial theories. In the Heart Solution, for instance, all policy posi­
tions are possible, whereas in the Winset Theory only policy proposals that are lat­
tice points - that is portfolio proposals - are considered.
Therefore, we have to examine the portfolio winset and not just the policy win- 
set, to predict a portfolio allocation and the accompanying coalition. If  there are no 
portfolios inside the intersection, the portfolio proposal qBA is an equilibrium coali­
tion. This means that, if qBA reflects the status quo,
“this coalition is in equilibrium if, when it has been formed it stays together because 
there is no player with the ability to bring down the coalition and replace it with an 
alternative which has the incentive to do so” (Laver & Shepsle, 1996, p 61).
According to Laver and Shepsle (1996), a coalition formation process in a parlia­
mentary democracy requires that a new government can replace the status quo. The 
status quo can be replaced if the new government holding the portfolios receives the 
support of each of its participants, plus the support of a legislative majority if necessary. 
Since the point of departure is always a status quo, every formation process starts by 
examining the portfolio winset of the status quo. Note that if the incumbent govern­
ment is brought down by the legislature or of it resigns, there may be a caretaker 
government until new elections take place. The outgoing government will however still 
be reckoned as the status quo, because we expect a caretaker government to continue 
the policy of the outgoing cabinet. In other words “i f  the incumbent has been defeated 
and a caretaker has taken over, government policy remains by default at the position o f 
the defeated incumbent” (Laver & Shepsle, 1996, p 48).
In order to describe Laver and Shepsle’s theory more exactly, I shall now present the 
main assumptions Laver and Shepsle developed in order to characterise equilibrium 
cabinets. I have translated these assumptions into propositions that are hierarchically 
structured. This allows us to test the Winset Theory empirically. Based on these 
propositions, two hypotheses will be derived. The first is based on the theory as 
described by Laver and Shepsle and refers the prediction of an equilibrium portfolio 
allocation. The second hypothesis has been formulated for practical reasons and 
translates the portfolio prediction into a coalition prediction, which enables us to
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compare this Winset Theory with other spatial theories that predict coalitions 
(rather than portfolios).
The first proposition refers to status quo equilibria. We have already said that, if 
the portfolio winset of the status quo is empty, there is no alternative that can beat 
the incumbent coalition. In this case, the status quo can be the dimension-by- 
dimension median. This means that the portfolio proposal of the coalition is the 
median on every dimension; x = (x1 med, x2 med, ..., xm med). This leads to the first 
assumption:
“The Dimension-by-Dimension Median (DDM) cabinet is an equilibrium i f  there 
is no alternative government in its winset” 6 (Laver & Shepsle, 1996).
Proposition 1 If the status quo portfolio allocation is in equilibrium - in other
words, if it has an empty winset - this allocation will come about.
For the next proposition we should define a strong party. A player j  is called 
strong if she participates in every coalition preferred by a majority to the cabinet in 
which party j  takes all portfolios (Laver & Shepsle, 1996). If the status quo allocation is 
not in equilibrium - that is if proposition 1 does not hold - we continue by examining 
whether strong parties exist. Strong parties with a non-empty coalition winset may 
occur. Two types of strong parties can be distinguished. If the ideal point of a party 
has an empty winset and the party is a generalised median, DD M , this party is con­
sidered to be very strong, denoted as VSP (Laver & Shepsle, 1996). In this case the 
strong party holds the median position on all portfolio dimensions. In the other 
case, the party has a non-empty winset but is nevertheless strong because it partici­
pates in every cabinet in the winset. This is called a merely strong party and is 
denoted as MSP. If there are two dimensions, i.e. two portfolios, the ideal point of 
the strong party is Qj. We define the strong party in a situation with two dimen­
sions as follows 7: j  is strong if and only if:
{( W  (0jj ) = 0 )  v  ( j  e  S, T  \S , T  e  W  a  5, T  Rj Qjj )} V i.
6 A s I said, a portfolio allocation is not equivalent to a coalition. In this proposition and in the follow ing 
propositions Laver and Shepsle define equilibrium  cabinets, w hich  in fact are equilibrium  portfolio a llo­
cations. I prefer the first assum ption to be read as follows: the DDM  portfolio proposal is in equilibrium 
if there is no alternative portfolio proposal in its portfolio winset.
7 Note that a lthough the strong party is usually unique, it is technically possible that tw o parties are 
strong parties at the same time. Im agine a two-dim ensional space and tw o parties w ith exactly the same 
num ber of seats. In this case both parties are strong parties and hold the DDM  position.
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We shall now define equilibria that deal with the strong party:
“ When a strong party exists, it is a member o f  every equilibrium cabinet”
(Laver & Shepsle, 1996). The portfolio proposal is either the ideal point of the very 
strong party or another cabinet in which the merely strong party participates. The 
strength of this player lies in the fact that it can veto every proposal (Laver & Shepsle, 
1996).
The D D M  portfolio proposal has an empty winset if the following assumption 
is met: “ When there is an empty winset DDM, no coalition in the winset ofthe strong 
party ideal is in equilibrium i f  it is less-preferred by the strong party to the D D M ” (Laver 
& Shepsle, 1996).
The above leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2  If  the status quo is not in equilibrium but there exists a very strong
party, the ideal portfolio distribution of the very strong party will come about.
The merely strong party can prevent coalitions that it prefers less than the dimen­
sion by dimension median from forming. Since the strong player is a participant in 
every equilibrium cabinet, it has the power to veto these cabinets.
However, it is possible that a merely strong party cannot veto because o f strategic 
behaviour by other parties. If the other parties in the winset prefer another coalition 
to the ideal point of the merely strong party, they can reach that point by making 
credible threats about vetoing the strong party’s ideal proposal. They can for 
instance threaten to support a coalition without the strong party. In this case, a stand­
off can be reached (Laver & Shepsle, 1996). Unfortunately, in these cases, it is hard 
to predict what will happen. Laver and Shepsle predict that the strong party will 
participate in a coalition, but they cannot tell in which cabinet. In order to solve 
this ambiguity, in case of a so-called standoff, I suggest that we predict the allocation 
from the winset, together with the largest party.
Proposition 3  If  proposition 1 and 2 are not true, the ideal point o f the merely 
strong party (MSP) or one of the points in its winset will be formed. If at the same 
time we find a MSP and an empty winset DDM , we predict an allocation from the 
winset of the MSP or the empty winset D D M . The empty winset D D M  necessari­
ly - by definition - includes the MSP on one of the portfolios. In case of a standoff, 
we decide as follows: from the prediction set we choose the allocation of the MSP, 
together with the largest party. If  the MSP is itself the largest party (measured in 
party weight), we predict the ideal point of the MSP
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If there is neither equilibrium status quo nor a strong party, but there is an empty 
winset D D M , this D D M  will be predicted:
Proposition 4  If there is no equilibrium status quo, or any kind o f strong party, but 
there exists an empty winset D D M , then this allocation will be predicted.
Strong parties and D D M ’s create a structure for the coalition formation process. 
Unfortunately, Laver and Shepsle do not provide us with a solution if the situation 
is less stable. In situations without a strong or holdout party (i.e. a powerful but not 
strong party) and a non-empty winset of the DD M , no coalition can be predicted. In 
these cases, cycles of cabinets can occur and bargaining remains. However, even though 
Laver and Shepsle do not define this, I propose that if there is no other allocation 
that beats the SQ, the status quo allocation remains.
Proposition 5  If there is no equilibrium whatsoever, i.e. if propositions 1 to 4 do 
not provide equilibria, the status quo allocation will be maintained.
Based on these five propositions, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
Hypothesis 4 .6  Winset
In the Winset Theory, the equilibrium portfolio allocation that satisfies propositions 
1 to 5 will come about.
Even though the division of portfolios is the main goal and contribution o f the 
W inset Theory, a ‘coalitional version’ of the Winset Theory will be designed in order 
to compare the Winset Theory with other coalition formation theories. Naturally, 
the party or parties from the portfolio allocation are expected to govern. If this party 
or these parties do not represent a legislative majority - which is unfortunately true in 
most cases - I expect that other parties will join, until we find a winning coalition. 
The party that is as close as possible in the portfolio space to the party or parties 
that hold the portfolios will join the coalition. Now the hypothesis for the coalitional 
version of the W inset Theory can be defined.
Hypothesis 4 .7  Winset M ajority
According to the W inset Theory, the parties or party that holds the main port­
folios will govern. If  this party or these parties do not represent a legislative 
majority, the closest parties in the portfolio space will join one by one, until this 
coalition becomes winning.
The Winset Theory will be illustrated with the coalition formation process after the 
Dutch elections of 1989. The two key policy dimensions in 1989 were an economic
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dimension and a dimension on foreign affairs. For this example, we use the Laver 
and H unt data set. In their survey on policy and party competition, Laver and H unt 
rankorder the most important policy dimensions as well as the most important 
portfolios. For the Netherlands, as well as for many other countries, the two most 
important portfolios are Finance and Foreign Affairs. The party positions are 
derived from the same data set by using the scores of the parties on the following 
two policy dimensions: - increase services vs. cut taxes, and - pro friendly relation 
to the USSR vs. anti friendly relations towards the USSR. Laver and H unt notice 
that in the portfolio game, the foreign affairs domain is much more important than 
it is in party competition in general (Laver & H unt, 1992). In the period 1986­
1989, the two portfolios were held by the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) - 0 CC
- and in 1989 the portfolio Financial Affairs was held by the Social Democratic 
Party (PvdA), and the Foreign Affairs minister came from the CDA - 0PC - . The 
parties that I include in this survey are the Social Democratic Party P with weight: 
wP = 49; the left-wing liberals D wD = 12; the Christian Democrats C wC = 54; 
and the Liberal Party V  wV = 22. The total number of seats in parliament is 150, 
which means that a coalition is winning if it represents at least 76 seats. In the period 
1986-1989 the Christian Democrats governed together with the Liberal Party 
(denoted as coalition {CV}). After the 1989 elections a government of Christian 
Democrats and Social Democrats - coalition {PC} - was formed. In our model, the 
incumbent government is represented by the portfolio 0CC. The possible winning 
coalitions are {PC}, {CV}, {PDC}, {PDV}, {PCV}, {DCV} and {PDCV}.
1.5
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In Figure 4.6 we see the representation o f the ideal points o f the parties, and the 
possible portfolio allocations. The square points are the ideal policy points of the 
four parties. Indifference curves are drawn centered around the parties ideal points 
and running through the status quo 0CC. The intersection of the circles is the winset 
of coalition 0 CC, i.e. the status quo. As one can see, the intersection of the indifference 
curves contains no portfolio proposal. This means that the portfolio winset of 0 CC 
is empty. The Christian Democratic party is a very strong party and is the DDM . 
Based on the theory, we may conclude that the allocation 0CC is in equilibrium and 
that this portfolio distribution will remain the same after these elections.
However, in 1989 the portfolio allocation was no longer 0CC as predicted, but 
0PC. Hence, the portfolio prediction was not correct. As can be seen in Figure 4.6, 
the coalitional prediction will also be wrong. The cabinet that was formed after the 
1989 elections was a cabinet of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. If 
we predict that the strong party - CDA - will be supported by the closest party until 
it reaches a majority, CDA will not be supported by the Social Democrats (P) with­
out first receiving support from the closest party, namely the liberal democrats (D).
Remarks
The Winset Theory has its merits but also its shortcomings. Laver and Shepsle 
themselves admit that the assumptions necessary to keep the number of credible 
proposals small, are hard to meet. These assumptions require:
- the number of salient policy jurisdictions to be low,
- the number of parties to be small, and
- the internal party discipline to be high (Laver & Shepsle, 1996).
The theory is likely to predict better and could actually predict coalitions - 
instead of the party distribution on the two main portfolios - if we could model all 
dimensions, i.e. all portfolios. In most multi-party systems this would lead to at 
least 10 dimensions. It seems that Laver and Shepsle do not give sufficient arguments 
for assuming that two or three dimensions would be enough to represent all port­
folios. The theoretical argument could be that there are less than 10 ‘main dimensions’.
However, we must acknowledge that with ten or more dimensions, the number 
o f credible proposals will be very high, which makes the prediction of a portfolio 
allocation complicated. Even with the computer programme8 that was developed 
for this theory, it is impossible to investigate the lattice points (portfolio positions)
8 Com puter program m e W INSET 5.1; w inset calculator. Developed by Paul Doyle. Copyright: Laver and 
Shepsle, 1997.
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if many dimensions are included. “ The number o f  comparisons increases dramatically 
with both the number o f  dimensions ofthe lattice and the number o f  parties' (Laver & 
Shepsle, Winset Manual). For instance, five parties and two portfolio-dimensions 
leads to 600 comparisons, whereas the same number o f parties and one dimension 
extra leads to 15500 comparisons. Naturally, with a more sophisticated computer 
programme than the one at hand, these numbers would not cause that much trouble.
Another difficulty, partly caused by the low dimensionality, is the distinction 
between a portfolio proposal and a coalition. Since a portfolio proposal can consist 
o f only one party or two parties that represent less than the majority o f the votes, 
we cannot be not sure which coalition will be formed if the portfolio allocation is 
introduced. If  all portfolios would be modelled, this discrepancy would disappear 
and we could predict coalitions. Note that the extra assumption about joining the 
parties from the winset solved this problem. This discrepancy between portfolios 
and coalitions is acknowledged in Laver and H unt (1992). The authors admit that 
it is possible to predict only one party, if one party holds the two key portfolios, but 
that does not imply that only that party will form the government. Laver and Hunt 
argue that this theory sets out to identify key players and not the whole coalition. 
This means that a prediction of two parties does not imply that the government will 
comprise at most two parties, but rather that this approach is silent on aspects other 
than the two key portfolios. This assumption is similar to the idea in the Heart 
Solution, which sometimes also predicts one or two key players and remains silent on 
the coalition as such, or implies that parties that are not a member o f the coalition 
will support a minority cabinet. This issue is dealt with in hypothesis two, but 
remember that this is my personal interpretation o f the Winset Theory, and not 
Laver and Shepsle’s view, nor their goal.
Next to uncertainties caused by the low dimensionality o f the portfolio space, it 
is also regrettable that the W inset Theory does not predict a coalition if there is no 
equilibrium. If there is no strong or holdout player and the winset of the dimension- 
by-dimension median is non-empty, no coalition can be predicted. This is not an 
uncommon problem in multi-dimensional coalition formation theories. For practical 
reasons this problem has been solved by including Proposition 5.
The distinction between a proposal 0AB - where party A has jurisdiction over the 
first and B over the second portfolio - and proposal 0BA seems intuitively right. 
However, even though I find the picture of ministers as ‘sole-masters’ over their 
jurisdiction to be far reaching, the distinction between proposals with identical parties 
but different distributions is, in my opinion, the main contribution of Laver and
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Shepsle’s theory. We should bear in mind that this leads to more complicated 
predictions. Laver and Shepsle do only predict which parties will hold the cabinet 
portfolios, but also who will hold which portfolio. The truth about the influence of 
the jurisdiction on portfolios probably lies somewhere in the middle. In the 
Netherlands, for example, parties and thus ministers who want to govern together 
develop a declaration of policy for the forthcoming years. Ministers work together 
in a coalition and share collective cabinet responsibility, so that they are not sole 
masters over their policy area. This can also be demonstrated by the fact that it is 
common in the Netherlands for an under-secretary of state - the highest political 
official after the minister in a department - to come from another governing party 
than the minister. We therefore suggest that the assumption that ministers are in 
control over a department must be weakened. Laver and Shepsle acknowledge the 
dilemma of ministers as sole masters versus ministers working together in a coalition. 
They consider collective decision-making in cabinet, but also state that this happens 
within “the context ofthe departmental structuring ofthe agenda o f  choices” (Laver & 
Shepsle, 1996).
4.2.4 Com petitive Solution
The Competitive Solution was, like other spatial theories, developed for spatial 
voting games. As we know, in these games the winning coalition receives a value of 1 
while the losing coalition gets nothing. The ideal points of parties are represented 
by points in a multi-dimensional ideological space. Again, the utility o f a coalition 
for a player is inversely proportional to the distance of the player to that coalition. 
McKelvey et al. (1978) define the main assumption as follows: “potential coalitions 
must bid for their members in a competitive environment via the proposals they offer’. 
I f  we compare two coalitional proposals the parties that are members of both coali­
tions are the critical players. The preference relations o f these parties determine the 
formation game. The fact that we compare the coalitional preferences o f the critical 
players rather than all players is the main distinction of this theory.
The set S1 Pi S2 is referred to as the set of critical - also denoted as pivotal - players 
between coalitions S1 and S2. A proposal is an ordered pair (u, S), where u denotes 
the utilities of the coalition for the players u= (u1, ...,  un) and S  is a coalition, with 
1 ,...,n  e  S. Let L be any set of distinct proposals such that no coalition is associated 
with more than one proposal. A proposal (u1; S1) is viable against proposal (u2; S2) 
if (u2; S2) is not strictly preferred to (u1; S1) by all the pivotal players. At least one 
pivotal player must be indifferent or must prefer (u1; S1) to (u2; S2).
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Definition
Viable: For any two proposals (u1; S1) and (u2; S2), (u1; S1) is viable against
(u2; S2) if it is not the case that, u1i< u2i for all i G S1 Pi S2 (McKelvey et al., 1978).
Viability can also be defined in terms of preference relations between coalitions: 
a proposal for coalition S1 is viable against S2 if S1RiS2 for some i e  S1P S 2.
The theory allows us to predict coalitions which coincide with a proposal from L , 
that are viable. Since there may be distinct sets of viable proposals, the authors intro­
duced the concept upset to reduce the prediction set. Closely related to the concept 
upset is the notion of strict viability. I shall here define strict viability. Selecting strict­
ly viable proposals leads to the same prediction set as selecting based on the concept 
upset. Since the notion strict viability more logically follows viability, I shall use 
strict viability.
A proposal (u, S) is strictly viable against (u , S’) if:
i) (u, S) is viable in L A (u , S’) is viable in L,
"  i e  S  P  S  : ui > ui '
Strict viability can also be defined in terms of preference relations between coalitions: 
A proposal for coalition S1 is strictly viable against S2 if S1PiS2 for all i e  S1 P S 2.
A set o f proposals K is a Competitive Solution if
i) For any pair of distinct proposals (u, S) and (u , S’) e  L and S ■£ S’,
ii) Every (u, S) e  L is viable in L and
iii) For no (u , S’) G L, V i G S  P  S’: u{ > u ’ (McKelvey et al., 1978).
The prediction is that proposals from K , the Competitive Solution, will be 
formed (McKelvey et al., 1978). All coalitions in the Competitive Solution are viable 
against each other. Therefore we can formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.8
Let G = (N, W, RM). Then a coalition from K will be formed.
For any coalition in the Competitive Solution set, it is true that all pivotal players 
simultaneously prefer a coalition to at least one proposal from L. A more restrictive 
set is the Strong Competitive Solution. K  is a Strong Competitive Solution if
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i) For any pair o f distinct proposals (u, S) and (u , S’) e  L and S ■£ S ,
ii) Every (u, S) e  K is viable in K and
iii) For no (u1 ; S j ) , ^  ; S2)e  K, it is the case that 
for all i e  S1 n  S2: u1i > u2i,
with > holding for at least one i e  S1 Pi S2 (McKelvey, et al., 1978).
In the Strong Competitive Solution, denoted as KS, strict viability is demanded 
for every proposal in the set K  The coalition or coalitions in the Strong 
Competitive Solution will be formed (McKelvey, et al., 1978).
Hypothesis 4.9
Let G = (N, W, RM). Then a coalition from KS will be formed.
To illustrate the Competitive Solution, the 1994 cabinet formation in the 
Netherlands will be studied. A procedure similar to the procedure for the Maximal 
Satisfaction Solution is followed. First, the Euclidean distances between the players 
and the possible winning coalitions are determined, which can be found in Table 4.8
D is t a n c e s p d c PDV PCV DCV PDCV
P v d A  ( p) 0 .9 0 0.99 1.26 1.61 1.14
d 6 6  ( d ) 0.74 0 .2 8 0.60 1.04 0.62
CDA(C) 1.37 2.00 1.33 1 .3 0 1.46
v v d (v ) 1.97 1 .40 1.48 1 .2 3 1.49
Table 4.8
W eighted
Euclidean distances 
betw een parties 
and coalitions 
in the Netherlands 
in 1994
The next step is to compare the coalitions and select the viable ones. In Table 4.8, 
the most preferred coalition of every player is highlighted. Note that a small num ­
ber means a small distance: the smaller the better. If  it would be true for one coali­
tion that all players prefer this coalition most, this would be a Strong Competitive 
Solution and we could stop the procedure. This coalition would simultaneously be 
a dominant coalition. Since this is not the case we have to start comparing coali­
tions:
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Table 4.9
Adjusted  W eighted 
Euclidean distances 
betw een parties and 
coalitions in the 
N etherlands in 1994
{PDC} vs. {PDV}: both viable,
{PDC} vs. {PCV}: both viable,
{PDC} vs. {DCV}: both viable,
{PDC} vs. {PDCV}: both viable,
{PDV} vs. {PCV}: {PCV} is not viable,
{PDV} vs. {DCV}: both viable, 
{PDV} vs. {PDCV}: {PDCV} is not viable.
The set of viable proposals in this example is {PDC}, {PDV}, and {DCV}. A pro­
posal is strictly viable if it is viable and if it is true that the proposal is strictly pre­
ferred to every other proposal by all pivotal players. In this example, none o f the 
proposals is strictly viable. For example, player P prefers {PDC} to {PDV} and play­
er D prefers {PDV} most. In 1994, the coalition PDV was formed. This coalition 
is included in the Competitive Solution.
Consider the adjusted distance matrix after the elections in 1994, in Table 4.9. 
Some distances have been changed in order to illustrate the case of a strictly viable 
proposal. The fictitious data are highlighted. Coalition {PDC} is now a strictly 
viable proposal. Since {PDC} is strictly viable, the coalition {PDC} is also a Strong 
Competitive Solution.
D is t a n c e s PDC PDV PCV DCV PDCV
P v d A  (A ) 0.90 0.99 1.26 1 .61 1.14
d 6 6  ( b) 0 .2 8 0 .7 4 0.60 1.04 0.62
c d a ( c ) 1 .2 5 2.00 1.33 1.30 1.46
v v d ( d ) 1.97 1.40 1.48 1.23 1.49
Remarks
The descriptive part of the Competitive Solution is similar to other spatial theories, 
and the theory does predict coalitions. The solution concept is interesting because the 
authors relate their solution to other well-known concepts such as the core solution 
in policy space. We know, for instance, that if the core position is non-empty, the 
core and the Strong Competitive Solution will predict the same coalition. The core 
solution is the only coalition that is strictly viable. In this definition o f the core, the
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core is - like the core in the Heart Solution - the dominant point, and not, as in the 
coalitional core (see Chapter 3, the policy distance theory), the set of undominated 
coalitions. Any other proposal is not strictly viable as compared to the core solution. 
It is easier to determine strict viability than dominance -, as one would do to find 
the core solution - because for the (Strong) Competitive Solution, only the payoffs 
o f the pivotal players need to be compared. Another interesting fact is that in most 
spatial examples in McKelvey’s article - including the example in this section - the 
Competitive Solution, unlike the Maximal Satisfaction Solution, corresponds to 
minimal winning and connected coalitions.
4.2.5 M aximal Satisfaction Solution
In this section, I shall present a new theory of coalition formation. It is a multi­
dimensional extension of De Swaan’s policy distance theory (1973). In contrast to 
De Swaan, this theory uses a metric distance measure. Furthermore, the theory uses 
a new solution concept called the Maximal Satisfaction Solution.
In De Swaan’s theory - see Section 3.3 - actors, i.e. political parties, compare their 
policy positions with the expected policy positions of coalitions. De Swaan describes 
the central behavioural assumption of the policy distance theory as follows:
“An actor strives to bring about a winning coalition in which he is included and 
which he expects to adopt a policy that is as close as possible, on a scale o f  policies, to his 
own most preferred policy” (De Swaan, 1973, p 88).
One important argument for transforming De Swaan’s policy distance theory 
into a multi-dimensional theory is that simultaneously positioning a party or a 
coalition on two or more policy or ideological dimensions is more accurate than 
placing it on a one-dimensional scale since it contains more information. As defined 
in Chapter 2, a policy dimension can represent any policy issue, and an ideological 
dimension represents a group of coherent policy issues. Ideally, a couple of important 
ideological dimensions are used to represent what a party desires. For instance, the 
position o f the Christian Democratic party in the Netherlands on an economic left- 
right dimension can be moderately right-wing, whereas its position on ‘religious issues’ 
is more to the extreme on a liberal-authoritarian, or also denoted as social values, 
dimension. Since party representation is more accurate on multiple dimensions 
than on one, we assume that the same is true for coalition formation. This is the 
main reason for extending the De Swaan’s policy distance theory.
1 1 6 GOVERNING WITH YOUR CLOSEST NEIGHBOUR
S p a t ia l  C o a l i t io n  Fo rm a t io n  T h e o r ie s
Obviously, the objective o f the extended theory is the same as in De Swaan’s uni­
dimensional model. The premise is the minimisation of the distance between the 
policy position o f a player and the expected policy position of a coalition. However, 
there is an important difference: in the extended theory distance is measured metrically 
instead o f ordinally. In the multi-dimensional theory, Euclidean distances are used. 
Both the distances between the policy positions o f the parties and the expected 
coalitions, and the preferences for coalitions that follow from this, are defined within 
the model.
A new assumption is also introduced. Since in the predictive part of the theory 
the coalitional core - the set o f undominated coalitions- is in many cases large, I 
shall introduce a new solution concept called the Maximal Satisfaction Solution. 
I assume that instead o f striving for their highest individual gain, parties strive for 
maximal collective satisfaction. Aiming for the best individual output often leads to 
cycling, for which reason I introduce the Maximal Satisfaction Concept which predicts 
the coalition with the highest average utility.
Descriptive part of the theory
De Swaan (1973) defined the expected policy position o f a coalition as a function 
of the weights and policy positions of the members o f a coalition.
Formally: xS = ƒ  (x, wi ), i e  S . In order to compute the expected policy position 
of a coalition, the connection between weights and position is maintained in the 
extended policy distance theory. w
The weights are normalised as follows: X ■. = ------1—i w2  i e S 1
where w{ are the weights of the players in a coalition S. The expected policy posi­
tion o f a coalition S, in the extended model, is defined as xS = 2  i eS Xj x{ . Again, 
xi is the ideal point of player i in an m-dimensional Euclidean space.
De Swaan introduced a pivotal player in order to detect preferences o f actors for 
coalitions. It is often impossible to identify the pivotal player in the multi-dimensional 
model. The pivotal player would be the median in all directions (Enelow & Hinich, 
1984). Plott (1967) proved that the median in all directions only exists under severe 
conditions which are seldom met. Yet, in the multi-dimensional model players can 
easily define their preference profiles because they use real Euclidean distances 
between the policy positions of the players and the expected positions of the coalition. 
The greater the distance between a player and the expected position o f a coalition, 
the less preferred this coalition will be. Hence, the axioms considering the pivotal 
player in De Swaan’s original theory are no longer needed.
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No more than two assumptions are necessary to define the descriptive part of the 
extended policy distance theory. The first is the central assumption. A player prefers a 
winning coalition, which is closer to her own preferred policy position to a coalition 
that is less close. The second assumption - the office seeking axiom - is the same as 
the last assumption in De Swaan’s model. It states that a player prefers a winning 
coalition to a losing coalition, and a player prefers a winning coalition of which she 
is a member to a winning coalition in which she is not.
Assumption 4.1
V i, such that i e  S  and i e  T  S, T e  W
SPiT  i f  and only if || ( (x;- - xS) || < || (x;- - xT) || ,
S/iT if and only if || ( (xi - xS) || = || (x;- - xT) || .
Assumption 4.2
V i, such that i e  S, i e  T  S  e  WT 7ïé W  SRtT,
V i, such that i e  S, i £ T  S  e  W, T  e  W  SRtT-
Here, Pi denotes strict preference, R  preference, and Ii indifference for player i.
Predictive part of the theory
In this part of the theory, solution concepts from n-person game theory will be 
used. The solution concept that will be applied, is the Maximal Satisfaction 
Solution. Empirical research has shown that for many coalitional games, the prediction 
set o f the coalitional core is often a large set of coalitions. The new solution concept 
should not predict large sets of coalitions like the core, but preferably predict only one 
or a few coalitions. This new concept should also preferably be non-empty in all cases.
Maximal Satisfaction Solution
I propose a concept, called the Maximal Satisfaction Solution, which predicts 
coalitions in which players, instead o f striving for ones own maximal utility, agree 
on the coalition with the highest average satisfaction. It is rational for the players to 
choose the maximal satisfaction coalition even if this coalition may not attribute 
them their highest individual utility. In social choice terms, aiming for the highest 
individual payoffs can lead to cycling preferences and thus to an intransitive social 
choice. It is therefore rational to settle for the coalition with the highest aggregate 
utility. This does not infer that I abandon the individual rationality assumption, 
which is one o f the main assumptions o f rational choice or game theory. It are 
individually rational players who will - according to the Maximal Satisfaction 
Solution - aim for the coalition with the highest average utility.
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For this solution concept, the utility of the players for the coalition is first aggre­
gated and then divided by the number of players in the coalition. Dividing by the 
number of players leads to coalitions in which the amount of players is not very 
large which contributes to the stability of the coalition. Furthermore, the Maximal 
Satisfaction Solution often predicts oversized coalitions in terms o f weight. This 
seems to fit the empirical reality since for example in the Netherlands coalitions on 
average represent 65% of the seats in parliament.
To sum up, in the Maximal Satisfaction Solution concept the following behavioural 
assumption is introduced: players strive for maximal collective utility. As I said, if 
only individual rationality is followed, preference cycles can occur. Since none of the 
players can enforce any coalition, it seems reasonable that the players settle for the 
coalition with the highest ‘average’ aggregated utility and thus choose for collective 
rationality - i.e. the Maximal Satisfaction Solution - which is the dominant strategy.
In order to compute the total satisfaction of a coalition, the first step is to ascribe 
utility to preferences. The preferences of the players are based on the distances 
between the player’s preferred policy position and the expected policy position of a 
coalition. The utility u  o f a player i, for a coalition is assumed to be inversely 
proportional to the distance between that player and a coalition. Distances will be 
normalised and inverted in order to ascribe utility to the coalitions. Next, it is possible 
to find the coalition with the highest aggregated utility.
The smallest distance between any player’s ideal point and a winning coalition in 
a game can be seen as a reference number, and the difference between the smallest 
and the largest distance can be seen as the range o f the distances within the game. 
The reference distance and largest distance are used to normalise the utilities.
Definition 4.1
The reference distance - the smallest distance d  between any party position xi and
any expected coalition position xS in the game - is defined as follows:
M in {d (xi,xS ) ç V i e  S, V S  e  W}.
Definition 4.2
The largest distance, d, between any party position xi and any expected coalition
position xS in the game - is defined as follows:
Max {d (xi,xS )ç V i e  S, V S e  W}.
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Definition 4.3
i) If j  e  T: the utility, u of player j  for coalition Tis:
u (T  = 1 _  d  (x,, xt) -  min d  (xj, xs))
j (max d  (xi, xS) - min d  (xi, xS))
where max d  (xi, xS) ^  min d  (xi, xS)
ii) The utility o f a player who is not a member o f a coalition, in accordance with
the office seeking argument, is zero: If  j  Ï T: the utility,
u of player j  for coalition Tis: Uj (T) = 0.
It follows from this definition that the utility of a player for a coalition is:
0 < Uj (T) < 1 . So, the utility is 0 if a player is not a member of the winning coalition 
under consideration, and if it is the player that is farthest away from any of the win­
ning coalitions, i.e. when d  (x,, xt) = max d  (xi, xS). O n the other hand, the utility of 
a player for a coalition is 1, if this player and this coalition are the closest combination 
in the game, in which case d  (x,, xt) = min d  (xi, xS).
The coalition with the highest aggregated utility divided by the number of players 
in a coalition is predicted. The total utility or satisfaction o f a coalition is the sum 
o f the individual utilities of the players that are member of that coalition, divided 
by the number of players in that coalition. Dividing by the number of players does 
not conflict with the notion of highest collective utility. This concept often leads to 
coalitions that do not ascribe the highest possible individual utilities to all players, 
but predict coalitions where the average satisfaction is as high as possible. Solely sum­
ming up the utilities without dividing by the numbers of players would lead to very 
large coalitions. Even though the policy distances and the weights are incorporated in 
the computation of utility, if enough players are added to a coalition, the satisfaction 
will increase.
We can now define the satisfaction score o f a coalition.
Definition 4 .4
2  e S Ui (S)i. Sat(S) = -------
#S
where #S  denotes the number o f players in S.
The set of maximal satisfying coalitions is defined as:
ii. WSAT = {Se W  Te W such that Sat(T) > Sat(S)}
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The next theorem shows that the Maximal Satisfaction Solution is never empty 
in spatial voting games.
Theorem 4.1
Let G = (N,W ,RM) and S, T  e  W, then WSAT *  0
Proof: If W SAT = 0 ,  we have to assume an infinite ordering o f the satisfaction of 
winning coalitions; Sat (S) > Sat (T) > ... > Sat (S-1). Since in a voting game the 
number o f players { 1 ,2 , . ,  N} is assumed to be finite, the number of possible win­
ning coalitions is finite and thus W SAT ^  0 .
Moreover, the Maximal Satisfaction Solution can predict a different solution 
than the Coalitional Core. In other words, the Maximal Satisfaction Solution is not 
a core-inclusive concept.
The descriptive part of the extended policy distance theory indicates how the 
preferences o f players for coalitions can be obtained. In the predictive part, the 
Maximal Satisfaction Solution provides us with a concept that solves the coalition 
game. The following hypothesis states that in coalitional games a coalition from the 
set of Maximal Satisfaction Solution(s) will be formed.
Hypothesis 4 .10
Let G = (N, W, RM). Then a coalition from WSATwill be formed.
Consider the following simplified coalitional game, based on the coalition forma­
tion after the 1998 Dutch elections: [76; 11, 45, 14, 29, 38]. The parties in this 
weighted majority game are respectively Green Left (GL), the Social Democrats 
(PvdA), the left wing liberals (D66), the Christian Democrats (CDA), and the liberals 
(VVD). Data were obtained on three ideological dimensions by means of computer 
based content analysis of the 1998 party manifestos (see Chapter 5). The three 
dimensions are ‘economic left-right’, ‘social values’, and ‘environmental protection’. 
The positions of the parties on the three equally weighed ideological dimensions are 
presented in Table 4.10.
Only the five largest parties are included in the analysis of this simplified game, and 
only eight possible winning coalitions are considered. Naturally, there are - also with 
these five parties - more winning coalitions possible, but since this is an illustration 
and not an empirical test, only cabinets that are likely to form, based on substantive 
knowledge o f the D utch party system, are included.
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The expected policy positions of the coalitions are computed with the definition 
presented before:
xs = 2 i es ■ For instance xpv = ( (45/83 (0.179) + 38/83 (1)),
(45/83 (0.4 1 9) + 38/83 (0)), (45/83 (1) + 38/83 (0.8 06)) = (0.5 5 5 , 0.227, 0.911).
The expected policy positions o f the coalitions can be found in the following 
table. Note that the first letters of all parties included in a coalition denotes the 
coalition. In the example above: xPV is the expected policy position of the coalition 
containing PvdA and VVD.
PARTY SEATS LEFT-RIGHT ENVIRNMONT VALUES
GRLINKS 11 0 1 0.851
PVDA 45 0 .1 7 9 0 .4 1 9 1
d 6 6 14 0 .4 4 6 0 .4 7 4 0 .9 2 6
CDA 9 0.221 0 .0 9 8 0
VVD 38 1 0 0 .8 0 6
COALITIONS 2  SEATS
PV 83 0 .5 5 5 0 .2 2 7 0.911
GPC 85 0 .1 7 0 0 .3 8 5 0.641
GPV 9 4 0 .4 9 0 0 .3 1 8 0 .9 0 5
GCV 78 0 .5 7 0 0 .1 7 7 0 .5 1 4
PDC 88 0 .2 3 5 0 .3 2 2 0 .6 5 9
PDV 97 0 .5 3 9 0 .2 6 3 0 .9 1 4
PCV 112 0 .4 6 9 0 .1 9 4 0 .6 7 5
DCV 81 0 .6 2 6 0 .1 1 7 0 .5 3 8
Table 4.10
Expected position 
of the  coalitions on 
three ideological 
d im ensions 
in 1998.
The next step is to compute the distances between the parties and the expected 
policy positions of the coalitions. The formula for Euclidean Distance is used to 
compute these distances. The results can be found in the following Table 4.11.
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table 4.11
Distances betw een 
parties and 
expected positions 
of coalitions 
in 1998.
DISTANCES PV GPC GPV GCV PDC PDV PCV DCV
GRLINKS 0 .9 5 3 0 .6 7 5 0.841 1 .0 5 8 0 .7 4 5 0 .9 1 5 0 .9 5 0 1 .1 2 9
PVDA 0.431 0.361 0.341 0 .6 6 9 0 .3 5 9 0 .4 0 2 0 .4 9 0 0 .7 1 0
D 6 6 0 .2 7 0 0 .4 0 7 0 .1 6 3 0 .5 2 3 0 .3 7 3 0.231 0 .3 7 7 0 .5 5 7
CDA 0 .9 7 9 0 .7 0 4 0 .9 6 9 0 .6 2 6 0 .6 9 6 0.981 0 .7 2 6 0 .6 7 3
VVD 0.511 0 .9 2 9 0 .6 0 9 0 .5 5 0 0 .8 4 3 0.541 0.581 0 .4 7 5
The distance between party CDA and coalition PD C is calculated as follows:
H( xCDA - xPDC II = sqrt ((0.221 - 0.235)2 + (0.098 - 0.322)2 + (0 - 0.659)2) = 0.696
Based on the distances above, it is possible to create a utility matrix. The distances 
will be used to calculate the utilities of the parties for the coalitions. These utilities 
are necessary to determine the Maximal Satisfaction Solution, i.e. the coalition with 
the largest average aggregated utility. The new concept selects the maximal satisfy­
ing coalition. The definitions in the previous section are used to compute the util­
ities o f the parties. The parties’ coalitional utilities are given in the Table 4.12.
Table 4.12
Utility,
agg reg a ted  utility, 
and the  average 
agg reg a ted  utility 
o f the parties 
fo r coalitions 
in 19 98  in the 
N etherlands
UTILITY pv g p c g p v GCV p d c p d v p c v DCV
GRLINKS 0 0 .4 7 0 0 .2 9 8 0 .0 7 3 0 0 0 0
P v d A 0 .7 2 3 0 .7 9 5 0 .8 1 7 0 0 .7 9 7 0 .7 5 3 0 .6 6 2 0
D 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 .7 8 3 0 .9 3 0 0 0 .5 9 2
C D A 0 0 .4 4 0 0 0.521 0 .4 4 8 0 0 .4 1 8 0 .4 7 2
V V D 0 .6 4 0 0 0 .5 3 8 0 .6 0 0 0 0 .6 0 9 0 .5 6 8 0 .6 7 7
e S UI 1.3 6 3 1 .7 0 6 1.653 1 .1 9 4 2 .0 2 9 2 .2 9 2 1 .647 1.741
2  e S  Ui  / # S 0 .6 8 2 0 .5 6 9 0.551 0 .3 9 8 0 .6 7 6 0 .7 6 4 0 .5 4 9 0 .5 8 0
The utility of coalition PD C for party CDA is measured by, taking 1 minus - the 
subtraction of the smallest distance of any party to any coalition in the game from the 
distance that party CDA has to PDC, divided by the difference between the largest 
and the smallest distance o f a party to a coalition, i.e. the range o f the distances. In 
other words: mcda (PDC) = 1 - (( 0.696 - 0.163) / (1.129 - 0.163)) = 0.448.
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The total satisfaction o f the coalition PDC is simply the summation of the util­
ities o f the parties in that coalition: X u(xPDC) = 0.797 + 0.783 + 0.448= 2.029. The 
average aggregate satisfaction, i.e. the satisfaction score, is 2.029 / 3 = 0.676.
The hypothesis is that the coalition with the highest average aggregate utility will 
be formed. In the game above, coalition {PDV} will therefore be predicted. This is 
in fact the coalition that did come about. So, in this case the Maximal Satisfaction 
Solution has predicted the correct coalition.
Remarks
The descriptive part o f the extended policy distance theory is roughly the same 
as that of most of the theories discussed in this section. The preferences are based on 
distances. These distances are translated into utilities, in order to apply the predictive 
part of the theory. Since the coalitional core often predicts a large set o f coalitions, 
the Maximal Satisfaction Solution is applied. This concept maximises the average 
aggregate utility of the parties for the coalitions. The idea o f maximising the aggre­
gate satisfaction distinguishes the theory form other theories in this research, since 
emphasis is placed on a collective notion of utility. A major advantage of this con­
cept as compared to other solution concepts is that the solution always exists, and 
that it usually predicts exactly one coalition.
4.3 Summary
A presentation was given and hypotheses derived for most well known 
coalition formation theories in Chapter 3. The same was done in this 
five spatial coalition formation theories. The main question in this 
whether spatial theories are preferable to the other classes of theories.
O n theoretical grounds, spatial theories seem promising. Especially the 
Protocoalition Formation and the Maximal Satisfaction Solution have good 
prospects, since both usually predict one only coalition. The Protocoalition 
Formation theory is a straightforward theory that does not have too many assumptions, 
and is not difficult to test. Most striking about this theory is its focus on subjective
- rather than symmetric - distances. The Maximal Satisfaction Solution is innovative, 
since it introduces a collective notion o f utility. The Competitive Solution also starts 
from preferences that are based on distances, but it often predicts more than one 
coalition. Interesting about this theory is its focus on critical players.
‘traditional’ 
chapter for 
research is
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The Heart Solution is a spatial solution that seems less promising, because it 
often predicts a series o f coalitions or more specifically a series o f key parties and not 
a coalition as such. Quite a number o f additional assumptions were needed, to make 
the concept fit for testing. We concluded that the set of axioms was insufficient, for 
which reason the Heart Solution does not meet the requirements for a formal theory. 
However, note that predicting coalitions instead o f party configurations may not 
have been the author’s goal.
The Winset Theory is quite dissimilar to the others, since it assumes that coalition 
formation is based on the distribution of ministerial portfolios. It is at the same time 
the most ‘institutional’ oriented spatial coalition formation theory in our selection, 
since it emphasises the powerful position of the status quo. Like the Heart Solution, the 
Winset Theory determines key players and not coalitions, and also here, I introduced 
new assumptions to enable empirical testing.
The reason for developing new coalition formation theories has not been that 
these theories are bad on theoretical grounds, but that they are not as good as we 
would like them to be empirically. Ideally, a coalition formation theory predicts 
every coalition formation correctly. This leads us back to our research question: “Do 
spatial coalition formation theories perform better empirically than the non-spatial 
theories”. This question will be addressed in Chapter 6. The empirical evaluation 
will be done in the same format as the classification of the theories. For every class, 
the theories will be tested, which will lead to a conclusion about the class of theories 
that performs best. The list o f all hypotheses can be found in appendix A3.
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5. Dutch Politics, Parties and Their Positions
5.1 Introduction
The spatial and non-spatial theories of coalition formation that will be tested 
were presented in the previous chapters. Before we can test them, we need to obtain 
data on party positions. In this chapter the Dutch party system will therefore be 
presented. The main goal is to provide positions of political parties on a number of 
ideological dimensions. In this context an ideological dimension is ideally a coherent 
group o f issues that form an idea about how society should be organised. These 
ideas need only hold for one country at one time, but the ideology should be the 
same for both political leaders and citizens. For instance, on the traditional left-right 
dimension, parties on the left side claim that more state interference in the economy 
for social equality is better than less state interference, whereas the parties on the 
right side of the spectrum claim the opposite. This dimension gives us information 
about how parties and the citizens that support these parties feel about tax policy, 
welfare state expansion, public vs. private ownership etc. Another dimension is 
often an immaterial or social values dimension that reflects liberal vs. authoritarian 
views on issues such as abortion, euthanasia, freedom and religion.
More important than the content of these dimensions is, however, that 
these so-called ‘ideological’ dimensions reduce the high dimensional policy space into 
a low dimensional space. Even if it is inductively obtained by using methodological 
techniques to reduce dimensionality, this low dimensional space is preferable 
because it makes testing our spatial theories easier. It can however be that these 
dimensions are methodological artefacts instead of real ideological dimensions. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the obtained dimensions do incorporate more information 
on what the parties stand for than the most commonly used ordinal uni-dimen­
sional left-right scales that are applied to the one-dimensional policy oriented coalition 
formation theories.
Before the party positions are derived and coalition formation in the Netherlands 
can be tested empirically, a brief description of the organisation of the Dutch political 
system in general seems indispensable. Hence, the next section will contain a 
description o f the Dutch parliamentary democracy. The third section provides an 
overview of the various data sets that can be used for deriving party positions. In the 
Section 4, the Manifesto data set that is used for positioning the parties in the 
Netherlands from 1946 until 1994 is described at length. Apart from the description, 
these data are analysed and party positions are derived. For the 1998 elections, 
I have gathered data myself by computer-coded content analysis of the party mani-
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festos. The results of this procedure are presented in Section 5. In Section 6, party 
positions based on another data set - the Laver and H unt expert data - are presented. 
This data set contains data on policy positions for 1989 and 1994, and will be 
added as a data set to check the results o f the Manifesto data. The data from the 
expert analysis should lead to the same coalitions as the Manifesto data for the years 
under consideration.
5.2 The Political System
The political system in the Netherlands can be characterised by two concepts: it is 
a constitutional monarchy, as well as a parliamentary democracy. These two features 
will be discussed in this section, and after that a description of the stages o f the 
coalition formation process will be presented.
Parliamentary democracy
A central feature of the Dutch political system is that it is a so-called representative 
democracy. In a parliamentary democracy the will of the people is represented by a 
parliament that, among other things, supervises the executive power, i.e. the govern­
ment. This division of power is a main organisational characteristic of the Dutch 
political system. The judiciary power lies in hands of the judiciary, and the executive 
power is in hands of the government. Parliament and government together hold 
legislative power. Both government and parliament have the right to propose and 
initiate legislation. In most cases, however, the government enforces legislation and 
parliament supervises this.
The Dutch parliament is divided into two chambers: the First (upper) Chamber 
has 75 members, who are elected by members of the Provincial States, whereas the 
Second (lower) Chamber has 150 members, who are chosen directly by the electorate. 
We can therefore say that the Second Chamber is the most ‘democratic’ institution 
o f the Dutch political system. This Chamber is also the most powerful of both 
Chambers of parliament.
The First Chamber is only allowed to accept or veto (and is thus not allowed to 
amend) legislative proposals that have already been accepted by the Second 
Chamber. The main task of the First Chamber, also referred to as the Senate, is to 
check if the legislative process proceeds accurately, and to check if the proposals are 
in line with international treaties and the constitution. The Second Chamber, on 
the other hand, is also allowed to initiate legislation, and to amend proposals from 
government. The broader mandate and the direct election of the Second Chamber 
cause the more powerful position of this Chamber.
The D utch electoral system is a list system of proportional representation in
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which seats are allocated to parties. There is in practice only one constituency. 
Compared to many other democracies, the election of the Second (lower) chamber 
is very close to a pure proportional division. All 150 members of the Second 
Chamber are elected on the basis of the national distribution of party votes. A party 
needs 0.67%, i.e. 1/150th, of the national vote for a seat in the Second Chamber. 
The seat allocation is computed with the d’H ondt formula (Farell, 1997).
The relation between government and parliament becomes most clear if we con­
sider responsibility and votes of confidence. In a parliamentary system, the government 
is obliged to justify its actions to parliament. Furthermore, it is said that parliament 
has confidence in the government as long as the opposite is not expressed by a 
majority of the parliament. The ministers can also be confronted by a vote of no 
confidence at the individual level. In these cases, either a single minister or the cabinet 
in its entirety can be dissolved. If the government has a conflict with parliament, 
another possibility is that the government dissolves parliament and announces new 
elections. In this case, the aim o f the government is to gain confidence in the new 
parliament (Van Deth & Vis, 1995). In conclusion, the relation between government 
and parliament is tight and both institutions cannot function without approval of 
the other.
Constitutional monarchy
The Dutch system is also a constitutional monarchy. In this system the King, or 
in the present Dutch case a Queen, is formally the highest authority, but she is not 
an absolute ruler since the Queen is bounded by the constitution. The succession 
of the Queen is hereditary. The government consists o f the Queen together with the 
ministers.
Formally, the Queen is the head of the government, but in contrast to the ministers 
she is not responsible for government actions. One formal instrument of power of 
the Queen is that she has to countersign legislation. This means that she can veto 
legislation if she for instance has moral objections. Another formal obligation is her 
role in the cabinet formation process. The Queen starts by consulting important 
politicians, after which that she appoints an informateur1 whose task it is to investigate 
cabinet possibilities. I f  the informateur has finished his job and can inform the
1 The concepts 'informateur' and 'formateur' will be referred to as such. The informateur is a (some) senior 
politician(s) assigned by the Queen w ho examines which cabinets are feasible. The form ateur enters later 
in the form ation process and his task is to form a new cabinet. Since the inform ateur and the form ateur 
are typical for the Dutch form ation process and they do not exist in other countries, there is no correct 
A n glo-Saxo n  w ord for them  and therefore w e will refer to them in Dutch.
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Queen that the formation of a particular cabinet is feasible, the Queen appoints a 
formateur who to actually form a new government. The formateur guides negotiations 
on future government policy and negotiations on the distribution of the offices 
between the different parties in the future cabinet. The formateur is often the party 
leader of the largest party o f the prospective government, which means that he is 
likely to become the Prime Minister of the future cabinet. The political power of 
the Queen lies in the choice of the (in)formateur(s), which actually exerts a major 
influence on the formation process.
It is difficult to ascertain where the power o f the Queen actually lies. Being head 
o f state without being responsible for the government actions would seem to make 
one powerful, for example. Yet, this privileged (immune) position o f the Queen is 
in practice seriously constrained. Since the ministers are responsible, they always 
check the actions of the Queen. W hen she visits other countries, for instance, the 
ministers always receive a copy of her speeches in advance, which they can try to 
change. O n the one hand then, the Queen’s power is limited by the constitution, 
and on the other she is restrained by the fact that the ministers are accountable for 
her actions. This means that the Queen’s freedom of autonomous action is in practice 
relatively small. The tasks of the monarch are therefore often said to be mainly 
ceremonial and symbolic (Van Deth & Schuszler, 1990).
We also stated that the Queen has to countersign all legislation. Again, this seems to 
make her more ‘powerful’ than she is in reality. I do not know of any case where the 
Queen decided against legislation that was approved by government and parliament. 
However, this is not the same as knowing for a fact that she has always approved. It 
can very well be the case that in earlier stages the Queen indicated or implied that 
she would not approve, and that as a result the proposal in question was revised or 
not pursued further.
In the case of cabinet formation, the ‘informal’ or ‘real’ power of the Queen is 
probably larger than her formal power seems to be. The choice for an informateur 
is a political decision. It is in this case, as in others, difficult to find hard evidence for 
the influence of the Queen. It is easy to imagine that if the Queen receives contra­
dictory advice about whom to appoint, she will take a decision based on her own 
knowledge and preferences. Either she simply cannot comply with all opinions at 
the same time, or she can but will not do so. During the formation of the Den Uyl 
cabinet in 1972, the Queen has been said to have been biased (Van Wijnen, 1975; 
Houwaart, 1998). The Queen is said to have steered the formation process in the 
direction of a cabinet with the Social Democratic party. The unexpected appointment
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of informateur Burger, in times of deadlock, and the later statement o f Den Uyl that 
“everything was going in accordance with the script” (Van Wijnen, 1975, p 57) can 
be interpreted as evidence of an active and biased Queen.
Note that since conversations of the Queen with political leaders take place 
behind closed doors, there is no way to check whether and how the Queen deals 
with advice, nor to find out to what extent she follows her own preferences.
O n the positive side, the Queen is - and the former Queens have been - very 
interested and knowledgeable about politics. Moreover, the Queen is usually by far 
the most experienced person in the cabinet formation process, for starters because she 
has usually reigned longer than politicians have been in office, which automatically 
gives the Queen expert status.
In summary, the role of the Queen is definitely more than marginal, or in other 
words her task is more than being a stamping machine. The precise power of the 
Queen depends on the interest she takes in politics and the political situation at any 
given moment in time.
Coalition formation
Typical for coalition formation in the Netherlands is that there are hardly any 
formally established rules. The choice for appointing either an informateur or a 
formateur, for instance, depends on an estimation of how difficult it will be to form 
a cabinet. The formal appointment o f the ministers by the Queen at the end of the 
formation process is the only stage that is laid down in law. Maas (1992) however 
noticed the following trends:
- it is usually the largest party that initiates the negotiation,
- if parties are trying to form a particular cabinet, they tend to keep trying to 
form this cabinet even if negotiations become problematic, and
- if the previous cabinet has fallen, the ‘trouble maker’ in that cabinet, usually 
gets the initiative to try and patch the cabinet.
In my opinion, this last trend only holds if the same parties are willing to continue 
governing together, which is naturally not always the case. In the 1989 formation, 
for instance, after the coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals has fallen, the 
Christian Democrats immediately started negotiating with the Social Democratic 
party.
Even though the rules are not formalised, it is fair to say that the Dutch coalition 
formation process proceeds in the following stages:
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1) The Queen consults politicians about which cabinet(s) is (are) feasible, and what 
procedure should be followed. It is convention that at least the chairs of the 
Chambers in Parliament, the vice-president of the State Council, and the leaders 
of all parliamentary parties are consulted.
2) In the second stage, an informateur is, or a couple of informateurs are appointed. 
Only in case of a clear-cut formation, in which it is already evident which parties 
will join a cabinet, and provided only limited controversy, will a formateur be 
appointed directly. In other cases, we start with an informateur, whose task it is 
to examine feasible coalition possibilities that will be supported by a majority in 
parliament. During this orientation period, the goal is to find out what problems 
could arise and at which points parties agree and disagree about future policy.
3) In the third stage, a first decision is made about the composition of the coalition, 
that is which parties are likely to join the new cabinet. If at this point parties 
agree on future policy in a broad sense, and if they agree on the composition of 
the new government, the informateur has fulfilled his job and the next stage 
starts with the appointment of the formateur whose task it is to actually form a 
new government.
4) In stage four, the formateur together with representatives of the future cabinet 
parties formulate a draft o f the government’s Declaration of Policy.
5) In the fifth stage, the distribution of portfolios in general, that is, which and how 
many departments each of the parties will get, are discussed.
6) In the sixth stage, the political parties in the new government decide which party 
members will take which offices.
7) In the final stage, the government is presented in a public conference, and the 
Queen officially installs the new ministers.
As said earlier, the formateur is often the leader of the largest party in the new 
government and often becomes prime minister. Since the position o f the prime 
minister is an important office, it can be smart to give the informateur more leeway 
and have him take care o f the process of selecting ministers, that is formally the job 
o f the formateur. In that case, if problems arise during negotiations it is not the 
would-be prime minister who is politically damaged. Note that the prime minister 
in the Netherlands does not have the same position as for instance the president in 
France. The prime minister is the leader of the government but is not allowed to 
take decisions on behalf of the government. The same confidence relation between 
government and parliament holds for the prime minister.
Another observation that should be made in this context is that in practice the 
coalition formation process often does not go as smooth as suggested in the ‘seven
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stages’ model. Problems can lead to moves backwards and forwards through the 
stages described above. It is not uncommon to start with an informateur, followed 
by a formateur, followed by - in case of no success - a new informateur, followed by a 
new formateur etc. The average duration of cabinet formation since 1946 is 71 days.
The fact that a new cabinet should be supported by parliament, i.e. a government 
can only govern if it can rely on the confidence o f parliament, often leads to what 
are called winning coalitions. In that case the parties in government represent a 
majority of the seats in the Second Chamber. In general the parties in government 
represent a relatively large majority of the parties in parliament: on average 65%.
5.3 Data selection
The main goal of this chapter is to determine positions o f political parties on a 
number of ideological dimensions. The first step then is to decide which kind of 
data to use. In the next chapter, coalition formation theories will be confronted with 
empirical research on coalition formation in the Netherlands. Therefore a database 
with a relatively large number of cases and enough information to place the parties 
on two or three dimensions is needed. The following types o f data sets are available:
- Election surveys
- Voting on legislation
- Data on expenditure
- Expert data on positions of parties on issues
- Content analysis (manifesto data)
The first database, the D utch Election Studies (NKO) is based on surveys held 
around every general election since 1967. Since 1977, questions on perceived poli­
cy positions of parties on some issues are included. The respondents are asked to 
place parties on seven or ten point scales.
An example is: “Euthanasia: W here would you place the PvdA (i.e. the social 
democratic party) on this line?” Options are then offered from 1. Forbid euthana­
sia to 7. Allow euthanasia. Another example is: “ Income Differences: W here would 
you place the VVD (right wing liberals) on this line?” Options are then offered from 
1. Larger differences to 7. Smaller differences. The information gathered by these 
questions is the kind o f material necessary for testing our multi-dimensional theo­
ries. A drawback, however, is that these questions were not included until 1977 
which means that there are only seven cases, i.e. the coalition formations in 1977, 
1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998. Another disadvantage of these election
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studies is that they only contain information on positions of parties on a small number 
o f policy issues. O n average, five or six questions about party positions on issues are 
asked. This is not enough if one wants to examine the dimensionality of the party­
space and then make a configuration o f the political parties. In order to obtain 
ideological dimensions that are predictive for policy positions of parties, more policy 
issues are needed. Technically, methods like Factor Analysis or Multi-Dimensional 
Scaling that can be applied to reduce the issue space, also require more variables in 
relation to the number of parties. Another problem with these mass-survey data is 
that they represent what the voters think the parties should do, and not what the 
parties actually do.
Data on voting on proposals for legislation and expenditure seem suitable 
because these data are ‘hard evidence’, but they have a disadvantage too. It is often 
hard to distinguish between coalition partners in these databases. During a govern­
mental period, parties that govern together tend to spend money together and to 
vote together. Moreover, package deals are often made, which makes it even more 
difficult to determine policy positions of individual parties. Even though expenditure 
data actually show what parties do when they are elected, instead of reflecting promises, 
the fact that parties do not govern alone make these data unfit for our task. As Kraan 
(1990) moreover demonstrated in his PhD-thesis, different governments show hardly 
any differences in expenditure patterns. The expenditure and voting data are, in my 
opinion, useful if the goal is to study cabinet-parties versus opposition-parties, but 
they are less valid for the purpose o f this research.
Several expert-survey databases are not very useful for our goal, since they only 
contain information on positions of political parties on one ‘left-right’ dimension 
(Castles & Mair, 1984; Hubert & Inglehart, 1995). Since I want to confront spatial 
coalition formation theories with empirical data, positions of parties on more than 
one dimension are necessary. For an overview of expert judgements on one left-right 
dimension, I refer to the appendix in Laver and Schofield (1990).
An important expert survey on party positions is the Laver and H unt (1992) data­
base. In this survey, country experts are asked to assign policy positions to political 
parties on several issues. This database is very broad and deals with interesting ques­
tions. For one, the questions as such are interesting because they were designed for 
the ‘89 formation and adjusted for 1994. Hence, issues that were particularly 
important in these years are included, whereas in other data sets important issues 
are missing and issues that are no longer political issues - i.e. issues that divide parties
- are still included. In the Laver and H unt survey, country experts positioned parties
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on eight policy issues on a scale from 1 to 20. W hat is also interesting is that, in 
contrast to other data sets, information is included about the weights of policy 
issues for the parties and data on policy versus power orientation o f parties. Despite 
the fact that the small number of cases makes this otherwise attractive data-set unfit 
for the task ahead - there are merely two cases available - these data will be used as 
control data to study the cabinet formation of 1989 and 1994 more thoroughly, and 
to examine whether the prediction efficiency o f the theories is different, if different 
data sets are used.
In my opinion, the best qualification of the final database in this overview - the 
Manifesto data - is that ‘in the land o f  the blind, the one-eyed is king’. Much has 
already been written about these data, though not often in a very positive tone 
(Laver & Hunt, 1992; Laver & Garry, 1998). The methodological status of these data 
has been questioned. Quantitative content analysis is said to be a bad method to 
gather information about party positions since the procedure only counts the num ­
ber o f sentences that are concerned with each issue, while it does not inform us 
about the positions of parties on these issues. Most issues in the database are valence 
issues, which means that all parties agree on the goal - like environmental protection
- but differ on how to reach this goal or on to which issue within the general set of 
issues priority should be given. In less than half of the cases, positive and negative 
attitudes on issues are distinguished. Moreover, the coding scheme provides ‘only’ 
56 issues. This seems a large set o f issues, but questions have been raised about the 
relative importance of the issues that are present and those absent in the coding 
scheme. I acknowledge these drawbacks, and yet it is this data set that will be used 
mostly in this research. The main reason is that the set includes more issues than 
other data sets and also runs over a longer period of time. Even though I shall only 
test coalition formation empirically in the Netherlands, it is interesting that this 
data set is the largest and most comprehensible set available. It contains data for 20 
countries from 1945 to 19882. Using the Manifesto data set makes future empirical 
research, i.e. extending the empirical tests o f these theories to other countries, 
relatively easy.
The following data sets and data reduction methods will be used in this study to 
obtain the data needed for empirical testing:
2 The author is grateful to Volkens et.al, and Kem an, H., and P. Pennings for providing the manifesto 
data. Volkens, A. et al. M anifestos Research project [com puter file] Colchester: ESRC Data Archive, 1995.
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•  1946-1994: In order to test four out o f five spatial theories - Heart Solution, 
Protocoalition Formation, Competitive Solution, and Maximal Satisfaction Solution
- policy positions will be derived from the Manifesto data set by means of multi­
dimensional scaling.
•  1946-1994: In order to test the Winset Theory, data on specific portfolio 
dimensions are necessary. The same data set is used, the Manifesto data, but another 
data reduction method, namely reliability analysis, will be applied.
•  For 1998, data were not yet available when the empirical research for this study 
was performed, so I performed a computer-coded content analysis of the party 
manifestos.
•  1989-1994: the expert data set of Laver and H unt (1992) and Laver (1995) will 
be used to check if the predictions based on multi-dimensional scaling of the 
Manifesto data in 1989 and 1994 and the predictions based on expert data comply.
As said above, we need multi-dimensional data on party policy positions for policy- 
based government formation theories. In this chapter we shall now discuss the various 
possibilities of determining policy positions and in addition provide policy positions 
o f parties on a number of dimensions. However, we must bear in mind that the 
Manifesto data set is by no means a perfect database. The lack of systematic data on 
more than a single dimension of ideology makes obtaining policy positions and testing 
theories a tricky enterprise. The ultimate consequence of a shortage o f good multi­
dimensional data is that developing multi-dimensional coalition formation theories 
is useless, since they cannot be tested anyway. The least we can say in this respect is 
that in this research an attempt is made to test spatial theories.
5.4 D eriving Policy Positions of Political Parties 
w ith the M anifesto Data Set
In this section we shall study and describe content analysis in general and the 
Manifesto data set in particular. The next step is to perform data analysis in order 
to obtain party positions. The first part of this analysis will aim at deriving positions 
o f parties on a number o f dimensions that best represent their positions. For four 
out o f the five spatial theories that will be tested, data on a number of dimensions 
are necessary in order to measure distances between parties and perceived positions 
o f coalitions. For the fifth spatial coalition formation theory, which is based on 
dividing the cabinet portfolios, specific positions on a number of ministerial dimen­
sions are needed. Analyses to obtain these data are performed at the end of this section.
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5.4.1 Description of the M anifesto Data Set
The Manifesto Research Group is a special research group within the European 
Consortium of Political Research that has conducted content analysis of election 
programmes in 20 countries. The official title of the project is Comparative 
Manifesto Project: Programmatic Profiles o f  Political Parties in Twenty Countries, 
1945-1988.
The Manifesto data are obtained by content analysis. Weber (1990) defined 
content analysis as “a research method that uses a set o f  procedures to make valid infer­
ences from text”. Content analysis is basically a method for data reduction. Holsti 
(1969) defined three requirements for content analysis:
1) Objectivity: each step in the research process must be carried out on the basis of 
explicitly formulated rules and procedures.
2) Systematic: the choice of categories for coding should be done systematically, i.e. 
consistent with rules that are defined to answer the research question.
3) Generality: the finding(s) should have theoretical relevance (Holsti, 1969).
Weber (1990) suggests that content analysis should meet reliability and validity 
requirements. Nowadays, these two requirements are most referred to in texts on 
content analysis. The first demand - reliability - is very much like objectivity in 
Holsti’s work. This means that the results of content classification should be invariant 
over time and over different coders. The last requirement - validity - refers to the 
content of the research and more or less combines the ‘systematic’ and ‘generality’ 
requirements. The method used by the Manifesto Research Group is referred to as 
quantitative content analysis, carried out by expert coders. Quantitative simply 
refers to the fact that the frequency of the issues occurring in the text is coded, 
whereas qualitative textual analysis is non-numerical and focuses on interpreting 
text. In the Manifesto content analysis, documents are selected, a coding scheme is 
constructed, and a counting unit is selected with which the programmes can be 
analysed.
The original goal o f the research group was to operationalise a specific model of 
party competition, which held that parties compete with each other in terms of 
salience of particular issues. The Manifesto data therefore measure the relative 
emphasis placed on an issue and not the parties’ positions on the issues. 
Unfortunately, the scarcity of policy data has led to using the manifesto data as policy 
positions.
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The research group analysed original documents supplied by political parties, in 
most cases election programmes. Twenty countries are included in the project and 
the general time span is from World War II until the late 1980’s. For the 
Netherlands, data for the formation o f 1989 and 1994 are also included3. Political 
parties that participated in at least one cabinet since 1945 were included in the 
analysis. In Table 5.1, I present the cases for the Netherlands, i.e. the election years
and the parties that are included in the data set:
PARTIES PPR PvdA d 6 6 VVD CDA KVP ARP d s 7 0 CHU PROGRESSIVE CHRISTIAN
1 94 6 * * * * *
1 94 8 * * * * *
1 952 * * * *
1 95 6 * * * * *
1 95 9 * * * * *
1 963 * * * * *
1 967 * * * * * *
1971 (*) (*) (*) * (*) (*) * (*) * *
1 972 * * * *
1 977 * * * * * *
1981 * * * *
1 982 * * * * *
1 98 6 * * * * *
1 98 9 * G rLinks * * * *
1 9 9 4 * G rLinks * * * *
•  (*): these parties are included in the platforms of combined programmes Dutch 
(Progressive and Christian). docum ents
covered
3 These data (1989, 1994) were made available by Hans Kem an and Paul Pennings w h o  co-ordinated 
the content analysis for these elections.
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•  The first party on the list, the PPR was a radical left-wing party. In 1989 the 
PPR together with two other small left-wing parties, the pacifist socialist party 
(PSP) and the communist party (CPN), merged into Green Left. The party Green 
Left (GrLinks) is a left-wing alternative for voters who find the social democrats 
(PvdA) too moderate. The average support for these parties (the PPR and GrLinks) 
is about 3% to 4% of the electorate.
•  The second party on the list, the PvdA has its roots in the labour movement 
and is the largest left-wing party in the Netherlands. This social democratic party 
usually gains almost one third of the votes and has been a partner in 8 out of 16 
cabinets since 1946.
•  The next party in the table is D66, Democrats66, named after the year in 
which it was founded. It is a moderate left-wing liberal party that originated as a 
party proposing constitutional reform. Its support ranges from 4% to 16% of the 
votes.
•  The VVD is a right-wing secular liberal party and is the main opponent of the 
PvdA on social economic issues. In general, PvdA and VVD were alternating coalition 
parties for the main Christian Democratic Party. The average turnout o f the VVD 
is 15%.
•  The Christian Democratic Party, CDA, was officially founded in 1980 but 
already entered the elections o f 1972 with a list. Three smaller religious parties 
merged into the CDA. These parties were the KVP (catholic party, the largest o f the 
three), the ARP (protestant party) and the C H U  (also a protestant party). CDA is, 
and before its founding the KVP was a centre party and a member in every cabinet 
until 1994. Its support ranges from approximately 20% to 35% of the vote.
•  The DS’70 party was originally founded by discontented members of the 
PvdA, but became a right- rather than left-wing party. Its electoral support has 
always been small.
The last two programmes in Table 5.1 are joined lists. In 1971 and 1972, the 
three progressive parties - PvdA, PPR and D66 - joined a combined ‘progressive’ 
platform, whereas in the same years the religious parties did the same and formed a 
united Christian list. The parties that were member of these joined lists are put 
between brackets in 1971, since they are not included seperately in the 1971 analysis. 
Counting them twice would cause two problems. The first problem is of course that 
they would be analysed twice, the second that the number o f parties (programmes) 
in 1971 would be much larger than in other years, which leads to a disproportional 
weight of this year when scaling methods are applied.
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We continue with a brief overview of the coding procedures. These procedures 
are described extensively in the Userguide (ECPR, 1996). The content analysis is per­
formed with election programmes, because these programmes cover a wide range of 
issues and represent the whole party. Moreover, the programmes are published 
before every election. The research group aimed at including all significant parties. 
In this respect a party is called a significant party if it has blackmail potential for 
being a coalition member (ECPR, 1996). Moreover, parties that are or have been 
members of a coalition are called significant parties and are thus included in the 
analysis, as are parties that are likely to become government members. Content 
analysis is a technique that provides a quantitative description o f the documents. In 
this research, 56 issues divided in seven policy domains are distinguished. The coding 
unit in the party programme is a statement or argument. Usually this coincides with 
a sentence, but it can be that a sentence contains two arguments that are easy to 
identify and distinguish. In that case the concept ‘quasi-sentence’ will be intro­
duced. This is a set o f words containing one political idea. The total number of 
units of analysis equals the total number of quasi-sentences in a party programme.
If the (quasi-) sentences are identified, the next step is to decide in which of the 56 
categories of the Standard Coding Frame these (quasi-) sentences fit. For dealing 
with difficult situations, like ‘no or more than one category seem(s) to apply’, specific 
rules are given. Finally, every coder in each country has to code the same exercise 
party platform in order to reach the highest possible degree of precision and 
standardisation. Only if the coder is able to ‘code’ this document well, she is allowed 
to code. The final score for an issue is the number of hits divided by the total 
amount o f coded (quasi-) sentences.
The 56 issues are presented in appendix B. The seven policy domains over which 
the issues are distributed are:
1) External Relations
2) Freedom and Democracy
3) Political System
4) Economy
5) Welfare and Quality of Life
6) Fabric of Society
7) Social Groups
Most issues - 30 out o f 56 - are uni-polar salience issues. This means that they 
can only be used to measure the emphasis given to these issues. For 13 issues, both 
a positive and a negative variant is included, for example ‘internationalism positive’
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and ‘internationalism negative’. We can assume that if a programme makes more 
references to the positive than the negative variant o f this issue, this party wants to 
increase internationalism. But even with these bipolar issues - that are more similar 
to position issues - it is difficult to interpret the results. A position on a seven- or 
10-point scale ranging from more to less internationalism would provide more 
information.
For 30 issues, there are no positive and negative stands possible. The idea is - and 
actually this concept holds for content analysis in general - that if a party really 
favours something, it will mention this issue often and therefore have a high score 
on this issue. Klingemann, et al. (1994) describe this as follows: “By stressing certain 
items and excluding others - without overtly denouncing the latter - parties are, to be 
sure, implicitly taking pro and anti positions’. This is a harsh statement since the 
absence of opposing sides on many issues can create ambiguity. For instance, we 
probably get into trouble if we assume that a party with a moderate position on an 
important issue like welfare will get a high score because this issue is mentioned a 
lot, whereas a party that has a more extreme ‘pro-’position but does not say so much 
about it, will have a lower score.
Laver and Garry (1998) describe this problem very eloquently: “Position and  
emphasis are utterly distinct parameters o f  party policy. One party may regard its centrist 
position on some issues as an electoral asset and devote a large section o f  its manifesto to 
emphasising this. A  rival party may well, and equally justifiably given the policy positions 
o f  its closest rivals, regard its relative extreme position on precisely the same issue as an 
electoral asset. I t  may therefore devote a large section o f  its manifesto to emphasising this 
issue. The two parties thus have quite different substantive positions on the same issue, 
but emphasise this issue to precisely the same extent in their respective manifestos". 
To summarise, the differences in scores on issues do not always reflect what we 
would like them to do. This is - of course - a problem of quantitative content analysis 
in general and not of the manifesto data set in particular. Since the original goal of the 
Manifesto Research Group (MRG) was to investigate whether the saliency model of 
party competition was correct, and not to provide policy positions of parties, all we 
can do is keep this in mind. W hat pleads for the salience theory of party competition
- which is the basis for this content analysis (Robertson, 1976 and Klingemann et 
al., 1994) - is that in the Manifesto data set, many anti or negative issues also have 
empty or almost empty cells. This complies with the intention of salience theory, 
namely that if parties oppose certain policies, they simply do not mention them.
O ne of the strong points of the data set is that so many countries can be com­
pared since the same coding scheme is used all over the world throughout the whole
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post war period. This, I believe, is also the downfall o f the Manifesto data set. It has 
led to the inclusion o f issues that do not seem to fit to the Dutch political situation. 
Issues like ‘political corruption’, ‘foreign special relationships - negative’, ‘economic 
planning’, ‘controlled economy’ and ‘nationalisation’, are not political issues in the 
Netherlands, but are included in the coding scheme. This is a small problem since 
these issues simply get extremely low or zero scores, and low or zero variance. 
However, significant issues that should be included in the analysis but are not, i.e. 
issues on unemployment, inflation, and gender politics and equality policies consti­
tute a more serious problem. Many immaterial issues like abortion, religion, homo­
sexuality and euthanasia are, as a group, incorporated in other issues in the data set, 
for instance in issues about ‘traditional morality’ and ‘special social groups’. I believe 
that these immaterial issues deserve their own place in the coding scheme, and 
should have been coded separately.
In order to examine the coherence between issues in the different domains, I have 
performed reliability analysis and factor analysis o f the issues within each domain. 
These data reduction methods will be presented shortly. The results of these analyses 
are bad, that is to say, there is not much connection between the issues within each 
domain.
The first method that I used in order to check the coherence between issues within 
a domain, and later on in order to find underlying dimensions in the policy space 
in general, is factor analysis. Harman (1976) gives a profound overview of factor 
analysis. In this work both the foundation and mathematical background, as well as 
different models of factor analysis are presented (Harman, 1976). Factor analysis refers 
to a set o f techniques, the goal of which is to represent a large set of variables into 
a smaller set of hypothetical variables. Starting point for any kind of factor analysis 
is the correlation matrix of the variables. If any set of variables is highly correlated, 
this set can be treated as an imperfect measure of the same phenomena. If  at the 
same time several sets of variables are mutually independent, this can mean that the 
data set consists o f a series of uncorrelated ‘latent’ variables (Kim & Mueller, 1978). 
In two different kinds of situations, factor analysis can be performed. At one 
extreme, the researcher has absolutely no idea about which and how many under­
lying dimensions there are. In that case, exploratory factor analysis is used as a way 
o f finding the minimum number of latent factors that can account for the observed 
covariation. In this type o f analysis, the data are explored with an eye to possible 
data reduction. O n the other extreme, the researcher anticipates for instance two 
factors and uses the analysis as a method for testing this hypothesis. This is referred 
to as confirmatory factor analysis (Scott Long, 1983).
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The last type o f analysis is performed to check whether the issues within the 
seven domains are highly correlated, and are thus different issues measuring the 
same phenomena. The expectation is that issues within one domain are highly 
correlated and can be represented with one latent dimension. For instance, the first 
ten issues (per 101 - per 110) measure the extent to which parties approve or object 
to a further growth of the external relations of a state. Factor analysis of these ten 
issues leads to four factors - underlying dimensions - all with an eigenvalue greater 
than one. The eigenvalue is the most common criterion by which the number of 
common factors (latent dimensions) can be determined. The average number of 
underlying dimensions that were detected when performing factor analysis is three per 
domain. This does not comply with our expectations. We expected one underlying 
dimension for every domain. Even two dimensions could have been satisfactory as 
long as the explained variance of the first factor would be high. For all policy 
domains, the explained variance for the first factor is low. The highest explained 
variance for the first factor is in domain 2 ‘Freedom and Democracy’ which consists 
o f only four issues, and amounts up to 40 %. In summary, the confirmatory factor 
analysis did not confirm the expectation that within each domain one latent phe­
nomenon is examined.
The second method to examine coherence between issues within a specific 
domain is reliability analysis. By this method, scales are constructed for a variety of 
related - correlated - items. O n a scale, responses to each of the items can be summed, 
resulting in a score for each case, in our case a score on for example external relations 
for every party. Reliability analysis starts with constructing a scale consisting of 
items that the researcher believes ‘belong together’. If the correlation between the 
items on a scale and the scale itself are high, the scale is said to be reliable. If, for a 
particular item, the correlation between this variable and the scale is low, this item can 
be deleted so that the reliability of the scale improves. The reliability analysis uses a 
coefficient to test the internal consistency o f a scale. The most common coefficient 
is Cronbach’s alpha, which is based on the average correlation of items within a test. 
Since the alpha is an average correlation it ranges between zero and one; the closer 
the coefficient is to one, the better the scale. Reliability analysis is performed for the 
items within a domain, not to construct scales, but again to examine the coherence 
of the domains. Again, the results were not promising, the best scales those with the 
highest Cronbach alpha are for domain 2 ‘Freedom and Democracy’ and for 6 
‘Fabric of Society’. The scales have alpha’s .39 and .36 respectively. These alphas can 
improve if items are deleted, but this is not done since the scaling procedure was 
merely performed to get an impression of the coherence of the issues within a 
domain, and not to construct scales.
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In this section, an assessment of content analysis and the Manifesto data was pre­
sented. In summary, we studied how the data are obtained, what the data look like, 
and how the data are divided in seven policy domains. The absence of some important 
issues and the presence of unim portant issues, as well as the lack of coherence 
between the various issues within the domains, were discussed.
5.4.2 M ulti-Dim ensional Scaling and Property Fitting  
Obtaining policy positions for political parties from 1946 until 1994
Factor analysis and reliability analysis both use correlation matrices as input for 
the scaling procedure. As concluded in the previous section, these methods do not 
fit the manifesto data well. The lack of coherence between the issues within each 
policy domain also indicate that we cannot simply use the seven domains as seven 
latent dimensions and start testing our theories. For four of the spatial theories that will 
be tested in this research, party positions on two (or more) dimensions are nevertheless 
required. In view o f all this, multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) will be applied. This 
method allows an analysis o f the Manifesto data and gains party positions on a 
number of dimensions. The MDS uses proximity as input and then searches for a low­
dimensional representation o f the data, that is, a good estimate o f the proximity 
between the parties. The results of MDS are inductively obtained positions in - for 
instance - two dimensions. The derived configuration will be interpreted by property 
fitting.
The procedures that are used to analyse the data in order to derive policy posi­
tions, and naturally the derived positions, will be introduced in this section.
Data Theory
Starting point for any sort of scaling is data theory. Any type of empirical 
observation can generate different kinds of data, and it is these data that we need 
for testing theories. In Data Theory and Dimensional Analysis Jacoby defines data 
theory as a theory that examines how real world observations are transformed into 
something to be analysed - that is data (Jacoby, 1991). In order to obtain these data 
measurement is necessary. Measurement refers to the process of applying numbers to 
objects in a meaningful way. Data theory, then, uses models that translate observations 
into data. O ne way to model observations is to take a geometric approach. Coombs 
developed several theories on the geometrical interpretation of data and argues the 
following:
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“Many measurement models in the behavioral sciences are based on geometric represen­
tations ofthe observed behavior. Frequently this geometric representation is a one-dimen­
sional scale but it need not be, and multi-dimensional representations are becoming more 
common. The points on these scales or in these spaces may represent individuals or stimuli 
or both, and the relations among the points reflect the observations according to some 
ru/e”(Coombs, Dawes & Tversky, 1970, p 32).
Data can be viewed as relations between points in a space. In this context 
Coombs et al. distinguish between two types o f relations between the objects. The 
first class deals with comparisons between objects based on a dominance or order 
relation, whereas in the second class the proximity (or consonance) relations are 
considered (Coombs et al., 1970). In general, a dominance relation exists when one 
object possesses more of some characteristic than another object does. This is the 
case when for instance children’s reading abilities at a certain age are compared. A 
proximity relation exists, when two objects coincide with each other to a greater 
extent. In the geometrical representation, entities are modelled as points within a 
space. If the objects are connected by a dominance relation, this is reflected by the 
ordering of the points along the dimension(s). If one object dominates another, its 
point is placed at a more extreme position on the dimension. Proximity is modelled 
as interpoint distance. If two objects become more alike - proximal -, the distance 
between their two points becomes smaller, and vice versa (Jacoby, 1991).
As said in the previous section, the most popular method for data reduction is 
factor analysis. This technique is often used to analyse the manifesto data (Budge, 
Robertson, Hearl, 1987, Klingemann et al., 1994). However, the data gathered in the 
Manifesto set - content analysis data - are more similar to proximity data than to 
dominance data, and are therefore not really suitable for factor analysis. This is also 
argued by Jacoby (1991) and by Van der Burg (1997). The fundamental difference 
lies in the entries o f their respective data matrices. For factor analysis, correlations 
are represented as scalar products and the angles between vectors. Factor analysis 
would monotonically transform the correlations. The MDS models (dis) similari­
ties as distances. It seems then that MDS is better equipped to model the Manifesto 
data as distances than to model them as correlations. My conclusion is that M DS is 
a more appropriate scaling technique for obtaining party positions from these data.
Multi-dimensional scaling refers to a family o f techniques that use proximity 
among any kind o f objects as input (Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Young, 1987). The MDS 
algorithms determine positions of objects in a space, based on the distances between 
these stimuli (objects). Different MDS techniques use different methods of translating
AN ASSESSMENT OF SPATIAL COALITION FORMATION THEORIES 1 4 5
C h a p t e r  5
proximities into distances. All MDS methods have in common that they provide 
spatial representations of data. The main goal o f M DS is to represent a more or less 
incomprehensible data-matrix in a spatial fashion that is easier to interpret (Kruskal 
& Wish, 1978).
The Manifesto data consist of percentages o f the total amount of sentences in the 
manifesto for each of the 56 issues. The proximity between parties on all these issues is 
calculated and then the scaling can start. If the multi-dimensional scaling is successful 
it will provide the best possible low-dimensional representation of this proximity 
matrix. The scaling procedure that is used to gain this configuration and thus the 
party positions will now be presented.
The MDS Model
In our data set, party positions are determined by the differences in emphasis that 
parties place on the issues. In the M DS model, this means that the more different 
issues are emphasised, the more distant the parties will be. In order to perform an 
M DS analysis, a proximity matrix should be created.
In studies on multi-dimensional scaling next to nothing has been written on the 
creation of the proximity matrix. All that is said in for instance Roskam’s manual on 
MINISSA about the input is: “The data matrix must be a symmetric matrix o f  (dis) 
similarity indices ... The entries in the matrix are considered as ordinal measures o f 
similarity or dissimilarity between the objects indicated by the row and column indices” 
(Roskam, 1975). The same holds for many articles that contain otherwise detailed 
descriptions of the procedures (Coxon, 1982; Davison, 1983; Ahrens, 1974; and 
Shephard, 1974). The inference from this is that creating proximity matrices can de 
done in many different ways from very different kinds of data, and no strict 
requirements are in force.
In accordance with Van der Brug (1996)4, I find the city block metric most suit­
able for transforming the raw manifesto data into a proximity matrix. City block is 
not the most common metric, but it has the following two advantages as compared 
to the more common Euclidean metric:
4 Note that the method w hich I apply is used in the sam e m anner as Van der Brug did, but the conclu­
sions based on the analysis differ. Van der Brug (1996) concluded that positioning parties on one dim en­
sion is preferable to positioning the parties on tw o dimensions.
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•  simply taking the sum of the absolute differences between the scores on all issues 
to obtain proximity between parties is a very straightforward and easy method.
•  the city block metric is less sensitive to ‘rightly skewed’ data, like the manifesto 
data, than the Euclidean metric.
Since I am not interested in how parties score on different groups of issues, nor 
in the relations between the issues, and since I only need a total proximity score for 
any pair of parties, the city block measurement seems a very straightforward 
method. The second argument, namely that the city block metric is considered 
more appropriate in case of ‘rightly skewed’-data, the exponential term in Euclidean 
distance would ‘over’-emphasise the issues in which large differences in emphasise 
are found, is also important. Euclidean distance would overestimate the difference 
in scores on these issues and thus ‘over-estimate’ the influence of ‘popular’ issues (i.e. 
issues with high scores and high variance) in the proximity matrix.
The formula for city block distances is the following:
d (x,y) = X \=1 I x j- y j  / 2
Where:
d  (x,y) is the distance between manifesto x and manifesto y 
i is the index of the issues (56 in total)
xi the proportion of coded sentences in manifesto x assigned to issue i 
yi is the proportion of coded sentences in manifesto y assigned to issue i.
The distances range from zero to one. If  the distance between two party 
programmes is 0 this means that the same proportion of sentences is assigned to 
each issue in both documents; the distance is 1 if all issues present in one manifesto 
are not emphasised by the other, and vice versa.
After determining the proximity matrix, the next step is to perform the MDS. 
The scaling procedure produces a configuration of points from the proximity 
matrix. This configuration consists of party positions that present a good fit 
between the proximity matrix and representation in a low dimensionality. The 
M DS programme that was used is called MINISSA, and it applies the Minkowski 
EQ2 metric (which is an Euclidean metric) with a possibility to untie. The scaling 
itself is performed ordinal (i. e. non-metric).
In contrast to the lack o f attention for the question which metric to choose in 
designing a proximity matrix, a lot of energy has gone into explaining the different 
M DS methods and metrics. The central idea for this step is to start with an
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Euclidean metric and diverge from this only if:
- there are strong theoretical reasons to do so, or
- the results of the analysis are disappointing, i.e. high stress and/or 
non-comprehensible configurations. (Davison, 1983; Ahrens, 1974)
Coxon (1982, p 146) explains this as follows:” ... the Euclidean metric appears to 
be robust against even extreme departures from its assumptions. ... Even i f  users wish to 
scale in a ‘simpler’ metric they are advised to begin with a Euclidean solution and work 
down (or up) to the preferred metric”.
Another important justification for using Euclidean Distance, next to the ones 
mentioned above, is that the goal of this analysis is to find party configurations in an 
Euclidean space. Euclidean distance is the metric that meets our intuition since we 
always calculate in Euclidean space and the coalition formation theories that will be 
tested in this research are based on Euclidean distances between parties and coalitions.
I acknowledge that creating the proximity matrix with the city block metric, and 
then performing the scaling in an Euclidean space sounds counter-intuitive. Yet as
I said earlier, compelling reasons have led to applying the city block metric for creating 
the proximity matrix. I have also mentioned that basically no requirements can be 
found in the literature for using a proximity matrix, and thus only the ‘uneasy’ feeling 
about using both city block and Euclidean distances is an argument against these 
steps. For either step however, the argumentation for the choice of the metric is 
clear5.
In summary, the scaling method that will be used in this analysis is non-metric - 
ordinal - scaling in a Euclidean space. The MDS programme that is used is MINISSA 
and the specific Euclidean metric is Minkowski EQ2, which includes a possibility 
to Untie (Roskam, 1975; Coxon, 1982).
The number of cases - manifestos - in the analysis is 73. I have decided not to 
perform one single M DS over the full data set. This would assume that the under­
lying dimensions would be the same during the whole post-war period, which I do not 
believe to be the case. The opposite alternative is to perform a separate analysis for 
every election year. This is not a good idea either. In separate analyses, the number
5 Moreover, the fear of violating the monotonicity demand in the scaling procedure is not realistic, since the 
m onotonicity relation should hold for the transform ation from  the proxim ity matrix to the party confi­
guration, and naturally this holds.
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of observations - i.e. cases - would be too small for meaningful MDS. Therefore I 
have chosen, in accordance with Van der Brug (1996) to divide the complete data 
matrix in overlapping sub-matrices and then perform MDS. In these sub-matrices 
of approximately ten years, the underlying dimensions in the party system have not 
changed significantly. Dividing the data in sub-matrices of roughly ten years has led 
to the following ten periods:
Table 5.2
M D S-periods
PERIOD 1 1946 1 948 1952 1 956
PERIOD 2 1952 1 956 1 959
PERIOD 3 1956 1 959 1963
PERIOD 4 1959 1963 1967
PERIOD 5 1963 1967 1971 1972
PERIOD 6 1967 1971 1972 1977
PERIOD 7 1971 1972 1977 1981
PERIOD 8 1977 1981 1982 1 986
PERIOD 9 1981 1982 1 986 1 989
PERIOD 1 0 1986 1 989 1 9 9 4
In the analysis, we thus start with a sub-matrix and search for the configuration 
that best fits the data matrix. The motivation is that the distances between the 
points should correspond to the proximities.
Three measures of fit determine which configuration and thus which correspon­
ding dimensionality is suitable to represent the party positions:
•  The Shephard Diagram: a scatter diagram which plots the distances versus the
proximity’s,
•  The stress scores: a ‘badness of fit measure’, and
•  Face validity: the question whether the configuration of party positions makes
sense according to prior knowledge of party positions.
The first test of the correspondence is by a scatter diagram (or called Shephard 
diagram) which displays proximities on the horizontal axes and distances at the verti­
cal axes. The best configuration o f the data is the configuration with the highest 
‘goodness o f fit’. Next to the geographical representation of the fit - the Shephard 
diagram - the statistical equivalent, the stress factor, also informs us about the quality 
of the dimensionality of the space. The stress factor that actually is a ‘badness o f fit 
measure’, measures the discrepancy between the dissimilarity and the distance
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among all points. We denote the distance between programmes x and y as dxy and 
their proximity as 8y  We can now define the following stress formula:
S (stress d-hat)
X { dxy _  f(8xy)}2
xy
xy
where f  (8xy) is a real number assigned to the proximity obtained by monotone 
regression.
Note that the smaller the stress is, the better the representation will be. Remind that 
the stress decreases as the number o f dimensions increases. In order to determine 
the dimensionality of the space we use the statistical technique and examine the
configuration in mind (Kruskal & Wish, 1978). As a rule of thumb, the following 
can be said about the stress or ‘coefficient o f alienation’:
Stress < .01 : excellent
.01 < S < .05 : good
.05 < S < .10 : fair
.10 < S < .15 : moderate
.15 < S : poor (Roskam, 1975).
As I said, not only the stress but also other considerations matter when the 
dimensionality of the space is determined. A third factor is interpretability. This is 
very important because all that has been proposed so far in this model is, roughly 
speaking, an inductive reduction of the multi-dimensional proximity space into a 
lower dimensional distance space. If  M DS is performed, a two-dimensional repre­
sentation of the distances between the manifestos can be derived. For illustrative 
purposes we shall now consider the M DS results for the manifestos in the 1986­
1994 period.
In Figure 5.1, the parties are placed on two coordinate axes, which as such have 
no substantive meaning. The figure presents a plot o f party positions based on the 
parties’ 1986, 1989 and 1994 election programmes. The black dots are the positions 
o f the parties. The lines connect party positions over time. An arrow denotes the 
direction. The first dot on a line is the party’s position in 1986, the second in 1989 
and the last - to which the arrowhead points - is its position in 1994.
‘stress’, but one should keep the interpretability of the space and ease of use of the
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Figure 5.1
Plot o f the 
tw o-d im ensional 
M D S solution 
of the m anifestos 
in 1 9 86 , 1989  
and  19 94
axis 1
The stress o f this two-dimensional solution is .09, which means that the two­
dimensional representation of these manifestos is, according to our rule o f thumb, 
a fairly good representation o f the data. Intuitively, the parties more to the right in 
this figure seem to be parties that we denote as left-wing, so we can suggest that 
there is a ‘left-right’ dimension crosscutting the figure. I would however like to be 
more systematic in the interpretation o f the M DS space. It is important to realise 
that all directions can be used to interpret this Euclidean space. The directions of the 
coordinate axes do not necessarily have any substantive meaning. A more reliable 
alternative to simply examining the configuration and recalling what is already known 
about the political parties - like checking for the ‘left-right’ dimension - is a method 
based on linear regression. The computer algorithm, developed by Chang and 
Carroll (1972), for fitting outside property vectors into stimulus spaces, is called 
PROFIT. If a variable is expected to relate to the configuration, it is possible to perform 
a linear multiple regression, using this variable as the dependent variable and the 
coordinates of the configuration as the independent variables. In this way, all 56 
variables can be regressed in the space. I have chosen to present only those variables in the 
plots that have a high explained variance and are at the same time vectors in different 
directions. Issues with more or less the same meaning and thus the same directions 
on the other hand do not lead to a significant increase o f our understanding o f the
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party system. For the ten M DS configurations of the party manifestos, the most 
important regression vectors based on the 56 possible variables are included. Next,
I have also made two scales that are useful for understanding the configuration of 
the manifestos.
These scales - a ‘left-right’ and a ‘social values’ scale - are included in the plots, if 
their explained variance for the configuration considered is high. The two scales are 
based on a number of issues from the original data set. The scales were constructed 
with reliability analysis. The left-right scale consists o f the following issues:
•  peace
•  democracy
• nationalisation
• social justice
•  labour groups: positive
•  military: positive
•  governmental and administrative efficiency
• free enterprise
•  incentives
•  economic orthodoxy
• welfare state limitation
• education limitation
• law and order
O n the left-right scale, an emphasis on the first five issues is considered to refer 
to left-wing party manifestos, whereas the others issues are considered right-wing 
statements. The manner in which the scales are constructed will be discussed in the 
next section. Here we confine ourselves to presenting the scales. The first seven 
issues on the following ‘social-values’ scale determine the extent of libertarianism, 
whereas the last issue on the scale determines the extent of authoritarianism. The 
social values scale consist of the following issues:
•  peace
•  democracy
• anti-growth economy
• environmental protection
• national way of life: negative
•  traditional morality: negative
•  minority groups
•  traditional morality: positive6
6The Cronbach A lpha scores for the left-right and social values scales are .68 and .78 respectively.
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Table 5.3
Resu lts o f the 
linear regression 
procedure,
in clu d ing
the positions 
o f the property 
vectors on the 
M D S axes and 
their explained 
variance R2
The results of the property fitting of the issues and scales in the 10 M DS con­
figurations are presented in Table 5.3. Only the vectors with a high explained variance 
and substantive meaning have been included.
PERIOD PROPERTY VECTOR ISSUE OR SCALE 1 s t  d im 2 n d  d im r 2
(M D S )
1 9 4 6 -1956 fre e  e n te rp r ise 401 .78 .62 .92
tr a d it io n a l m o ra lity  p o s it iv e 6 0 3 -.7 4 .66 .91
le ft -r ig h t scale .22 -.9 7 .59
1 9 5 2 -1959 fre e  e n te rp r ise 401 .14 -.9 9 .92
tr a d it io n a l m o ra lity  p o s it iv e 6 0 3 .73 .68 .92
le ft -r ig h t scale -.9 0 .43 .83
1 9 5 6 -1963 fre e  e n te rp r ise 401 -.11 -.9 9 .88
tra d it io n a l m o ra lity  p o s it iv e 6 0 3 .95 .30 .86
le ft -r ig h t scale -.4 8 .88 .89
1 9 5 9 -1967 fre e d o m  a n d  h u m a n  r ig h ts 201 -.9 9 -.0 4 .87
d e m o c ra c y 2 0 2 -.9 5 -.31 .90
so c ia l v a lu e s scale -.9 5 -.31 .92
le ft -r ig h t scale -.8 7 .49 .85
1 9 6 3 -1972 in c e n t iv e s 4 0 2 .20 -.9 8 .83
so c ia l ju s t ic e 503 -.9 9 -.0 7 .83
le ft -r ig h t scale -.9 9 -.1 5 .9 4
so c ia l v a lu e s scale -.7 3 .68 .90
1 9 6 7 -1977 p e a ce 106 .59 -.81 .88
so c ia l ju s t ic e 503 .99 -.0 5 .85
le ft -r ig h t scale .97 -.2 6 .95
1971-1981 fre e  e n te rp r ise 401 -.9 5 .32 .86
so c ia l ju s t ic e 503 .69 .72 .85
le ft -r ig h t scale .90 .43 .9 4
1977-1986 so c ia l ju s t ic e 503 .99 .11 .85
w e lfa re  s ta te  e x p a n s io n 5 0 4 -.1 9 .98 .92
le ft - r ig h t scale .72 .70 .9 4
1 9 8 1 -1989 p e a ce 106 .91 .42 .93
e c o n o m ic  g o a ls 4 0 8 .99 -.1 0 .8 4
le ft -r ig h t scale .66 .75 .93
1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 4 fre e d o m  a n d  h u m a n  r ig h ts 201 .96 .29 .78
w e lfa re  s ta te  lim ita t io n 505 -.6 9 -.7 3 .88
le ft - r ig h t scale .21 .98 .97
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The ease of use should also be considered in the choice for dimensionality. If, 
based on the statistical results (the stress), the researcher is not sure about how many 
dimensions to include, lower dimensionality beats higher dimensionality. It is much 
easier to examine and interpret a two-dimensional space than a three- or higher­
dimensional space. Higher dimensional configurations have to be presented as a 
number of lower dimensional configurations that are related, simply because we 
cannot grasp more than three dimensions at once.
The ideal scaling result is a low-dimensional representation of the party system 
in which the dimensions are ideological dimensions. As said in the introduction to 
this chapter, in that case each dimension consists of a coherent group of issues that 
form an idea about how society should be organised. I follow the definition of 
ideology given by Hinich and Munger (1994):
“Ideology. An internally consistent set o f  propositions that make both proscriptive and 
prescriptive demands on human behavior. A ll ideologies have implications for (a) what 
is ethically good; (b) how society’s resources should be distributed; and (c) where power 
appropriately resides".
If we obtain party positions on ideological dimensions, the ideology provides a 
set o f linkages with the numerous policy issues in the m-dimensional policy space. 
In this case, the ‘latent’ ideological dimension predicts what parties will do on a 
number of policy issues. Remember our left right scale: if we know the position of 
a party on this scale, we can infer its attitude towards tax-policy or welfare issues. In 
Analytical Politics, Hinich and Munger (1997), further argue that ideology is a 
means of communication, commitment and budgeting. Ideology simplifies the 
message that is to be sent to the voter. If  parties follow an ideology, they do not have 
to inform the voter about their position on every issue, since these positions can be 
inferred from the ideology. Moreover, ideology makes voters believe that the parties 
are committed to what they promise. The ideology can be seen as the reason why 
parties take certain stands on particular issues. Thirdly, the ideology provides infor­
mation on how the state budgets will be distributed once a party is elected. Most 
interesting for our purposes is the fact that once we have party positions on ideological 
dimensions, we can expect these positions to represent a large number o f issues, and 
can therefore rely on a low number of dimensions. Party positions on two or three 
ideological dimensions are the ideal input for testing our coalition formation theories. 
Unfortunately, this is not the output o f our MDS. The important role of ideology 
is the reason why the left-right and social values (libertarian versus authoritarian 
attitudes) scales were designed. Hence, even though the party positions on the coor­
dinate axes do not represent party positions on ideological dimensions, we prefer the 
property vectors across the space to consist o f our ideological scales.
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The MDS analyses yield ten two-dimensional plots. The policy positions of the 
parties in each sub-matrix can quite well be represented in a two-dimensional space. 
In this section, three MDS plots in which the interpretation of the configuration by 
means of property fitting is included, will be presented. The first is a plot of the 
manifesto positions in the 1952-1959 period, the second is a configuration for the 
1970’s, and the last is the same configuration of parties as in Figure 5.1 above, for 
1986-1994, but differs in the sense that the results of property fitting are included. 
These configurations display different periods in Dutch politics.
Figure 5.2
Plot of 
the tw o ­
dim ensional 
M D S solution 
of party 
m anifesto 
in 1 9 52 , 1956  
and  1959
axis 1
Ever since the introduction of universal suffrage in 1917, the Dutch political system 
was characterised by ‘verzuiling’ or pillarization. This segmentation in subcultures 
is described in detail by Lijphart (1990). The country was divided in five minority 
groups that organised not just politics but almost every aspect of social life. The five 
minority groups were: the liberals politically represented in 1952 by the VVD, the 
working class (PvdA), the Catholics (KVP), and two protestant groups (ARP and CHU). 
The division is based on two main dimensions of conflict, the first being religion 
and the second social class. The same division in two dimensions can be found in
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the interpretation of the MDS-configuration of the party system in 1952-1959. 
The first social class dimension is represented by the vectors left-right and free enter­
prise, whereas in the second dimension, traditional morality, divides the space into 
religious parties on one, and secular parties on another side. For this configuration 
the stress value is .11, which is characterised by Roskam (1975) as a ‘moderate’ 
result.
2
-2
Figure 5.3
Plot of the 
tw o-d im ensional 
M D S solution 
of the m anifestos 
in 19 67 , 1971, 
1972, 1977
In the late 1960’s the political system started to change. Most important indicator 
o f political change was the election result of 1967, when 10 % of the seats unexpect­
edly changed ‘political hands’. This was a big event, since the period o f pillarization 
was - among other things - characterised by a large degree of electoral stability. New 
political parties also appeared and the old conflict dimensions seemed to loose 
weight. In particular the role o f religion in subcultures declined. These developments 
can be found reflected in Figure 5.3. Traditional morality - the issue representing 
religious denomination - is no longer an important vector giving meaning to the 
configuration. It seems that more weight is attached to social class, or to put it 
differently the left-right dimension, than before. Although an increasing number of 
parties can be found in this configuration, the stress value of the representation for 
the 1970’s is .12, again a moderate result.
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Figu re  5.4
Plot o f the 
tw o -d im en sio n al 
M D S solution 
of the m anifestos 
in 1 9 86 , 1989  
and  19 94
axis 2
O ne of the results of the dwindling influence of religion on politics, and thus the 
decline of electoral support for the religious parties, was the amalgamation of three 
religious parties into one Christian Democratic Party (CDA) in 1980. Naturally 
this changed the balance of parties and seats. The central position o f the CDA in 
the political space made it a pivotal player. All cabinets until 1994 included the 
Christian Democrats, and they used to govern together with one or two o f  the other 
main parties, the Social Democrats (PvdA), the left-wing Liberals (D66) and the 
right-wing Liberals (VVD). In our configuration, positions on the left-right axis - 
denoted by left-right and welfare state negative - are fairly stable. The relative positions 
of the parties compared to one another keep pace on this axis. The party positions 
do change in another direction in this period, but they simultaneously move in the 
same direction. The vector that most coincides with changes in this direction is 
‘freedom and hum an rights’, which includes attitudes towards personal freedom, 
freedom from bureaucratic control, and individualism. The stress value of this con­
figuration is .09, characterised by Roskam (1975) as a fair result.
These plots are interesting because they are graphical representations o f  the party 
space. Since a number o f election programmes o f each party are included in these plots, 
changes over time in party positions can also be detected easily. This is interesting,
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but in order to test coalition formation theories, the only essential information are the 
coordinates for every party in every election year. Apart from avoiding dreariness, 
this is the reason why not all configurations are presented and no attempts to elucidate 
movements in party positions are made.
The coordinates and stress-scores for every configuration can be found in 
Appendix C. Since most party manifestos are included in a number o f MDS analyses
- because we used overlapping sub-matrices - we have distinct coordinates for iden­
tical manifestos. The following step is then to decide which configuration will be 
used for which election year. This could be a difficult choice if the M DS results were 
to be used in order to study party change over time. But since this is not our goal, 
and since the relative positions of the parties remain the same within the different 
configurations, this is not a problem. I have therefore chosen - whenever possible - 
to select the coordinates for a specific election from the configuration where this 
election lies most in the middle of the ten years included. In that case the substantive 
meaning of the space is ‘most correct’. For the choices of configurations and the 
results of the scaling procedure in general, we refer to the tables in Appendix C. In 
these tables, the stress value is and the coordinates on two dimensions are given. The 
data that will be used for testing the coalition formation theories have been high­
lighted.
In this section, party positions based on a content analysis of the party manifestos 
were presented. The raw data contained information on the salience o f issues. From 
these data, distances between parties were derived and multi-dimensional scaling 
was performed. This resulted in party positions on two dimensions for all election 
years included in the data set. These party positions will be used, in the next chap­
ter to test spatial coalition formation theories.
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5.4.3 Reliability Analysis. Obtaining portfolio  positions for political 
parties from  1946 until 1994
The above data - derived by multi-dimensional scaling - are useful to test spatial 
theories that rely on the policy positions o f  parties in a multi-dimensional space. 
W ith MDS, we applied an inductive method and had the ‘data speak for themselves’. 
This resulted in a configuration o f the parties in a two-dimensional space that we 
could interpret by means of property fitting. However, in order to test the theory 
on credible proposals (Laver & Shepsle, 1996) a different kind of party positions are 
needed: policy positions on specific ministerial portfolios. A ministerial portfolio is 
a minister’s portfolio, and a party is said to govern a policy dimension if it ‘holds’ 
the accompanying portfolio. Therefore a different scaling method will be applied.
W ith regard to the portfolio distribution theory, the following questions need to be 
answered:
•  W hich portfolios are considered key-departments in the Netherlands?
•  W hich policy-dimension best describes the jurisdiction of each key portfolio?
•  W here does each party stand on each o f these policy dimensions?
(Laver & Shepsle, 1996).
The first question was already answered by Laver and Shepsle (1996). They claim 
that for the Netherlands, as well as for many other countries they studied, the 
Finance and Foreign Affairs portfolios are most significant. Financial Affairs is an 
important portfolio because it symbolises the ‘left-right’ position of the parties. 
O ther portfolios that are also important in this respect, are Employment and Social 
Security, and Economic Affairs. Parties are expected to have more or less the same 
positions on these portfolio dimensions as compared to their positions on Finance. 
Since the political experts in the Laver and H unt survey (1992) also claim that 
Finance is the most important portfolio, this is the first portfolio that will be used 
in our analyses.
Attitudes o f political parties on Foreign Affairs are in general less outspoken. In 
everyday discussions about politics, these attitudes are not on the top of the agen­
da. Yet, parties do hold different views on the extent to which countries should par­
ticipate in international cooperative ventures such as U N  forces. Even though the 
foreign issues policy dimension is usually not seen as one o f the most important pol­
icy dimensions, the Foreign Affairs portfolio is an important ministerial portfolio in 
cabinet formation, and is therefore included in this analysis.
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If we choose to add a third portfolio in the analyses, for instance in case the same 
party holds the portfolios above, the best option is probably to add Internal Affairs1. 
It is an important policy dimension since it is concerned with the fabric of society. 
The dimension is based on attitudes of parties on bureaucracy, efficiency and law 
and order.
Even though Dutch political scientists would choose the so-called Triangle 
Finance, Economic Affairs and Social Affairs as the main portfolios, for this 
research, the two main portfolios will be Finance and Foreign Affairs. The classical 
Dutch threesome all belong to the same policy jurisdiction and therefore only one 
o f them will be chosen. Moreover, in the Laver and Hunt (1992) and Laver and Shepsle 
(1996) studies, the portfolios Finance and Foreign were said to be the most important 
portfolios. The answer to the first question “ W hich portfolios are considered key­
departments in the Netherlands?” is therefore Finance and Foreign. If  a third portfolio 
is required by the coalition formation theory, Internal Affairs will be added to this list.
The answer to the second question “W hich policy-dimension best describes the 
jurisdiction of each key portfolio” has already been given in the previous section. 
The left-right dimension best describes the portfolio Finance, whereas the Foreign 
Affairs portfolio is symbol for the foreign policy or internationalisation dimension. 
The third portfolio, Internal Affairs, belongs to the policy domain ‘fabric of society’, 
which describes the organisation o f public rule.
Based on the Manifesto data set, party positions on these portfolio dimensions 
will be derived by simple reliability analysis. This will provide the answer to our 
third question: “ W here does each party stand on each of these policy dimensions?” 
Using reliability analysis is a pragmatic choice, since the scales that we need cannot 
be obtained by MDS. Therefore, we shall use reliability analysis even though this 
technique is based on correlations between issues and not on similarities. We shall 
start with all issues and the same manifestos as described in Table 5.1. Measurement is 
necessary in order to obtain positions o f the parties on the policy-dimensions represen­
ted by the main portfolios. The aim is to create scales that measure the positions on 
the portfolios as well as possible. A scale is said to be a good scale if the inter-item 
correlation is high. This means that there should be a clear connection between the
1 This is based on a theoretical argum ent that is put forward in Chapter 4. The empirical consequences 
for predicting coalitions if one party holds both portfolios - w hether in the form er cabinet or in the new 
cabinet - will be studied in the next chapter. In short, it is possible in this case to predict a one-party 
coalition even if this party does not represent the majority in parliament.
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items that together constitute the scale. In that case, the scale is a reliable measurement 
o f the phenomena to be studied. Naturally the scale should be valid too. Otherwise any 
group o f issues that happen to be highly correlated can form a scale. The procedure 
to carry out reliability analysis is the following:
•  First the researcher selects a list o f  items that (s)he believes are good indicators 
for the scale.
•  In the next step the analysis is performed. This is done with a computer program 
(SPSS PC version) that computes the correlations, constructs the scale and provides 
a scalability coefficient.
•  This reliability coefficient, Cronbach’s alpha, is based on the internal consistency 
o f a test. Cronbach’s alpha is always between zero and one, since it is based on 
the average correlation of the items within a scale. If the coefficient is high - let 
us say above .8 - the procedure ends because the items are good indicators for the 
scale. If the alpha is low, the item with the lowest correlation should be deleted, 
and the analysis should be repeated until a scale is found in which the items are 
highly correlated.
This procedure is followed for our three policy dimensions. I first transformed 
the raw data in order to weaken the influence of issues with extremely high scores. 
The raw data were first rounded down and then ordered from large to small. The 
rounding off downwards is done in order to avoid small differences in the raw data 
to cause large differences in the correlations. The ordering from large to small is 
done to avoid that issues with large values predominate issues with smaller values.
W ith this transformed data set, I performed the procedure presented above. The 
Finance portfolio is represented by the same left-right dimension as discussed in the 
former section. Again, the left-right scale consists of the following issues:
•  peace (per 106)
•  democracy (per 202)
•  nationalisation (per 413)
•  social justice (per 503)
•  labour groups: positive (per 701)
•  military: positive (per 104)
•  governmental and administrative efficiency (per 303)
•  free enterprise (per 401)
•  incentives (per 402)
•  economic orthodoxy (per 414)
•  welfare state limitation (per 505)
•  education limitation (per 507)
•  law and order (per 605)
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On the left-right scale, emphasis on the first five issues is considered to refer to left- 
wing party manifestos, whereas the other issues are considered right-wing statements. 
Again, for the content o f these issues I refer to Appendix B. In order to construct a 
scale based on these issues, the scores on the first five issues are inverted. Since a 
high score on the first five issues would make a party more left-wing, and scores on 
the last eight issues would make a party more right-wing, it would be thoughtless 
to add them all. The left-wing scores are inverted and the right-wing scores not, so 
that a lower score puts a party more to the left, which meets our intuition. Exactly 
the same issues as in our scale are used by Van Kersbergen (1997) where these issues 
are referred to as ‘typically left issues’ and ‘typically right issues’. The Cronbach 
alpha o f this scale is .68. This is not by far an ideal scale coefficient. For a scale to 
be really good, the coefficient should be larger, but this is the best combination o f 
validity and reliability that could be found. Naturally, in a data set constructed for 
obtaining policy positions, and not as in our case a data set created to study saliency, 
the likelihood of generating a better scale is higher.
The next scale that was constructed concerns the portfolio Foreign Affairs. In 
general, the foreign affairs issues in the Manifesto data set have low values, and for some 
o f the issues within the External Relations Domain the parties hardly distinguish 
themselves. This has forced me to create a scale consisting of only two issues. These 
issues are internationalism ‘positive’ (per 107) and peace (per 106). The reliability 
coefficient for this scale is .67. A higher score on this scale means more internatio­
nalisation and promoting peace, whereas a lower score means less emphasis on these 
issues.
The scale for the portfolio Internal Affairs consists o f four items. The Cronbach 
alpha coefficient is .64, which again is not high. The issues that are part of this scale 
are centralisation (per 302), governmental and administrative efficiency (per 303), 
political authority (per 305), and law and order (per 605). Bluntly, a higher score on 
this scale represents a positive attitude toward a stronger government.
These three scales, constructed with the manifesto data, are frankly the best I 
could do with the data. We must keep in mind that they consist of very few items 
each, and that they are not highly correlated - see the relatively low alpha scores - 
and are therefore not very reliable. Yet since there are no better data available, these 
scales still have to be used to assign positions to the portfolio dimensions o f the 
political parties.
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The last question in the introduction to this section was: “where does each party 
stand on each o f these policy dimensions?” The position o f a party on a scale is 
based on the average position this party has, on the items that together form the 
scale. Since the scales are formed with the transformed, as opposed to raw, data, the 
positions o f  the parties on the scales are also derived from the transformed data. The 
standardised scores o f the parties on these three policy dimensions can be found in 
Appendix D. These policy positions stand for the positions of the parties on the 
portfolios, and can thus be used as input for our test o f the theory o f credible pro­
posals in the next chapter.
5.5 Positions of Parties on the Main Ideological Dim ensions in 1998: 
Computer-Coded Content Analysis
5.5.1 Computer-Coded Content Analysis of the Party Manifestos: Theory
Obtaining policy positions of parties in the present can be done with methods 
like expert surveys, elite surveys, mass surveys, or content analysis. In order to test 
theories on party competition or coalition formation in retrospect, the data on party 
positions should be improved. Since for past policy positions the formal texts, i.e. 
the party programmes, are the best possible information sources, Laver and Garry
(1998) propose two important improvements for the Manifesto data. They suggest 
the following two methods to refine the content analysis:
•  To redo the content analysis with a fine-grained coding scheme. This new coding 
scheme contains at least bipolar and most of the time three-polar issues (i.e. pro, 
con and neutral). The issues are also hierarchically structured, starting with defin­
ing to which domain an issue belongs and then refining more and more until 
they fit in a specific category. This method is similar to the original manifesto 
coding since expert coders perform the coding. The improvement lies in the 
more refined coding scheme, which allows us to obtain policy positions instead 
o f measuring emphasis and it is at the same time expected to have higher coder 
reliability.
•  The second, more revolutionary alternative to the qualitative expert coding is 
quantitative computer coding, which distinguishes itself from the former method 
by perfect ‘coder’ reliability and ease of use, especially when large documents are 
concerned (Laver & Garry, 1998).
I have decided to use the latter method for content analysis of the 1998 Dutch 
manifestos, for the following reasons. First, the reliability is better than in expert
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coding. This goes without saying since there is no room for interpretation - a word 
is either in the text or is not - or mistakes in computing a word’s frequency. 
Secondly, although computer coding is said to be less valid because it mechanically 
codes without being able to ‘understand’ the context, the other side o f the coin is that 
expert coders are almost inevitably biased. The coder - being an expert - is familiar 
with the basic ideas of the parties, and can thus be inclined to interpret similar state­
ments differently if they stem from different parties. Hence, Computer coding has 
validity advantages too. Thirdly, the fact that the first results o f  computer coding o f 
the manifestos by Laver and Garry are promising, has also contributed to the decision. 
Laver and Garry have performed computer coding as well as the revised - fine 
grained - expert coding for Britain in 1989 and 1997 and Ireland in 1992 and 1997. 
They compared the results o f these methods with the original MRG results and the 
Laver and H unt expert surveys. They consider their results encouraging because the 
cross validation of the different methods is good, i.e. high Pearson correlations exist 
between the party positions derived by different methods. The estimates o f eco­
nomic left-right positions showed correlations above .84 (Laver & Garry, 1998). In 
conclusion, Laver and Garry suggest that “computer coding o f huge volumes o f virgin 
text may be a viable undertaking" (Laver & Garry, 1998).
In the next section, the computer-coded content analysis of the 1998 Dutch 
manifestos will be performed. For the most part, I shall follow the procedure 
described in Laver and Garry (1998). The following steps, which are the basic steps 
for any kind of content analysis, will be taken:
- Selection o f the documents to be coded
- Defining the coding units (sentence, quasi-sentence or word)
- Defining the coding categories (dictionaries)
- Performing the analysis.
5.5.2 Computer-Coded Content Analysis of the Party Manifestos: 
Practice
High reliability o f computer coding and promising empirical results o f Laver and 
Garry’s content analysis are part o f the reason to perform the same type of analysis 
for the Netherlands in 1998. W hat is also important is the urge to explore possible 
methods that might solve the lack of reliable and valid estimates o f party positions 
in retrospect. Better methods will in future years probably result in better estimates 
of policy positions, and improved empirical studies on party competition in general 
and coalition formation in particular. This section should therefore not only be seen
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as a means to collect data for 1998, but most of all as a first effort towards improving 
the data on policy positions in general. However, this is a tryout and many improve­
ments, especially by refining the dictionaries, should be made before applying the 
method in retrospect.
Com puter coded content analysis is performed to obtain policy positions of the 
main political parties in 1998. The first step was to choose the documents to be 
analysed. The five largest parties - CDA, D66, GrLinks, PvdA, and VVD - are in­
cluded in the analysis and the documents are the party manifestos. In this method, 
the next step is to design dictionaries of words that are relevant for a particular policy 
domain. These dictionaries are the coding schemes. In this procedure, the coding 
unit is a word. If these steps are accomplished, the computer analyses the texts word 
by word, and counts the number of words associated with each coding category.
After choosing the coding unit and the documents, the dictionaries have to be 
developed. Designing the dictionaries is a vital part o f content analysis. Since there 
were no good dictionaries at hand, I designed my own. I did not have to start from 
scratch, because I decided to use the policy domains distinguished by Laver and 
Garry (1998). They applied the following categories for both refined expert coding 
and computer coding:
•  Economic policy
•  Social values
•  Political reform
•  Law and order
•  Environmental policy
The next step is to allocate words to these coding categories. The dictionaries made 
by Laver and Garry were used as reference dictionaries. These reference dictionaries, 
the manifestos and common sense were used to design the dictionaries. Ideally, other 
important documents o f  political parties in the same period, instead o f  the manifes­
tos themselves should be used, to develop the dictionaries. Using other documents 
to create the dictionaries is suggested by Laver and Garry (1998). In this way, we 
would avoid using the same texts for designing the wordlists and performing the 
analysis. Unfortunately, the same texts are used for both in this analysis. This is of 
course not very elegant, but being limited by time and lack of available reference 
documents has led to this procedure.
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The main requirements for a word to be added to a wordlist are:
- it should have substantive meaning for a category, i.e. a validity requirement,
- it should be interpreted the same in all texts, i.e. there should be little room for 
ambiguity about the meaning of the word, and
- it should be discriminating between the parties, i.e. the frequency of a word turning 
up in a document should be significantly different for different parties (Laver & 
Garry, 1998).
For the categories distinguished above, I designed bipolar wordlists. For economic 
policy and social values bipolar dictionaries were created and content analysis per­
formed. The same procedure was followed for the categories ‘law and order’ and 
‘political reform’. Dictionaries for these two domains were constructed, but they 
were later removed from the analysis, because the parties did not distinguish them­
selves on these domains.
Only for environmental policy is the wordlist uni-polar, since references to 
environment are made in the protection sense only. No sane party would actually 
state that it wants to destroy the environment. Even if  a party is not willing to spend 
a lot o f money on environmental protection, it will only make positive references. 
The difference in the extent to which parties choose for environmental protection 
is measured by comparing the percentage of words of the whole document dedicated 
to environmental protection.
The wordlist for left-wing words for the economic left-right dimension consists 
o f typical left-wing words like ‘care’, ‘state’, ‘insurance’, ‘health’ and ‘social security’. 
Words on the others side of the left-right dimension are ‘growth’, ‘budget deficit’, 
‘individual’, and ‘stimulate’. These words have substantive left- or right-wing meaning, 
and the frequency of these words in the different documents differs. The social value 
wordlist provides a list of liberal words on the one and conservative words on the 
other hand. Parties distinguish themselves on this scale and the words are relevant 
for each category. Liberal words are ‘emancipation’, ‘equality’, ‘self-determination’, 
‘freedom’ and ‘ethnicity’, whereas conservative words are ‘value’, ‘traditional’, ‘religion’, 
and ‘family’. The dictionary for ecological commitment is a very large dictionary, 
since environmental words are usually not ambiguous. The words with ‘energy’, 
‘soil’ or ‘resources’ or even the term ‘environment’ itself, usually refer to environ­
mental protection and are thus used in a pro-ecological sense. The wordlists for the 
domains left-right, social values and environmental protection can be found in appen­
dix E. These dictionaries will be set down in Dutch. Anglo-Saxon readers will 
understand the meaning of the scales from the short overview above. Keeping the 
dictionaries in Dutch gives the opportunity to verify the results and to extend the 
same analysis with new documents.
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The frequencies of words from the wordlists - obtained with the computer pro­
gram KWALITAN (1998) - occurring in the documents, are portrayed in the fol­
lowing table.
Table 5.4
C o u n ts  of 
coded  w ords 
in the party 
m anifestos 
of 1998
PARTY LEFT RIGHT SOCIAL VALUES ENVIRONMENT TOTAL
LEFT RIGHT LIBERAL CONSERV. ENVIRONMENT #  WORDS
GRLINKS 590 93 109 114 3 1 9 2 3 0 2 5
PVDA 7 3 8 186 110 106 3 2 5 3 4 2 7 5
d 6 6 6 5 6 2 7 9 176 177 502 5 0 7 4 4
CDA 6 3 6 176 153 2 67 2 3 9 3 3 8 3 2
VVD 2 12 2 12 6 4 69 101 1 5 9 5 9
The next step is to calculate the party positions on the policy scales. The position of 
a manifesto on the left-right scale depends on the proportion of left-wing statements 
as compared to the right-wing hits. For example, the position o f Green Left on the 
left-right policy scale is the number o f words coded right, minus the number of 
words coded left, divided by the total number of hits on left and right;
93-590 / 683 = -.73. The score for the D66 is 279-656 / 935 = -.40. The same 
formula works for the value scale. The position on the ecological scale is computed 
differently. O n this salience issue, parties always score positive. The position is 
therefore the proportion of words dedicated to environmental protection from the 
total amount of words in a document.
The ranges of these positions differ considerably, since the number of words in 
the dictionaries for social values and left-right, also vary considerably. For instance, 
the list and hits for left-wing words is larger than for right-wing words which means 
that all scores are below zero. The raw scores for environment are also very small 
since they are related to the total number of words in the document. To make com­
paring positions on different scales easier and to create better data for testing the 
theories, I have decided to transform the scores. O n each scale, the largest score 
receives the value 1 and the lowest score receives 0. The other scores on the scale 
receive their normalised score, which is the raw score divided by the range o f the 
scores on the scale. I f  differences in the size o f  the dictionaries induce a smaller 
range of scores on a particular scale than on another, and if at the same time these 
scales are perceived as equally important, this would (mis)lead to the conclusion
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that on one scale parties are more alike than on another. This would influence the 
perceived party policy positions and would thus cause problems when testing the 
coalitions formation theories for 1998. The normalised scores o f the Dutch mani­
festos in 1998 for left-right, social values and environmental protection can be 
found in Appendix F. For illustrative purposes, we present a graphical representa­
tion of party positions on the scales in the Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
d66
PVDA
GRLINKS
VVD
CDA
0
LEFT-RIGHT
d66
VVD■
1
GRLINKS
PVDA
CDA
0
LEFT-RIGHT
Figure 5.5
Left-right vs. 
liberal-conservative 
values in 1998
Figure 5.6
Left-right vs. 
environm ental 
protecion in 1998
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Researchers from the Free University of Amsterdam have also been working on 
the 1998 party positions. Kleinnijenhuis and De Ridder performed expert content 
analysis in media, newspapers and television programmes in the months before the 
elections until Election Day in 1994 (Kleinnijenhuis & De Ridder, 1998) and in 1998 
(Kleinnijenhuis et al. 1998). The emphasis o f  these studies is on issue ownership o f 
parties, and less on issue positions like in our analysis. Still, it is interesting to compare 
these results and see whether or not they comply with our results. The issues in their 
1998 research closely related to our scales are: environment, Christian ethics and 
left-right. The placement of the parties in relation to each other on the first two 
issues - in our research denoted as environmental protection and social values - are 
fairly similar but not identical to our results. O n the social values dimension positions 
of parties have even changed place. In both studies the Christian Democratic Party 
is positioned far away form the other parties on the value scale, and the remaining 
parties lie closer together. However, on Kleinnijenhuis’ scale, the most liberal party 
is the PvdA, whereas on our scale it is D66. O f course, these analyses were done 
with different wordlists, different documents and for different purposes, but since 
the same parties were analysed, one would expect the same positions to be found. 
It is, however, encouraging that on the economic policy domain we find the posi­
tion o f the Christian Democratic Party in both analyses further to the left on the 
left-right scale - even at the left-hand side of D66 - than its traditional position. In 
most studies, the CDA is positioned to the right of D66, and the fact that both 
studies show the same deviance from the CDA’s traditional position increases con­
fidence in the scaling method. Based on merely face value, the CDA manifesto of 
1998 also seems to be more ‘social’, i.e. left-wing, than the D66 programme. 
Finding this unanticipated shift o f  the CDA in both analyses complies with the idea 
of high reliability o f computer coded content analysis.
A criterion to validate the results used by Laver and Garry is to study correlation 
between scales constructed by different methods. Fortunately, Laver and Mair
(1999) were so kind to provide the - not yet published - results of their 1998 expert 
survey. The results of the cross validation seem very promising. The lowest correlation 
coefficient can be found for left-right - based on computer coding - and general left- 
right in the expert survey: it is .865. If we apply and average this general left-right 
issue with the other left-right issue in the expert data set - taxes vs. public spending
- the average correlation between these methods increases to .93. The correlation 
between the Laver and Mair environmental party positions, and the computer- 
coded environmental party positions is .97. The last dimension social values also 
provides promising results. The correlation between computer-coded social value 
positions and social values in Laver and Mair is .937; whereas computer-coded
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social values and the Laver and Mair clerical issue scores .956. A summary o f these 
results can be found in Table 5.5.
correlation coefficient 
LEFT-RIGHT
TAXES VS. SERVICES 
expert data
LEFT-WING VS. RIGHT-WING 
expert data
AVERAGE POSITION ON LEFT-RIGHT 
expert data
computer-coding .973 .865 .93
correlation coefficient
SOCIAL VALUES 
computer-coding
PERMISSIVE POLICIES ON
a b o r tio n /h o m o s e x u a lit y  
expert data
.9 3 7
CLERICAL 
expert data
.9 5 6
AVERAGE POSITION ON SOCIAL VALUES 
expert data
.949
correlation coefficient
ENVIRONM. PROTECTION 
computer-coding
ENVIRoNMENTAL PRoTECTIoN  
expert data
.97
In order to construct decent scales, more research on content analysis and espe­
cially on designing wordlists is necessary. Also, the validation method should be 
applied and extended, so that a good criterion can be found to evaluate the com­
puter-coding method in general. If  this method for obtaining party positions on 
important ideological dimensions proves to be as promising as it seems, the next 
task is to perform computer-coded content analysis in retrospect.
Table 5.5.
C ro ss-va lidatin g  
party positions: 
correlating 
com puter-cod ing 
w ith  expert data
5.6 Expert Data as Control Variables
In the Laver and H unt data set, country experts of 24 democracies positioned 
parties on a range of policy dimensions. It is exceptional that in this survey also 
information on salience of the policy dimensions and the salience of the ministerial 
portfolios is gathered. Even though policy positions of the political parties in the 
Netherlands for 1989 and 1994 have already been constructed by means of MDS 
of the Manifesto data, this survey will be used too. Advantages of the expert survey are 
that the ‘right’ questions are asked, that the policy issues included seem important 
issues in society, and that information on the salience of issues and portfolios is 
included. Therefore, the party positions obtained by this data set will be used as 
control variables. If the policy positions in this expert survey are correct and if the
1 7 0 G O V ERN IN G  W ITH YO U R  C LO SE ST  NEIGHBOUR
D u t c h  P o l i t i c s ,  P a r t i e s  a n d  T h e i r  P o s i t i o n s
policy positions derived by the M DS are valid, the same policy positions should 
emerge from both data sets, so that the same coalitions will be predicted.
In this survey for the Netherlands in 1989, parties are positioned on eight policy 
issues on a scale from 1 to 20. The issues included are:
•  taxes vs. public services
•  foreign policy
•  public ownership
•  social policy (policy on abortion and homosexuality)
•  religious dimension
•  urban vs. rural interests
•  centralisation of decision-making
•  environmental policy
For the elections of 1994, Laver repeated the expert analysis but used “a shorter 
survey form more closely tailored to the Dutch case” (Laver, 1995). The scales with the 
lowest salience scores in 1989, which were centralisation o f decision-making and 
urban vs. rural interests, were removed from the analysis. In 1994, the foreign affairs 
issue changed from ‘pro friendly relations towards the USSR vs. anti friendly relations 
toward the USSR’ into ‘pro or anti friendly relations towards the USA’. Four new 
issues were introduced to meet the changing political reality. These issues deal with 
policy on the European Union, immigration, institutional change and the welfare 
state.
Note that Laver and H unt (1992) and Laver (1995) denote policy issues as policy 
dimensions. Since I want to reduce this issue space into a smaller dimensional space, 
I refer to these policy dimensions as policy issues and to the newly obtained dimensions 
as dimensions. For 1989, I shall reduce the dimensionality even though for some of 
our theories it might be just as well to use the eight issues as eight dimensions. 
However, for the graphical representations of the data and for comparability o f the 
different data sets, it is preferable to reduce dimensionality and focus on the main 
dimensions. Moreover, I want to obtain party positions on more or less the same 
dimensions as found earlier. In that case the data can truly be used as a ‘control’ data 
set. Hence, I would like to find a left-right- and a libertarian-authoritarian (or social 
values) dimension in 1989 and 1994.
Reducing dimensionality was done in many different ways in this chapter. The 
techniques that I shall apply here are a combination of face validity and informa­
tion on the salience of policy issues and correlations between the policy issues. More
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inductive methodological techniques like factor analysis or MDS will not be used 
in this survey because the aim is to gather data on the dimensions that we have 
already detected in the previous sections.
First the results from the 1989 survey will be presented. The policy issues with 
the highest mean saliency scores are taxes vs. public services and social policy. These 
issues are very similar to the dimensions that I would like to find, namely left-right 
and social values. Since ‘public ownership of business and industry’ is also included 
in the survey, and since this seems to be a ‘left-right’ issue, this policy issue was also 
considered. The correlation between the scores on ‘taxes vs. public services’, which 
represents the attitudes of the parties toward raising or cutting down taxes for public 
spending, and ‘public ownership’ is very high, namely .98. A left-right scale was 
constructed o f  these two issues. Since the direction o f  these issues is the same, a 
score on this dimension can simply be obtained by taking the average score o f a party 
on the two issues. Note that, a low score on the dimension again means a position 
more to the left than a high score.
The second dimension in the multi-dimensional scaling of 1986-1994, represented 
by the property vector ‘freedom and human rights’, and in the 1998 content analysis 
represented by social values, should be the score on the policy issue ‘social policy’. 
Social policy consists of attitudes of a party that promote or oppose permissive policies 
on matters such as abortion and homosexual law. A high score on the social dimension 
means a more conservative attitude, whereas a lower position represents a more pro­
gressive attitude. The scores on the left-right dimension and the social policy 
dimension for 1989 were added as control data and can be found in Appendix G in 
table G1.
Like in the sections above, different data are needed for the theory on ministerial 
portfolios. Questions on the salience of portfolios are asked in these expert surveys. 
As we observed earlier, finance and foreign affairs seem the most important portfolios. 
The score of a party on left-right - representing the finance portfolio - is the same 
as above. For the score on foreign affairs, the foreign policy issue is used. A low score 
on the left-right dimension is again more left- than right-wing, and a low score on 
the foreign affairs dimension is a positive attitude towards friendly relations with the 
USSR, whereas a higher score is a more anti USSR attitude. The data can be found 
in table G2 in appendix G.
For 1994, the same pattern is followed. A difference is that the left-right dimension 
includes a new issue, namely ‘welfare state’. This issue concerns promoting versus 
cutting back on existing welfare benefits. The left-right dimension is thus composed o f
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three policy issues: taxation, public ownership and welfare state. The second dimen­
sion is again social policy, which measures policy on homosexuality and abortion. 
Another new issue, namely immigration policy, i.e. accepting immigration and pro­
moting policies helping immigrants versus opposing immigration and opposing any 
policies helping immigrants, also has high salience. This new issue in the survey can 
be added as a separate dimension. I will however not include it, since I prefer to 
apply dimensions that are as similar as possible to the dimensions constructed with 
the other data sets. The data for 1994 on the two dimensions can be found in table 
G3 of appendix G. The direction of the scales is the same as in 1989. For the theory 
on the distribution o f  portfolios, we look once more at Finance and Foreign Affairs. 
The finance portfolio is policed by the left-right dimension. The Foreign Affairs 
portfolio is the average score on two foreign issues, namely ‘foreign policy’ and 
‘European policy’: opposing versus promoting a close relationship with the United 
States, respectively opposing versus promoting a close relationship with the European 
Union. Note that for this dimension the direction has changed as compared to 
1989. A low score means opposing a close relation with the USA and the EU, 
whereas a high score means promoting these relations. The data on the positions o f 
the portfolios for the parties in 1994 can be found in table G4 in appendix G.
Applying statistical tests to evaluate the party positions o f the different data sets 
is not advisable, because we do not have many cases, and the dimensions - except 
for left-right - obtained by the different data sets are not similar enough. To test the
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main spatial theories, we use the two dimensions, namely left-right and social values. 
The latter dimension consist of a quite different issue in the Laver and H unt survey
- policy on abortion and homosexuality - as compared to the most suitable property 
vector from the manifesto data, i.e. freedom and hum an rights. Comparing the 
party positions of the Laver and H unt survey for 1989 and 1994 with the MDS 
results of the manifesto data for the same period is thus difficult. The party positions 
on these dimensions are presented in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8.
It is hard to compare the MDS results with the expert survey results, since the 
policy positions derived by Laver and Hunt (see above) are on the main axes, whereas 
the positions of the parties on the dimensions in M DS (see Figure 5.4) can be found 
with the property vectors. It seems that the left-right positions of the parties are 
more or less similar in both data sets, or at least the order o f  the parties on this 
dimension is the same. However, the positions of the parties on Laver and H unt’s 
social policy dimension and on the ‘Freedom and Hum an Rights’ vector of the 
manifesto data are very different. Especially the traditional ‘conservative’ position o f 
the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) is not found in the M DS solution. This is 
probably caused by the fact that the issue ‘freedom and hum an rights’ does not 
relate to issues that are traditionally opposed by the churches, whereas abortion and 
homosexuality are issues that religious parties in general do not support.
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We can also compare positions on the portfolio dimensions of the Laver and 
H unt data set with the positions gathered by reliability analysis o f  the manifesto 
data. For both data sets, Finance and Foreign Affairs are examined. Again, the positions 
o f both databases on the finance portfolio - policed by left-right - are very similar. 
The Foreign Affairs dimensions consist o f  different issues and unfortunately the two 
data sets produce very different policy positions. In the 1989 Laver and H unt data 
set, the foreign portfolio is represented by opposing vs. promoting a close relation 
with the USSR. Green Left (GrLinks) promotes this relation whereas the Liberals 
(VVD) oppose a close relationship. In 1994 however, the survey concerns opposing 
vs. promoting a close relation with the USA, and opposing vs. promoting a close 
relation with the EU, and the scores are reversed. For instance, the Liberals opposed 
a close relation with the USSR in the 1989 survey, but promote a closer relation to 
the USA and the EU. There seems to be hardly any connection between these party 
positions, and the positions obtained by reliability analysis o f the manifesto data 
that concerned attitudes towards internationalisation and peace. N ot only did we 
find large differences in the positions of parties between the two data sets, we also 
found an extremely large discrepancy in the party positions of 1989 and 1994 with­
in the manifesto data. Even though the same issues were used, most parties changed 
place on this dimension. If we suppose that the Laver and H unt survey is valid, and 
thus believe that the positions of the parties on their foreign policy issues make 
sense, this leads to the conclusion that the Foreign Affairs scale derived from the 
manifesto data-set is problematic. Om itting these data, however, would mean that 
the portfolio theory could not be tested for cabinet formations before 1989. Hence, 
we continue with these data, and again keep in mind that the manifesto data are not 
as valid nor reliable as we would like them to be.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we first described the Dutch political system. It appears that the 
Queen has a peculiar position in the cabinet formation process. Exactly indicating 
the Queen’s influence turned out to be impossible, but the overall conclusion is that 
her political role and influence definitely exceeds the connotation ‘symbolic’.
Secondly, the Manifesto data set was used to obtain party positions for 1946 until 
1994 on the main dimensions. The greatest part o f the data was analysed with 
multi-dimensional scaling, and the outcomes seem to make sense. The stress scores 
(remember that the lower the score, the better the result) are fairly high - between .09 
and .18 - but still not too bad, and the interpretability analysis with Profit provided
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good results. However, we must not forget that the Manifesto data were collected 
for another purpose than obtaining party positions, and therefore the quality of the 
raw data is not very high. The results from our analyses are the best we can get. The 
resulting party positions will be used for testing spatial coalition formation theories.
Thirdly, reliability analysis was performed with the Manifesto data in order to 
collect data on portfolio dimensions for 1946 to 1994. The results are not promising. 
The scalability scores are not good - .68, .65 and .67 - but at least the dimensions
- left-right and foreign affairs - consist o f  issues that are expected to represent the 
main portfolios well. However, as we have seen in the previous section, especially 
the foreign affairs dimension causes problems.
A computer-coded content analysis — based on the approach developed by Laver 
and Garry (1998) - was performed for the 1998 coalition formation. The party 
manifestos of 1998 were analysed, and scales were made. Party positions on an 
environmental scale, on left-right, and on social values were gathered. For this election 
year, no data were collected for the specific portfolio dimensions. This analysis is an 
important first step towards developing a reliable and valid method for obtaining 
policy positions, both in the future and for retrospective research.
The last step was to study the Laver and H unt data set. These data were not fit for 
our task, since the survey was at the time of testing only held twice; namely in 1989 
and 1994. Positions of parties on a large number of important issues are examined. 
Information on the position and importance of portfolios is also included. This 
makes the data set valuable, but more cases are needed to test the theories. This data 
set was however used as a control variable. The resulting party positions o f the MDS 
with the manifesto data and the resulting positions of the expert data were com­
pared for 1989 and 1994. The positions of the parties on the left-right dimension 
are quite similar, but the positions on the values dimension in the Laver and Hunt 
data set and the positions on the vector ‘freedom and hum an rights’ in the MDS 
display great differences. The same problem was found with the party positions of 
these data sets on the portfolio dimensions. Again, left-right seemed reliable, but 
Foreign Affairs caused problems.
Even for an optimist, the conclusion must be that the party positions gained by 
our data sets are not very reliable. The lack of reliable multi-dimensional data is a 
large handicap. If, in the next chapter, the hypotheses of the coalition formation 
theories are falsified, we cannot be sure if this is caused by the data-problem or by 
a theoretical deficiency. The differences between the data sets can simply be caused
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by the fact that different issues produce scales that I would like to be the same but 
are probably not. It might also be the case that the MDS solutions are reliable, but 
the interpretation o f the property vectors causes the deviance from the other data 
sets. I suggest that the best thing to do is continue with testing the theories, and at 
the same time be critical about the results.
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6. Empirical Confrontation
of the Coalition Formation Theories
6.1 Introduction
The most common office- and policy-seeking coalition formation theories were 
presented in Chapter 3. Hypotheses that were derived there will now be confronted 
with data. The cases that we shall study are cabinet formations in the Netherlands, 
since World War II. Only coalition formation that follows elections is taken into 
account in the analysis. This leaves 16 cases o f  coalition formation in the 
Netherlands after the Second World War: 1946, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1959, 1963, 
1967,1971 ,1972 , 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998.
In order to test power-oriented, policy-oriented and actor-oriented theories, data on 
the number o f  seats o f  parties and the position o f parties on a uni-dimensional scale 
are necessary. The legislative power o f the parties and the coalitions that have been 
formed can be found in the ‘Compendium voor politiek en samenleving in Nederland’, 
which is a compendium of Dutch Politics (Daalder & Schuyt, 1986). Party positions 
on a uni-dimensional ordinal scale are also available (Van Roozendaal, 1992).
For testing spatial theories, presented in Chapter 4, metric data on party 
positions on more than one policy or ideological dimension are needed. These data 
were gathered, and the results of the analyses presented, in the previous chapter. 
These spatial theories will also be tested in this chapter.
N ot every political party has been selected for the analysis. This is partly my 
choice but mostly motivated by the Manifesto Research Group’s selection o f parties. 
Since it is my general aim is to compare the theories as well as possible, only parties 
that were included in the Manifesto data set are included in the analysis. If, we 
would for instance use all possible parties when testing office-seeking theories, and 
only the ‘significant’ parties for testing spatial theories, the comparison would not 
be fair. N ot much is said in the Userguide of the Manifesto Project about the crite­
ria for selecting parties. Parties with blackmail potential are said to be included. This 
excludes very small parties, but it also excludes the communist party after W W  II, 
even though it had ten percent o f the seats in 1946. Coalition potential is defined 
as ‘the actual or former membership in a government’ or ‘the possibility of becom­
ing a government party’ (Manifesto Userguide, 1995)1.
1 In one case, I have removed a party even though it w as in the data set. The Dem ocratic Socialist party, 
'D S '7 0 ', w as no longer a significant party in 1977: it only had one seat.
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The first step is to examine whether or not the theories predict the coalitions that 
came about - i.e. whether or not the theories would have predicted the so-called his­
torical coalitions2. This is simply done by confronting the theories with the election 
results, and if necessary the policy positions of the parties. For each theory the 
results of the testing and an example o f the procedure to derive a prediction set will 
be presented in the Section 2.
In Section 3, the success rate and prediction efficiency of the theories will be 
determined and evaluated. For a sound description of the concepts success rate and 
prediction efficiency, I refer to Steunenberg (1992). The first is the ratio of correct 
predictions by the theory. The correct coalition is of course the historical coalition. 
The latter compares the success rate with the total number of predictions by each 
theory. This enables us to compare naïve theories - with broad prediction sets - with 
more thrifty theories. Both measurement tools are descriptive and are used to gain 
more insight in the predictive power of the theories.
Since information about the statistical strength of the theories is also needed, the 
following step in this chapter is to perform a statistical test. In the past, several 
statistical tests have been suggested to determine the predictive power o f coalition 
formation theories. The tests start from the notion that the number of correct pre­
dictions by a theory should be higher than the number of correct predictions based 
on a random selection of coalitions (Taylor & Laver, 1973; De Swaan, 1973; De Swaan 
& Mokken, 1980; Boute, 1988; Steunenberg, 1992). Various kinds of tests based on this 
idea have been performed. De Swaan (1973) applies the ‘Fisher exact probability 
test’. The null hypothesis is that the random selection o f coalitions selects the same 
number o f historical coalitions as the theory, whereas the alternative hypothesis 
states that the selection o f historical coalitions by the theory is more accurate than the 
number of correct predictions selecting random. The question is: does the theory 
predict better than a random selection? To answer this, a one-tailed hypergeometrical 
test is performed, since the variables are discrete. Every period leads to one unique 
prediction set, even though during inter-electoral periods more than one cabinet 
formation can take place. In the statistical test, De Swaan and Mokken (1973,1980) 
consider one period as sampling without replacement.
Taylor and Laver (1973) however, examine all cabinets within a period. They 
apply sampling with replacement and use a binomial distribution. They further
2 In accordance w ith - am ong others - De Sw aan and M okken (1980), I refer to the coalition that actu­
ally came about as the 'historical coalition'. This is to distinguish between the coalition(s) predicted by 
the theory and the actual coalition.
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apply a correction for discontinuity. The largest difference between the two test statis­
tics is that De Swaan and Mokken use a different admissible set than Taylor and 
Laver. De Swaan and Mokken only allow winning coalitions in the admissible set, 
whereas the latter allow all possible combination of parties. Note that the admissible 
set is the set of feasible coalitions. De Swaan and Mokken’s admissible set seems 
reasonable since most theories assume the majority principle anyway. Moreover, if 
we enlarge the admissible set by permitting minority coalitions, this may lead to an 
overestimation o f the predictive power o f the theories.
Boute (1988) and Steunenberg (1992) both use a very large number of cases, 
since they test municipal coalition formation, view the binomial distribution as a 
normal distribution, and use Z-statistics.
In Section 4 of this chapter, a statistical test based on simulation will be performed. 
In this empirical study, the number of cases is very small, the variables are discrete
- either a right (1) or wrong prediction (0) - and it is possible to exactly determine 
the probabilities at stake.
I agree with Mokken and De Swaan that, even though more cabinets were formed 
than elections held, we have a unique prediction set - that is, the set o f  coalitions 
predicted by a theory - for every period. As such, I suggest that for the purpose of 
testing, we only consider the first coalition that is formed after an election. Another 
argument for admitting only one prediction set every electoral period is that during 
an inter-electoral period party positions hardly change, and the weights of the polit­
ical parties certainly do not change, so that the game stays exactly the same. Hence, 
only coalition formation that follows elections is taken into account in the analysis.
Further, I prefer only winning coalitions in the admissible (feasible) set. In the 
two cases that a version of a theory, i.e. the winset allocation distribution and the 
heart solution, allows minority coalitions, I shall adjust the admissible set and study 
all possible combinations o f allocations or parties. Since all other theories in this 
study are based on the assumption that winning coalitions will be formed, and since it 
is not common in the Netherlands to form minority coalitions, it seems reasonable to 
exclude the possibility of minority cabinets and use as the standard the set of winning 
coalitions.
The exact probabilities for each theory, for each case of coalition formation, will 
be determined and then coalition formation will be simulated 50.000 times. The 
probability o f a theory is the number o f coalitions in its prediction set divided by 
the number of admissible coalitions for that year. The theory of minimal winning 
coalitions, for instance, predicts 4 coalitions out of 12 possible winning coalitions 
for 1946. Hence the probability of this theory predicting correctly in 1946 is 4/ 12. 
Based on probability and the probabilities for other years, simulations will be run.
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Then a one-tailed test is performed, and if the success rate of a theory lies within 
the region o f rejection (a  = .05) of the simulated distribution, the theory performs 
better than random. In this case the null hypothesis, predicting that the success rate 
o f the theory and random will be equal, should be rejected.
In Section 5, the results of the theories based on the control variables are discussed. 
For 1989 and 1994, I have added data on party positions based on expert surveys 
in order to evaluate the degree to which different data bases lead to different policy 
positions and, as a result of that, to different predictions.
In the final section, concluding remarks on the prediction power of the various 
classes of theories will be made.
6.2 Testing Coalition Formation Theories
This chapter will follow the same order as Chapters 3 and 4. We shall start with tests 
for office-seeking theories, continue with uni-dimensional policy-seeking theories, 
then deal with the actor-oriented theories and end with spatial theories of coalition 
formation. For the first three classes of theories, one case will be discussed and then 
the results of the theories for all 16 cabinet formations will be presented. Since spatial 
theories are often complicated to test empirically, more examples will be given there.
6.2.1 Office-Seeking Theories
Three power-oriented theories were presented in Chapter 3: the theory on minimal 
winning coalitions, which predicts coalitions that become losing if any party leaves 
it; the minimal size theory predicting combination o f parties that have as few seats 
as possible and are still winning; and the bargaining set which selects winning coali­
tions with the smallest number of players.
We shall first examine the weighted majority game and compute which combi­
nations of parties are logically possible, and then select all winning coalitions. 
Coalition formation in 1946 will be reviewed. In 1946, the Second Chamber 
counted 100 seats and the quota is thus 51. The following parties - ordered from 
left to right - are included in this example: the Social Democrats (PvdA), the 
Catholics (KVP), the Protestants (ARP), another Protestant party (CHU) and the 
Liberals (VVD). The corresponding weighted majority game is [51; 29, 32, 13, 8, 6]. 
The total amount of seats does not add up to 100, which is caused by smaller parties
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that are not included in the Manifesto data set, and that will not be included in the 
testing. The ‘missing parties’ are the Communist party with 10 seats and a small 
Reformed (protestant) party with 2 seats.
There are 26 possible combinations of two or more parties: 10 two-party com­
binations, 10 three-party combinations, 5 four-party combinations, and the grand 
coalition3. The only two-party coalition that is winning is the PvdA-KVP coalition, 
denoted by the first letter of the party names: {pk}. O ut of the 10 possible three- 
party coalitions only 5 are winning; all four-party coalitions as the grand coalition 
are also winning. For this example, I present the set of winning coalitions in Table 6.1. 
Note that, the coalitions are again denoted by the first letter of the included parties.
Table 6.1
W in n in g  
coalitions 
in 1946
COALITION PK PKV KA V PKA PKC K A C PA C V PKA V P K C V K A C V PKA C K A C V
W EIGHT 61 67 51 7 4 69 53 56 80 75 59 82 88
T he following office seeking hypotheses were tested for all 16 cases.
Let G = (N, W) be a simple game.
Then only coalitions from W MIN will be formed (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1990).
Let [q; w2, w2, ..., wn ] be a weighted majority game.
Then only coalitions from W SIZE will be formed (Riker, 1962).
Let [q; w1 w2 , ..., wn ] be a weighted majority game.
Then only coalitions from W BAR will be formed (Leiserson, 1968).
For the coalition in W MIN it must be true that a winning coalition turns into a 
losing coalition if one of the players withdraws. This is true for {pk}, {kav}, {kac}, 
and {pacv}. In this prediction set not all coalition are o f minimal size. The opposite 
is never true; there cannot be a minimal size coalition that is not simultaneously 
minimal winning, for it would not be o f minimal size then. The coalition with the 
smallest weight is {kav} with exactly 51 seats. Note that it is not necessary for the 
smallest winning coalition to hold exactly the same weight as the quota. The last
3 The num ber of possible com binations w ith 2 or more parties is com puted w ith com binatory
m athem atics: a com bination of k parties on n places can be com puted with: ( % )  = ( n- V  (n-k)/ )
If w e consider 5 parties and w e add ( ^ z ) ^ 5 ^ / ) ^ 5 ^ / ) ^ 5 ^ / ) ,  w e find 26 possible com binations.
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office-seeking hypothesis predicts coalitions with as few members - read political 
parties - as possible. In 1946 this is the only two-player coalition: {pk}.
The coalition that was formed after the 1946 election, was the coalition {pk}. So, 
as far as 1946 is concerned, the minimal winning and the bargaining theory predict 
the correct - historical - coalition. Unfortunately, the coalition is not of minimal 
size, so that particular theory predicts wrong in 1946.
The results of the office seeking theories in general are not very promising. The 
results can be found in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2
Success of
office-seeking
theories
number of possible 
winning coalitions
1
historical coaltion Wmin Wsize Wbar
1946
T
12 PvdA-KVP (pk) pk, kav, kac, pacv kav pk
1948 12 PvdA-KVP-CHU-VVD (pkcv) pk, kav, kac, pacv kav pk
19524 6 PvdA-KVP-ARP-CHU (pka) pk, pav, kav pav, kav pk
1956 15 PvdA-KVP-ARP-CHU (pkac) pk, pav, pcv, kav, pac, kac pcv, kac pk
1959 14 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (kacv) pk, pav, pcv, kav, kcv pcv pk
1963 13 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (kacv) pk, kav, kcv, kac, pacv kac pk
1967 24 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (kacv) pk, pacv, pdav, dkac, pdav pk
kacv, dkav, kdcv, kdac
1971 6 Christian5-DS70-VVD (cdv) pc, pdv, dcv pdv pc
1972 7 Christian-Progressive (cp) pc, pv, dcv dcv pc, pv
1977 16 CDA-VVD (cv) cv, pc, pv cv cv, pc, pv
1981 6 PvdA-D66-CDA (pdc) pc, pdv, dcv pdv pc
1982 16 CDA-VVD (cv) cv, pc, pv cv cv, pc, pv
1986 16 CDA-VVD (cv) cv, pv, pc pv cv, pv, pc
1989 15 PvdA-CDA (pc) cv, pc, gpv, pdv cv cv, pc
1994 11 PvdA-D66-VVD (pdv) gpc, dcv, pcv, pdc, p dv gpc gpc, dcv, pcv,
pdc, pdv
1998 14 PvdA-D66-VVD (pdv) pv, gcv, gpc, dcv, pdc gcv pv
SUCCESS RATE 9/16 2/16 7/16
4 In 1952, the CHU  w as not included in the manifesto data set. Therefore coalition (pka) will be regarded 
as the correct prediction.
5 Christian and Progressive are joined lists (see Section 5.4.1); Christian includes KVP, A RP and CHU. 
Progressive includes PPR, PvdA and D66.
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6.2.2 Uni-dimensional Policy-Seeking Theories
The second class o f theories includes both policy and power motivations. The 
first theory in this class, is Axelrod’s conflict of interest theory that predicts minimal 
connected coalitions. The connectedness refers to being ‘neighbours’ on the uni­
dimensional policy scale, and the coalition must be winning in the sense that no 
player can leave the coalition without causing this coalition to be no longer winning 
or connected. The second theory, developed by Leiserson, only allows coalitions 
that include the smallest range possible - on a policy scale - without becoming losing. 
According to this theory a coalition will be formed if the parties agree that the range 
of this coalition is not larger than the range of any other winning coalition. De 
Swaan’s policy distance theory is somewhat more complex. Players prefer to be 
members of a coalition for which it is true that the ideal point of this coalition is as 
close as possible to their own ideal point. In the descriptive part of the theory we 
are therefore no longer searching for the smallest range but have to determine the 
preferences for all winning coalitions as held by each player, based on policy distance. 
In the predictive part, a core concept is applied that selects undominated coalitions. 
The theory is naïve as compared to other uni-dimensional policy-seeking theories, 
since it leads to large prediction sets.
The coalition formation that will be discussed for these theories is that of 1959. 
We examine the following weighted majority game: [76; 48, 49, 14, 12, 19]. The 
parties are ordered from left to right - the Social Democrats (PvdA), the Catholics 
(KVP), the Protestants (ARP), another Protestant party (CHU) and the Liberals 
(VVD). There are 14 possible winning coalitions; 1 two-party combination {pk}, 7 
three-party combinations, 5 four-party combinations and the grand coalition. For 
these theories a uni-dimensional policy scale is required. The scale that we use is 
derived from Van Roozendaal (1992). The policy scales in Van Roozendaal are based 
on Morgan (1976) and Castles and Mair (1984). Only the parties that are includ­
ed in our data - see Chapter 4 - receive a position on our uni-dimensional left-right 
policy scale. The following scale is used for coalition formation until the late 1970’s. 
From left to right: PPR-PvdA-D66-DS’70-KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD.
After the founding o f the Christian Democratic Party - the CDA, which is a 
merger from ARP, C H U  and KVP - we find the following scale: PPR-PvdA-D66- 
DS’70-CDA-VVD. In the late 1980’s a number of small left-wing parties merged 
into Green Left, which turns the policy scale into: GL-PvdA-D66-CDA-VVD. 
These policy scales are ordinal, which means that the only information available is 
the order of the parties on the scale. We do not know the exact - metric - positions
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of the parties on the scale. Only, for 1998, I did apply a different uni-dimensional 
scale. The CDA leapfrogged and ended up to the right of D66, and the last policy 
scale is thus: GL-PvdA-CDA-D66-VVD.
The information needed to test the uni-dimensional policy-seeking theories is 
complete. Since these theories will be illustrated with the data from 1959, the first 
policy scale is used. The parties in our 1959 data set are ordered on the ordinal pol­
icy scale as follows: PvdA, KVP, ARP, CH U , and VVD. This means that KVP and 
ARP are neighbours but KVP and C H U  are not. The policy seeking hypotheses that 
were derived and tested are:
•  Let G q be a policy game. Then only coalitions from W MC will be formed 
(Axelrod, 1970; Van Deemen, 1997).
•  Let Gq be a policy game and let S, 7e W  and V 7e W  \ 3 S: DS < D T,
then only coalitions from S will be formed (Leiserson, 1966).
•  Let Gq be a policy game. In the policy distance theory a coalition from
the core, W core, will be formed (De Swaan, 1973).
For Axelrod’s theory, coalitions that are simultaneously minimal winning and 
connected are predicted. After examining all possible winning coalitions, only two 
turn out to be minimal connected. The coalition KVP-ARP-VVD for instance is 
minimal winning, but is not connected since the C H U  is not included. The two-party 
coalition PvdA-KVP is both minimal winning and connected. The only other W MC 
is KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD. The coalition is quite large - it represents 94 seats - but 
if any party departs the coalition, it either becomes losing or unconnected.
The next hypothesis predicts the winning coalitions with the smallest range. This 
naturally leads to predicting the only two-party winning coalition - in which the 
parties are adjacent on the policy scale - because on an ordinal scale any two-party 
coalition that is connected has a smaller range than any three-party connected coali­
tion. The prediction set o f the W MC therefore consists of only coalition: PvdA - KVP
Selecting the coalitions that are predicted by De Swaan’s policy distance theory is 
more laborious. We shall use the same ordinal policy scale, and start by assigning 
preferences of players to the winning coalitions. After that, in the predictive part of 
the theory, we shall determine dominance between coalitions and predict the set of 
undominated coalitions.
The main assumption is that a player prefers a coalition in which she is included 
and which lies as close as possible on a scale of policies to her own preferred policy
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position. The first step is to find the pivotal player for every possible winning coali­
tion and compute the excess of that coalition.
Table 6.3
Policy 
D istance 
Theory 
in 1959
COALITIONS WEIGHT PIVOTAL PLAYER EXCESS
p k 97 kvp 48
p a v 81 pvda -33
p c v 79 pvda -31
p k v 116 kvp 29
k a v 82 kvp -33
k c v 80 kvp -31
p k a I l l kvp 34
p k c 109 kvp 36
p a c v 93 pvda -45
p k a v 130 kvp 15
p k c v 128 kvp 17
k a c v 94 kvp -45
p k a c 123 kvp 22
p k a c v 142 kvp 3
Remember that a party is pivotal if the difference between the combined weights 
of the members to the left of this party and the weights o f the members to the right 
are less than the (absolute value) weight of this actor.
Consider coalition {pav}: PvdA is pivotal because 0 - 33 = -33 and 33 is smaller 
than the weight of the PvdA, which is 48. For coalition {pka}, the pivotal player is 
the KVP; 48 - 14 = 34 is smaller than the weight of the KVP. W ith this procedure, 
the pivotal player for every coalition is selected and the excess is computed. The 
excess is simply the difference between the combined weights of the members to the 
left of the pivotal player and the weights of the members to her right. Note that a 
pivotal player prefers coalitions for which she is pivotal above coalitions for which 
she is not. Moreover, the smaller the absolute excess, the closer this coalition is to 
the pivotal player.
It is now possible to order all coalitions on a left-right scale: (PvdA) - pcv - pav - 
pacv - pk - pkc - pka - pkv - pkac - pkcv - pkav - pkacv - (KVP) - kcv - kav - kacv
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- (ARP) - (CHU) - (VVD). The next step is to determine the preferences of the parties 
for the coalitions. The most preferred coalition is the coalition for which a party is 
pivotal and at the same time has the smallest excess. After positioning the coalitions 
for which a party is pivotal, we continue by ordering the other coalitions in which 
this party is included. If all coalitions lie on one side of it, we simply follow the pol­
icy order in the direction away from the position of it. If  remaining coalitions lie on 
both sides of this party, the party is indeterminate, and the coalitions on either side 
receive the same ‘preference value’.
We start by assigning preferences for the PvdA. Note that all coalitions lie to the 
right of this party.
The PvdA is pivotal for coalition {pvc} and this coalition has the smallest excess. We 
can simply order the coalitions in the same order as above and remove the coalitions 
that do not include the PvdA. PvdA: {pcv - pav - pacv - pk - pkc - pka - pkv - pkac
- pkcv - pkav - pkacv - (kcv, kav, kacv)} The most preferred coalition is pcv, which 
receives 11 points, the next receives 10 points until a number has been assigned to 
each coalition that could be ordered. The most preferred coalition receives 11 
points, since from the 14 winning coalitions, three do not include the PvdA and 
thus receive the value ‘zero’.
The KVP finds coalitions both on its left and on its right. The grand coalition is 
most preferred here; the KVP is pivotal, and the excess is as small as possible.
KVP: {pkacv - pkav - pkcv - pkac - pkv - kcv - kav - pka - pkc - kacv - kp - (pcv, 
pav, pacv )}. There are three coalitions in which the KVP is excluded, so that the 
most preferred coalition again receives 11 points, and so forth.
For the remaining parties, we simply order the coalitions in which they are members 
from right to left, and give the closest party the highest preference. Note that these 
three parties are not pivotal for any o f the coalitions.
ARP: {kacv - kav - pkacv - pkav - pkac - pka - pacv - pav
(kcv, pkcv, pkv, pkc, pk, pcv)}.
CHU: {kacv - kcv - pkacv - pkcv - pkac - pkc - pacv - pcv
(kav, pkav, pkv, pka, pk, pav)}.
VVD: {kacv - kav - kcv - pkacv - pkav - pkcv - pkv - pacv - pav - pcv
(pkac, pka, pkc, pk)}.
In this example, it is quite easy to determine the preferences. Note that, in other 
cases, it is possible that parties lie in the middle of the policy order. If, on both sides 
o f this party, coalitions exist, that include the party in question but for which it is 
not pivotal, this party is indeterminate. In that case the coalitions receive the same 
value in the preference order.
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After the preference profiles are determined, the second part of the theory comes 
into effect. Domination between coalitions is measured. A coalition A  dominates 
coalition B, if and only if all players in A prefer this coalition to the other. Only the 
preferences of the players that are members o f both coalitions matter. Note that if 
we compare the first two coalitions in Table 6.4, {pk} and {pav}, the latter dominates 
the first because the PvdA prefers {pk}. Even though the KVP prefers coalition {pk}, 
this coalition is dominated by {pav}, since the KVP has no authority in the latter 
coalition.
As can be seen in Table 6.4, eight coalitions are undominated and will be pre­
dicted by the policy distance theory for 1959. The prediction set is: {pkv, kav, kcv, 
pkav, pkcv, kacv, pkac, pkacv}.
Table 6.4
Preference 
profiles 
o f parties 
fo r coalitions
PARTIES PVDA KVP ARP CHU VVD DOMINANCE
COALITIONS
PK 8 1 0 0 0 DOM  BY PAV
PAV 10 0 1 0 2 DOM BY KAV
PCV 11 0 0 1 1 DOM  BY KC V
PKV 5 7 0 0 4 UNDOMINATED
KAV 0 5 7 0 9 UNDOMINATED
KC V 0 6 0 7 8 UNDOMINATED
PKA 6 4 3 0 0 DOM BY KAV
PKC 7 3 0 3 0 DOM BY KAV
PACV 9 0 2 2 3 DOM BY KAV
PKAV 2 10 5 0 6 UNDOMINATED
PKCV 3 9 0 5 5 UNDOMINATED
KA CV 0 2 8 8 10 UNDOMINATED
PKAC 4 8 4 4 0 UNDOMINATED
PKACV 1 11 6 6 7 UNDOMINATED
The conflict o f interest (WMC) and the policy distance theory have predicted the 
historical coalition in 1959, which is {KVP, ARP, CH U , VVD}. The minimal range 
theory did not predict the correct coalition. I am inclined to prefer the conflict of 
interest theory to the policy distance theory because the size of the prediction set of the 
policy distance theory is fairly large; it predicted eight out of 14 possible winning 
coalitions in 1959. This conclusion also holds if we view the results o f these three
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theories for the complete set of 16 cases. The prediction set of the policy distance Table 6.5 
theory is usually very broad, and the number of correct predictions is the same as p o iicy-seekin g
of the "WMC. theories
NUMBER OF
WINNING COALITIONS
1
HISTORICAL COALTION WMC WMINRANGE WCORE
1946
y
12 PVDA-KVP (PK) P K , KAC PK PKA, PKCV, PKAV, P K A C , KAV, K A C , KA CV , PKACV
1948 12 PVDA-KVP-CHU-VVD (PKCV) PK, KAC PK PKV, PKA, PKC, PKAV, P K C V , P K A C, PKACV
1952 6 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKA) PK, KAV PK P K A , KAV, PKAV
1956 15 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKAC) PK, KAC PK KAV, K A C , PKAV, PKCV, KACV, P K A C , PKACV
1959 14 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) PK, K A C V PK PKV, KAV, KCV, PKAV,PKCV, K A C V ,P K A C , PKACV
1963 13 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) PK, KAC PK K A C , K A C V , P K A C, PKACV
1967 24 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) PDK, K A C V , PDK PKAV, PKCV, PDKV, P K A C , PKACV,
DKAC PDKAV,PDKCV, PD KAC, PD KACV
1971 6 CHRISTIAN-DS70-VVD (cDV) D C V , PDC D C V , PDC PD C, PDCV
1972 7 CHRISTIAN-PROGRESSIVE (CP) PD C, DCV PD C, D CV DCV
1977 16 CDA-VVD (CV) C V , PDC CV PC, RCV, DCV
1981 6 PVDA-D66-CDA (PDC) PD C, D CV PD C, DCV PD C, DCV, PDCV
1982 16 CDA-VVD (CV) C V , PDC CV C V , RCV, DCV, PCV, RDCV, RPCV, PDCV, RPDCV
1986 16 CDA-VVD (CV) C V , PDC CV C V , RCV, DCV, PCV, RDCV
1989 15 PVDA-CDA (PC) CV, PDC C V CV, DCV, G D CV
1994 11 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) DCV, PDC DCV, PDC DCV, PD C, GDCV, G D PC , PDCV, GPDCV
1998 14 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) G P C , DCV, PCD G P C , DCV, PCV, GCDV, GPCV, PCDV, GPDCV
PCD
SUCCESS RATE 6
0
^
6/16 6
8/
6.2.3 Actor-Oriented Theories
Two types of powerful actors can be distinguished in coalition formation. The 
first is powerful by virtue of its size: the dominant party. The second is powerful 
because o f its position on the uni-dimensional policy scale, and is called the centre 
player.
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6.2.3.1 Dominant Player
A dominant actor is not just an actor with the largest weight; she is powerful 
because she has as least as much power as the total weight of the other members in the 
coalition, dominated by this player dominates. The formal definition o f a dominant 
player and the difference between weak domination and domination can be found 
in Chapter 3. Recall that there is at most one dominant player in a game and that 
this player is always the player with the largest weight. This information is helpful 
in determining whether a dominant player exist. The procedure is to select the 
largest party and check whether there are winning coalitions for which it is true that 
the largest party can form a winning coalition with parties from outside that coalition, 
whereas the remainder of the ‘original’ coalition cannot form a winning coalition 
with these parties. If this is true, this player dominates the coalition. If  in another 
coalition this dominant player can form a winning coalition with some party or parties 
from outside the coalition, and the remaining parties from the first coalition can 
also do this, this party is said to weakly dominate that coalition. Naturally, if a party 
dominates a coalition it also weakly dominates that coalition, since the latter is a less 
severe demand.
The dominant player will be illustrated with the weighted majority game of 
1963: [76; 43, 50, 13, 13, 16]. The parties are from left to right: PvdA, KVP, ARP, 
CH U , and VVD. The largest player - and thus candidate for dominant player - is 
the KVP with 50 seats. The trick is to first check whether there are two minimal 
winning coalitions that only have the largest party in common and examine these. 
In this case {pk} and {kac} are both minimal winning coalitions, sharing the KVP 
Party {p} with {ac} is losing whereas both party {p} with {k} and {ac} with {k} are 
winning (denoted as {p} n  {k} e  W ), so the KVP is the dominant player.
The next step is to generate the prediction set by selecting the coalitions that the 
dominant player dominates and weakly dominates. Then we can test the following 
hypotheses:
•  Let G = (N, W) be a simple game with one dominant player.
Then only coalitions from D W (G) will be formed (Peleg, 1981).
•  Let G = (N, W) be a simple game with one dominant player.
Then only coalitions from D (G) will be formed (Van Deemen, 1989).
•  Peleg-Riker Principle Let G = [q; w1, w2,, ..., wn ] be a dominated and proper
weighted majority game. Then only coalitions from D  P  Wsize will be formed
(Van Deemen, 1989).
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We shall now check all 13 winning coalitions in 1963:
► pk: {p}n{ac}e L and {k}n{ac}e W: {pk}e D (G )5
► pkv: {pv}n{ac}e W  and {k}n{ac}e W: {pkv}e D W(G)
► kav: (av} n{p}e L and {k}n{p}e W: {kav}e D(G)
► kcv: {cv}n{p}e L and {k} n{p}eW : {kcv}e D(G)
► pka: {pa}n{cv}e W  and {k}n{cv}e W: {pka}e D W(G)
► pkc: {pc}n{av}e W  and {k}n{av}e W: {pkc}e D W(G)
► kac: {ac}n{p}e L and {k}n{p}e W: {kac}e D(G)
► pacv: does not include the dominant player.
► pkav: {pav}n {c}e W  and {k}n {c}e L
► pkcv: {pcv}n {a}e W  and {k}n {a}e L
► kacv: {acv}n {p}e W  and {k]n {p}e W: {kacv}e D W(G)
► pkac: {pac}n {v}e W  and {k}n {v}e L
► vpkac: {vpac}e W  and {k}e L
The prediction set for the first hypothesis is DW(G): {pk, pkv, kav, kcv, pka, pkc, 
kac, kacv}. The prediction set for the second hypothesis is: {pk, kav, kcv, kac}. The 
last hypothesis is a combination o f the dominant player and the size principle. The 
dominant player is said to be most powerful in the smallest coalition possible. The 
hypothesis leads to predicting coalition {kav}. The historical coalition - kacv - is 
only predicted by the hypothesis that selects weakly dominated coalitions.
Unfortunately, the theory and its extensions on the dominant player often have 
empty prediction sets. In these cases none of the players is dominant. An example 
is the coalition formation discussed in the previous section (1959): [76; 48, 49,14, 
12, 19] The order of the parties is again pkacv.
Minimal winning coalitions are: {pk, pav, pcv, kav, kcv}. Candidate for dominant 
player is the KVP with 49 seats. There are no two minimal winning coalitions that 
have only {k} in common for which it is true that:
B n  {S-{k}}e L and Bn{k}e W 6
Consider:
pk: {av}n {p}e W  and {av}n {k}e W
kav: {p}n{av}e W  and {p}n {k}e W
kcv: {p}n {cv}e W  and {p}n {k}e W
There is no dominant party because all combinations of parties that can win with 
player {k} can also win with player {p}.
6 See for explanation of these definitions C hapter 3. Note that B is a party or a coalition that has no 
players in com m on w ith S.
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The results for the dominant player theories are presented in Table 6.6. If  there 
is a dominant player, it is often a member o f the historical coalition, but even this 
demand is not always met.
number of
winning coalitions
1
historical coaltion Dw(G) D(G) D n  W SIZE
1946
T
12 PvdA-KVP (pk) PK, PKV, KAV, PKC, KAC, KACV PK, KAV, KAC KAV
1948 12 PvdA-KVP-CHU-VVD (pkcv) PK, PKV,KAV, KAC, KACV PK, KAV, KAC KAV
1952 6 PvdA-KVP-ARP-CHU (pka) 0 0 0
1956 15 PvdA-KVP-ARP-CHU (pkac) PK, PAV, PCV, PAC, PACV PK, PCV PCV
1959 14 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (kacv) 0 0 0
1963 13 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (kacv) PK, PKV, KAV, KCV, PK, KAV, KCV, KAC KAC
1967 24 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV)
PKA, PKC, KAC, KACV  
PK, KACV, DKAV, DKCV, PK, DKCV, DKAC DKAC
1971 6 Christian-DS70-VVD (cdv)
DKAC, DKACV 
0 0 0
1972 7 Christian-Progressive (cp) PC, PV, PDC, PDC PC, PG 0
1977 16 CDA-VVD (cv) 0 0 0
1981 6 PvdA-D66-CDA (pdc) 0 0 0
1982 16 CDA-VVD (cv) 0 0 0
1986 16 CDA-VVD (cv) 0 0 0
1989 15 PvdA-CDA (pc) CV, PC, GCV, GPC, DCV, CV, PC CV
1994 11 PvdA-D66-VVD (pdv)
PDC, GDCV, GPDC
0 0 0
1998 14 PvdA-D66-VVD (pdv) 0 0 0
SUCCESS RATE 5/16 3/167 0
Table 6.6
Success of 
the dom inant 
player theories
7 If w e w ould only observe coalitions w ith a dom inant player, the success rate w ould  be Dw(G): 5/7 .
AN ASSESSMENT OF SPATIAL COALITION FORMATION THEORIES 1 9 3
C h a p t e r  6
6.2.3.2 Centre Player
The centre player is powerful by virtue of her position on the policy scale. A 
party i is a centre player if the coalition of all parties to its left on the policy scale 
are losing without i but winning with i, and if all players to the right o f i are losing 
without her but winning with her. This means that the weight of the centre player 
must be more than the absolute value o f the difference between the weights to the 
left of the centre player and the weights to her right. The procedure demands that we 
order the parties on the policy scale, and determine whether the centre party exists. 
In the ‘plain’ version of the centre party theory, all coalitions that are winning and 
include the centre party will be predicted. The other theories based on the central 
actor are refinements of this assumption. The first predicts maximally balanced 
coalitions; these are coalitions with the centre player restricted with the demand that 
the difference between the weights to the left and to the right of this player, are as 
small as possible. In a maximally balanced coalition, the centre player can best control 
the coalition. The next refinement includes a more office-oriented argument. Now, 
the coalition with the centre player with maximal power excess will be predicted. 
Power excess o f the centre player is maximal in the coalition where the weight of the 
centre player minus the internal opposition in the coalition is as large as possible.
The following three hypotheses will thus be tested:
•  In centralised policy games only coalitions with the centre player (C) 
will be formed (Van Deemen, 1991).
•  In centralised policy games only maximally balanced coalitions (B) 
will be formed (Van Deemen, 1997).
•  In centralised policy games only coalitions with maximal power excess 
will be formed (Van Deemen, 1997).
Coalition formation based on these theories will be studied for 1986. The 
weighted majority game accompanying coalition formation in 1986 is [76; 2, 52, 
9, 54, 27]. The parties are - ordered from left or right - PPR (denoted by r), PvdA, 
D66, CDA, and VVD. The Christian Democratic Party is the centre party since the 
coalition o f PPR, PvdA and D66 is losing without the CDA but winning with the 
CDA, and the VVD is simultaneously losing without the CDA, but winning with 
the Christian Democrats. In Table 6.7, the winning coalitions that include the centre 
player and the accompanying balance weight and power excess are presented. The 
winning coalitions {pv}, {rpv}, {pdv}, {rpdv} are not included in the table, since they 
exclude the centre party and will therefore not be predicted.
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Table 6.7
C en tre  player 
in 1986
COALITIONS WEIGHT CENTRAL PLAYER BALANCE POWER EXCESS
CV 81 C D A 27 27
PC 106 C D A 52 2
RCV 83 C D A 25 5
RPC 108 C D A 54 0
DCV 90 C D A 18 18
PCV 133 C D A 25 -25
PDC 115 C D A 61 -7
RDCV 92 C D A 16 16
RPCV 135 C D A 27 -27
RPDC 117 C D A 63 -9
PDCV 142 C D A 34 -34
RPDCV 144 C D A 36 -36
The balance excess is computed by taking the absolute value of the difference 
between the weights o f the parties to the left o f the centre player and the parties to 
the right. For instance {cv} is 0-27 = 27 and {pc} is 52-0 = 52. The power excess is 
the difference between the weight of the centre party and the other party or parties 
in the coalition. For instance {cv} is 54-27 = 27 and {pc} is 54-52 = 2.
Hypothesis 1 predicts the following set of coalitions: {cv, pc, rcv, rpc, dcv, pcv, 
pdc, rdcv, rpcv, rpdc, pdcv, rpdcv}. The second hypothesis selects the maximally 
balanced coalition {rdcv}, and the third predicts coalition {cv}. The coalition that 
was formed in 1986 is coalition {cv}, and was thus predicted by the centre player 
and the power excess theory.
Just like the dominant player, the centre player sometimes does not exist. 
Consider the weighted majority game of the coalition formation in 1981. The parties 
are, from left to right, PvdA, D66, CDA, and VVD; [76; 44, 17, 48, 26]. The 
Democrats (D66) are not the centre party because the coalition {pd} is not winning. 
The Christian Democratic Party is not a centre player either. The CDA can form a 
winning coalition with the parties to its left, but the coalition of the CDA with the 
party to its right - the VVD - is losing.
Note that the non-existence o f centre players is in most cases a bias caused by 
solely including the ‘significant’ parties in the empirical testing. Recall that in a 
decisive game (for a definition see Chapter 2 Section 2.2) - a game that is proper and 
strong - a centre player always exists. The results o f the theories based on the cen­
tre player concept are given in Table 6.8.
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NUMBER OF 
WINNING COALIT
1946 1
ONS
1
2
HISTORICAL COALTION
PVDA-KVP (PK)
w ( c )
PK, PKV, KAV, PKA, PKC, KAC,
WMAX BALANCED
PKACV
WPOWER EXCESS
KAV
1948 12 PVDA-KVP-CHU-VVD (PKCV)
PKAV, PKCV, KACV, PKAC, PKACV 
PK, PKA, KAV, PKV, PKC, KAC, PKACV KAV
1952 6 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKA)
PKAV, PKCV, KACV, PKAC, PKACV 
PK, PKA, KAV, PKV, PKAV PKAV KAV
1956 15 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKAC) PK, PKV, KAV, PKA, PKC, KAC, PKACV KAC
1959 14 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV)
PKAV, PKCV, KACV, PKAC, PKACV 
PK, PKV, KAV, KCV, PKA, PKC, PKACV KCV
1963 13 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV)
PKAV, KACV, PKAC, PKACV
PK, PKV, KAV, KCV, PKA, PKC, KAC, PKACV KAC
1967 24 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV)
PKAV, PKCV, KACV, PKAC, PKACV
PK, PKV, PKA, PKC, PDK, PKAV, PKCV, PDKV, PDKACV DKAC
1971 6 CHRISTIAN-DS70-VVD (CDV)
KACV, DKAV, DKCV, PKAC,PDKC, DKAC,
PKACV, PDKAV, PDKCV, DKACV, PDKAC, PDKACV
0  0 0
1972 7 CHRISTIAN-PROGRESSIVE (CP) 0 0 0
1977 16 CDA-VVD (CV) CV, CP, CRV, CRP, CVD, CVP, CDP, CRVD, RDCV CV
1981 6 PVDA-D66-CDA (PDC)
CRVP, CRDP, CVDP, CRVDP 
0 0 0
1982 16 CDA-VVD (CV) CV, PC, RCV, RPC, DCV, PCV, PDC, RDCV, PCV CV
1986 16 CDA-VVD (CV)
RPCV, RPDC, PDCV, RPDCV
CV, PC, RCV, RPC, DCV, PCV, PDC, RDCV, RDCV CV
1989 15 PVDA-CDA (PC)
RPCV, RPDC, PDCV, RPDCV
CV, PC, GCV, GPC, DCV, PCV, PDC, GDCV, GDCV CV
1994 11 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV)
GPCV, GPDC, PDCV, GPDCV
0 Æ 0 0
1998 14 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) 0 Æ 0 0
SUCCESS RATE 11/168 0 6
3/
8 If w e w ould  only observe coalitions w ith a centre player, the success rate w ould be 1.
Table 6.8
Success of the 
centre player 
theories
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If a centre player exists in these examples, it is a member of the historical coalition, 
but note that the prediction set of this theory is very broad. An important conclusion 
that can be drawn from Table 6.8, is that the centre position of KVP and later CDA 
explains their powerful positions. Note that KVP and CDA have been members of 
all post-World War II coalitions until 1994.
The theory of maximally balanced coalitions leads to terrible results. In none of 
the 16 cases the historical coalition was predicted. Finally, the power excess theory 
predicted the correct coalition in only three out o f 16 cases.
6.2.4 Spatial Theories
The Heart solution is the first spatial theory to be tested, and for reasons of clarity 
the same order of theories as in Chapter 4 will be followed. After the Heart solution, 
Protocoalition formation will be examined. We continue with the Winset theory, 
the Competitive Solution and finish with the Maximal Satisfaction Solution. As 
said, in the introduction to this chapter, for some theories more than one example 
will be given. The Heart solution can be found, for example, when a core party 
exists, but can also be formed by the bounded set of median lines. The Winset theory 
also generates different kinds of equilibria. For these theories, more examples are 
needed to illustrate the ‘operating procedures’.
6.2.4.1 Heart Solution
Since in the heart different types of equilibria can be found, more than one example 
will be given. The first example includes a bounded cycle set, the second presents a 
core party and in the last example almost anything can be predicted. Since the heart 
solution, its majority extension and its distance- refinement were discussed exten­
sively in Chapter 4, I continue straight away with the three hypotheses.
•  Heart: Let G = (N, W, RM). Only coalitions from the heart will be formed.
•  Heart Majority: Let G = (N, W, RM). Only winning coalitions
from the heart will be formed.
•  Heart Distance: Let G = (N, W, RM). The heart coalition
with the lowest aggregated distance will be formed.
The 1948 election can be represented with the following weighted majority 
game: [51; 27, 32, 13, 9, 8]. The parties are from left to right: PvdA, KVP, ARP, 
CH U , and VVD. The coalitional game can be illustrated by the following party 
configuration9:
AN ASSESSMENT OF SPATIAL COALITION FORMATION THEORIES 1 9 7
C h a p t e r  6
-1 .5
Pv >A ^ /  J  arp
CHU
kvp
-1.5
Figu re  6.1
1 9 4 8  Heart Solution
To find the heart, the first step is always to search for median lines. The following 
lines comprise a majority: {PvdA, KVP}, {KVP, VVD}, {KVP, ARP} and {PvdA, 
CHU}. N ot all median lines run through any particular party’s policy position, so 
there is no core party. There is however a bounded cycle set. The set is bounded by 
the median lines: {PvdA, KVP}, {KVP, ARP} and {PvdA, CHU}. Since the median 
line {KVP, VVD} is not necessary for enclosing the cycle set, this median line will 
not be considered in the prediction set. The VVD can however support a minority 
cabinet. The four steps described by Schofield will be followed to present the solution 
o f this coalitional game.
Prediction set:
(a) heart surplus coalition: {PvdA, KVP, ARP, CHU}
(b) minimal winning coalition: {PvdA, KVP}
(c) minority coalitions: {KVP, ARP}, {PvdA, CHU}
(d) minority + support: {KVP, ARP, CHU}, {PvdA, CH U , ARP, VVD}10.
9 For inform ation about the party configurations and the interpretation of the dim ensions, I refer to 
C hapter 5.
10 A s I argued in Chapter 3, I do not expect the minority coalitions { KVP, ARP} and {PvdA, CHU  } to be 
supported by respectively PvdA and KVP, since this w ould lead to the m inimal w inning coalition {KVP, 
PvdA} com bined w ith another strong party (i.e. a party on a median line), w ithout the latter party being 
a necessary player.
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Hypothesis 1. H eart
In a spatial coalitional game only coalitions in the heart will be formed. 
Prediction set: {PvdA, KVP, ARP, CHU}, {PvdA, KVP}, {KVP, ARP},
{PvdA, CHU}, {KVP, ARP, CHU}, {PvdA, C H U , ARP, VVD}.
Hypothesis 2. H eart M ajority
In a spatial coalitional game only winning coalitions from the heart will be formed. 
Prediction set: {PvdA, KVP, ARP, CHU}, {PvdA, KVP}, {KVP, ARP, CHU}, 
{PvdA, CHU , ARP, VVD}.
For the refined version, the aggregate distances within a coalition must be com­
puted. The results of that can be found in the Table 6.9.
Table 6.9
A gg reg a ted  
d istance per 
coalition 
in 1948
DISTANCE VV D  KVP P v d A  CHU A RP AGGREGATED
DISTANCE
k v p / p v d a /a r p / c h u 0 .5 2 5 0 .8 2 3 0 .6 9 3 1 .0 7 0 3 .1 5 4
k v p / p v d a 0 .5 6 7 0 .6 7 2 0 . 8 3 5
k v p /a r p 0 .4 0 3 0 .9 9 2 1.3 9 5
p v d a / c h u 0 .3 7 9 1.1 3 6 1 .9 0 8
k v p /a r p /c h u 0 .3 9 3 0 .2 8 7 1 .0 0 8 1 .2 9 6
p v d a / c h u /a r p /v v d 1 .4 0 9 0 .7 8 6 1.051 0 .7 7 2 4 .7 0 4
Hypothesis 3. H eart distance
In a spatial coalitional game the heart coalition with the lowest aggregated distance 
will be formed. In this refined version o f the heart the minimal winning coalition 
{KVP, PvdA} is predicted. This is, however, not the coalition that came about in 
1948. The actual coalition - {PvdA, KVP, CH U , VVD} is neither in the heart, 
nor in the heart majority, nor in the heart distance prediction set.
The election results of 1981 have led to the following weighted majority game: 
[76; 44, 17, 48, 26]. The parties are from the left to the right: PvdA, D66, CDA, 
VVD. In Figure 6.2, the party configuration that belongs to the 1981 coalition for­
mation is presented.
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In 1981, only two lines comprise a majority and are median lines: {PvdA, CDA}, 
{CDA, D66}
Since both median lines run through the CDA, this party is what Schofield 
defined as a core party.
The prediction set according to Schofield’s four steps is:
(a) heart surplus coalition: {PvdA, CDA, D66}
(b) minimal winning heart coalition: {PvdA, CDA}
(c) minority coalitions: {CDA, D66}
(d) minority + support: {CDA, D66, VVD}
The first hypothesis predicts all possible coalitions in the heart, and is {PvdA, 
CDA, D66}, {PvdA, CDA}, {CDA, D66} and {CDA, D66, VVD}.
The second hypothesis only allows winning coalitions from the heart, and pre­
dicts {PvdA, CDA, D66}, {PvdA, CDA}, {CDA, D66, VVD}.
In order to find the prediction set o f the distance version, i.e. the ‘heart’ coalition 
with the lowest aggregate distance, we have to examine Table 6.10. According to 
this hypothesis the minority coalition {CDA, D66} will be formed.
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Table 6.10
Aggregated 
distance 
per coalition 
in 1981
DISTANCE p v d a D 6 6 VV D CD A AGGREGATED
DISTANCE
p v d a / c d a / d 6 6 0 .4 2 6 0 .1 9 8 0 .3 2 8 0 .9 5 2
p v d a / c d a 0 .3 9 3 0 .3 6 0 0 .7 5 3
c d a / d 6 6 0 .1 3 6 0 .0 4 8 0 . 1 8 5
c d a / d 6 6 / v v d 0.361 0 .6 1 4 0 .2 1 0 1 .1 8 6
Hence, the ‘heart’ and ‘heart majority’ theories did predict the historical coali­
tion, i.e. the heart surplus coalition {PvdA, D66, CDA}, but the heart-distance ver­
sion did not.
The last illustration o f the heart is the 1998 coalition formation. The following 
weighted majority game [76; 11, 45, 14, 29, 38], with parties GL, PvdA, D66, 
CDA, VVD, represents the parliamentary distribution of seats.
Figu re  6.3
1998 Heart 
Solution
-1.5
In this configuration, the cycle set is a broad area connecting almost all parties. 
It even more or less resembles two cycle sets, i.e. the two triangles formed by medi­
an lines. The large set of median lines is {PvdA, VVD} {PvdA, CDA} {CDA, D66} 
{D66, VVD} {VVD, GL}. This leads to the following prediction set:
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(a) heart surplus coalition: {GL, PvdA, D66, CDA,VVD}
(b) minimal winning heart coalition: {PvdA, VVD}
(c) minority coalitions: {PvdA, CDA}, {CDA, D66}, {D66, VVD} {VVD, GL}
(d) minority + support: {PvdA, CDA, D66} {D66, VVD, GL, CDA}.
The minority coalitions will not be supported by PvdA or VVD, since these par­
ties together form a majority. According to the first hypothesis, all coalitions from 
the above set will be predicted: {GL, PvdA, D66, CDA,VVD}, {PvdA, VVD}, 
{PvdA, CDA}, {CDA, D66}, {D66, VVD}, {VVD, GL}, {PvdA, CDA, D66} and 
{D66, VVD, GL, CDA}.
Hypothesis 2
In a spatial coalitional game only winning coalitions from the heart will be formed.
Prediction set: {GL, PvdA, D66, CDA, VVD}, {PvdA, VVD}, {PvdA, CDA,
D66} {D66, VVD, GL, CDA}.
The last hypothesis predicts the coalition from the heart with the lowest aggre­
gate distance. According to Table 6.11, we therefore predict the minority coalition 
{D66, VVD}.
DISTANCE GRLIN KS p v d a d 6 6 CD A VVD AGGREGATED
DISTANCE
g l / p v d a / d 6 6 / c d a /v v d 0 .4 5 2 1 .0 1 6 0 .1 1 0 0 .6 4 3 0 .5 2 0 2 .7 4 0
p v d a /v v d 0 .3 8 6 0 .4 5 7 0 .8 4 3
p v d a / c d a 0 .3 9 2 0 .6 0 9 1.001
c d a / d 6 6 0 .6 4 3 0 .3 1 0 0 .9 5 3
d 6 6 / v v d 0 .4 1 4 0 .1 5 3 0 . 5 6 7
v v d / g l 0 .7 7 7 0 .2 2 5 1.001
p v d a / c d a / d 6 6 0 .3 4 6 0 .3 4 0 0 .6 5 9 1 .345
d 6 6 / v v d / g l /c d a 0 .6 1 9 0 .3 6 5 0 .6 6 4 0 .5 0 5 2 .1 5 3
Table 6.11
A gg reg a ted  
d istance per 
coalition 
in 1998
Neither the ‘heart’, nor the ‘heart majority’, nor the ‘heart distance version’ 
predicted the historical coalition of 1998, {PvdA, D66, VVD}.
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The overall results of the heart solution theories are presented in the table below. 
The success rates are not too bad. But unfortunately the ‘heart solution’ - normal 
version - has broad prediction sets and still fails to predict the correct coalition in 
almost half the cases.
NUMBER OF 
WINNING COALITIONS
-------------------  COALTION HEART SOLUTION HEART WINNING HEART RIFINED
SOLUTION VERSION
V
1 9 4 6 12 PVDA-KVP (PK) PKACV, PK, KA, KC, KV, 
KAV, KAC
PKACV, PK, KAV, KAC KA
1 9 4 8 12 PVDA-KVP-CHU-VVD (PKCV) PKAC, PK, KA, PC, KAC, PACV PKAC, PK, KAC, PACV PK
1 9 5 2 6 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKA) PKAV, PK, KA, KV, KAV PKAV, PK, KAV KA
1 9 5 6 15 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKAC) PKA, PK, KA, PA, KAC, PAV PKA, PK, KAC, PAV KA
1 9 5 9 1 4 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) PKAC, PK, KA, KC, KACV, KCV PKAC, PK, KACV, KCV KA
1 9 6 3 13 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) PKAV, PK, KA, PV, KAV, PACV PKAV, PK, KAV, PACV KA
1 9 6 7 2 4 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) PK PK PK
1 9 7 1 6 CHRIS-DS70-VVD (CDV) PDCV, PC, PV, DC, PDV, DCV PDCV, PC, PDV, DCV PC
1 9 7 2 7 CHRIS-PROG (CP) PDCV, PC, PV, DC PDCV, PC, PV, PC
1 9 7 7 16 CDA-VVD (CV) PCV, CV, PC, PV PCV, CV, PC, PV CV
1 9 8 1 6 PVDA-D66-CDA (PDC) PDC, PC, DC, DCV PDC, PC, DCV DC
1 9 8 2 16 CDA-VVD (CV) PCV, PC, CV, PV PCV, PC, CV, PV PC
1 9 8 6 16 CDA-VVD (CV) PCV, PC, CV, PV PCV, PC, CV, PV CV
1 9 8 9 15 PVDA-CDA (PC) PCV, PC, CV, PV, PVD PCV, PC, CV, PVD CV
1 9 9 4 11 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) PDCV, PD, PC, CD, DV, 
PDC, CDV
PDCV, PDC, CDV DC
1 9 9 8 1 4 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) GPDCV, PV, PC, DC, DV, 
GV, PDC, DVGC
GPDCV, PV, PDC, DVGC DV
SUCCESS RATE 9 / 1 6 9 / 1 6 3/ 1 6
Table 6.12
Success of the 
Heart Solution 
Theories
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The dynamic Protocoalition Formation Theory also starts from ideological closeness 
o f parties. A dynamic reciprocal closeness relation determines coalition formation.
It is dynamic because the formation proceeds in stages. In the first stage, the parties 
that are closest to each other in a game form a protocoalition. In the second stage, 
this protocoalition is considered as one player, and the closest two players again 
form a coalition. This continues until a winning coalition is formed. A special distance 
measure is applied. Subjective Weighted Euclidean Distance determines the preferences 
and thus the formation process. For definitions on Protocoalition Formation I refer 
to Section 4.2.2.
For this theory, two examples of coalition formation - 1971 and 1977 - will be 
given, and then the results for all cases will be presented. Two hypotheses will be 
tested. The first relating to the Protocoalition Formation as developed by Grofman 
(1982). The second is a combination of the Heart Solution and Protocoalition 
Formation, suggested by Schofield (1995).
•  Let G = (N, W, RM). The first protocoalition that represents
a legislative majority o f votes will be formed.
•  Combination Heart Solution and Protocoalition Formation Theory.
Let G = (N, W  RM). The first protocoalition from parties inside the heart
that represents a legislative majority of votes will be formed.
The weighted majority game in 1971 is [76; 52, 8, 58, 16]. The parties ordered 
from left to right are: Prog, DS70, Chris, and VVD. Note that ‘Prog’ and ‘Chris’ 
are pre-coalitional alliances. Prog consists of the PvdA, D66 and the PPR and is 
thus a left-wing alliance and Chris is a combination of the three Christian parties - 
KVP, ARP, C H U  - that later merged into the CDA (officially in 1980).
The weighted Euclidean distances between the remaining parties or groups of 
parties can be found in Table 6.13.
Table 6.13
Protocoalition 
Form ation 
in 1971
6.2.4.2 Protocoalition Formation Theory
DISTAN CE VVD D S 7 0 PRO GRESSIVE CHRISTIAN
VVD 0.00 0.37 0.94 0.50
d s 7 0 0.75 0.00 0.86 1.01
PROG 0.29 0.13 0.00 0.38
CHRIS 0.137 0.14 0.34 0.00
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The parties DS’70 and VVD are close to each other, and form a protocoalition. The 
reciprocity requirement is an important demand: even though the progressive alliance 
is close to DS’70, DS’70 prefers the VVD and the VVD prefers DS’70, so the latter 
two form a protocoalition. The protocoalition is denoted by the first two letters of 
the parties and can be found in Table 6.14, where again the distances are computed.
Table 6.14
Protocoalition DISTANCE VD PRO GRESSIVE CHRISTIAN
Form ation - second
stage - in 1971
VD 0.00 0.70 0.46
PROGRESSIVE 0.32 0.00 0.38
CHRISTIAN 0.19 0.34 0.00
In step two, the protocoalition of VVD and DS70 is closest to the Christian 
alliance and this relation is reciprocal. Therefore, the protocoalition {VVD, DS’70} 
and Chris form a new protocoalition. Since this protocoalition represents a legisla­
tive majority, it will be predicted. Hence, hypothesis 1 predicts {VVD, DS70, Chris}.
The heart surplus coalition consists o f all parties. Hypothesis 2 therefore predicts 
the same coalition as hypothesis 1. Coalition {VVD, DS70, Chris} is the historical 
coalition and is thus a correct prediction.
In 1977, the weighted majority game is [76; 3, 53, 8, 49, 28] with parties PPR, 
PvdA, D66, CDA, and VVD. The corresponding distance table shows that the first 
protocoalition contains PvdA and PPR.
Table 6.15
Protocoalition 
Form ation 
in 1977
DISTANCE CD A PPR V VD D 6 6 PVDA
CD A 0.000 0.093 0.465 0.165 0.791
p p r ( r ) 1.519 0.000 2.512 0.864 0.346
VVD 0.813 0.269 0.000 0.421 1.696
d 6 6 1 .01 1 0 .324 1.474 0.000 0.750
PVDA 0.732 0.020 0.896 0.113 0.000
We continue with the protocoalition and again compute the weighted distances.
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DISTAN CE CD A RP VVD d 6 6
CD A 0.000 0.814 0 .4 6 5 0.165
RP 0.712 0.000 0.867 0.110
VVD 0.813 1.734 0.000 0.421
d 6 6 1.011 0.7 6 9 1.474 0.000
Now the protocoalition {rp} and d66 are closest to each other, and thus form the
next protocoalition. Since this is still not a majority, we continue.
DISTAN CE C D A VVD PVDA
CD A 0 .0 0 0 0 .4 6 5 0 .8 2 6
VVD 0 .8 1 3 0 .0 0 0 1 .7 4 4
RPD 0 .6 3 2 0 .7 6 3 0 .0 0 0
In the third stage, VVD and CDA are closer to each other than to the proto­
coalition. CDA and VVD form a new protocoalition. Since the combination of 
these two parties represents a majority, this coalition will be formed and the process 
ends. The prediction is therefore {CDA, VVD}.
In 1977, we found the following median lines {CDA, VVD}, {CDA, PvdA}, {CDA, 
D66}, {PPR, VVD}, {PvdA, VVD}. Since the cycle set consists only of {CDA, PvdA, 
VVD}, the median lines {VVD, PPR} and {CDA, D66} are not included in the cycle 
set. We continue with Protocoalition Formation from the heart surplus coalition: 
{PvdA, CDA, VVD}.
DISTAN CE C D A VVD PVDA
CD A 0 .0 0 0 0 .4 6 5 0.791
VVD 0 .8 1 3 0 .0 0 0 1 .6 9 6
PVDA 0 .7 3 2 0 .8 9 6 0 .0 0 0
Table 6.16
Protocoalition 
Form ation 
- second stage - 
in 1977
Table 6.17
Protocoalition 
Form ation 
- third stage - 
in 1977
Table 6.18
Protocoalition 
Form ation and 
the Heart in 1977
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The same coalition is predicted by the Heart-Protocoalition Formation Theory. 
Now the first protocoalition that is formed is between the CDA and VVD. Since 
these two parties represent a majority, the second hypothesis also leads to coalition 
{CDA, VVD}.
Both examples o f the Protocoalition Formation Theory predicted the historical 
coalition. As can be seen in the Table 6.19, this is not always the case. The number 
of correct predictions of both the Protocoalition Formation and the combination of 
the Heart and the Protocoalition Formation is not very high: respectively 6 out of 
16 and 5 out o f 16. An advantage o f these theories is, however, that the prediction 
sets are unique.
NUMBER OF 
WINNING COALITIONS
HISTORICAL COALTION PROTOCOALITION
FORMATION
PROTOCOALITION 
AND HEART
r
1946 12 PVDA-KVP (PK) KACV KACV
1948 12 PVDA-KVP-CHU-VVD (PKCV) PKACV KAC
1952 6 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKA) KAV KAV
1956 1 n PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKAC) KAC PKA
1959 14 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) KACV PKAC
1963 13 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) KACV KAV
1967 24 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) KACV PK
1971 6 CHRIS-DS70-VVD (CDV) DCV DCV
1972 7 CHRIS-PROG (CP) PC PC
1977 16 CDA-VVD (CV) CV CV
1981 6 PVDA-D66-CDA (PDC) DCV PDC
1982 16 CDA-VVD (CV) RPCD PC
1986 16 CDA-VVD (CV) CDV CV
1989 1 n PVDA-CDA (PC) CDV CV
1994 1 1 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) DCV PDC
1998 14 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) GPDCV GPDCV
SUCCESS RATE 6/16 n/16
Table 6.19
Success o f the 
Protocoalition 
Form ation 
Theory
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The main distinction of the W inset Theory as compared to other spatial theories 
in this research is that in the W inset Theory the distribution of ministerial portfo­
lios is central to the bargaining process. Like the Heart Solution, the W inset Theory 
allows minority predictions because only the distribution of the main portfolios is 
studied. Note that more than one coalition can go along with a ministerial distri­
bution. The winset portfolio distribution can lead to a ‘one-party’ minority predic­
tion, because the only thing that is said is that this party will hold the two main 
portfolios, but this is not analogous to a one-party government. Similar to the Heart 
Solution, is the adjusted version o f the W inset Theory that I proposed in Section 
4.2.3. In the original version, which will be discussed and tested first, the predic­
tion of the portfolio distribution will be the result of the testing. In the adjusted ver­
sion, a majority criterion again comes into effect. The parties closest to the proposed 
distribution will join the ‘gut-coalition’ until this coalition becomes winning.
In Section 4.2.3, I split the W inset Theory into five hierarchical propositions that 
will be used for testing. The following two hypotheses will be tested:
•  Winset: Let G = (N, W, RM). The portfolio allocation that is
in equilibrium - according to propositions 1 to 5 - will come about.
•  W inset Majority Version: Let G = (N, W, RM).
According to the W inset Theory, the parties or party that holds the main port­
folios will govern. If  this party or these parties do not represent a legislative
majority, the closest party in the portfolio space will join until the coalition
becomes winning.
Since the different propositions refer to different types of equilibria, for instance 
a very strong or merely strong party equilibrium or an empty winset D D M  (i.e. 
dimension by dimension median with an empty winset), four examples will be pre­
sented. In this manner, different kinds of equilibria can be illustrated. The first 
shows a status quo equilibrium, the second a very strong party, the third a merely 
strong party, and the last presents an example where no equilibrium exists. The 
computer programme W INSET is used in order to compute the equilibria. In order 
to illustrate the working o f this programme, the output of the winset programme 
for 1948, 1956 and 1959 are presented in Appendix H.
6.2.4.3 Winset Theory
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Status Quo Equilibrium
The weighted majority game in 1989 is [76; 6, 49, 12, 54, 22] and the parties are 
respectively GL, PvdA, D66, CDA, and the VVD. The status quo portfolio allocation 
{CDA, CDA} has an empty winset. The allocation is the ideal point of the very 
strong party - the CDA - in equilibrium and will therefore be predicted. Hypothesis 1 
thus predicts {CDA, CDA}. The portfolio allocation o f the parties and the matching 
indifference curves are illustrated in Figure 6.4.
Since the CDA does not represent a legislative majority by itself, we continue by 
searching for the closest parties that will join the CDA in order to form a winning 
coalition. The CDA - as can be seen in the table below - will be joined by D66 and 
the VVD.
Figure 6.4
Legislature 
1989 
fo re ign  vs. 
finance
0 1
finance
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PARTY W EIG HT FINANCE FOREIGN
d 6 6 12 0 .5 5 7 0 .5 6 4
GL 6 0.191 0 .7 8 4
V VD 22 0 .6 8 6 0 .3 3 6
DA 54 0 .6 4 8 0 .5 7 6
PVDA 4 9 0 .4 3 6 0 .8 9 6
c d a / d 6 6 66 0.631 0 .5 7 4
Table 6.20
Party policy 
positions and 
w e igh ts  in 1989
DISTAN CE D 6 6 GRLIN KS V VD PVDA
CD A 0 .0 9 2 0 .5 0 2 0 .2 4 3 0 .3 8 4
c d a / d 6 6 0 .4 8 8 0 .2 4 4 0 .3 7 7
Table 6.21
Distance table 
a ccord ing  to  the 
w in set m ajority 
th eo ry  in 1989
The correct portfolio distribution in 1989 was {PvdA, CDA}: PvdA on Finance 
and CDA on Foreign Affairs. This means that the portfolio predicted by hypothesis 
1 {CDA, CDA} is not the correct portfolio. The historical coalition was also not 
predicted correct by the winset-winning version.
Very Strong Party
For 1967 we run into a problem: the winset programme indicates two D D M ’s. 
The weighted majority game in 1967 is [76; 37, 7, 42, 15, 12, 17] and the parties are 
PvdA, D66, KVP, ARP, CH U , and VVD. More than one dimension by dimension 
median can occur, if the game is symmetric, or - like in this case - if not all parties 
that gained seats are included in the game. Therefore, in situations like this, we solve 
this problem by including parties that were not in the original data set.
The winset programme led to 2 empty winset D D M ’s in 1967. Since this is 
caused by the fact that not all parties are included in our analysis, we include the 
Farmers Party to see which of the equilibria is strongest. This party had seven seats in 
1967 and had a far ‘right-wing’ policy position on both dimensions. The KVP now 
turns out to be the very strong party, and the portfolio prediction is: {KVP, KVP}. This 
is, however, not the portfolio distribution that came about after the formation in 1967.
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Table 6.22
Party policy 
positions and 
w eigh ts 
in 1967
PARTY W EIG HT FINANCE FOREIGN
KVP 42 0 .6 7 8 0 .6 4 0
CHU 12 0 .7 0 8 0 .6 8 4
ARP 15 0 .5 7 0 1 .0 0 0
PVDA 37 0.181 0 .6 2 4
d 6 6 7 0 .3 1 6 0 .8 4 0
VVD 17 0 .8 5 8 0 .5 2 8
k v p / c h u 54 0 .6 8 4 0 .6 5 0
k v p / c h u /v v d 71 0 .7 2 6 0.621
Table 6.23
D istance table 
accord ing  to 
the w in set 
m ajority  theory 
in 1967
DISTAN CE CHU ARP PVDA D 6 6 VVD
KVP 0 . 0 5 3 0 .3 7 6 0 .4 9 7 0 .4 1 4 0 .2 1 2
k v p / c h u 0 .3 6 8 0 .5 0 4 0 .4 1 5 0 . 2 1 2
k v p / c h u /v v d 0 . 4 1 0 0 .5 4 5 0 .4 6 5
Since the KVP is not winning by itself, we shall continue by adding the ‘closest’ 
parties until we find a winning coalition.
The predicted coalition based on the winset majority theory is {KVP, ARP, CH U, 
VVD}, which is the historical coalition of 1967.
Merely Strong Party
There was neither a status quo equilibrium nor a very strong party in 1956. The 
weighted majority game after the elections in 1956 is the following: [51; 
34,33,10,8,9] and the parties are from left to right: PvdA, KVP, ARP, CH U , VVD.
The C H U  is a Merely Strong Party. The winset of the ideal point of the MSP is 
not empty. In the winset of this allocation, we find the portfolio distribution {PvdA, 
CHU}. This allocation is likely to be formed, since the ideal point of the C H U  is 
not an equilibrium and the PvdA is the largest party. If the C H U  would have been 
both the MSP and the largest party, its ideal point would stand a chance, but now 
we expect that the PvdA will support the MSP
Unfortunately, the portfolio allocation {PvdA, CHU} is not the allocation that 
came about in ‘56. The non-empty winset of the C H U  - the merely strong party - 
is illustrated in Figure 6.5.
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Since these two parties - PvdA  and C H U  - together do not form a w inning coali­
tion, the distances o f the other parties toward the ‘gut-coalition’ o f {PvdA, C H U } 
needs to be examined. After that, it is possible to determine which coalition w ill 
come about.
PARTY WEIGHT FINANCE FOREIGN
KVP 33 0.771 0.312
VVD 9 0.868 0.128
PVDA 34 0.134 0.252
CHU 8 0.722 0.188
ARP 10 0.831 0.096
p v d a /c h u 42 0.246 0.240
DISTANCE KVP VVD ARP
PVDA. CHU 0 .5 3 0 0.631 0.602
Figure 6.5
Legislature
1956
foreign vs. 
finance
Table 6.24
Party policy 
positions 
and weights 
in 1956
Table 6.25
Distance table 
according to 
the winset 
majority theory 
in 1956
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As can be seen in Table 6.25, the party that w ill jo in  the coalition is the KVP. The 
coalition that w ill be formed based on the coalitional version o f the W inset Theory is 
therefore: {PvdA, KVP, C H U }. This coalition however is not the historical coalition.
Cycles
The last example that w ill be studied is the 1986 coalition formation. The 
weighted m ajority game is [76; 2, 52, 9, 54, 27] and the parties from left to right are 
the PP R , PvdA, D66, C D A , and V V D .
These parties and accompanying positions on the portfolio dimensions do not 
lead to any kind o f equilibrium . There is no strong party and no D D M  w ith  an 
empty winset. Since we can assume that in this case there are cycles throughout the 
whole portfolio space, no equilibrium  can be found. However, I suggest that the 
theory would predict the Status Quo. After all, if  there is no alternative portfolio 
allocation that can beat the status quo portfolio, the status quo w ill not be ‘over­
ruled’. Hence, the same allocation as in 1982 w ill be predicted. The C D A  holds 
both portfolios, which is actually the portfolio allocation that came about in 1986.
Since the C D A  does not represent a majority, we continue to compute which 
party or parties are closest to the C D A  in order to predict a w inning coalition.
Table 6.26
Party policy 
positions and 
weights 
in 1986
PARTY WEIGHT FINANCE FOREIGN
D66 9 0,658 0,520
PVDA 52 0,403 0,844
VVD 27 0,740 0,556
p p r ( r ) 2 0,262 0,612
CDA 54 0,727 0,644
Table 6.27
Distance table 
according to 
the winset 
majority theory 
in 1986
DISTANCE D66 PVDA VVD PPR
CDA 0.142 0.380 0.089 0.466
The closest party w ill join the C D A , namely the V V D . The prediction based on 
the w inning version o f the W inset Theory is therefore {C D A , V V D }. This is the his­
torical coalition.
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The above examples provided an illustration o f the W inset Theory. The strength 
o f both hypotheses for coalition formation in the Netherlands can be found in Table 
6.28. In  the third column the number o f possible portfolio distributions is given.
Norm ally, the number o f w inning coalitions is sufficient but note that a portfolio o f 
PvdA  and K V P  can be both {KV P, PvdA} or {PvdA, K V P }, and note that the winset 
allocation theory also predicts allocations that do not represent w inning coalitions.
Therefore, the number o f all possible combinations o f two parties and the possible 
‘one party hold both portfolios’ combinations are added in this column. This means 
that the random chance that the correct portfolio is predicted for 1946 is 1 divided 
by 25. This in contradiction to the ‘winset m ajority’ coalitions version and most 
other theories where the chance o f selecting the right coalition depends on the number Table 6.28 ,Success of the
o f possible w inning coalitions. Winset Theory
NUM BER OF 
WINNING COALITIONS
V
N UM BER OF PORTFOLIO ALLOCATIONS
1 9 4 6 12 25 PVDA-KVP (PK) KVP-PVDA PVDA-KVP
1 9 4 8 12 25 PVDA-KVP-CHU-VVD (PKCV) KVP-ARP-VVD PVDA-VVD
1 9 5 2 6 16 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKA) KVP-ARP-VVD PVDA-PVDA
1 9 5 6 15 25 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKAC) PVDA-KVP-CHU PVDA-KVP
1 9 5 9 14 25 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) PVDA-KVP ARP-KVP
1 9 6 3 13 25 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD(KACV) KVP-ARP-CHU VVD-KVP
1 9 6 7 24 36 kvp-arp-chu-vvd (kacv) KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD VVD-KVP
1971 6 16 CHRIS-DS70-VVD (CDV) PROG-CHRIS KVP-KVP
1 9 7 2 7 16 CHRIS-PROG (CP) CHRIS-DS70-PROG PVDA-PVDA
1 9 7 7 16 25 CDA-VVD (CV) CDA-D66-VVD CDA-VVD
1981 6 16 PVDA-D66-CDA (PDC) CDA-VVD-D66 CDA-PVDA
1 9 8 2 16 25 CDA-VVD (CV) CDA-PPR-PVDA CDA-CDA
1 9 8 6 16 25 CDA-VVD (CV) CDA-VVD CDA-CDA
1 9 8 9 15 25 PVDA-CDA (PC) CDA-D66-VVD PVDA-CDA
1 9 9 4 11 25 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) PVDA-D66-CDA VVD-D66
1 9 9 8 * 14 25 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) PVDA-D66-VVD VVD-PVDA
SUCCESS RATE 4/16
WINSET 
PORTFOLIO 
ALLOCATION FIN-FOR
KVP-PVDA
KVP-KVP
ARP-KVP
PVDA-CHU
KVP-KVP
KVP-KVP
KVP-KVP
PROG-CHRIS
CHRIS-CHRIS
CDA-CDA
CDA-CDA
CDA-CDA
CDA-CDA
CDA-CDA
PVDA-PVDA
VVD-VVD
2/16
*SINCE DIFFERENT DATA WERE USED FOR 1998, WE HAVE A DIFFEENT PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION, NAMELY FIN-HOME 
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The em pirical results o f the winset portfolio allocation and the winset m ajority 
version are not very promising. Note that the results are not worse than those for 
some other theories discussed in this chapter, and that the prediction set o f each 
coalition formation is unique.
6.2.4.4 Competitive Solution
The Com petitive Solution also starts w ith  the idea that distances between parties 
and coalitions determine the preferences o f parties. In  evaluating the possible winning 
coalitions, the emphasis is put on the critical players. A  critical players is a player 
who is member in ‘both’ coalitions that are compared. A ll coalitions are compared 
in pairs, and the goal is to determine whether the coalitions are viable. A  coalition 
is viable against another coalition, if  it is not the case that all critical players prefer 
one o f the coalitions to the other. I f  all critical players strictly prefer one coalition 
to another, the first coalition is said to be strictly viable and this coalition may be a 
member o f the Strong Com petitive Solution.
This theory w ill be illustrated w ith  the 1994 coalition formation. The following 
two hypotheses w ill be tested:
• Com petitive Solution: Let G = (N, W, R1^ ).
Then only coalitions from K  - the Com petitive Solution - w ill be formed.
• Strong Com petitive Solution: Let G = (N, W, RM).
Then only coalitions from K  - the Strong Com petitive Solution - w ill be formed.
Table 6.29
Distances between 
parties and 
coalitions for the 
Competitive 
Solution in 1994
Based on the distances in Table 6.29, we start w ith  checking {dpv} versus {dpc}: 
D66 prefers {dpc} and PvdA prefers {dpc}; so {dpv} is not viable. W e continue w ith all 
other comparisons:{dpv} vs {dvc}: which are both viable. For further comparisons, 
I refer to the following list.
DISTANCES DPV DPC DVC PVC PCG DPVC DPVG DPCG DVCG PVCG DPVCG
D66 0.475 0.090 0.485 0.304 0.483 0.152 0.427 0.300
PVDA 0.610 0.577 0.727 0.467 0.700 0.552 0.515 0.664 0.649
VVD 0.898 0.821 0.888 0.956 0.945 0.842 0.922 0.980
CDA 0.564 0.506 0.646 0.674 0.599 0.626 0.530 0.684 0.635
GRLINKS 1.134 1.148 1.182 1.549 1.299 1.297
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{dpv} vs {pvc}: both viable {pvc} vs {dpvg}: both viable
{dpv} vs pcg}: {dpv} not viable {pvc} vs {dpcg}: {pvc} not viable
{dpv} vs dpvc}: both viable {pvc} vs {dvcg}: {pvc} not viable
{dpv} vs dpvg}: both viable {pvc} vs {pvcg}: both viable
{dpv} vs {dpcg}: {dpv} not viable {pvc} vs {dpvcg}: both viable
{dpv} vs dvcg}: {dpv} not viable {pcg} vs {dpvc}: both viable
{dpv} vs pvcg}: {pvcg} not viable {pcg} vs {dpvg}: {dpvg} not viable
{dpv} vs dpvcg}: both viable {pcg} vs {dpcg}: both viable
{dpc} vs {dvc}: both viable {pcg} vs {dvcg}: both viable
{dpc} vs {pvc}: {pvc} not viable {pcg} vs {pvcg}: {pvcg} not viable
{dpc} vs {pcg}: both viable {pcg} vs {dpvcg}: both viable
{dpc} vs {dpvc}: {dpvc} not viable {dpvc} vs {dpvg}: both viable
{dpc} vs {dpvg}: both viable {dpvc} vs {dpcg}: both viable
{dpc} vs dpcg}: both viable {dpvc} vs {dvcg}: both viable
{dpc} vs {dvcg}: both viable {dpvc} vs {pvcg}: both viable
{dpc} vs {pvcg}: {pvcg} not viable {dpvc} vs {dpvcg}: both viable
{dpc} vs {dpvcg}: {dpvcg} not viable {dpvg} vs {dpcg}: both viable
{dvc} vs {pvc}: {pvc} not viable {dpvg} vs {dvcg}: both viable
{dvc} vs pcg}: {pcg} not viable {dpvg} vs {pvcg}: both viable
{dvc} vs {dpvc}: both viable {dpvg} vs {dpvcg}: both viable
{dvc} vs dpvg}: both viable {dpcg} vs {dvcg}: both viable
{dvc} vs {dpcg}: both viable {dpcg} vs {pvcg}: {pvcg} not viable
{dvc} vs dvcg}: both viable {dpcg} vs {dpvcg}: {dpvcg} not viable
{dvc} vs {pvcg}: {pvcg} not viable {dvcg} vs {pvcg}: both viable
{dvc} vs dpvcg}: both viable {dvcg} vs {dpvcg}: both viable
{pvc} vs {pcg}: both viable {pvcg} vs {dpvcg}: both viable
{pvc} vs {dpvc}: both viable
Now, it is possible to exclude the coalitions that are not viable. The remaining 
‘viable’ coalitions are: {dpc, dvc, dpcg, dvcg}. Since these four coalitions are viable 
against each other, there cannot be a Strong Com petitive Solution, since in that case 
one o f these coalitions would be strictly better than another. Unfortunately, the 
Competitive Solution - {dpc, dvc, dpcg, dvcg} - does not include {dpv}, i.e. the historical 
coalition o f 1994. The results o f the Com petitive Solution and its stronger version 
are presented in the Table 6.30. The Strong Com petitive Solution is in almost all 
the cases that were tested empty. Remember that this is the case because the Strong 
Com petitive Solution only exists if  a coalition dominates all others.
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NUM BER OF 
W INNING COALITIONS
COALTION COMPETITIVE SOLUTION STRONG COMPETITIVE
I SOLUTION
1946 12 PVDA-KVP (PK) VAK, PAK, KAC, VPAK, VPCK, VACK, 
PACK, VPACK
1948 12 PVDA-KVP-CHU-VVD (PKCV) KCA
1952 6 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKA) VAK VAK
1956 15 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKAC) KVA, KCA, KVCA
1959 14 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) CAVK, CAVPK
1963 13 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD(KACV) AKV, KCV, AKCV, APCV
1967 24 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) KCAD, KCAV, KCDV, KADV, KCADV, KCAPD,
KAPDV, KCAPDV
1971 6 CHRIS-DS70-VVD (CDV) VDP, VDC, VDPC
1972 7 CHRIS-PROG (CP) CP, CDP, VCDP
1977 16 CDA-VVD (CV) CV, CRV, CRVD
1981 6 PVDA-D66-CDA (PDC) PDC, PVC, DCV, PDCV
1982 16 CDA-VVD (CV) PDC, VRDC, PRDC
1986 16 CDA-VVD (CV) CV, DVC, VRC, DVRC
1989 15 PVDA-CDA (PC) CV, DCV
1994 11 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) DPC, DVC, DPCG, DVCG
1998 14 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) GPC, GPDC, GPDV
SUCCESS RATE 8/16 0
Table 6.30
Success of the 
Competitive 
Solution
6.2.4.5 Maximal Satisfaction Solution
This solution concept diverges from other theories in this chapter, because it 
starts w ith  a notion o f collective utility. The coalition w ith  the smallest distance per 
member, i.e. the highest utility, is predicted. The main argument is that if  we aim 
for a dominant coalition, i.e. a coalition preferred by all members to any other coali­
tion, the result is often an empty prediction set. The reason for this is naturally that 
one coalition seldom assigns the highest u tility to every player. The rational player 
w ill therefore agree to a coalition where the sum o f utilities, based on distances and 
divided by the number o f members in the coalition, is as large as possible.
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The following hypothesis was derived:
• M axim al Satisfaction Solution: Let G = (N, W, RM).
Then only coalitions from WSAT w ill be formed.
The coalition formation in 1972, is used to illustrate the M axim al Satisfaction 
Solution. The weighted m ajority game is [76; 56, 6, 48, 22] w ith  respectively ‘Prog’, 
DS70, ‘Chris’ and V V D . Note that as we saw in an earlier example, ‘Prog’ and 
‘Chris’ are progressive and Christian electoral alliances.
There are seven possible w inning coalitions. The first part o f Table 6.31 gives the 
distances o f the parties towards the w inning coalitions. In  the lower part o f Table 
6.31, the distances are translated into utilities - for the formula see Section 4.2.4 - 
and are aggregated. The last row presents the aggregated distance, divided by the 
number o f players per coalition, and generates the M axim al Satisfaction Solution. 
The prediction for 1972, according to the M axim al Satisfaction Solution, is coali­
tion {cp}, since this coalition has the highest value, i.e. maximal satisfaction.
DISTANCE VP CP VCD VCP VDP CDP VCDP
VVD 1.962 1.520 2.073 1.902 2.030
CHRISTIAN 0.322 0.750 0.275 0.274 0.312
d s '7 0 0.491 0.789 1.335 0.933
PROGRESSIVE 0.771 0.276 0.676 0.831 0.335 0.717
UTILITY
VVD 0.062 0.308 0.000 0.095 0.024
CHRISTIAN 0.974 0.736 1.000 1.001 0.980
d s '7 0 0.880 0.715 0.411 0.634
PROGRESSIVE 0.724 0.999 0.777 0.691 0.967 0.754
SUM UTILITY 0.786 1.973 1.924 1.777 1 .501 2.379 2.393
MAXIMAL 0.393 0 .9 8 7 0.641 0.592 0.500 0.793 0.598
SATISFACTION SOLUTION
table 6.31
Maximal Satisfaction 
Solution in 1972
The historical coalition in 1972, was as coalition consisting o f the progressive 
and Christian alliance, so for this case the M axim al Satisfaction Solution predicted 
correctly. In  Table 6.32, the results o f the M axim al Satisfaction Solution for our 16 
cases are presented.
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NUM BER OF 
W INNING COALITIONS
----------------  HISTORICAL COALTION MAXIMAL SATISFACTION
SOLUTION
V
1 9 4 6 12 PVDA-KVP (PK) PK
1 9 4 8 12 PVDA-KVP-CHU-VVD (PKCV) KCA
1 9 5 2 6 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKA) PK
1 9 5 6 15 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU (PKAC) KCA
1 9 5 9 14 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) PK
1 9 6 3 13 kvp-arp-chu-vvd (kacv) AKV
1 9 6 7 24 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD (KACV) KCAV
1971 6 CHRIS-DS70-VVD (CDV) PC
1 9 7 2 7 CHRIS-PROG (PC) PC
1 9 7 7 16 CDA-VVD (CV) CV
1981 6 PVDA-D66-CDA (PDC) PDC
1 9 8 2 16 CDA-VVD (CV) PDC
1 9 8 6 6 CDA-VVD (CV) CV
1 9 8 9 15 PVDA-CDA (PC) CV
1 9 9 4 14 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) PDC
1 9 9 8 14 PVDA-D66-VVD (PDV) PDV
Table 6.32
Success of 
the Maximal 
Satisfaction 
Solution
Like the m ajority version o f the W inset Theory, the M axim al Satisfaction 
Solution also selects unique prediction sets, but it predicts more correct coalitions. 
Note however that in more than half the cases, the theory still does not predict the 
historical coalition.
6.3 Success Rate and Prediction Efficiency Compared
In  this section, the predictive power o f the coalition formation theories w ill be 
evaluated. In  order to keep the comparisons as clear as possible, I have decided to 
remove some o f the theories from our analysis. This concerns all ‘refined’ versions 
o f the theories, and the normal version o f the heart and winset allocation. The first 
group was deleted because the ‘refined’ versions, in general, do not perform very 
well. The latter twosome are deleted since in the normal versions o f the heart and
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the winset the number o f possible coalitions diverges from the other theories in our 
testing. The Heart Solution since it allows m inority cabinets and the W inset Theory 
allows for a difference between the number o f possible portfolio allocations and the 
number o f possible w inning coalitions. For reasons o f completeness, a table for all 
results - also o f the versions o f the theories that w ill not be discussed - is included 
in Appendix I.
In  this section, I shall direct attention in particular to the predictive power o f the 
different classes o f theories. The emphasis on the different classes is necessary to 
answer our main research question, which is “ Do spatial coalition formation theories 
perform better empirically than non-spatial coalition formation theories?”
Both the success rate and the prediction efficiency o f the different classes o f theories 
w ill be evaluated. The success rates o f the theories have already been computed and 
sometimes discussed briefly in Section 6.2. The success rate is sim ply the number 
o f correct predictions divided by the number o f cases. This means that in this 
research, the success rate is some value divided by 16, since we studied 16 cases o f 
coalition formation. The success rate is always between zero and one, and naturally 
a good theory has a success rate o f one or almost one.
However, the success rate alone is not sufficient to evaluate coalition formation 
theories. There is a difference between theories w ith  unique or small prediction sets, 
and theories w ith large prediction sets. Naturally, it is more difficult for a thrift theory 
to predict correctly than for a broad or naïve theory. In  the latter case, if  10 coalitions 
out o f 15 possible w inning coalitions are predicted, using chance already leads to 
better results. To distinguish between the thrift and naïve theories, we introduce 
prediction efficiency. This is measured by dividing the number o f correct predictions 
by the total number o f predictions made by the theory. Both the Bargaining Set 
Theory -W BAR- and the M axim al Satisfaction Solution, for instance, have a success 
rate o f 7/16 = 0.44, but Leiserson predicted a total o f 28 coalitions for 16 cases, 
whereas the M axim al Satisfaction Solution has unique prediction sets and thus pre­
dicted 16 coalitions in total. Since we would be inclined to prefer a thrift theory 
w ith  a high success rate to a more naïve theory w ith  the same success rate, we com­
pute the prediction efficiency for the theories that are still in our analysis.
The results w ill be presented in two tables. The first, 6.33, gives the success rates 
and prediction efficiency per theory, and the second, 6.34, presents average score 
per class o f theories. For Table 6.34, four classes are taken into account: the office­
seeking theories, the uni-dimensional policy-seeking theories, the actor-oriented 
theories and the spatial theories.
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Table 6.33
Success rate and THEORY1 TOTAL AMOUNT OF
prediction efficiency PREDICTED COALITIONS CORRECT PREDICTION
of the main coalition PREDICTED BY THE THEORY PREDICTIONS SUCCESS RATE EFFICIENCY
formation theories WMIN 66 9 0.563 0.136
WsizE 19 2 0.105 0.105
WBAR 28 7 0.438 0.250
WMC 34 8 0.500 0.235
WMINRANGE 22 6 0.375 0.273
WCORE 82 8 0.500 0.098
DOMINANT PLAYER 19 3 0.188 0.158
CENTRE PLAYER 128 11 0.688 0.086
1 The total number MAX SATISFACTION SOL 1 6 7 0.438 0.438
of possible winning 
coalitions based on COMPETITIVE SOL 56 8 0.500 0.143
the parties that are HEART MAJORITY 65 9 0.563 0.138
included in the test­
ing is 203. The num-
WINSET MAJORITY 16 4 0.250 0.250
ber of cases that are PROTOCOALITION FORM 16 6 0.375 0.375
tested is 16
A  criterion for a successful theory, based on the success rate, can be that the the­
ory should predict more than ha lf o f the coalitions correctly. The following theories 
fit into this category:
• m inim al w ining theory
• centre player
• heart m ajority coalition
Unfortunately, these theories are also the theories w ith  the largest prediction sets. 
A  better procedure is to compare the prediction efficiency. D ifferent theories score 
better on this criterion, which is in m y opinion a better measure o f the strength of 
these theories. The Protocoalition Form ation Theory and the M axim al Satisfaction 
Solution perform relatively well on this criterion.
In  order to compare the classes o f theories we now study Table 6.34.
Table 6.34
Success of classes COALITION FORMATION AVERAGE AVERAGE
of theories THEORIES SUCCESS RATE PREDICTION EFFICIENCY
compared (where
OFFICE SEEKING 0.375 0.164m = number of
ideological or POLICY SEEKING (M = 1 ) 0.458 0.202
policy dimensions) ACTOR ORIENTED 0.438 0.122
SPATIAL THEORIES (M = 2) 0.425 0.269
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Based on Table 6.34, not much can be said about the differences between the 
average success rates o f the classes o f theories. A  cautious conclusion may be that 
policy-seeking theories in general (uni-dimensional and spatial) are preferable to 
office-seeking theories. Moreover, if  we consider the more exact criterion - the 
prediction efficiency - spatial theories perform better than other theories. From  this 
point o f view, compared to the other theories discussed in this research, developing 
spatial coalition formation theories is a worthwhile undertaking. The theory w ith 
the highest prediction efficiency - the M axim al Satisfaction Solution - also belongs 
to this category.
Note, furthermore, that the best theory among the spatial theories and the best 
office-seeking theory - that is, best according to its prediction efficiency - both apply 
a criterion for the number o f players. The latter - the bargaining set - is actually the 
theory that selects the coalition(s) w ith  as few players as possible, and in the 
M axim al Satisfaction Solution the number o f players is taken into account, since we 
divide the aggregate utility by the number o f players in the coalition. So, not the weight 
as such, but the number o f players seems to be im portant in coalition formation
The overall conclusion, based on the empirical results, is that studying coalition 
formation w ith in  a game-theoretical approach may just not be good enough to 
tackle coalition formation. The advantage o f clarity o f the assumptions, and the 
ability to generalise does not countervail the bad empirical results. However, since the 
main goal here is not find the ‘perfect’ coalition formation theory, but to compare 
classes o f theories and discuss whether the ‘latest’ fashion in coalition formation the­
ory - the spatial theories - is a sensible development, we continue the discussion.
In  general, since only sixteen cases have been tested em pirically and since the 
differences in predictive power o f the theories are quite small, we should be cautious 
when drawing conclusions. It  is therefore a good idea to perform another kind of 
test in order to be able to conclude whether these theories are actually performing 
better than a random selection o f coalitions would. In  the next section we shall 
therefore simulate random selections o f coalitions and determine whether or which 
o f the theories are ‘significantly’ better than chance.
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6.4 Simulating Coalition Formation; 
Empirical Results Compared to Random
In  order to decide whether coalition formation theories perform better than a 
random selection based on probability would, a sim ulation is performed. This 
means that, based on the number o f possible w inning coalitions and the number of 
coalitions in the prediction set o f a theory, we can assign a probability to a theory for 
every specific case. Thus, if  a theory predicts 5 out o f 18 possible coalitions, a random 
selection would have a chance o f 5/18 o f predicting the historical coalition. W e now 
want to decide whether the theory predicts better than a distribution based on these 
probabilities would. For every theory, the chance o f predicting the historical coalition 
for every formation is determined, and based on this 50.000 cases are generated.
• The null hypothesis states that the probability based on sim ulation predicts 
the same number o f historical coalitions as the theory.
• The alternative hypothesis states that the selection o f historical coalitions
by the theory is higher than the probability selection.
After generating the 50.000 cases, it is possible to perform a one-tailed test w ith 
an a  o f 5 % , i.e. a 5 %  level o f significance, and determine which o f the hypotheses 
can be rejected. Rejection o f the null hypothesis means that the theory performs 
better than a random selection based on probability. Further, if  the success rate o f the 
theory lies w ith in  the last five percent o f the distribution gained by the probability 
distribution - based on the simulation - the null hypothesis is rejected. If, however, the 
results o f the sim ulation lie w ith in  the first 95 %  o f the distribution, the alternative 
hypothesis is rejected, and the theory is not considered significantly better than the 
random probability distribution.
As I said, the 50.000 cases were obtained by simulation. Consider the m inim al 
w inning theory: in 1946, 4 out of12 possible w inning coalitions are predicted by the 
theory. The chance o f predicting the historical coalition is 4/12. A  correct prediction 
is assigned the value 1, a false prediction 0. For all 16 cases a probability distribu­
tion is developed and 50.000 samples are generated. Then a frequency table on the 
number o f correct predictions by the sim ulation is produced. W ith  these frequency 
tables the hypotheses can be tested. For instance, in the last five percent o f the ‘correct 
predictions distribution’ for the m inim al w inning theory, 10 or more historical 
coalitions should be predicted. The m inim al w inning theory predicted correctly in 
9 out o f 16 cases, and is thus not significantly better than the random probability 
distribution. This means that for the m inim al w inning theory the alternative
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hypothesis is rejected, and we cannot claim  that the theory predicts better than a 
random distribution does.
The frequency distributions o f the sim ulation results are depicted for all theories 
and accompanying refinements in Appendix J. For our goal - i.e. examining 
whether the theories predict significantly better than the accompanying probability 
distributions - it is however sufficient to represent the results o f the sim ulation in a 
table that sim ply denotes which hypothesis should be rejected. The same theories as 
in the previous section w ill be studied.
THEORY NULL HYPOTHESIS ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS
WMIN REJECTED
WSIZE REJECTED
WBAR REJECTED
WMC REJECTED
WMINRANGE REJECTED
w core REJECTED
DOMINANT PLAYER REJECTED
CENTRE PLAYER REJECTED
MAX SATISFACTION SOL REJECTED
COMPETITIVE SOL REJECTED
HEART MAJORITY REJECTED
WINSET MAJORITY REJECTED
PROTOCOALITION FORM REJECTED
The null hypothesis, which states that the probability based on sim ulation pre­
dicts the same number o f historical coalitions as the theory, is tested on a one-tailed 
distribution w ith a five percent significance level. I f  the null hypothesis is rejected, in 
Table 6.35, it is safe to assume that the theory is really better than a random selection 
based on the probability distribution. I f  the alternative hypothesis is rejected, the 
selection o f historical coalitions by the theory is not significantly higher than the 
probability selection.
The theories that reject the null hypothesis are preferable to theories that do not 
reject this hypothesis. A  comfortable finding is that - in general - theories that ‘score’ 
better on the prediction-efficiency criterion more often reject the null hypothesis. 
The two classes o f theories that had the worst prediction-efficiency results for
Table 6.35
Simulation results
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instance, - i.e. the office-seeking and the actor-oriented theories - also reject the 
alternative hypothesis most often. The only outlier is the bargaining set theory, but 
note that this theory also had the best efficiency results o f all theories in these classes.
Again, both the uni- and multi-dimensional policy-seeking theories have better 
results. M ore than half the theories in either class reject the null hypothesis. In  the class 
o f uni-dimensional policy-seeking theories, the worst theory in terms o f efficiency
- D e Swaan’s policy distance theory - is also the only theory from this class that does 
not reject the null hypothesis. Note, in reverse, that the two best theories according 
to the prediction efficiency criterion - the M axim al Satisfaction Solution and the 
Protocoalition Form ation Theory - both do reject the null hypothesis. The heart- 
w inning solution also rejects the null hypothesis, and thus performs better than the 
probability distribution that belongs to this theory.
Even though comparing the results o f the sim ulation based on the probability 
distributions and the em pirical results does not provide very convincing evidence 
for any o f the classes, policy-seeking theories still beat non policy-seeking theories. 
I f  all spatial theories would reject the null hypothesis, this would be better evidence 
for the superiority o f these theories, especially since these spatial theories are less 
parsimonious and should as such lead to better prediction results anyway. This 
‘economy’ argument is valid, only because I assume that information on the ideological 
positions o f parties other than the uni-dimensional ideological positioning should 
lead to better coalition formation theories.
Nevertheless, it is still safe to assume that investing in spatial theories in order to 
invent a good coalition formation theory is a worthwhile effort. A  successful coalition 
formation theory should have high results on both success-rate and prediction effi­
ciency. A  theory meeting these requirements w ill naturally beat a chance distribution, 
as in our simulation.
6.5 Empirical Results of the Spatial Theories 
for 1989 and 1994 based Expert Data
A n inconvenience o f em pirical research is not only that the world seems 
unmanageable, but also that the data we use to study reality are often not as precise 
as we would like. In  this research, especially the data on policy or ideological positions, 
w hich could be derived from different data sets and different scaling methods, are 
worrisome. A  question that naturally follows from this reflection is whether different 
data sets lead to different coalition predictions.
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Data obtained by surveys among experts on policy positions o f political parties 
are available for 1989 and 1994, (Laver &  Hunt, 1992; Laver 1995). From  these data 
sets party positions on two dimensions - a left-right economic dimension and a 
dimension on social values - are obtained and the theories are again tested. The 
main finding is that the em pirical results o f spatial theories tend to improve when 
expert data are used. N aturally the number o f cases is too small to be decisive, but 
the evidence still points in this direction. The (dis-)advantages o f the expert data as 
compared to other data sets have already been discussed in the previous chapter.
Another im portant finding is that for most theories and for most refined versions 
o f the theories, the prediction sets obtained w ith  different data overlap but are not 
analogous. I f  the prediction sets o f the theories, based on the different data, would 
exactly coincide, this would be all the better since this would im ply that using dif­
ferent data sets would not influence the em pirical tests. Unfortunately, this is not 
true, but note that at least the diversion is in one direction. I f  we consider the results 
o f the five main spatial theories for 1989 and 1994, the only discrepancy is that the 
expert data for 1994 sometimes predict the correct coalition, whereas the testing 
based on the Manifesto data set did not. It is an unlucky circumstance that precise­
ly  these two cabinets formations are predicted falsely for almost all theories, which 
makes comparing the data sets more difficult.
Table 6.36 presents the results o f the testing based on Manifesto and expert data 
for the main theories for the two formations. The presentation focuses on whether 
a theory has or has not predicted the historical coalition.
Both for the theories above, and for the theories no longer included in the analysis, 
it is true that the expert data never exclude the historical coalition in the prediction
Table 6.36
Test results of 
the manifesto 
and expert data 
compared
SPATIAL THEORIES 1989 1989 1994 1994
PREDICTION MANIFESTO DATA EXPERT DATA MANIFESTO DATA EXPERT DATA
control variable control variable
MAXIMAL FALSE FALSE FALSE CORRECT
SATISFACTION SOLUTION
COMPETITIVE SOLUTION FALSE FALSE FALSE CORRECT
HEART MAJORITY SOLUTION CORRECT CORRECT FALSE CORRECT
WINSET COALITIONAL VERSION FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
PROTOCOALITION FORMATION FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
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set (i.e. a ‘false’ score) if  the Manifesto data has predicted the historical coalition. 
Moreover, sometimes the historical coalition is not predicted w ith  the Manifesto data 
set but is predicted w ith the expert data set. The conclusions based on a comparison 
between the different data sets, is therefore that the choice o f a data set still matters 
and that the expert data are preferable to the Manifesto data.
The problem o f inaccurate data, which is also discussed in Chapter 5, is that we 
reach a stalemate; the empirical results can be bad because the theories are not good 
as coalition formation predictors, or the results can be bad because the data were 
inaccurate to start w ith. In  theory, we could em pirically test coalition formation 
theories only if  the perfect data set is found, and the data would be an exact 
representation o f reality.
6.6 Evaluation of the Empirical Findings 
of Spatial and non-Spatial Coalition Formation Theories
In  this chapter the hypotheses were tested in two different manners. The first step 
was to test the hypotheses derived in Chapters 3 and 4 em pirically and determine 
the success rate and prediction efficiency. If, the hypothesis for instance stated that 
in a weighted m ajority game a m inim al w inning coalition should be formed and not 
all cases generate a m inim al w inning coalition, the hypothesis could be rejected. 
This is true if  we assume that there is no ‘uncertainty’ and there are no measurement 
errors. Since the maximal amount o f correct predictions is 11 out o f 16 cases, none 
o f the theories in this research can, according to this criterion, be judged to be good 
coalition formation theories. Hereby, I refer to a good theory as a theory that always 
predicts correctly. Sim ply studying the success rate would lead to rejecting all 
hypotheses, but note that in this case the standard would be very high because the 
theories were tested against a hypothetically perfect theory. The same reasoning is 
applicable for the evaluation o f prediction efficiency.
In  general, some level o f uncertainty is allowed for em pirically testing theories. A  
statistical test was then performed. Since the number o f cases in this research is too 
small to decide on a meaningful statistical standard, the best method is probably to 
descriptively compare the different levels o f the success rate and prediction efficiency 
between the classes o f theories, as is done in this chapter. In  this case no decision 
about rejecting the hypotheses is made, but preferences between the classes o f theories 
could be formulated. The policy-seeking theories and especially the spatial theories 
are preferred to the office-seeking and actor-oriented theories.
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The second stage in the test o f our hypotheses was a statistical test in which the 
theories were compared w ith  the results based on a simulation. For this part o f the 
testing, the standard was the 5 %  significance level. It was easy to determine which 
theories reject their null hypothesis and determine which theories predict better 
than the outcomes based on a probability distribution.
The spatial theories and the uni-dimensional policy oriented theories are also 
winners in this respect. M ost policy-oriented theories rejected the null hypothesis 
whereas most theories rejected the alternative hypothesis for the other classes. From 
the 13 theories that were tested only the following six were able to reject the null 
hypothesis and thus come out as best theories in this research:
• Bargaining Set Theory
• Conflict o f Interest Theory: W MC
• M in im al Range Theory
• M axim al Satisfaction Solution
• Heart m ajority Solution
• Protocoalition Form ation Theory
O n ly the first theory is an office-seeking theory, so an important conclusion o f this 
research - even though it does not come as a surprise - is that policy-seeking theories 
are better than office-seeking theories. Furthermore, the M axim al Satisfaction 
Solution, which is based on a notion o f aggregate u tility  turned out to be the best 
theory in this research. Even though it does not have the highest success rate, it has 
the best prediction efficiency, and simultaneously rejects the null hypothesis, and is 
thus better than the random distribution based on this theory.
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7. Summary and Conclusions
“The game o f science is, in principle, without end. He who decides one day that scien­
tific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be regarded as finally 
verified, retires from the game” (Popper, 1975, p 53).
7.1 Summary
This book began w ith  an introduction to coalition formation and its importance 
in a multi-party democracy. Coalition formation lies at the heart o f a multi-party 
system, yet is a process that is difficult to anticipate for the voters. Coalition formation 
involves uncertainty for the voters, since their act o f voting is not directly translated 
into the choice for a government. M ore knowledge about coalition formation provides 
a better understanding o f politics in a multi-party democracy.
Different classes o f theories o f coalition formation, based on different assumptions 
that are said to influence the process were studied in this research. The main 
research question o f this study was “ do spatial theories o f coalition formation perform 
better empirically than non-spatial theories o f coalition formation” . Spatial theories are 
a growing branch o f coalition formation theories that have been developed in the 
last few decades in order to better explain and predict coalition formation. These 
theories start from a metric multi-dimensional policy or ideology space and predict 
that coalitions w ill be formed w ith  distances between the parties and the coalitional 
ideal points in this space that are as small as possible. The distance between parties 
and the expected policy positions o f coalitions is measured in spatial theories w ith 
the Euclidean distance metric. The theories that I denote as classical or non-spatial 
theories are theories based on power arguments, on powerful actors in the coalition 
formation process, or on policy or ideological preferences o f parties for coalitions on 
a ordinal, usually uni-dimensional, scale. Coalition formation theories based on 
institutional constraints were also categorised as non-spatial theories. The research 
question was addressed w ith empirical instruments. In  the first chapter o f this research, 
the research question was elaborated and the outlines o f this research presented.
In  the Chapter 2 the focus was on the origins o f the models o f coalition formation. 
I argued that these models stem from theories on party or electoral competition. For 
coalition formation, the preferences, and in case o f policy-oriented or spatial theories 
also the distances, should be considered to apply to parties and coalitions instead o f 
voters and candidates.
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The two main theories that take the policy or ideological positions o f parties and 
coalitions into account, namely the classic Downsian (proximity)- and the direc­
tional theory, were then introduced. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence 
it is not possible to be conclusive about which theory refutes the other. Em pirical 
evidence shows a slight advantage for the directional theory, but theoretical evidence 
points in both directions. In  policy-seeking or spatial coalition formation theories, 
parties want to maximise their u tility  by choosing the closest possible w inning coali­
tion. For spatial theories o f coalition formation, a com bination o f the classical 
Downsian and the linkage (also called ideology) model was used. Since I understand 
the ideology model as an extension o f the classical model, this is not problematic. 
Party and coalitional positions were derived w ith  data reduction methods based on 
party positions on issues. The notion o f underlying latent ideological dimensions, as 
in the ideology model, was employed in this research. Most spatial coalition formation 
theories are silent on the issue o f selecting a spatial model, but they usually apply 
the classical or extended Downsian model and not the directional model.
In  this chapter the game theoretical basis - the coalitional game - that was used 
to study coalition formation was also introduced. In  a game theoretic model, the 
descriptive part o f a theory determines how preferences o f parties for coalitions 
come about, whereas the predictive or solution part o f the theory predicts coalitions.
In  the next chapters, - 3 and 4 - coalition formation theories are presented and 
hypotheses are derived to test the theories. The third Chapter presents the ‘classical’ 
coalition formation theories, whereas in Chapter 4 the spatial theories are presented.
The institutional theories are mostly non-formal theories, and therefore by 
definition do not com ply w ith  the requirements for a formal theory. These theories 
do not consist o f series o f assumptions that are simultaneously internally consistent, 
independent, sufficient and necessary. The fact that assumptions in these theories, 
especially in the theories discussed in Section 3.5.1, are not derived by deduction, 
and are constraints rather than axioms, leads to descriptive and not to predictive 
theories. Ruling out all coalitions that are not obeying the institutional constraints 
is not the same as formulating an axiomatic theory predicting which coalition 
should be formed. Moreover, in case o f more comprehensive and predictive theories 
in this class, such as Baron’s probability theory, the rules o f the game should fit 
em pirical reality before the theory can be tested. Baron’s (1991/1993) and Austen­
Sm ith &  Banks’ (1988) models, discussed in Section 3.5.2, are moreover difficult 
to extend to more complex situations, i.e. more policy dimensions or more parties 
than the authors describe. The Structure-Induced Equilibrium  however does seem
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to fit the requirements o f a formal theory. Shepsle and Weingast (1981) suggest to 
have new proposals brought in in a vote against the status quo or/and to assign to 
a specific actor jurisdiction on a specific policy domain. Since these assumptions are 
very sim ilar to the W inset Theory, which is studied in the class o f spatial theories 
(Section 4.2.3), I decided to also remove this theory from the empirical analysis. 
This means that all institutional theories have been removed from the analysis.
The other theories discussed in Chapter 3 - the office-seeking, policy-seeking and 
actor-oriented theories - are simple axiomatic models. Office-seeking theories take 
only power arguments into consideration, and for instance search for the smallest 
possible w inning coalition. Actor-oriented theories explain coalition formation 
through certain power properties o f particular parties. Powerful players can receive 
this annotation by their size or ideological position, and are said to influence coalition 
formation more than other players in the game. Policy-seeking theories take both 
office and policy motives into account. These policy motives start from the idea that 
coalitions w ith  ideological closeness are more likely to be formed than more diverse 
coalitions. In  these uni-dimensional policy-oriented theories, the policy positions of 
parties and coalitions are ordinal positions on one ideological dimension. From  the 
class o f policy-seeking theories, only De Swaan’s policy distance theory is problematic. 
The internal inconsistency o f this theory is discussed in Section 3.3.3. The hypotheses 
that were derived in Chapter 3 were tested in Chapter 6.
In  Chapter 4, the spatial theories o f coalition formation were studied and for 
every theory a computation example was given. Com m on for this class o f spatial 
theories is the behavioural assumption that players prefer a coalition that is as close 
as possible in a multi-dimensional ideology or policy space to their own position. 
The Protocoalition Form ation Theory is a straightforward theory that has few 
assumptions and is not d ifficult to test. M ost striking about this theory is its 
assumption o f subjective rather than sym m etrical distances. The M axim al 
Satisfaction Solution is innovative since it introduces a collective notion o f utility. 
The Com petitive Solution also assumes preferences to be based on distances, but it 
often predicts more than one coalition. Interesting about this theory is its notion o f 
critical players.
The Heart Solution is also a spatial solution concept. Its prediction depends on the 
party configurations. Q uite a few additional assumptions are needed in order to test 
this solution concept. A t first glance then, the set o f axioms is not sufficient. The 
same is true for the last spatial theory - the W inset Theory - evaluated here. It is dis­
sim ilar to other spatial theories, since it assumes that coalition formation is based
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on the distribution o f m inisterial portfolios. It is at the same time the most 
‘institutionally’ oriented spatial coalition formation theory in our selection, since it 
emphasises the powerful position o f the status quo. As I said, the W inset Theory 
and the Heart Solution do not contain enough assumptions to predict coalitions. 
However, predicting coalitions, instead o f party configurations or instead o f identi­
fying key players, may not have been the goal o f these theories. Both the Heart 
Solution and the W inset Theory determine key players. In  the W inset Theory, the 
parties that hold the main portfolios are predicted. W e  may find this less attractive, 
but it cannot be said that, given their own goals, these theories are not good formal 
theories.
The em pirical evaluation followed the same format as the classification o f the 
theories. For every class, the theories were tested against coalition formations in the 
Netherlands since 1946, which led to a conclusion about which class o f theories 
performs best.
Chapter 5 starts w ith  a description o f the Dutch political system. The Netherlands 
can be characterised as a parliamentary democracy and as a constitutional monarchy. 
Elections for parliament are held, as a rule, every 4 years. After elections, the process 
o f coalition formation starts. Since no party usually gains the m ajority o f the vote, 
cabinet formation is an im portant feature o f our Dutch democracy. The Queen has 
an interesting role in this process. The Queen consults politicians and then appoints 
an inform ateur or formateur to lead the cabinet formation. This political role o f the 
Queen in times o f cabinet formation is a very peculiar feature o f the Dutch 
parliam entary democracy.
Also in Chapter 5, party positions on a number o f latent ideological dimensions 
and on the main portfolio dimensions were gathered, since these positions are needed 
to em pirically test the theories. For most cases o f coalition formation, manifesto 
content-analysis data were analysed by means o f multidim ensional scaling (M D S ). 
The stress scores o f the M D S  results, which are statistical badness o f fit scores, are 
fairly high (between .09 and .18), but they are not too bad. Moreover, the inter- 
pretability o f the space w ith  Profit, a property fitting method, provides reasonable 
results. However, I observed that the manifesto data were collected for another purpose 
than obtaining party positions, namely for determ ining issue saliency, and as a result 
o f that I concluded that the quality o f the data when translated into policy positions 
is not very high. The results from the analyses were however the best I can get. The 
party positions, induced by multi-dimensional scaling o f the manifesto data, were 
later used for testing the spatial coalition formation theories.
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Reliability analysis was also performed w ith the manifesto data in order to collect data 
on portfolio dimensions for the W inset Theory. The results are not very promising; 
the scalability scores are not good (.68, .65 and .67) but, unlike the M D S  results, these 
dimensions do consist o f issues that are expected to represent the main portfolios.
In  order to also test the 1998 coalition formation a computer-coded content 
analysis was performed. The party manifestos o f 1998 were analysed w ith  the Laver 
and G arry (1998) procedure and scales were obtained. Party positions on an environ­
mental scale, on a left-right and on a social values dimension were gathered. The 
computer-coded content analysis is innovative and might be a good way to obtain 
valid data on policy positions for other years as well. The cross-validation o f the 
party positions derived by computer coding and the results o f a 1998 expert survey 
were promising.
The last step was to study the Laver and H unt (1992) data set. These expert data 
are unfortunately not fit for em pirical testing here, since the survey has only been 
held twice. This is unfortunate, since positions o f parties on a large number o f 
im portant issues are examined, and since much inform ation on positions on and 
importance o f portfolios is also included. This makes the data set a valuable asset 
for testing spatial theories, but more cases are needed to put this idea into practice. 
This data set is therefore only used as control variable in order to measure the effects 
o f different data sets used for testing the theories. The results o f the M D S  w ith  the 
manifesto data and the results o f the expert data were compared for 1989 and 1994. 
The positions o f the parties on the left-right dimension are quite similar, but the 
positions on the values dimension in the Laver and H unt data set and the positions 
on the vector ‘freedom and human rights’ in the M D S  display great differences. A  
sim ilar problem was found when the party positions o f the manifesto data were 
compared to the expert data on the portfolio dimensions: again left-right seemed 
reliable but the Foreign Affairs portfolio caused problems.
Unfortunately, the party positions gained by the data sets in this research are not very 
reliable. The lack o f reliable multi-dimensional data is a large handicap for empiri­
cally testing spatial coalition formation theories. However, I decided to continue w ith 
testing the theories and simultaneously keep a critical attitude towards the results.
In  Chapter 6, the hypotheses were tested in two different ways: first, by measuring the 
success rate and prediction efficiency o f the theories, and secondly by simulating coali­
tion formation based on the probability distribution derived from coalition formation 
theories, and then comparing the sim ulation results w ith  the em pirical results.
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The first approach then consisted o f em pirically testing the hypotheses derived 
in Chapters 3 and 4 and determining the success rate and prediction efficiency. If, 
for instance, the hypothesis states that in a weighted majority game a minimal winning 
coalition should be formed and not all cases generate a m inim al w inning coalition, 
the hypothesis should be rejected. This holds if  we assume that there is no ‘uncertainty’ 
and there are no measurement errors. The highest amount o f correct predictions is 
found in the centre player theory, which predicts correctly in 11 out o f 16 cases, 
leading to a success rate o f 11/16 or .688. None o f the theories in this research can 
therefore, according to this criterion, be judged good coalition formation theories. 
Sim ply studying the success rate would lead to rejecting all hypotheses, but note 
that the standard is very high if  the theories are tested against a hypothetically perfect 
theory. The same reasoning is applicable for the evaluation o f prediction efficiency.
In  general, some uncertainty is allowed for em pirically testing theories. One good 
method is to descriptively compare the different levels o f the success rate and pre­
diction efficiency between the classes o f theories, as was done in Chapter 6. In  this 
manner, no decision about rejecting hypotheses can be made but preferences 
between the classes o f theories can still be formulated. An im portant benefit o f the 
prediction efficiency method as compared to the success rate is that in the former 
both the degree o f falsifiability and the com patibility w ith  empirical research are 
measured. It is d ifficult to come to a conclusion about which class o f theories is best 
solely based on the success rate. The highest average success rate is for the policy- 
seeking and actor-oriented theories, which have an average success rate o f .438 and 
.458 respectively. The lowest success rate is for the office-seeking theories, which score 
.375. The average score o f the spatial theories is .425. Based on the prediction 
efficiency, the policy-seeking theories (.202) and especially the spatial theories (.269) 
should be preferred to the office-seeking (.164) and actor-oriented theories (.122).
In  Chapter 6, the second method applied to test the hypotheses is a statistical test in 
which the theories were compared w ith  hypothetical results based on a simulation. 
For this part o f the testing, a 5 %  significance level was introduced, and I deter­
mined which theories reject their null hypothesis - i.e. ‘the probability based on sim­
ulation predicts the same number o f historical coalitions as the theory’. A  theory 
rejects the null-hypothesis if  the number o f historical - read: correct - coalitions 
predicted by the theory is significantly higher than the number o f correct predic­
tions based on the probability distribution contrived by the simulation. From  the 
15 theories that were tested empirically, the following 6 theories rejected the null­
hypothesis:
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• Bargaining Set
• Conflict o f Interest Theory
• M in im al Range Theory
• Heart M ajority
• Protocoalition Form ation
• M axim al Satisfaction Solution.
Hence, the spatial theories and the uni-dimensional policy oriented theories are 
also winners in this respect.
7.2 Conclusions
In  this section, the in itial research question “do spatial theories o f coalition 
formation perform better empirically than non-spatial theories o f coalition formation" 
w ill be answered.
I shall first briefly consider some theoretical issues and thereby reflect on whether 
the theories discussed here are actually fit for predicting coalitions. Next, I shall 
examine whether the classes o f coalition formation theories are compatible w ith 
em pirical research - as indicated by the success rate - and if  the theories discrim inate 
enough, which is indicated by the prediction efficiency. The latter means that if  d if­
ferent theories predict correctly the same number o f times, I prefer a theory that 
predicts only one or a few coalitions to a theory that has large prediction sets.
Theoretical Remarks
A ll theories included in the empirical part o f this research are formal theories as 
defined by Popper (1975). From  the non-spatial theories only D e Swaan’s Policy 
Distance Theory, from the class o f ‘policy-seeking’ theories, was found to be 
inconsistent. Furthermore, two spatial theories - the Heart and the W inset - needed 
additional assumptions before they could be tested. According to the Popper (1974, 
see also Section 1.2) requirements this implies that ‘the set o f axioms is not sufficient’. 
However, note that these adjustments might be caused by the fact that these theories 
were not designed to predict coalitions. Obviously, I started from the notion that all 
theories in this research were designed to predict coalitions. W ith in  the class o f spatial 
theories this assumption is not always met. However, I believe that it is unfair to 
refute these theories because different goals were aimed at. A ll other theories in this 
research meet all requirements for a formal theory.
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As the research question implies, I am more interested in the empirical quality of 
the theories. In  particular I am interested in the question whether the new research 
programme, in the sense o f Lakatos’ view  on scientific growth (1970), that is the 
group o f spatial theories is preferable to the classical non-spatial theories.
Empirical Comparison
New  coalition formation theories have not been developed for theoretical reasons. 
As I said, most theories are satisfactory on theoretical grounds, but do not perform 
as well as we would like them to do empirically. Ideally, a coalition formation theory 
predicts every case o f coalition formation correctly. This led us to the research question: 
“Do spatial coalition formation theories perform better empirically than the non- 
spatial theories".
For the first part o f the empirical research, I studied descriptive measurement 
tools: the success rate and the prediction efficiency. In  this concluding section, the 
focus is on prediction efficiency rather than on the success rate, even though the latter 
is also interesting. The success rate sim ply measures the number o f times that a the­
ory predicts the historical coalition divided by the number o f coalition formations 
under consideration. The prediction efficiency measures the success rate o f a theory 
in relation to the degree o f falsifiability. The average success rate o f most theories is 
rather low. M ost theories predict correctly in less than the m ajority o f the cases. 
Moreover, the difference between the average success rate o f the non-spatial theories 
as compared to spatial theories is insignificant.
However, even though the average success rates among the classes o f theories are 
not very dissimilar, the absolute number o f times that theories predict the historical 
coalition is quite diverse. From the sixteen cases studied, the best theory according to 
the success rate - the centre player - predicts the correct coalition 11 times, whereas 
the worst theory in terms o f the success rate - the M in im al Size Theory - predicts 
the correct coalition only twice. One o f the actor-oriented theories then, the centre 
player, has the highest success rate in our research, namely .69. Yet, this does not 
make the ‘centre player’ concept a good coalition formation theory, since its prediction 
efficiency is very low, namely .086. This means that the number o f correct predictions 
is high, but that this is caused by a low  degree o f falsifiability. In  plain English: if  
we predict almost every possible w inning coalition in a game, the chance that we 
predict the correct one is high. So predicting correctly, that is only considering the 
success rate, does not give sufficient inform ation about the quality o f a coalition for­
mation theory.
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Actually, in the two classes where theories violated the theoretical requirements 
for a good formal theory, we find the ‘best’ em pirical results. In  the class o f policy- 
seeking and spatial theories, average prediction efficiency rates are .202 and .269 
respectively, whereas the average prediction efficiency rates for the office-seeking 
and actor-oriented theories are .164 and .122 respectively. The average prediction 
efficiency for all theories in the so-called non-spatial class, that is the office-seeking, 
actor-oriented and policy-seeking theories - calculated as ((0.164 + 0.202 + 0.122) 
/ 3 ) - is .163, whereas the average prediction efficiency for spatial theories is .269. 
The prediction efficiency rates are measured by dividing the number o f correct pre­
dictions by the total number o f predicted coalitions. It is moreover interesting that 
w ith in  the class o f policy-seeking theories, the only inconsistent theory, the policy 
distance theory, performs worse than the others, and that in the class o f spatial theories, 
the Heart Solution and the W inset Theory perform worse than two out o f three 
other theories in that class.
The empirical results show the same pattern if  we study the statistical test based 
on simulating coalition formation. The null hypothesis states that the probability 
based on sim ulation predicts the same number o f correct coalitions as the theory. 
The alternative hypothesis states that the selection o f historical coalitions by the the­
ory is not significantly higher than the probability selection. I f  the null hypothesis 
is rejected, it is safe to assume that the theory predicts better than a probability dis­
tribution based on the theory would. The hypotheses obtained in Chapters 3 and 4 
are rejected if  the theory does not reject the null hypothesis in the simulation. The 
null hypothesis was rejected more often for policy-seeking and spatial theories than 
for the other classes o f theories. The null hypothesis is not rejected for only one out 
o f three theories - the Po licy Distance theory- in the policy-seeking class, whereas in 
the spatial class two out o f five theories - the Com petitive Solution and the W inset 
Theory - do not reject the null hypothesis. From  the list o f theories below, the 
Conflict o f Interest- and the M in im al Range theory belong to the class o f policy- 
oriented theories. From  the class o f spatial theories, the M axim al Satisfaction 
Solution, the Heart M ajority, and the Protocoalition Form ation theory reject the 
null-hypothesis.
AN ASSESSMENT OF SPATIAL COALITION FORMATION THEORIES 2 3 7
C h a p te r  7
From  the 13 theories that were tested only the following six reject the null 
hypothesis. These theories cannot, according to the statistical test, be rejected.
• Bargaining Set Theory
• Conflict o f Interest Theory: W MC
• M in im al Range Theory
• M axim al Satisfaction Solution
• Heart M ajority
• Protocoalition Form ation Theory
O n ly  the first theory is an office-seeking theory, so one o f the conclusions based 
on this research is that policy-seeking theories perform better than office-seeking 
theories. Furthermore, the M axim al Satisfaction Solution, which is based on a 
notion o f aggregate utility, is considered the best theory in this research. Even though 
it does not have the highest success rate, it has the highest prediction efficiency, 
namely .438, and beating the random distribution based on this theory, it simultan­
eously rejects the null hypothesis.
If, based on the simulation, the whole body o f non-spatial theories is compared 
w ith  the latest development in coalition formation theory, spatial theories, this leads 
to a preference for spatial theories. From  the three classes w ith in  the group o f non- 
spatial theories, only three out o f eight theories reject the null hypothesis. From  the 
spatial theories that are tested, the majority, three out o f five, rejects the null 
hypothesis. In  general, the theories that score best on prediction efficiency also more 
often reject the null hypothesis.
Based on the success rate and prediction efficiency, the coalition formation theories 
that include policy motives, such as the policy-seeking and spatial theories, perform 
better em pirically than the other classes o f theories. So, if  the focus is on policy- 
seeking and spatial theories, and the number o f times that the null hypothesis can 
be rejected is considered, these classes o f theories end in a tie. Nevertheless, the spatial 
theories are slightly ahead o f the uni-dimensional policy-seeking theories in terms 
o f prediction efficiency. Considering these differences, I conclude that based on the 
empirical research, the spatial theories are also preferable to the policy-seeking theories 
w ith in  the class o f non-spatial theories.
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Reservations
Unfortunately, as I mentioned in Chapter 5, reservations about the empirical 
research must be made. Even for an optim ist, the conclusion o f the research on data 
reduction is that the party positions gained by the data sets in this research are not 
very reliable. The lack o f reliable multi-dimensional data is a large handicap for testing 
spatial coalition formation theories.
M ost spatial theories - the Heart, the Com petitive Solution, Protocoalition 
Form ation and the M axim al Satisfaction Solution - were tested w ith  data obtained 
by multi-dimensional scaling (M D S ) o f the Manifesto data set. The test for the last 
spatial theory - the W inset - also used the Manifesto data set but applied reliability 
analysis.
For the multi-dimensional scaling, proximities among party manifestos instead 
o f correlations among party manifestos form the input o f the analysis. Since the 
Manifesto data are content analysis data and the scores are based on the number o f 
sentences dealing w ith  an issue, these data are proximities. Hence, multi-dimen­
sional scaling is preferable to for instance factor analysis, which requires correlations 
as input. However, remember that the Manifesto data were collected for measuring 
the salience o f policy issues and not policy positions, even though I use the scaling 
output as such. Also, I found that im portant issues like inflation, unemployment or 
equal treatment policies were either missing in this data set or were part o f a broader 
policy issue. The statistical indicators o f the output o f the multi-dimensional scaling 
showed fairly good results, as did the interpretation o f the space w ith property fitting. 
However, we should be careful using these data and keep all reservations in mind.
For the W inset Theory, data on specific portfolio dimensions were necessary. 
This has led, in contrast to earlier reservations, to applying a data-reduction method 
that uses correlations among issues as its input. Reliability analysis is a straightforward 
scaling method based on correlations. Since the M D S  o f the manifesto data did not 
produce scales that could be applied to the most im portant portfolio jurisdictions, 
this side-step was necessary. Here, we should also remember these comments when 
evaluating the em pirical quality o f the W inset theory.
It is disconcerting to find that different data sets, more specifically the manifesto 
data and the Laver and H unt data set (the latter is used as a device to check the 
influence o f different data sources on the results) produce different party positions. 
These differences between the party positions o f the data sets can sim ply be caused 
by the fact that the different issues in the data sets produce different scales or, in
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other words, different latent dimensions. Another possibility is that the m ulti­
dimensional scaling solutions o f the Manifesto data are reliable, but the interpreta­
tion o f the property vectors causes the deviance from the other data set. M ore likely, 
it is the case that the data just do not give a good representation o f the empirical 
reality, which is more troublesome. As I said before, this is probably caused by the 
fact that the in itial goal o f the Manifesto data set was not to gather party positions 
on issues but to measure the saliency o f issues. As I said in the discussion in Chapter 
5, the different data sets produce more or less sim ilar party positions on a left-right 
economic scale, but diverge on other dimensions. Unfortunately, I believe that the 
last reason, namely that the data do not provide good party positions, is the most 
probable reason for the diverging positions o f the parties on sim ilar issues or similar 
dimensions. Doubts about the em pirical research also rise because the same spatial 
theories predict different coalitions if  different data sets are used. This was further 
reviewed in Section 6.5. Slightly com forting is the discovery that the Manifesto 
data, which were used most in the empirical testing, do not predict correctly more 
often than the control data. This could be a coincidence, but it is comforting since it 
implies that the quality o f the spatial coalition formation theories is not overestimated.
The last type o f data describes the policy positions o f parties for the 1998 cabinet 
formation. These data were obtained by computer-coded content analysis following 
the Laver and G arry (1998) procedure, and these data seem promising. A  cross­
validation o f these data w ith  the prelim inary results o f the 1998 expert survey 
showed high correlations between the party positions on sim ilar dimensions. This 
method to obtain party positions might be a solution to our problems. M ore 
research on this method needs to be done and the procedure should be refined, but 
this could be a way forward in empirical political research.
A  last comment that should be made in respect to the quality o f the empirical 
part o f this research relates to the ability to generalise the results. As I said in the 
introduction o f this research, in an ideal situation all cases o f coalition formation in 
multi-party democracies would be tested empirically. In  this research, only coalition 
formation in the Netherlands was studied. The Netherlands is a good case because 
it is a stable democracy w ith  a large number o f effective parties. It is likely that the 
em pirical results o f the coalition formation theories w ill be comparable to results 
based on testing in other multi-party democracies. Bu t obviously the only way to 
find out if  this is true is to perform empirical testing for the same theories in other 
countries too. So, we must bear in m ind that the conclusions o f this research are 
only valid for the Netherlands.
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General Comparison
Less than half o f the theories in this research predict the historical coalition in a 
m ajority o f cases. This is disturbing even for someone who is not studying coalition 
formation. As said before, there is little wrong w ith  most spatial and non-spatial 
theories in terms o f the theoretical requirements they should meet. Profound diffe­
rences were found in the empirical part o f this research. Even though caution is 
required because the data are not very reliable and because the Netherlands were the 
only em pirical test-case, two conclusions can be drawn:
• Spatial theories are preferable to non-spatial theories o f coalition formation.
• Coalition formation theories that include policy motives are preferable to
coalition formation theories that do not include policy motives.
7.3 Contribution to Political Science and Further Research Topics
In  this research, a small contribution to the field o f political science was made. 
As expressed in the quote, w ith  which I opened this concluding chapter, the game 
o f science is in principle w ithout end. It is an appropriate quote: more than having 
answers, as a result o f this study, new questions have risen.
I have concluded that spatial theories better explain coalition formation than 
non-spatial theories, and also that theories that include policy motives - spatial theories 
as well as policy-oriented theories - better explain coalition formation than theories 
that do not include policy motives. But naturally, the aim o f this research is above all 
to be a study o f democracy. In  order to better understand democracy, it is necessary 
to improve our understanding o f coalition formation. Theoretically describing spatial 
theories and contributing to the field o f spatial theories w ith  the Maxim al 
Satisfaction Solution, and em pirically testing these lines o f thought, has improved 
our knowledge on coalition formation.
Unfortunately, none o f the theories in this research were able to explain coalition 
formation sufficiently. Bo ld ly speaking, most theories do not predict much better 
than throwing a dice would. So, even though spatial theories may perform better 
than others, a large part o f the coalition formation process remains still unexplained.
The question that now arises is what should we do to improve our results. M y 
answer is twofold.
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• First, the theories themselves need improvement, which can be done by adding 
new assumptions. However, I do not yet know o f any assumption that is not 
idiosyncratic and could or should be included in these theories.
• Secondly, data on party positions need improvement. It is worthwhile to develop 
a good data set to further test spatial theories and to have at hand when testing 
improved theories.
The path towards im proving coalition formation theories may lie in another new 
development in the field; the emergence o f institutional theories. Including rules of 
the ‘game’ and including more substantial political knowledge o f a particular country at 
a particular moment w ill probably lead to higher success rates for coalition formation 
theories. Now, it is true that including more specific rules and country- and time- 
specific elements, like whether or not the political leaders o f the large parties like 
one another, w ill improve the prediction, but it also has a serious drawback. 
Theories including these kinds o f restrictions cannot be generalised to other countries 
or other time periods, and are not logically derived from general definitions and 
behavioural assumptions. However, future research could examine whether a combi­
nation o f institutional and spatial theories can better explain coalition formation, 
and whether this could lead to theories that transcend the level o f description.
The em pirical part o f this research also needs improvement. An attempt has been 
made to em pirically test several spatial theories. This had not been done in any 
systematic manner before. In  this research, the empirical results on these theories o f 
coalition formation are a contribution to the profession. Naturally, the problems 
that I have met in the em pirical part o f the research also lead to future research 
tasks. As said before, obtaining good data on multi-dimensional party positions is a 
major challenge for the future. The computer-coded content analysis, even though 
not yet performed perfectly in this research, can be a good starting point for obtaining 
this kind o f data. A  second em pirical issue - namely the small number o f cases that 
are tested here - can also be solved in future research. It would be interesting to 
extend the em pirical testing o f these theories to more cases and different countries, 
in order to find out whether the results w ill be the same.
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Table 1. - Election results for all political parties from 1946 until 1998 in the Netherlands 
(the numbers represent the amount of seats in parliament)
CPN PSP PPR GRLI PVDA d 66 VVD CDA KVP ARP DS70 CHU SGP KNP GPV RPF BP NMP RKPN EVP CD AOV UNIE55+ SP
1946 10 29 61 32 13 8 2
1948 8 27 8 32 13 9 2 1
1952 6 30 9 30 12 9 2 2
1 9 5 6 2 7 50 13 49 15 13 3
1959 3 2 48 19 49 14 12 3
1963 4 4 43 16 50 13 13 3 1 3
1967 5 4 37 7 17 42 15 12 3 1 7
1971 6 2 2 39 11 16 35 13 8 10 3 2 1
1972 7 2 7 43 6 22 27 14 6 7 3 2 3
1977 2 1 3 53 8 28 49 1 3 1 1
1981 3 3 3 44 17 26 48 3 1 2
1982 3 3 2 47 6 36 45 3 1 2
1986 1 2 52 9 27 54 3 1 1
1989 6 49 12 22 54 3 2 1
1994 5 37 24 31 34 2 2 3
1998 11 45 14 38 29 3 2 3
1 The six seats in 1946 were actually fo r the 'party fo r freedom ' - PvdV - but this party merged in the W D  in 1948.
2 In 1956 the number o f seats in parliament extended from  100 to  150.
3 Actually this seat was not fo r the CD but fo r  the CP, but since these parties are very close to  each o ther in terms o f content, I did not take the CP into the table too, since 
it is the only tim e tha t it gained a seat.
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The parties in the table are represented in arbitrary order. The party most to the 
left in the table - C P N  - was the Com m unist party. The PSP  was also a small left 
w ing pacifist party. The next, the P P R , was also a progressive left-wing party. In  
1989 the P P R  together w ith  three other small left-wing parties, the pacifist social­
ist party (P S P ), the Christian left-wing party (E V P ) and the communist party 
(C P N ) merged into Green Left (G rL i). This is now a left-wing alternative for vot­
ers who find the social democrats (PvdA ) too moderate. The average support for 
these parties (the P P R  and G rL i) is about 3 or 4 %  o f the electorate.
The next party on the list, the PvdA, which has its roots in the labour movement, 
is the largest left-wing party in the Netherlands. This social democratic party usu­
ally gains almost one third o f the votes and has been a partner in 8 cabinets since 
1946. The following party in the table is D66, Democrats ‘66, named after the year 
o f their founding. This is a moderate left-wing liberal social party that originated as 
a party proposing constitutional reform. Its support ranges from 4 %  to 16%  o f the 
votes. The V V D  is a right-wing secular liberal party and is the main opponent o f the 
PvdA  on social economic issues. In  general, the PvdA  and the V V D  were alternating 
coalition parties for the main Christian Dem ocratic Party. The average turnout of 
the V V D  is 15%.
A  Christian Dem ocratic Party, the C D A , was officially founded in 1980 but 
already entered the elections o f 1972 w ith  a list. Three religious parties merged into 
the C D A . These parties are the K V P  (catholic party, the largest o f the three), the 
A R P  (protestant party) and the C H U  (also a protestant party). The C D A  and 
before its founding the K V P  is a center party and was a member in every cabinet 
until 1994. Its support ranges from approximately 20%  to 35%  o f the vote.
The DS70 party was originally founded by discontented members o f the PvdA  
but became a more right- than left-wing party. Its electoral support has always been 
small.
The S G P  is the ‘State Reformed Party’; it has a very small but stable electorate 
and represents the reformed religion, which can be seen as the strict part o f the 
protestant religion. The next party in the table is the K N P  - the Catholic National 
Party -, which was a schism o f the K V P
Next in the table are the G P V  - reformed political league - and the R P F  - reformed 
political federation - both strict protestant parties. The R P F  is said to be slightly 
more left w ing on social economic issues. These parties have small but stable groups 
o f voters.
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The following party named B P  - ‘the farmers’ party - was quite right wing. Next 
is the N M P  - the trades-people party - representing the interests o f the shopkeepers 
and otherwise self-employed trades- people. The R K N P  - Rom an Catholic Party o f 
the Netherlands - has been an orthodox separation o f the KVP. The E V P  were 
Protestants that did not agree w ith  the merger o f the Protestant parties -ARP and 
C H U -  w ith  the Catholic Party (K V P ). People in his party were progressive 
Protestants and later merged into the left-wing party Green Left.
The C P  and the C D  are extreme right-wing racial prejudiced parties.
The A O V  and U N IE55+  are parties protecting the interest o f the elderly people 
in society. Finally the SP  is the Socialist Party that advertises w ith  “Vote Against the 
Establishment” Vote SP.
O f  all parties in this table only nine o f them occur in the em pirical analysis of 
coalition formation in the Netherlands. Some parties are too small and are therefore 
not likely to become coalition members and other parties are anti-system parties 
(for instance the C P N , CP, C D ) and are therefore not considered ‘coalitionable’. A  
technical reason for not including many parties in the analysis is that I do not have 
inform ation i.e. data on the policy positions o f these parties. For a fair comparison 
o f the spatial and non-spatial theories I preferred to include, also in the office seeking 
theories, only the parties that can be positioned on the dimensions.
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Appendix A 2
Table 2 - Cabinets in the Netherlands
YEAR COALITION NAME CABINET PRIME
MINISTER
LARGEST
PARTY
TOTAL DURATION
1946 - 1948 PVDA-KVP BEEL I KVP KVP 766
1948 - 1951 PVDA-KVP-CHU-VVD DREES - VAN SCHAIK PVDA KVP 950
1951 - 1952 ' in t e r im ' PVDA-KVP-CHU-VVD DREES I PVDA KVP 537
1952 - 1956 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU DREES II PVDA KVP/PVDA 1502
1956 - 1958 PVDA-KVP-ARP-CHU DREES III PVDA PVDA 800
1958 - 1959 ' in t e r im ' KVP-ARP-CHU BEEL II KVP PVDA 148
1959 - 1963 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD DE QUAY KVP KVP 1527
1963 - 1965 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD MARIJNEN KVP KVP 630
1965 - 1966 ' in t e r im ' PVDA- KVP-ARP CALS KVP KVP 587
1966 - 1967 ' in t e r im ' KVP-ARP ZIJLSTRA KVP KVP 134
1967 - 1971 KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD DE JONG KVP KVP 1553
1971 - 1972 KVP-ARP-CHU-DS70-VVD BIESHEUVEL I ARP PVDA 380
1972 - 1973 ' in t e r im ' KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD BIESHEUVEL II ARP PVDA 295
1973 - 1977 PVDA-PPR-D66-KVP- ARP DEN UYL PVDA PVDA 1683
1977 - 1981 CDA-VVD VAN AGT I CDA PVDA 1362
1981 - 1982 PVDA-D66-CDA VAN AGT II CDA CDA 260
1982 - 1982 ' in t e r im ' CDA-D66 VAN AGT III CDA CDA 159
1982 - 1986 CDA-VVD LUBBERS I CDA PVDA 1348
1986 - 1989 CDA-VVD LUBBERS II CDA CDA 1212
1989 - 1994 PVDA-CDA LUBBERS III CDA CDA 1749
1994 - 1998 PVDA-D66-VVD KOK I PVDA PVDA 1558
1998 - PVDA-D66-VVD KOK II PVDA PVDA ???
In  this research not all cabinets that have been formed are included in the analysis. 
I have chosen to exclude the so-called ‘interim  cabinets’. These coalitions are not 
formed after elections and can for this reason not be viewed as coalition formation 
following new voting games. Interim  cabinets usually govern after the premature 
‘death’ o f the former coalition. In  these cases is it very well likely that an incident 
has occurred that has led to dissolution o f the cabinet after which some parties do 
not want to govern together anymore.
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Hypotheses
Power-oriented theories
Let G = (N, W) be a simple game.
Then only coalitions from W MIN w ill be formed (Von Neumann &  Morgenstern, 1990). 
Let [q; w1, w2 , ..., wn ] be a weighted m ajority game.
Then only coalitions from W SIZE w ill be formed (Riker, 1962).
Let [q; w1, w2 , ..., wn ] be a weighted m ajority game.
Then only coalitions from W BAR w ill be formed (Leiserson, 1968).
Policy-oriented theories
Let G q be a policy game.
Then only coalitions from W MC w ill be formed (Axelrod, 1970; Van Deemen, 1997). 
Let Gq be a policy game and let S, 7e W  and 3 S \ DS < DT V  T e  W,
Then only coalitions from S w ill be formed (Leiserson, 1966)
Let Gq be a policy game.
Then only coalitions from the core w ill be formed (De Swaan, 1973)
Actor-oriented theories
Let G = (N , W) be a simple game w ith  one dominant player.
Then only coalitions from D W (G) w ill be formed (Peleg, 1981).
Let G = (N , W) be a simple game w ith  one dominant player.
Then only coalitions from D (G) w ill be formed (Van Deemen, 1989).
Peleg-Riker Principle Let G = [q; w1, w2,, ..., wn ] be a dominated and 
proper weighted m ajority game.
Then only coalitions from D  P i Wsize w ill be formed (Van Deemen, 1989).
In  centralised policy games only coalitions w ith  the centre player (C ) 
w ill be formed (Van Deemen, 1991).
In  centralised policy games only maximally balanced coalitions (B ) 
w ill be formed (Van Deemen, 1997).
In  centralised policy games only coalitions w ith  maximal power excess 
w ill be formed (Van Deemen, 1997).
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Let G = (N, W, RM):
- In  a spatial coalitional game only coalitions in the Heart w ill be formed 
(Schofield, 1993b).
- In  spatial coalitional games only w inning coalitions from the Heart w ill be 
formed.
- In  a spatial coalitional game the Heart coalition w ith the lowest aggregated distance 
w ill be formed (Schofield, 1997).
- The first protocoalition that represents a legislative m ajority o f votes w ill be 
formed (Grofman, 1982)
- The first protocoalition from parties inside the Heart that represents a legislative 
m ajority o f votes w ill be formed.
- In  the W inset Theory, the equilibrium  portfolio allocation that satisfies propo­
sitions 1 to 5 w ill come about.
- According to the winset theory, the parties or party that holds the main port­
folios w ill govern. I f  this party or these parties do not represent a legislative 
majority, the closest party in the portfolio space w ill jo in  it until this coalition 
becomes w inning.
- In  a spatial coalitional game a coalition from K  - com petitive solution- w ill be 
formed (McKelvey et al., 1978).
- In  a spatial coalitional game a coalition from K S - strong com petitive solution­
w ill be formed (McKelvey et al., 1978).
- In  a spatial coalitional game a coalition from W SAT - maximal satisfaction solution­
w ill be formed (De Vries, 1999).
Spatial coalitional games
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Appendix B
Manifesto Research Group - 
Content Analysis Variables:
DOMAIN 1: EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
per 101
foreign special relationships: positive
Favourable mentions of particular coun­
tries with which the manifesto country has 
a special relationship. For example, in the 
British case: former colonies; in the 
German case: East- Germ any; in the 
Swedish case: the rest of Scandinavia; the 
need for cooperation with and/or aid to 
such countries. 
per 102
foreign special relationships: negative
Negative mentions of particular countries 
with which the manifesto country has a 
special relationship; otherwise as 101, but 
negative.
per 103 anti-imperialism
Negative references to exerting strong 
influence (political, m ilitary or commer­
cial) over other states; negative references 
to controlling other countries as if  they 
were part of an empire; favourable men­
tions of decolonization; favourable refer­
ences to greater self-government and inde­
pendence for colonies; negative references 
to the imperial behaviour of the manifesto 
and/or other countries. 
per 104 military: positive 
Need to maintain or increase m ilitary 
expenditure; modernising armed forces 
and improvement of military strength; rear­
mament and self-defence; need to keep mil­
itary treaty obligations; need to secure ade­
quate manpower in the military. 
per 105 military: negative 
Favourable mentions of decreasing m ili­
tary expenditures; disarmament; “evils of
war” ; promises to reduce conscription, 
otherwise as 104, but negative. 
per 106 peace
Peace as a general goal; declarations of 
belief in peace and peaceful means of solv­
ing crises; desirability of countries joining 
in negotiations with hostile countries. 
per 107 internationalism: positive 
Need for international co-operation; co­
operation with specific countries other 
than those coded in 101; need for aid to 
developing countries; need for world plan­
ning of resources; need for international 
courts; support for any international goal or 
world state; support for U N . 
per 108 european community: positive 
Favourable mentions of European 
Com m unity in general; desirability of 
expanding the European Community and/ 
or increasing its competence; desirability 
of the manifesto country joining (or 
remaining a member). 
per 109 internationalism: negative 
Favourable mentions of national inde­
pendence and sovereignty as opposed to 
internationalism; otherwise as 107, but 
negative.
per 110 european community: negative
Hostile mentions of the European 
Community; opposition to specific Euro - 
pean policies which are preferred by 
European authorities; otherwise as 108, but 
negative.
DOMAIN 2: FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY 
per 210 freedom and human rights
Favourable mentions of importance of per­
sonal freedom and civil rights; freedom 
from bureaucratic control; freedom of 
speech; freedom of coercion in the political 
and economic spheres; individualism in the 
manifesto country and in other countries.
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per 202 democracy
Favourable mentions of democracy as a 
method or goal in national and other 
organisations; involvement of all citizens in 
decision-making, as well as generalised sup­
port for the manifesto country’s democracy. 
per 203 constitutionalism: positive
Support for specific aspects of the constitu­
tion; use of constitutionalism as an argu­
ment for policy as well as general approval 
of the constitutional way of doing things.
per 204 constitutionalism: negative
Opposition to the constitution in general 
or to specific aspects; otherwise as 203, but 
negative.
DOMAIN 3: POLITICAL SYSTEM 
per 301 decentralisation 
Support for federalism or devolution; more 
regional autonomy for policy or economy; 
support for keeping up local and regional 
customs and symbols; favourable mentions 
of special consideration for local areas; def­
erence to local expertise.
per 302 centralisation
Opposition to political decision-making at 
lower political levels; support for more 
centralisation in political and administrative 
procedures; otherwise as 301, but negative. 
per 303 governmental and 
administrative efficiency 
Need for efficiency and economy in gov­
ernment and administration; cutting down 
civil service; improving governmental pro­
cedures; general appeal to make the 
process of government and administration 
cheaper and more effective.
per 304 political corruption
Need to eliminate corruption, and associ­
ated abuse, in political and public life. 
per 305 political authority 
Favourable mentions of strong government, 
including government stability; manifesto
party’s competence to govern and/or other 
party’s lack of such competence.
DOMAIN 4: ECONOMY 
per 401 free enterprise
Favourable mentions of free enterprise cap­
italism; superiority of individual enterprise 
over state and control systems; favourable 
mentions of private property rights, 
personal enterprise and initiative; need for 
unhampered individual enterprises.
per 402 incentives
Need for wage and tax policies to induce 
enterprise; encouragement to start enterpris­
es; need for financial and other incentives. 
per 403 market regulation 
Need for regulations designed to make pri­
vate enterprises work better; actions 
against monopolies and trusts, and in 
defence of consumer and small business; 
encouraging economic competition; social 
market economy. 
per 404 economic planning 
Favourable mentions of long-standing eco­
nomic planning of a consultative or 
indicative nature, need for government to 
create such a plan
per 405 corporatism
Favourable mentions of the need for the 
collaboration of employers and trade 
union organisations in overall economic 
planning and direction through the medi­
um of tripartite bodies of government, 
employers and trade unions.
per 406 protectionism: positive
Favourable mentions of extension or main­
tenance of tariffs to protect internal markets; 
other domestic economic protectionism 
such as quota restrictions.
per 407 protectionism: negative 
Support for the concept of free trade; 
otherwise as 406, but negative.
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per 408 economic goals
Statements of intent to pursue any eco­
nomic goals not covered by other cate­
gories in domain 4. Note: this category is 
created to catch an overall interest of par­
ties in economics and, therefore, covers a 
variety of economic goals.
per 409 keynesian demand management
Demand-oriented economic policy; eco­
nomic policy devoted to reduction of 
depressions and/or to increase private 
demand through increasing public 
demand and/or through increasing social 
expenditures.
per 410 productivity
Need to encourage or facilitate greater pro­
duction; need to take measures to aid this; 
appeal for greater production and impor­
tance of productivity to the economy; the 
paradigm of growth. 
per 411 technology and infrastructure 
Importance of modernisation of industry 
and methods of transport and communi­
cation; importance of science and techno­
logical developments in industry; need for 
training and research.
per 412 controlled economy 
Central need for direct government con­
trol of economy; control over prices, 
wages, rents, etc.
per 413 nationalisation 
Government ownership, partial or com­
plete, including government ownership of 
land.
per 414 economic orthodoxy
Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, 
e.g. reduction of budget-deficits, retrench­
ment in crisis, thrift and savings, support 
for traditional economic institutions such 
as stock market and banking system; sup­
port for strong currency. 
per 415 marxist analysis 
Positive references (typically but not neces­
sary by communist parties) to the specific 
use of Marxist-Leninist terminology and 
analysis of situations which are otherwise 
uncodable.
per 416 anti-growth economy
Favourable mentions of anti-growth poli­
tics and steady state economy; ecologism; 
“Green Politics” .
DOMAIN 5: WELFARE AND QUALITY OF LIFE 
per 501 environmental protection 
Preservation of countryside, forests, etc.; 
general preservation of natural resources 
against selfish interests; proper use of natio­
nal parks, etc.; environmental improvement. 
per 502 culture
Need to provide cultural and leisure facili­
ties including arts and sport; need to spend 
money on museums, art galleries etc.; need 
to encourage worthwhile leisure activities 
and cultural mass-media. 
per 503 social justice 
Concept of equality; need for fair treat­
ment of all people; special protection for 
underprivileged; need for fair distribution 
of resources; removal of class barriers; end 
of discrimination such as racial or sexual 
discrimination, etc. 
per 504 welfare state expansion 
Favourable mentions or need to introduce, 
maintain or expand social service or social 
security scheme; support for social services 
such as health service or social housing. 
Note: this category excludes education. 
per 505 welfare state limitation 
Lim iting expenditure on social services or 
social security; otherwise as 504, but 
negative.
per 506 education expansion
Need to expand and/or improve educa­
tional provision at all levels. Note: This 
excludes technical training which is coded 
under 411.
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per 507 education limitation
Lim iting expenditure on education; other­
wise as 506, but negative.
DOMAIN 6 : FABRIC OF SOCIETY 
per 601 national way o f life: positive 
Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; 
suspension of some freedoms in order to 
protect the state against subversion; sup­
port for established national ideas. 
per 602 national way o f life: negative
Against patriotism and/or nationalism; 
opposition to the existing national state; 
otherwise as 601, but negative. 
per 603 traditional morality: positive 
Favourable mentions of traditional morel 
values; prohibition, censorship and 
suppression of immorality and unseemly 
behaviour; maintenance and stability of 
family; religion.
per 604 traditional morality: negative
Opposition to traditional moral values; 
support for divorce, abortion etc.; other­
wise as 603, but negative. 
per 605 law and order 
Enforcement of all laws; actions against 
crime; support and resources for police; 
tougher attitudes in courts.
per 606 social harmony 
Appeal for national effort and solidarity; 
need for society to see itself as united; 
appeal for public spiritedness; decrying 
anti-social attitudes in times of crisis; sup­
port for the public interest. 
per 607 multi-culturalism: positive 
Cultural diversity, communalism, cultural 
plurality and pillarization; preservation of 
autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages 
within the country including special edu­
cational provisions.
per 608 multi-culturalism: negative
Enforcement or encouragement of cultural 
integration, otherwise as 606, but negative.
DOMAIN 7: SOCIAL GROUPS
per 701 labour groups: positive
Favourable references to labour groups,
working class, unemployed; support for
trade unions; good treatment of manual
and other employees.
per 702 labour groups: negative
Abuse of power of trade unions; otherwise 
as 701, but negative. 
per 703 agriculture
Support for agriculture and farmers; any 
policy aimed at specifically benefiting 
these.
per 704 middle class 
and professional groups
Favourable references to middle class, pro­
fessional groups, such as physicians or 
lawyers; old and new middle class.
per 705 minority groups
Favourable references to underprivileged 
minority groups who are defined neither in 
economic nor in demographic terms, e.g. 
the handicapped, homosexuals, im m i­
grants, etc.
per 706 non economic 
demographic groups
Favourable mentions of, or need for, assis­
tance to women, old people, young people, 
linguistic groups, etc., special interest 
groups of all kinds.
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Table C.1
Coordinates 
of the parties on 
tw o dimensions. 
Stressvalue for 
configuration 
1946-1956 is .18
Table C.2
Coordinates 
of the parties on 
tw o dimensions. 
Stressvalue for 
configuration 
1952-1959 is .11
Appendix C
Results of the MDS analysis
The highlighted coordinates are included in the ‘testing file’.
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YEAR PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION 2
1946 VVD 0.24 0.67
1946 PVDA -0.94 -0.26
1946 ARP 0.54 -0.30
1946 CHU 0.26 -1.16
1946 KVP -0.19 -0.28
1948 VVD 0.93 1.03
1948 KVP -0.15 -1.00
1948 PVDA -0.84 0.02
1948 CHU 0.31 -0.96
1948 ARP 0.71 0.10
1952 VVD 0.47 1.87
1952 PVDA -1.24 0.30
1952 ARP 0.32 -0.33
1952 KVP 0.09 -0.13
1956 KVP -0.11 -0.06
1956 VVD -0.21 1.19
1956 PVDA -1.36 0.20
1956 CHU 0.90 -0.78
1956 ARP 0.27 -0.11
YEAR PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION 2
1952 VVD 0.25 -1.61
1952 PVDA -1.03 0.36
1952 ARP 0.79 0.35
1952 KVP 0.57 0.17
1956 KVP 0.09 0.24
1956 VVD -0.33 -1.03
1956 PVDA -1.01 0.24
1956 CHU 0.81 0.81
1956 ARP 0.71 0.17
1959 CHU 0.35 0.93
1959 ARP 0.51 -0.06
1959 VVD 0.44 -0.83
1959 PVDA -1.27 0.56
1959 KVP 0.88 0.31
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1956
1956
1956
1959
1959
1959
1959
1959
1963
1963
1963
1963
1963
YEAR
1959
1959
1959
1959
1959
1963
1963
1963
1963
1963
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
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PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION 2
kvp 0.15 0.33
VVD -1.12 -0.41
PVDA 0.37 -0.79
CHU -0.01 1.31
ARP -0.40 0.74
CHU 0.56 0.91
ARP -0.13 0.65
VVD -1.19 0.28
PVDA 0.97 -0.75
KVP -0.61 -0.85
ARP 0.15 0.22
kvp -0.13 -0.86
PVDA 0.57 -1.12
CHU 1.29 0.49
VVD -0.49 -0.15
PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION 2
chu 1.186 .679
ARP .934 .209
VVD 1.135 -.572
PVDA -.401 .988
kvp .475 -1.096
ARP .437 .199
kvp .083 -.807
pvda -.794 -.053
CHU .431 .957
VVD .380 -.345
kvp -.038 -.223
CHU -.235 .342
ARP .01 7 .1 84
PVDA -1.585 .230
d66 -1.732 -.314
VVD -.293 -.380
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Table C.5
Coordinates of 
the parties on 
tw o dimensions. 
Stressvalue for 
configuration 
1963-1972 is .15
YEAR PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION 2
1963 ARP .330 -1.023
1963 KVP .846 -.666
1963 PVDA -.600 -.046
1963 CHU -.147 -1.427
1963 VVD .759 -.347
1967 KVP .291 -.438
1967 CHU -.112 -.461
1967 ARP -.254 -.712
1967 PVDA -1.459 -.100
1967 D66 -1.194 .514
1967 VVD .420 -.148
1971 VVD .293 .307
1971 DS70 .333 1.023
1971 PRG3 -.335 .758
1971 CHR3 -.159 -.033
1972 VVD 1.693 .906
1972 CHR3 -.346 .445
1972 DS70 .626 .756
1972 PRG3 -.987 .691
Table C.6
Coordinates of 
the parties on 
tw o dimensions 
.Stressvalue for 
configuration 
1967-1977 is .12
YEAR PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION 2
1967 KVP -.618 -.896
1967 CHU -.362 -.799
1967 ARP .108 -1.061
1967 PVDA 1.244 -.871
1967 D66 1.188 -.330
1967 VVD -.794 -.667
1971 VVD -.502 -.219
1971 DS70 -.422 .903
1971 PRG3 .486 .516
1971 CHR3 .123 -.112
1972 VVD -1.844 .527
1972 CHR3 .381 .079
1972 DS70 -.723 .567
1972 PRG3 .886 .400
1977 CDA -.224 .035
1977 DS70 -.191 .389
1977 PPR 1.080 .551
1977 VVD -1.068 -.135
1977 D66 .295 .732
1977 PVDA .959 .391
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1977
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1981
1981
1981
YEAR
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1981
1981
1981
1981
1982
1982
1982
1982
1982
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
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PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION 2
VVD -.780 -.055
DS70 -.459 .764
PRG3 .671 -.041
CHR3 .102 .194
VVD -2.094 .636
CHR3 .767 -.426
DS70 -.735 -.629
PRG3 1.096 .112
CDA -.155 -.504
DS70 -.220 -.293
PPR 1.377 -.003
VVD -1.397 -.205
D66 .334 .566
PVDA 1.149 .283
PVDA .764 .512
D66 .210 -.040
VVD -.916 -.265
CDA .287 -.604
 PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION
 CDA -.515 .328
 ds70 -.641 .146
 PPR .203 1.161
 VVD -1.281 -.213
 d66 -.514 1.132
 pvda .350 .991
 PVDA .417 .783
 d66 -.093 .446
 VVD .783 -.234
 CDA -.129 .265
 VVD -.469 -1.461
 pvda .904 -.582
 PPR 2.541 -.340
 d66 .182 -.249
 CDA .085 -.231
 d66 .067 -.566
 pvda .312 -.287
 VVD -.362 -.675
 PPR .244 .043
 CDA .348 -.456
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Table C.9
Coordinates of 
the parties on 
tw o dimensions. 
Stressvalue for 
configuration 
1981-1989 is .13
YEAR PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION 2
1981 PVDA .848 .812
1981 D66 .299 .424
1981 VVD -.202 -.742
1981 CDA .423 .042
1982 VVD -.497 -1.401
1982 PVDA .793 -.521
1982 PPR 2.980 -.358
1982 D66 -.173 .158
1982 CDA -.171 -.116
1986 D66 -.374 -.058
1986 PVDA -.048 .068
1986 VVD -.635 -.319
1986 PPR -.009 .310
1986 CDA -.547 -.214
1989 D66 -.737 .345
1989 GRLINKS .016 1.023
1989 VVD -.757 -.051
1989 CDA -.770 .194
1989 PVDA -.440 .404
Table C.10
Coordinates of 
the parties on 
tw o dimensions. 
Stressvalue for 
configuration 
1986-1994 is .09
YEAR PARTY DIMENSION 1 DIMENSION 2
1986 D66 -0.07 0.34
1986 PVDA 0.37 0.47
1986 VVD -0.65 0.38
1986 PPR 0.62 0.65
1986 CDA -0.51 0.59
1989 D66 -0.10 0.73
1989 GRLINKS 1.24 0.15
1989 VVD -0.44 0.78
1989 CDA -0.31 0.61
1989 PVDA 0.20 0.53
1994 D66 -0.19 -0.70
1994 PVDA 0.38 -1.04
1994 VVD -0.94 -1.71
1994 CDA -0.60 -0.45
1994 GRLINKS 0.99 -1.32
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Appendix D Party positions on the portfolio dimensions, 
data for testing the Winset Theory
Table D.1
Standardised 
scores of parties 
on three portfolio 
dimensions, 1946
YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1946 PVDA -1.24 -1.00 -0.09
1946 VVD 0.26 -1.16 -0.31
1946 KVP -1.19 -0.66 -0.75
1946 ARP 0.36 -1.69 0.36
1946 CHU -0.15 -1.69 0.37
YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1948 PVDA -1.24 -0.83 0.85
1948 VVD 0.66 -0.86 -0.66
1948 KVP .09 -0.57 -0.11
1948 ARP 0.18 -1.51 -0.39
1948 CHU -0.06 -1.69 0.63
Table D.2
Standardised 
scores of parties 
on three portfolio 
dimensions, 1948
YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1952 PVDA -1.83 0.81 -1.14
1952 VVD 1.53 -1.42 -1.17
1952 KVP 1.04 -0.82 -0.28
1952 ARP 0.62 -1.62 -0.63
Table D.3
Standardised 
scores of parties 
on three portfolio 
dimensions, 1952
YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1956 PVDA -1.64 -0.83 -1.09
1956 VVD 1.24 -1.26 -1.12
1956 KVP 0.86 -0.63 -0.68
1956 ARP 1.10 -1.37 -0.54
1956 CHU 0.66 -1.05 -0.60
Table D.4
Standardised 
scores of parties 
on three portfolio 
dimensions, 1956
YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1959 PVDA -0.43 0.20 -1.43
1959 VVD 1.44 -1.62 -0.75
1959 KVP 0.38 -0.52 -1.61
1959 ARP 0.57 -1.51 -1.04
1959 CHU 0.35 -1.46 -0.80
Table D.5
Standardised 
scores of parties 
on three portfolio 
dimensions, 1959
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Table D.6
Standardised YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
scores of parties
on three portfolio 1963 PVDA -1.87 1.49 -1.24
dimensions, 1963 1963 VVD 0.45 -1.04 -1.24
1963 KVP -0.14 0.56 -1.61
1963 ARP 0.51 0.24 -1.53
1963 CHU 0.29 1.67 -1.61
Table D.7
Standardised YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
scores of parties
on three portfolio 1967 PVDA -1.46 0.44 -1.20
dimensions, 1967 1967 D66 -0.93 1.17 -0.68
1967 VVD 1.20 0.11 -0.16
1967 KVP 0.49 0.49 -0.74
1967 ARP 0.07 1.72 -0.63
1967 CHU 0.61 0.64 -0.20
Table D.8
Standardised YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
scores of parties
on three portfolio 1971 VVD 0.79 -0.47 0.23
dimensions, 1971 1971 DS70 -0.14 -0.38 0.04
1971 PROG -1.34 0.55 0.06
1971 CHRS -0.95 1.28 -0.52
Table D.9
Standardised YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
scores of parties
on three portfolio 1972 VVD 1.30 -1.46 -0.04
dimensions, 1972 1972 DS70 0.48 -0.15 -0.05
1972 PROG -2.17 1.36 -0.19
1972 CHRS -0.72 0.15 -0.37
Table D.10
Standardised YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
scores of parties
on three portfolio 1977 PPR -2.06 1.56 -0.93
dimensions, 1977 1977 PVDA -2.01 1.53 -0.02
1977 D66 -0.52 -0.34 -0.79
1977 VVD 1.34 -0.30 1.11
1977 CDA 0.37 0.60 0.75
1977 DS70 -0.39 0.05 1.36
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YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1981 PVDA -1.92 1.31 -0.78
1981 D66 -1.07 0.78 -0.08
1981 VVD 0.92 0.38 0.45
1981 CDA -0.07 0.56 0.15
Table D.11
Standardised scores 
of parties on three 
portfolio dimensions, 
1981
YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1982 PPR -0.03 0.71 -0.31
1982 PVDA -0.32 1.47 0.58
1982 D66 -0.22 0.03 0.76
1982 VVD 1.37 -0.03 0.79
1982 CDA 0.11 1.15 1.42
table D.12
Standardised scores 
of parties on three 
portfolio dimensions, 
1982
YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1986 PPR -1.14 0.40 0.24
1986 PVDA -0.59 1.19 1.02
1986 D66 0.41 0.08 1.21
1986 VVD 0.73 0.21 1.53
1986 CDA 0.68 0.51 0.78
table D13
Standardised scores 
of parties on three 
portfolio dimensions, 
1986
YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1989 GRLI -1.42 0.98 0.61
1989 PVDA -0.46 1.36 1.21
1989 D66 0.01 0.23 1.26
1989 VVD 0.52 -0.55 1.99
1989 CDA 0.37 0.27 1.80
table D.14
Standardised scores 
of parties on three 
portfolio dimensions, 
1989
YEAR PARTY Z-FINANCE Z-FOREIGN Z-HOME AFFAIRS
1994 GRLI 0.43 0.76 1.05
1994 PVDA 0.99 0.33 1.77
1994 D66 1.07 0.79 1.92
1994 VVD 1.76 -0.22 2.48
1994 CDA 1.14 1.00 1.36
table D.15
Standardised scores 
of parties on three 
portfolio dimensions, 
1994
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Appendix E
Wordlists used for Content Analysis of the party manifestos in 19981 
E.1.1 Economic Policy Domain - Wordlist left
overheid zekerheid uitkering
sociale gezondheidszorg uitkeringen
sociaal vervoer m inim um loon
zorg koppelen armoede
zorgen koppeling armoedeval
werk ontkoppeling armoedebestrijding
investeren gekoppeld anti-armoedebeleid
zekerheid gekoppelde solidariteit
basis koppelingswet bijstand
staat arbeid m inim um
draagvlak instellingen herverdeling
voorzieningen betaald basisvoorzieningen
investeringen betaalde
E.1.2 Economic Policy Domain - Wordlist right
infrastructuur
lastenverlichting
individuele
beperking
groei
particuliere
versterking
keuzevrijheid
besparingen
industrie
financieringstekort
vrijheid
zelfstandig
staatsschuld
tekort
concurrentiepositie
concurrentie
stimuleren
ontplooien
ontplooiing
deregulering
flexi...
veiligheid
afdrachten
orde
marktsector
1 These wordlists contain words that are not complete, or more precise, there are words that miss letters 
at the end. This is due to the maximum number of letters that Kwalitan can represent. The dots after 
the word 'flexi' mean that all words that begin with 'flexi' - like flexibel - will be counted.
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E.2.1 Social Values Domain - Wordlist conservative
alleenstaanden gezinsplanning naturalisatie-
allochtone gezinsverantwoordel naturaliseren
allochtonen gezinsvoogden norm
allochtoon gezinsvoogdij-inste normatieve
alleenstaande gezinsvorming normen
asiel gezinsvriendelijk normvervaging
asiel- gezinsvriendelijke opvoeden
asielaanvragen gezinsvriendelijkhe opvoeding
asielfunctie gezin_ opvoedings-
asielverzoek godsdienst- opvoedingsaspect
asielverzoeken godsdiensten opvoedingsklimaat
asielzoeker huwelijk opvoedingsondersteu
asielzoekers huwelijkse ouder
asielzoekerscentra immigranten ouderbetrokkenheid
beginsel immigrantenkinderen ouders
bordeelverbod immigratie religie
burgerlijk immigratie- religieuze
burgerlijke inburge- remigratie
burgermaatschappij inburgering respect
defensie inburgeringsbeleid respecteert
defensie- inburgeringscontrac respecteren
defensie-identiteit inburgeringscursus re_ntegratie
defensie-industrie inburgeringsprogram re_ntegratiebeleid
defensie-uitgaven inburgeringstraject toelatingsbeleid
defensiecapaciteit kerk toelatingsregeling
defensiepersoneel kerkdiensten traditie
defensieuitgaven kerkelijk tradities
doormigratie kerkelijke traditioneel
echtgenoot kerken traditionele
evangelie koningin verantwoorde
familie koninklijk verantwoordeli
familieband koninklijke verantwoordelijk
familiebedrijven koninkrijk verantwoordelijkhed
familiebeleid koninkrijksverband verantwoordelijkhei
familieleden koninkrijksverhoudi verantwoording
familieverband levenbeschouwelijke verantwoordingen
familievriendelijke levensbeschouwelijk verboden
gehuwden levensbeschouwing waarden
gelijkgezinde migranten waardengemeenschap
geloof migrantenbeleid zingeving
geloofwaardig migrantenkringen zingevingsvragen
geloofwaardige migrantenvraagstuk medisch-ethische
geloofwaardiger migratie klonen
geloofwaardigheid migratie- gentherapie
gezin migratie-effecten genetische
gezinnen migratieoverschot euthanasie
gezins- migratiestromen euthanasie/hulp
gezinsbeleid migratievraagstuk zelfdoding
gezinslid monarchie
2 6 2  GOVERNING WITH YOUR CLOSEST NEIGHBOUR
A ppend ix
E.2.2 Social Values Domain - Wordlist liberal
alleengaande liberalen
alleengaanden liberalisatie
anti-discriminatieb liberalisering
anti-discriminatiew medeburger
anti-racisme medeburgers
antidiscriminatiebe meningsuiting
antidiscriminatieco meningsuitingen
antifoltercommissie mens
bewustwordingsproce mens-
bewustzijn menselijke
civil mensen
discriminatie mensenhandel
discrimineren mensenrechtelijke
discriminerend mensenrechten
draagmoederschap mensenrechten-
eiceldonatie mensenrechtenaspect
emancipatie mensenrechtenbeleid
emancipatiebeleid mensenrechtencommis
emanciperen mensenrechtengroepe
etniciteit mensenrechtennormen
etnisch mensenrechtenorgani
etnische mensenrechtenpoliti
gelijk mensenrechtenschend
gelijkberechtiging mensenrechtensituat
gelijke mensenrechtenstanda
gelijkgestemde mensenrechtenverdra
gelijkgestemden mens_
gelijkheid minderheden
gelijkheidsbeginsel minderhedenbeleid
gelijkwaardig minderheid
gelijkwaardige minderheidsgroepen
gelijkwaardigheid minderheidsgroeperi
gerechtigd minderheidsrechten
gerechtigden multiculturaliteit
gerechtigheid multicultureel
gerechtvaardigd multiculturele
gerechtvaardigde non-conformisme
gescheiden onderdrukking
gezinshereniging partner
grondrecht partnerregistratie
grondrechten partners
homoseksuele partners/samenwonen
humanitaire partnervoogdijschap
keuzevrijheid prostitutie
leefvormen racisme
lesbische racistisch
levensbe_indiging rolpatronen
levensvormen samenlevingen
liberale samenlevingsvorm
samenlevingsvormen
samenwonen
samenwonenden
seksueel
seksuele
sexueel
subcultuur
tolerantie
tolereert
verdraagzaamheid
vluchtelingen
vluchtelingen-
vluchtelingenorgani
vrede
vredesonderhandelin
vredesproces
vrije
vrijheid
vrijheidszin
zelfbeschikking
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E.3 Environmental Protection
aardbol
aarde
aardgas
aardgasbaten
aardgasvoorraden
aardolie
aardwarmte
afval
afvalberg
afvalproductie
afvalrecycling
afvalstoffen
afvalstoffenheffing
afvalstromen
ammoniak
anti-verdrogingsbel
atoomenergie
bedrijfsmilieuplan
bestrijdingsmiddele
bio-industrie
biodiversiteit
biodiversiteitsverd
biologische
biomassa
biotechnologische
bodem-
bodembescherming
bodems
bodemsanering
bodemvervuiling
brandstof
brandstofdrager
brandstoffen
broeikaseffect
broeikasgassen
broeikassen
chemicali_n
chemische
co2-
co2-beleid
co2-emissie
co2-emissies
co2-gemeenschap
co2-uitstoot
co2
congestie
congestieproblemen
congestiegebieden
delfstoffen
dienstfietsen
diesel
dodewaard
drinkwater
drinkwater-voorzien
drinkwaterbedrijven
drinkwatervoorzieni
dumpen
duurzaam
duurzaamheid
duurzaamheidsaspect
duurzaamheidseisen
duurzame
duurzamer
eco-tax
ecologie
ecologisch
ecologische
ecologiseren
ecologisering
ecopolis
ecotax
ecotoerisme
emissie
emissiearme
emissieplafonds
emissierechten
emissiereducties
emissies
energie
energie-
energie-accijns
energie-afhankelijk
energie-effici_nte
energie-effici_ntie
energie-extensiveri
energie-intensieve
energie-intensiteit
energie-opwekking
energiebedrijven
energiebehoefte
energiebelastingen
energiebeleid
energiebesparing
energiebronnen
energiedistributien
energiedragers
energiegebruik
energieheffing
energiekeurmerk
energiekwaliteit
energieleveranciers
energiemarkt
energieoverschotten
energieprestatienor
energieprijzen
energieproducenten
energieproductie
energiesector
energiesystemen
energieverbruik
energievoorziening
energievoorzieninge
energiezuinig
energiezuinige
energiezuiniger
erodeert
fiets
fiets-
fietsen
fietser
fietsers
fietspaden
fietsroutes
fietsverkeer
gasprijs
geluidhinder
geluidshinder
geluidsnormen
groen
groene
groenfondsen
groenstructuren
grondbeleid
grondgebied
grondgebruik
grondstof
grondstofbesparing
grondstoffen
grondstofvoorraden
grondwater
grondwateronttrekki
herbebossing
herbruikbaar
herbruikbare
hergebruik
hergebruiken
hergebruiksector
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hergebruikt
kernafval
kerncentrale
kerncentrales
kernenergie
kernkwaliteit
kerosine
klimaat
klimaatsysteem
klimaatverandering
kooldioxide
krachtcentrale
kringloopcentra
kringloopfuncties
kringlopen
kunstmest
kustgebied
kuststroken
kustuitbreiding
kustvaart
leidingwater-afvalw
lozingen
luchtvervuiling
mest
milieu
milieu-
milieu-activist
milieu-afval
milieu-effecten
milieu-efficiency
milieu-eisen
milieu-heffing
milieu-innovatie
milieu-investeringe
milieu-onvriendelij
milieu-oogpunt
milieu-overtredinge
milieu-vriendelijke
milieubegroting
milieubeheer
milieubelang
milieubelastende
milieubelasting
milieubelastingen
milieubeleid
milieubeleidsplan
milieubeleidsplanne
milieubesef
milieubeslag
milieubestemmingshe
milieubeweging
milieubewegingen
milieuco
milieuconvenanten
milieucriminaliteit
milieudelicten
milieudiplomatie
milieudiplomatiek
milieudoel
milieudoelen
milieudoelstelling
milieudoelstellinge
milieudruk
milieueffectrapport
milieueisen
milieufactor
milieugebied
milieugebruik
milieugebruiksruimt
milieugedrag
milieugegevens
milieugelden
milieugerichte
milieugevaarlijke
milieugevolgen
milieugrenzen
milieugroepen
milieugulden
milieuguldens
milieuheffing
milieuheffingen
milieuhinder
milieujaarverslag
milieukaders
milieukosten
milieukwaliteit
milieukwaliteitseis
milieulast
milieulasten
milieumaatregelen
milieunormen
milieuorganisaties
milieuplafonds
milieupolitie
milieupolitiek
milieuprobleem
milieuproblemen
milieuprojecten
milieuregelgeving
milieuregels
milieurendement
milieuruimte
milieuschade
milieuschadelijke
milieutechnologie
milieuterrein
milieuterreinen
milieutraject
milieuvastrechtkaar
milieuverantwoord
milieuverantwoorde
milieuverbetering
milieuverbeteringen
milieuverbruik
milieuverdragen
milieuvergunningen
milieuverklaring
milieuvernietiging
milieuverontreinigi
milieuverplichtinge
milieuverslag
milieuversterking
milieuvervuilende
milieuvervuiling
milieuvoordelen
milieuvoorwaarden
milieuvriendelijk
milieuvriendelijke
milieuvriendelijker
milieuvriendelijkhe
milieuwaarheid
milieuwinst
milieuzorg
natuur
natuur-
natuur/
natuur/milieu
natuur/wonen
natuurbeheer
natuurbehoud
natuurbeleid
natuurbeleving
natuurbescherming
natuurbouw
natuurbouwprojecten
natuurcompensatie
natuureisen
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natuurgebied
natuurgebieden
natuurherstel
natuurkwaliteiten
natuurontwikkeling
natuurontwikkelings
natuurproductie
natuursparende
natuurvoorwaarden
natuurvriendelijke
natuurwaarden
natuurzuivere
nitraat-richtlijn
nucleaire
nul-emissie-situati
oppervlaktewater
oppervlaktewateren
radioactief
recycling
regenwouden
rijwielpaden
ruimtebeheer
ruimteclaims
ruimtegebruik
ruimtetoedeling
schone
schoner
schonere
schoon
spuitbussen
statiegeldsysteem
statiegeldsystemen
temperatuurstijging
uitlaatgassen
uitstoot
vervuilde
vervuilende
vervuiler
vervuilers
vervuiling
vervuilingsrechten
verzurende
verzuring
warmte-krachtkoppel
warmtekracht
warmtekrachtkoppeli
water
water-
waterbeheer
waterbodems
watergebruik
waterhuishouding
waterkwaliteit
waterschappen
waterspoor
watersystemen
watervoorziening
waterwinning
wereldklimaatconfer
wereldmilieufonds
windenergie
windenergieplan
windmolens
windpark
zee
zeehaven
zeemilieu
zoetwatervoorzienin
zonne-energie
zonne-energie-insta
zonnecellen
zonnepanelen
zuiderzee-hsl
zwavelverbindingen
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Appendix F
Results of the computer-coded content analysis 
of the 1998 manifestos in the Netherlands
Table F.1
Normalised scores N O RM . SCO RES ECO N O M IC  POLICY SO C IAL V A LU ES EN V IR O N M EN T
on the economic
'left-right' scale, the GR O EN L IN K S 0 .86 1
liberal-conservative PVD A .18 1 .42
value scale and the D66 .45 .93 .47
environmental pro­ CD A .22 0 .10
tection scale. V V D 1 .81 0
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Control data for the Netherlands in 1989 and 1994 based 
on the Laver and Hunt (1992) and Laver (1995) expert data sets
Table G.1
PARTY LEFT-RIGHT SOCIAL POLICY Policy positions of 
the parties in 1989
GROENLINKS -1.26 -0.93 on the left right
PVDA -0.59 -0.68 and social policy
D66 0.06 -0.69 dimension
CDA 0.49 0.74
VVD 1.04 -0.40
When the data for 1989 were collected the Green Left (groenlinks) party was not included. Since this 
party was the fifth largest party in the election of 1989, I have decided to include it in this analysis.
Its score is the average score of the scores of the three parties (PSP, PPR, CPN) that later merged into 
Green Left.
Table G.2
Portfolio positions of 
the parties in 1989 
on the Finance 
and Foreign Affairs 
portfolios
PARTY FINANCE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GROENLINKS -1.26 -1.06
PVDA -0.59 -0.58
D66 0.06 -0.27
CDA 0.49 -0.01
VVD 1.04 0.48
PARTY LEFT-RIGHT SOCIAL POLICY
GROENLINKS -1.49 -1.37
PVDA -0.44 -1.06
D66 0.09 -1.20
CDA 0.53 0.49
VVD 0.65 -0.84
Table G.3
Portfolio positions of 
the parties in 1994 
on the left right 
and social policy 
dimension
PARTY FINANCE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GROENLINKS -1.48 -0.89
PVDA -0.43 0.54
D66 0.09 0.76
CDA 0.53 0.98
VVD 0.65 1.27
Table G.4
Portfolio positions of 
the parties in 1994 
on the Finance 
and Foreign Affairs 
portfolios
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W inset Programme Output
Note that W IN SET represents the parties by the first and last letter of the abbrevi­
ation that we usually apply: so the {kvp} becomes {kp} etceteras.
1948: Investigating the status quo (PvdA, KVP)
.---- finance
/ .— foreign
/ /
Investigating : | pa | kp |
.-- .-- Preferred by:
Winpoint no. 1 | kp | kp | kp ap cu vd
2 | kp | pa | kp ap cu vd
3 | kp | ap | kp ap cu vd
4 | kp | vd | kp ap cu vd
5 | pa | pa | pa ap cu vd
6 | pa | vd | pa ap cu vd
7 | ap | kp | kp ap cu vd
8 | ap | pa | kp ap cu vd
9 | ap | ap | kp ap cu vd
10 | ap | vd | kp ap cu vd
11 : | cu | kp | kp ap cu vd
12 : | cu | pa | kp ap cu vd
13 : | cu | ap | kp ap cu vd
14 : | cu | vd | kp ap cu vd
15 : | vd | kp | kp ap cu vd
16 : | vd | pa | kp ap cu vd
17 : | vd | ap | kp ap cu vd
18 : | vd | vd | kp ap cu vd
1948: Winset of the DDM (KVP, PvdA)
.---- finance
/ .— foreign
/ /
Investigating : | kp | pa |
.-- .---. Preferred by:
Winpoint no. 1 : | cu | kp | kp pa
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.---- finance
/ .— foreign
/ /
Investigating : | kp | kp |
.-- .---. Preferred by:
Winpoint no. 1 : | kp | pa | pa ap cu
2 : | kp | vd | pa ap cu
Note: prediction is the ideal point of the MSP {KVP, KVP}.
1948: Selection of the strong party (KVP) + Winset
1956: Winset of the 1952 status quo: {PvdA, PvdA}
.---- foreign
/ .— finance
/ /
Investigating : | pa | pa |
.-- .-- Preferred by:
Winpoint no. 1 | pa | kp | kp ap vd
2 | pa | ap | kp ap vd
3 | pa | vd | kp ap vd
4 | pa | cu | kp ap vd
5 | kp | kp | kp ap vd
6 | kp | ap | kp ap vd
7 | kp | vd | kp ap vd
8 | kp | cu | kp ap vd
9 | ap | kp | kp ap vd
10 : | ap | ap | kp ap vd
11 : | ap | vd | kp ap vd
12 : | ap | cu | kp ap vd
13 : | vd | kp | kp ap vd
14 : | vd | ap | kp ap vd
15 : | vd | vd | kp ap vd
16 : | vd | cu | kp ap vd
17 : | cu | kp | kp ap vd
18 : | cu | ap | kp ap vd
19 : | cu | vd | kp ap vd
20 : | cu | cu | kp ap vd
vd
vd
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
cu
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1956: Winset of the DDM
-foreign
finance
Investigating | pa | kp |
.-- .--- Preferred by:
1 : | kp | cu | pa kp
2 : | ap | cu | pa ap vd
3 : | vd | cu | pa ap vd
4 : | cu | cu | pa ap cu
/
/ /
1956: Winset of the strong party
.---- foreign
/ .— finance
/ /
Investigating : | cu | cu |
.-- .---. Preferred by:
Winpoint no. 1 : | pa | cu | pa kp
2 : | cu | kp | kp ap vd
1959: Winset of the 1956 status quo: {PvdA, KVP}
.---- finance
/ .— foreign
/ /
Investigating : | pa | kp |
Preferred by:
Winpoint no. 1 : 1 kP | kp | kp vd ap
2 : | ap | kp | kp vd ap
3 : | ap | pa | kp vd ap
4 : 1 cu 1 kp | kp vd ap
cu
cu
cu
cu
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1959 DDM
.---- finance
/ .— foreign
/ /
Investigating : | kp | kp |
This point has an empty winset. 
1959 (very) strong party
.---- finance
/ .— foreign
/ /
Investigating : | kp | kp |
Note: the VSP {KVP} has an empty winset and its ideal point is predicted.
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Success Rate and Prediction Efficiency
A p p e n d i x
total amount
theory of predicted prediction efficiency =
(nr possible coalitions cases correct success rate nr correct pred/total
winning predicted by predictions predicted coalitions
coalitions is 203) the theory
WMIN 66 16 9 0 .5 6 3 0 .1 3 6
WSIZE 19 16 2 0 .1 2 5 0 .1 0 5
WBAR 28 16 7 0 .4 3 8 0 .2 5 0
w MC 34 16 8 0 .5 0 .2 3 5
w MINRANGE 22 16 6 0 .3 7 5 0 .2 7 3
w CORE 82 16 8 0 .5 0 0 0 .0 9 8
Dw (g) 42 16 5 0 .3 1 3 0 .1 1 9
d(g ) 19 16 3 0 .1 8 8 0 .1 5 8
d(g ) n  w sizE 16 16 0 0 0
w (c ) 1 2 8 16 11 0 .6 8 8 0 .0 8 6
WMAX BAL 16 16 0 0 0
W pow  excess 16 16 3 0 .1 8 8 0 .1 8 6
MAX SAT 16 16 7 0 .4 3 8 0 .4 3 8
com p so l 56 16 8 0 .5 0 0 0 .1 4 3
strong  com  sol 16 16 0 0 0
heart 83 16 9 0 .5 6 2 0 .1 0 8
heart 'w inning ' 65 16 9 0 .5 6 2 0 .1 3 8
heart (refined) 16 16 3 0 .1 8 7 0 .1 8 7
w inset allocation 16 16 2 0 .1 2 5 0 .1 2 5
w inset coalition 16 16 4 0 .2 5 0 0 .2 5 0
proto c o a l.form 16 16 6 0 .3 7 5 0 .3 7 5
proto+ heart 16 16 5 0 .3 1 3 0 .3 1 3
The number of predicted coalitions by each theory is at least 16 since we have 16 
cases, but in some cases we have included an empty prediction set. Some years did 
not have a dominant or center party and did not predict anything.
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Sim ulation results
Minimal Winning Theory
S i m u l a t i e  e x a c t e  k a n s  v a n  t h e o r i e  bi j  c o m b i n a t i e  v a n  v e r k i e z i n g e n '  
s u b t i t l e  ' t h e o r i e  M I N W I N ' .
S P S S  J O B
i n p u t  p r o g r a m .
l o o p  c a s e = 1  t o  5 0 0 0 0 .
c o m p u t e  y 4 6  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 4 6 4 v a n d e 1 2
r e c o d e  y 4 6  ( o t h r u  . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 4 8  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 4 8 4 v a n d e 1 2
r e c o d e  y 4 8  ( o t h r u  . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 5 2  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 5 2 3 v a n d e 6.
r e c o d e  y 5 2  ( o t h r u  . 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 5 6  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 5 6 6 v a n d e 1 5
r e c o d e  y 5 6  ( o t h r u  . 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 5 9  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 5 9 5 v a n d e 1 4
r e c o d e  y 5 9  ( o t h r u  . 3 5 7  1 4 2 8 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 6 3  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 6 3 5 v a n d e 1 3
r e c o d e  y 6 3  ( o t h r u  . 3 8 4 6 1 5 3 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 6 7  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 6 7 7 v a n d e 2 4
r e c o d e  y 6 7  ( o t h r u  . 2 9 1 6 6 6 6 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 7  1 == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 7  1 3 v a n d e 6
r e c o d e  y 7  1 ( o t h r u  . 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 7 2  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 7 2 3 v a n d e 7 .
r e c o d e  y 7 2  ( o t h r u  . 4 2 8 5 7 1 4 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 7 7  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 7 7 3 v a n d e 1 6
r e c o d e  y 7 7  ( o t h r u  . 1 8 7 5 0 0 0 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 8 1  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 8 1 3 v a n d e 6.
r e c o d e  y 8 1  ( o t h r u  . 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 8 2  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 8 2 3 v a n d e 1 6
r e c o d e  y 8 2  ( o t h r u  . 1 8 7 5 0 0 0 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 8 6  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 8 6 3 v a n d e 1 6
r e c o d e  y 8 6  ( o t h r u  . 1 8 7 5 0 0 0 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 8 9  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 8 9 4 v a n d e 1 5
r e c o d e  y 8 9  ( o t h r u  . 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 9 4  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 9 4 5 v a n d e 1 1
r e c o d e  y 9 4  ( o t h r u  . 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
c o m p u t e  y 9 8  == u n i f o r m ( 1 . 0 )  . /* 1 9 9 8 5 v a n d e 1 4
r e c o d e  y 9 8  ( o t h r u  . 3 5 7  1 4 2 8 = 1 ) ( e l s e  = 0
e n d  c a s e .  
e n d  l o o p .  
e n d  f i l e .
e n d  i n p u t  p r o g r a m .  
f o r m a t s  y 4 6  t o  y 9 8 ( f 1 . 0 ) .  
c o u n t  n s u c  =  y 4 6  t o  y 9 8 ( 1 ) .  
f o r m a t s  n s u c ( f 2 . 0 ) .
l i s t  v a r  =  y 4 6  t o  n s u c  / c a s e s  =  f r o m  1 t o  1 0 0  
f r e q  v a r  =  n s u c  / s t a t  =  al l  / b a r c h a r .
2 7 4 GOVERNING WITH YOUR CLOSEST NEIGHBOUR
A p p e n d i x
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation of 
the minimum 
winning theory
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions 
- NSUC- of the 
simulation of the 
minimum 
winning theory
The minimal winning theory predicted 9 historical coalitions. Since the cumulative 
percentage until eight correct predictions is 93.3, and our a  = 5% the null hypothesis 
can not be rejected. The prediction based on the theory is not significantly better 
than the prediction based on random4.
Minimal Winning Theory
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
14
TOTAL
frequency
38
339
1485
4153
7706
10117
10256
7888
4675
2269
808
207
50
8
1
50000
percent
.1
.7
3.0
8.3
15.4 
20.2
20.5 
15.8
9.4
4.5
1.6 
.4 
.1 
.0 
.0
100.0
VALID PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
.1
.7
3.0
8.3
15.4 
20.2
20.5 
15.8
9.4
4.5
1.6 
.4 
.1 
.0 
.0
100.0
.1
.8
3.7
12.0
27.4 
47.7 
68.2 
84.0 
93.3
97.9
99.5
99.9 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0
12000 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10000,
8000.
:  M
Frequency
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
NSUC
4 In the figure of the distribution of correct prediction based on simulation belonging to the minimal 
winning theory and in all other distribution figures 'NSUC' stands for the number of successful predic­
tions with the simulation.
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Minimum Size Theory
The success rate of the minimal size theory is 2/16. This is not significantly better 
than the number of correct predictions based on random. The null hypothesis is 
therefore not rejected.
frequency percent valid percent cumulative percent
14.8
45.5
74.6 
91.3
97.8 
99.5
99.9 
100.0 
100.0
20000
NSUC
0 7416 14.8 14.8
1 15321 30.6 30.6
2 14556 29.1 29.1
3 8351 16.7 16.7
4 3240 6.5 6.5
5 868 1.7 1.7
6 211 .4 .4
7 26 .1 .1
8 11 .0 .0
AL 50000 100.0 100.0
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation of 
the minimum 
size theory
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions
- NSUC- of the 
simulation of the 
minimum 
size theory
2 7 6 GOVERNING WITH YOUR CLOSEST NEIGHBOUR
A p p e n d i x
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation of 
the bargaining 
set theory
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions 
- NSUC- of the 
simulation of 
the bargaining 
set theory
The success rate of the bargaining set is 7/16. The percentage of correct predic­
tions at 6 in the simulation is 99.6. The null hypothesis should therefore be reject­
ed and we conclude that the bargaining set theory predicts significantly better than 
a random probability distribution.
Bargaining Set Theory
frequency percent VALID PERCENT cumulative percent
0 3138 6.3 6.3 6.3
1 10122 20.2 20.2 26.5
2 14438 28.9 28.9 55.4
3 12034 24.1 24.1 79.5
4 6644 13.3 13.3 92.8
5 2618 5.2 5.2 98.0
6 806 1.6 1.6 99.6
7 159 .3 .3 99.9
8 38 .1 .1 100.0
9 3 .0 .0 100.0
TOTAL 50000 100.0 100.0
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The number of historical coalitions predicted by this theory - it is eight - lies in the 
last five percent of the distribution based on random. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
is rejected.
Minimal Connected Winning Theory
frequency percent VALID PERCENT cumulative pef
0 1479 3.0 3.0 3.0
1 6117 12.2 12.2 15.2
2 11064 22.1 22.1 37.3
3 12760 25.5 25.5 62.8
4 9806 19.6 19.6 82.5
5 5445 10.9 10.9 93.3
6 2291 4.6 4.6 97.9
7 775 1.6 1.6 99.5
8 213 .4 .4 99.9
9 45 .1 .1 100.0
10 4 .0 .0 100.0
11 1 .0 .0 100.0
TAL 50000 100.0 100.0
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the minimal 
connected 
winning theory
Distribution 
of correct 
predictions
- NSUC- of 
the minimal 
connected 
winning theory
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Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the minimal 
range theory
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions
- NSUC- of the 
simulation of 
the minimal 
range theory
The number of successful predictions by the minimal range theory is 6. The per­
centage of correct of predictions by the simulation at 5 is 99, so the null hypothe­
sis is rejected. The number of historical predictions by the theory is significantly 
better than by random.
Minimal Range Theory
frequency percent VALID percent cumulative percent
0 4307 8.6 8.6 8.6
1 11716 23.4 23.4 32.0
2 14892 29.8 29.8 61.8
3 11109 22.2 22.2 84.0
4 5417 10.8 10.8 94.9
5 1985 4.0 4.0 98.9
6 462 .9 .9 99.8
7 98 .2 .2 100.0
13 .0 .0 100.0
9 1 .0 .0 100.0
TOTAL 50000 100.0 100.0
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The number of historical coalitions predicted by the policy distance theory is 
eight. This result is not significantly better than the prediction that is based on the 
probability distribution. Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected.
Policy Distance Theory
frequency percent VALID PERCENT cumulative percent
VALID 0 9 .0 .0 .0
1 81 .2 .2 .2
2 519 1.0 1.0 1.2
3 1766 3.5 3.5 4.8
4 4412 8.8 8.8 13.6
5 7732 15.5 15.5 29.0
6 10214 20.4 20.4 49.5
7 9972 19.9 19.9 69.4
8 7833 15.7 15.7 85.1
9 4490 9.0 9.0 94.1
10 2083 4.2 4.2 98.2
11 690 1.4 1.4 99.6
12 169 .3 .3 99.9
13 25 .1 .1 100.0
14 5 .0 .0 100.0
TOTAL 50000 100.0 100.0
12000 -------------
1 0 0 0 0 ,
8000.
6000.
4000,
Frequency
2000,
0 ___ _
0 1
NSUC
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the policy 
distance theory
Distribution 
of correct 
predictions
- NSUC- of 
of the policy 
distance theory
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Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the weak 
dominant player 
theory
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions
- NSUC- of the 
simulation 
of the weak 
dominant player 
theory
The theory based on the weak version of the dominant player predicted the correct 
coalition five times. This is less than can be expected based on the simulation. The 
null hypothesis is therefore not rejected.
Weak Dominant Player Theory
VALID PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
580
3677
10210
15088
12737
5981
1554
173
1.2
7.4
20.4 
30.2
25.5 
12.0
3.1
.3
1.2
7.4
20.4 
30.2
25.5 
12.0
3.1
.3
1.2
8.5
28.9
59.1
84.6 
96.5
99.7 
100.0
50000 100.0 100.0
NSUC
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The success rate of the dominant player is 3/16. This not significantly better than 
prediction based on simulation and the null hypothesis can thus not be rejected.
Dominant Player Theory
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the dominant 
player theory
Distribution 
of correct 
predictions
- NSUC- of 
of the dominant 
player theory
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Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the centre 
player theory
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions
- NSUC- of the 
simulation 
of the centre 
player theory
The centre player theory predicted 11 historical coalitions. The prediction based 
on the probability distribution by simulation shows that the results of the theory are 
not significantly better than the prediction by the simulation. The null hypothesis 
is not rejected.
Centre Player Theory
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The power excess theory predicted three historical coalitions. This is enough to 
reject the null hypothesis.
Power Excess Theory
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the power 
excess theory
Distribution 
of correct 
predictions
- NSUC- of 
of the power 
excess theory
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Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the heart 
solution
Distribution of
correct
predictions
- NSUC- of the
simulation
of the heart
solution
The heart solution predicted the correct coalition in 9 of the 16 cases. This is 
more than can be expected based on our simulation. The null hypothesis is therefore 
rejected. Note that the probability distribution is different from other theories - not 
only because the different size of the prediction set in relation to other theories - but 
also because this theory accepts minority coalitions which enhances the number of 
possible coalitions.
Heart Solution
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Heart Winning Theory
The success rate of the heart winning theory is 9/16, and is better than what can 
be expected based on the simulation. The null hypothesis is rejected.
FREQUENCY PERCENT VALID PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
.1 
1.2 
5.5 
16.8 
35.6
57.4 
76.9
89.5 
96.2 
99.0 
99.8
100.0 
100.0 
100.0
12000
NSUC
0 53 .1 .1
1 526 1.1 1.1
2 2179 4.4 4.4
3 5625 11.3 11.3
4 9401 18.8 18.8
5 10926 21.9 21.9
6 9720 19.4 19.4
7 6339 12.7 12.7
8 3345 6.7 6.7
9 1379 2.8 2.8
10 391 .8 .8
11 100 .2 .2
2 13 .0 .0
13 3 .0 .0
TAL 50000 100.0 100.0
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the Heart 
winning theory
Distribution 
of correct 
predictions
- NSUC- of 
of the Heart 
winning theory
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Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the heart 
solution refined 
version
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions 
- NSUC- of the 
simulation 
of the heart 
solution refined 
version
Heart Solution refined version
The heart-refined version is also compared to all possible combinations of two or 
more parties since the refined version also allows minority cabinets. The three his­
torical coalitions that are predicted by the refined version of the heart solution are 
more correct predictions than could be expected based on the simulation. The null 
hypothesis is rejected.
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The number of correct coalitions predicted by the protocoalition formation theory
- 6 - is larger than the number of correct predictions expected by the probability dis­
tribution based on the simulation results. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Protocoalition Formation
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the
protocoalition 
formation theory
Distribution 
of correct 
predictions 
- NSUC- of 
of the
protocoalition 
formation theory
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Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation of 
the combination 
of the protocoali­
tion formation 
and heart theory
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions
- NSUC-of 
the simulation of 
the combination 
of the protocoali­
tion formation 
and heart theory
The success-rate of these combined theories is 5/16, and is in the last five percent 
o f the distribution based on simulation. The null hypothesis can be rejected and 
thus the theory predicts better than random.
Proto Coalition Formation & Heart Solution
FREQUENCY PERCENT VALID PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0 10248 20.5 20.5 20.5
1 17378 34.8 34.8 55.3
2 13290 26.6 26.6 81.8
3 6371 12.7 12.7 94.6
4 2075 4.2 4.2 98.7
5 512 1.0 1.0 99.7
6 110 .2 .2 100.0
7 12 .0 .0 100.0
8 3 .0 .0 100.0
9 1 .0 .0 100.0
TOTAL 50000 100.0 100.0
20000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NSUC
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The number of correct predictions by the winset theory, namely 2, is not greater 
than most predictions done by the simulation. Therefore, the null hypothesis can 
not be rejected. Note that the number of possible portfolios is all possible two-port­
folio combinations. (i.e, aa, ab, ba, bb, etc.)
Winset Theory
FREQUENCY VALID PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0 24027 48.1 48.1 48.1
1 17902 35.8 35.8 83.9
2 6397 12.8 12.8 96.7
3 1416 2.8 2.8 99.5
4 230 .5 .5 99.9
5 26 .1 .1 100.0
6 1 .0 .0 100.0
7 1 .0 .0 100.0
TOTAL 50000 100.0 100.0
PERCENT
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the
winset theory
Distribution 
of correct 
predictions 
- NSUC- of 
of the
winset theory
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Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the winset 
winning theory
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions
- NSUC-of 
the simulation 
of the winset 
winning theory
Winset winning Theory
The winning - coalitional - version of the winset theory does not predict signifi­
cantly better than the random distribution based on this theory does. The deviance 
from the significance level is very small but the alternative hypothesis must still be 
rejected.
FREQUENCY PERCENT VALID PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
20.7 
55.0
81.8 
94.6
98.8
99.8 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0
20000
0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NSUC
TOTAL
0 10344 20.7 20.7
1 17161 34.3 34.3
2 13388 26.8 26.8
3 6427 12.9 12.9
4 2065 4.1 4.1
5 502 1.0 1.0
6 96 .2 .2
7 15 .0 .0
8 2 .0 .0
50000 100.0 100.0
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Maximal Satisfaction Solution
The success-rate of the maximal satisfaction solution is 7/16, and is higher than can 
be expected based on the distribution found by simulations. The null hypothesis is 
therefore rejected.
Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation 
of the maximal 
satisfaction 
solution
Distribution 
of correct 
predictions
- NSUC- 
of the maximal 
satisfaction 
solution
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Frequency table 
of correct 
predictions of 
the simulation of 
the competitive 
solution
Distribution of 
correct 
predictions
- NSUC-of 
the simulation of 
the competitive 
solution
Com petitive Solution
The results of the competitive solution, eight correct predictions, do not give a 
reason to reject the null hypothesis. The theory is not predicting significantly better 
than the simulation distribution based on the probability distribution.
FREQUENCY PERCENT VALID PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
.1 
1.6 
7.7 
21.8 
43.4 
66.2 
83.9
93.8 
98.1 
99.6
99.9 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0
14000
12000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
NSUC
0 61 .1 .1
1 758 1.5 1.5
2 3035 6.1 6.1
3 7051 14.1 14.1
4 10793 21.6 21.6
5 11417 22.8 22.8
6 8815 17.6 17.6
7 4986 10.0 10.0
8 2156 4.3 4.3
9 723 1.4 1.4
10 161 .3 .3
11 37 .1 .1
12 6 .0 .0
13 1 .0 .0
TOTAL 50000 100.0 100.0
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List of symbols and abbreviations
coalition S, T
complement of coalition S Sc
set of winning coalitions W
value of coalition S v (S)
actor / player i
weight of player i w i
normalised weight o f player i *  i
quota q
set of players N
strict preference P
(weak) preference R
indifference I
coalition S is preferred by i to coalition T SPiT
most preferred policy position o f a player i xi
expected policy position of a coalition S xS
distance between xi and xS )x(x,d
(also) distance between xi and xS II xi -xs II
number of dimensions m
m-dimensional Euclidean space RM
dominates A
for which it holds that I
policy order 0
function ƒ
greater than >
less than <
summation I
implication =>
for all V
there exists 3
negation -i
conjunction, and A
inclusive disjuction,or V
absolute value o f x Ix I
cardinality o f S # S
is element of e
subset Ç
is unequal to *
empty set 0
union u
intersection n
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Regeren met je naaste buur
Een evaluatie van ruimtelijke coalitieformatietheorieën
In Nederland is de zetelverdeling over de verschillende politieke partijen na 
afloop van Tweede Kamerverkiezingen wel bekend, maar de vraag wie met wie zal 
gaan regeren is daarmee nog niet beantwoord. Meer inzicht in het proces van 
coalitievorming in een democratie met een meer-partijenstelsel is wenselijk. Een 
theorie die op basis van de op dat moment beschikbare informatie de uitkomst van 
het coalitieformatieproces voorspelt kan daartoe bijdragen.
1. Onderzoeksvraag en onderzoeksontwerp
In dit onderzoek worden verschillende soorten theorieën over coalitieformatie 
bestudeerd, die gebaseerd zijn op verschillende gedragsassumpties. H et doel van 
theorieën over coalitieformatie is de uitkomst van deze fase in het democratische 
proces te voorspellen. Eén van de laatste ontwikkelingen betreft de zogenaamde 
ruimtelijke theorieën van coalitieformatie. Ruimtelijke theorieën voorspellen coalities 
waarvoor geldt dat de afstand tussen de posities van partijen in de coalitie en de 
verwachte positie van de coalitie zo klein mogelijk is. Deze theorieën gaan uit van een 
metrische meerdimensionale ideologische of beleidsruimte waarin politieke partijen 
zich bevinden. De afstand tussen partijen en de verwachte positie van een coalitie 
wordt met behulp van Euclidische afstandsmetriek berekend.
Doel van de ruimtelijke theorieën is uiteraard beter in staat te zijn kabinetsfor­
matie te voorspellen dan de andere coalitieformatie theorieën. De doelstelling van dit 
onderzoek heeft betrekking op verschillende klassen van kabinetsformatietheorieën 
en luidt als volgt:
Voorspellen ruimtelijke coalitieformatietheorieën coalitieformatie beter dan
niet-ruimtelijke coalitieformatietheorieën?
Voor de ruimtelijke theorieën worden geregeld nieuwe concepten ontworpen, die 
wiskundig gezien steeds complexer worden. Deze theorieën zijn echter nog niet 
eerder getoetst. In dit onderzoek toets ik ruimtelijke en niet-ruimtelijke theorieën 
om de empirische kwaliteit van beide klassen te vergelijken. De volgende 
ruimtelijke theorieën van coalitieformatie worden bestudeerd:
•  Heart oplossing
• Protocoalitieformatie
•  Winset theorie
•  Competitieve oplossing
• Maximale satisfactie oplossing
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De eerste vier theorieën in deze opsomming zijn reeds bestaande theorieën. De 
maximale satisfactie oplossing betreft een nieuw oplossingsconcept.
De theorieën die in dit onderzoek worden aangeduid als ‘niet-ruimtelijke theo­
rieën’ zijn onder te verdelen in de volgende groepen:
•  machtsgerichte theorieën
•  actor-gerichte theorieën
•  één-dimensionale beleidsgerichte theorieën
•  institutionele theorieën.
Uit de groep van de zogenaamde ‘niet-ruimtelijke theorieën’ wordt een aantal 
machtsgerichte, beleidsgerichte en actor-gerichte theorieën empirisch getoetst. De 
toetsing heeft betrekking op kabinetsformaties in Nederland vanaf 1946 tot heden. 
De resultaten van deze empirische toets worden vervolgens vergeleken met de resul­
taten voor de vijf ruimtelijke theorieën.
In dit onderzoek ligt de nadruk dus op de empirische kwaliteit van de ruimtelijke 
coalitieformatie theorieën in vergelijking met de niet-ruimtelijke. In het inleidende 
hoofdstuk zijn de onderzoeksvraag en het ontwerp van dit onderzoek behandeld.
2. Speltheorie en ruimtelijke modellen
In Hoofdstuk 2 worden drie ruimtelijke modellen van partijconcurrentie geïntro­
duceerd. Deze modellen worden eerst geïntroduceerd omdat coalitieformatietheo­
rieën gebaseerd zijn op partijconcurrentiemodellen. Het gedrag en de voorkeuren 
van de kiezers en de relatie tussen kiezers en partijen vertonen grote overeenkomsten 
met het gedrag en de voorkeuren van de partijen en de verhouding tussen partijen 
en de coalities. M et andere woorden: de kiezer prefereert een politieke partij met 
beleidsstandpunten die dichtbij de eigen voorkeur liggen en een partij prefereert een 
coalitie waarvoor geldt dat de verwachte beleidspositie dicht bij de eigen positie ligt.
Het klassieke nabijheidsmodel (Downs, 1957) en het directionele model (Rabino­
witz & McDonald, 1989) zijn de twee belangrijkste theorieën over partijcompetitie 
die uitgaan van voorkeuren die gebaseerd zijn op beleidsposities. In de afgelopen 
jaren zijn deze modellen veelvuldig besproken en empirisch getoetst. Geen van 
beide modellen kwam echter als ‘winnaar’ uit de bus. De empirische resultaten 
geven het directionele model een lichte voorsprong, terwijl beide modellen met 
behulp van theoretische argumenten ondersteund kunnen worden. Een derde partij- 
concurrentie model is het linkage model ofwel ideologie model (Enelow & Hinich, 
1984).
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In de beleidsgerichte en ruimtelijke coalitieformatietheorieën wordt veronder­
steld dat partijen hun nut maximaliseren door de coalitie te kiezen die het dichtst bij 
hun eigen positie ligt. Deze theorieën maken gebruik van de zogenaamde ‘kleinste- 
afstandshypothese’. Voor de modellering van de ruimtelijke theorieën wordt gebruik 
gemaakt van een combinatie van het nabijheidsmodel en het derde - ideologie - 
model. Ik beschouw het ideologiemodel als een uitbreiding van het klassieke nabij­
heidsmodel. In het nabijheidsmodel wordt bijvoorbeeld een sociaal economische 
links-rechts dimensie beschouwd als de belangrijkste ideologische dimensie waarop 
de partijen met elkaar om de gunst van de kiezer concurreren. Deze dimensie wordt
- hoewel de partijposities daar slechts ordinaal geordend zijn - ook in de unidimensio- 
nale beleidsgerichte theorieën van kabinetsformatie gebruikt. Het ideologiemodel 
stelt vervolgens dat er één of meer belangrijke dimensie(s) zijn, maar voegt toe dat 
deze dimensie(s) voorspellend zijn voor beleidsposities op issues voor partijen en 
kiezers. Dit werkt als volgt: een partij met een zogenaamde ‘rechtse’ positie op de 
sociaal economische links-rechts dimensie, zal op het beleidsissue ‘belastingtarieven’ 
met grote waarschijnlijkheid een positie innemen tegen het verhogen van belasting.
Wanneer we echter, zoals in dit onderzoek, de partij- en coalitieposities verkrijgen 
door middel van data reductie methoden die worden toegepast op scores op issues, 
dan wordt eigenlijk het ideologie- model toegepast. Het concept ideologie wordt 
zowel in het linkage- ofwel ideologiemodel, als in de data reductie methode - de 
multidimensionale schaaltechniek - als onderliggende voorspellende dimensie voor 
posities op allerlei issues verondersteld.
Het directionele model wordt niet toegepast in de bestaande ruimtelijke coalitie- 
formatietheorieën. D it model gaat - zoals de naam al aangeeft - uit van de richting 
van beleidsposities. Zowel de richting, ruwweg het voor of tegen x  o f y  zijn, als de 
intensiteit van de voorkeur wordt gemeten. Vernieuwend is dat er niet van de kiezer 
wordt verwacht dat deze precies weet waar de partijen zich bevinden, en dus precies 
de afstanden tussen haar eigen positie en de partijposities kan berekenen, terwijl dit 
bij het nabijheidsmodel wel wordt verondersteld. Een tweede opvallend verschil met 
de modellen die uitgaan van de kleinste-afstandshypothese is dat in het directionele 
model het centrum van een dimensie geen reëel beleidsalternatief is, omdat kiezers 
en partijen worden verondersteld voor of tegen te zijn. In het directionele model 
heeft een kiezer voorkeur voor een extreme partij aan de goede kant van het 
‘nulpunt’, terwijl in het nabijheidsmodel een kiezer een partij prefereert die zo dicht 
als mogelijk bij zijn eigen positie ligt. Dit leidt ertoe dat het directionele model 
vaker partijen met extreme beleidsposities voorspelt.
Samenvattend: het is nog altijd onbeslist welk model een betere indicator is voor 
het gedrag van partijen en kiezers. In het nieuwe ruimtelijke oplossingsconcept zal
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ik om twee redenen gebruik maken van het nabijheidsmodel. In de eerste plaats 
wordt er in coalitieformatietheorieën nog altijd uitgegaan van de kleinste- 
afstandshypothese en staat deze hypothese ook centraal in de ruimtelijke theorieën. 
Ten tweede omdat ik het construct dat wordt gebruikt in het directionele model om 
te extreme partijen te weren - de zogenaamde ‘grens van aanvaardbaarheid’ - 
onacceptabel vind, omdat het ad hoc wordt toegepast.
3. Coalitieformatietheorieën
De zogenaamde ‘niet-ruimtelijke’ klassen van coalitieformatietheorieën worden in 
Hoofdstuk 3  gepresenteerd. Van de vier klassen niet-ruimtelijke theorieën - machts­
gerichte, beleidsgerichte, actorgerichte en institutionele theorieën - worden de institu­
tionele theorieën als enige groep niet getoetst. De institutionele theorieën bestaan 
niet - zoals de andere theorieën in deze studie - uit verzamelingen van veronderstel­
lingen die tegelijkertijd voldoen aan de vereisten voor interne consistentie, onafhanke­
lijkheid, voldoende en noodzakelijkheid. Met andere woorden: de institutionele 
theorieën zijn geen formele theorieën. De assumpties in de institutionele theorieën
- vooral de theorieën in Paragraaf 3.5.1 - zijn niet afgeleid door middel van deductie, 
maar hebben eerder het karakter van beperkende voorwaarden.
De institutionele theorieën die wel formele voorspellende theorieën zijn, kennen 
andere beperkingen. Deels zijn het theorieën die gedragsassumpties maken die in 
strijd zijn met de Nederlandse politieke werkelijkheid, deels zijn het theorieën die 
de complexe werkelijkheid - van veel partijen en issues - niet kunnen modelleren. 
Een uitzondering is het Structure-Induced Equilibrium dat wel voldoet aan de eisen 
van een formele theorie en toepasbaar zou zijn op coalitievorming in Nederland. 
O m dat de gedragsassumpties in deze theorie nagenoeg gelijk zijn aan de assumpties 
in de W inset theorie (Laver & Shepsle, 1996), een ruimtelijke theorie die wordt 
behandeld in het volgende hoofdstuk, zal het structuur-geïndiceerd evenwicht niet 
worden getoetst in dit onderzoek.
De drie andere klassen theorieën in dit hoofdstuk - de machtsgerichte, actorgerichte 
en beleidsgerichte coalitieformatietheorieën - zijn eenvoudige axiomatische modellen 
die in dit onderzoek wel empirisch worden getoetst.
De machtsgerichte theorieën zijn theorieën die alleen machtsargumenten in over­
weging nemen. Kenmerkend is dat deze theorieën zo klein mogelijke coalities voor­
spellen. De achterliggende gedragsassumptie is dat partijen de ‘regeringsmacht’ met 
zo weinig mogelijk andere partijen willen delen.
Actorgeoriënteerde coalitieformatietheorieën verklaren coalitieformatie op basis
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van eigenschappen van machtige spelers. Enerzijds betreft dit actoren - politieke 
partijen - die heel machtig zijn door hun electorale positie, anderzijds betreft dit 
actoren die machtig zijn door hun centrale positie in de ideologische of beleids­
ruimte. In beide gevallen gaat het om spelers die meer dan gemiddelde macht 
hebben in het coalitieformatieproces en hiermee de kabinetsformatie beïnvloeden.
De laatste groep theorieën in de verzameling ‘niet-ruimtelijke theorieën’ is die van 
de beleidsgerichte coalitieformatietheorieën. Deze theorieën houden rekening met 
zowel machts- als beleidsmotieven van de spelers in het coalitieformatie proces. Een 
beleidsmotief is bijvoorbeeld dat ideologisch gezien ‘uniforme coalities’ beter kunnen 
samenwerken en meer kans maken om te worden gevormd dan ideologisch hetero­
gene coalities. In deze klasse theorieën wordt dus gebruik gemaakt van de kleinste- 
afstandshypothese.
De één-dimensionale beleidsgerichte theorieën hebben dus met de ruimtelijke 
theorieën gemeen dat ze uitgaan van de assumptie dat voorkeuren van partijen voor 
coalities mede gebaseerd zijn op verenigbaarheid van beleidsstandpunten. De uni- 
dimensionale theorieën onderscheiden zich echter van de ruimtelijke theorieën 
doordat eerstgenoemde uitgaan van een ordinale ruimte, terwijl de laatsgenoemde 
uitgaan van een Euclidische metriek.
4 Ruimtelijke coalitieformatietheorieën
In Hoofdstuk 4 worden de ruimtelijke theorieën van coalitieformatie bestudeerd, 
en bij de bespreking van elke theorie wordt een uitgebreid rekenvoorbeeld gegeven. 
Gangbaar voor deze klasse theorieën is de gedragsassumptie dat partijen coalities 
prefereren die in een multidimensionale ideologische of beleidsruimte zo dicht 
mogelijk bij de eigen positie liggen.
Het meest opvallende kenmerk van de Protocoalitieformatie theorie is dat ze uitgaat 
van subjectieve - in plaats van symmetrische - afstanden. In een subjectieve ruimte 
kan partij A  dichter bij B liggen dan andersom, als A bijvoorbeeld meer macht heeft 
dan B. Verder onderscheidt deze theorie zich van de andere theorieën in dit hoofd­
stuk, doordat deze theorie coalitieformatie als een dynamisch ‘multi-stage’ spel 
modelleert. Als twee partijen dichter bij elkaar liggen dan bij andere partijen, waarbij 
geldt dat partij A het dichtst bij B ligt en vice versa, dan vormen deze partijen een 
protocoalitie. Als deze protocoalitie winnend is, dat wil zeggen de meerderheid in de 
Tweede Kamer vertegenwoordigt, dan wordt deze coalitie voorspeld. Indien dit niet het 
geval is, gaat het proces de volgende fase in en wordt de protocoalitie als zelfstandige 
speler - met een nieuwe beleidspositie - beschouwd. Het proces herhaalt zich totdat 
een winnende coalitie gevormd wordt.
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De Competitieve oplossing gaat uit van de kleinste-afstandshypothese en gebruikt 
Euclidische metriek. Het oplossingsdeel van de theorie is afwijkend van andere theorie­
ën, omdat bij het voorspellen van kabinetten spilspelers worden geïntroduceerd. 
Coalities worden paarsgewijs vergeleken. Een speler is een spilspeler als deze lid is 
van beide mogelijke kabinetten die met elkaar worden vergeleken. Vervolgens is een 
coalitie levensvatbaar in vergelijking met een andere coalitie, als niet alle spilspelers 
de laatstgenoemde coalitie prefereren boven de eerstgenoemde. Met behulp van de 
spilspelers en het paarsgewijs vergelijken van coalities wordt in de competitieve 
oplossing onderzocht welke coalities levenvatbaar zijn. De competitieve oplossing 
voorspelt dan de verzameling levensvatbare coalities.
De Heart theorie onderscheidt zich van de bovenstaande theorieën omdat 
gezocht wordt naar ongedomineerde beleidsposities. De Heart oplossing is te vinden 
door een geometrische representatie van de partijen op basis van de posities in de 
ideologische o f beleidsruimte te tekenen. De eerste stap is dan het selecteren van 
mediaan lijnen. Een mediaan lijn is een lijn die partijen verbindt waarvoor geldt dat 
zich op deze lijn of aan elke zijde van deze lijn een meerderheid bevindt. Indien er 
een zogenaamde core-partij aanwezig is - dit is een partij waarvoor geldt dat de positie 
van deze partij een mediaan in alle richtingen vormt - dan zal een coalitie met deze 
partij worden voorspeld. Indien er geen core-partij is dan worden coalities voorspeld 
met partijen die op mediaan lijnen liggen. Aangezien de Heart oplossing ook minder- 
heidscoalities voorspelt en deze in Nederland alleen in zeer uitzonderlijke - interim
- situaties voorkomen, heb ik een aantal aanvullende assumpties toegevoegd. Met 
behulp van deze assumpties is een Heart — meerderheids - versie van deze theorie 
ontstaan, waardoor de voorspellende waarde van deze theorie beter te vergelijken is 
met de andere theorieën in dit boek.
Dit laatste geldt ook voor de Winset theorie. Deze theorie onderscheidt zich van de 
andere ruimtelijke theorieën, doordat ze er van uitgaat dat onderhandeld wordt over 
portefeuilles van ministers. Voor de Winset theorie wordt een aantal belangrijke 
portefeuilles onderscheiden waarover onderhandelingen plaatsvinden. De partijen 
die vervolgens deze portefeuilles krijgen zullen in het kabinet plaatsnemen. Het is 
mogelijk dat deze partijen (of partij) geen meerderheid vormen. In dat geval zijn 
ook additionele assumpties nodig om een ‘meerderheidsvoorspelling’ te doen. Zoals 
eerder opgemerkt is de Winset theorie de meest institutionele theorie in de klasse 
ruimtelijke theorieën. Bij de onderhandelingen over de portefeuilles wordt namelijk 
steeds als uitgangspunt de status quo portefeuilleverdeling genomen. Slechts indien 
een meerderheid een nieuwe portefeuilleverdeling prefereert boven de oude, wordt de 
status quo verdeling vervangen.
Ik heb dus bij de Heart oplossing en bij de Winset theorie additionele assumpties 
geïntroduceerd. Deze zijn toegevoegd omdat ik graag meederheidskabinetten wil
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voorspellen. Het oorspronkelijke doel van deze theorieën is eerder het aanwijzen van 
belangrijke spelers in het formatieproces, dan het voorspellen van coalities. De aanvul­
lende assumpties moeten dan ook niet worden gezien als een poging tot het ‘verbeteren’ 
van deze theorieën, maar veeleer als een middel waardoor de verschillende theorieën 
in deze studie beter met elkaar kunnen worden vergeleken.
De laatste theorie in de klasse van ruimtelijke theorieën is de Maximale satisfactie 
oplossing. Ook dit concept gaat uit van de kleinste-afstandshypothese en gebruikt 
Euclidische metriek om de afstanden te berekenen. Vernieuwend in dit concept is 
de introductie van collectieve satisfactie. Partijen prefereren coalities op basis van de 
afstand tussen de eigen positie en de verwachte coalitiepositie, maar erkennen dat het 
meestal onmogelijk is om een coalitie te vormen die voor alle partijen tegelijkertijd 
favoriet is. Er ontstaan zogenaamde ‘cycli’ van voorkeuren. O m  dit probleem op te 
lossen wordt op basis van individuele voorkeuren, maar met het besef van de 
mogelijkheid van het ontstaan van cycli, per coalitie uitgerekend hoe hoog het gemid­
delde nut voor de spelers in de coalitie is. De coalitie met het hoogste gemiddelde 
nut wordt door de Maximale satisfactie oplossing voorspeld.
5. Nederlandse politiek, partijen en hun posities
Hoofdstuk 5 begint met een beschrijving van het Nederlandse partijsysteem als 
constitutionele monarchie en parlementaire democratie. Hierin worden de formele en 
informele regels met betrekking tot de coalitieformatie bestudeerd. De eigenaardige 
rol van de Koningin in de Nederlandse kabinetsformatie komt aan de orde. In de 
formatie heeft zij onder meer door de benoeming van de (in)formateur een 
duidelijke politieke rol.
Het grootste deel van dit hoofdstuk bespreekt de voorbereiding van de confrontatie 
van de theorieën met de empirie. Voor het toetsen van de ruimtelijke theorieën zijn 
metrische partij posities op meerdere latente ideologische dimensies nodig en daarom 
worden in Hoofdstuk 5 verschillende data reductie methoden op verschillende 
datasets toegepast.
Voor het toetsen van de coalitieformatietheorieën voor kabinetsformaties in 
Nederland van 1946 tot en met 1994 zijn de Manifesto data geanalyseerd. Deze 
dataset bevat scores van politieke partijen op issues verkregen door inhoudsanalyse 
van partijprogramma’s. Vervolgens is een multi-dimensionale schaaltechniek 
toegepast om de posities van de partijen op deze issues te modelleren in een sterk 
gereduceerd aantal dimensies. De resultaten van deze analyses zijn partijposities op 
een tweetal dimensies. De kwaliteit van de analyses, weergegeven in stress-scores, zijn 
redelijk te noemen. Daarnaast levert property fitting, een regressie methode waarmee
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de gereduceerde ruimte geïnterpreteerd kan worden, ook redelijke resultaten op.
De Manifesto data zijn verzameld om het belang van issues te meten, reden waarom 
deze data eigenlijk niet geschikt zijn voor het verkrijgen van partijposities. Echter, 
omdat de Manifesto dataset de enige dataset is die tegelijkertijd een groot aantal cases 
bevat en indirect informatie bevat over issueposities, wordt deze toch in dit onder­
zoek gebruikt.
Voor het toetsen van de winset theorie zijn partijposities ten aanzien van de 
belangrijkste ministeriële portefeuilles nodig. O m  deze te verkrijgen is dezelfde dataset 
gebruikt, maar was de multidimensionale schaling als data reductie techniek niet 
toepasbaar. De multi-dimensionale schaaltechniek die is toegepast voor het verkrijgen 
van partijposities zoals hierboven beschreven, levert posities op een tweetal belangrijke 
dimensies op. De posities van de partijen die op deze manier zijn verkregen, zijn 
echter geen posities op de portefeuilles Financiën en Buitenlandse Zaken. Daarom 
is voor het toetsen van de winset theorie een schaaltechniek op basis van correlaties 
tussen issues - de zogenaamde reliability analysis - gebruikt. De kwaliteit van de 
gevonden posities op de twee portefeuilles is niet echt goed te noemen. De schaal- 
baarheidsscores liggen tussen .65 en .68, maar in ieder geval betreffen de resultaten 
posities op de portefeuille dimensies.
Om  de coalitievorming in 1998 te toetsen is een andere methode van inhouds­
analyse gebruikt. De partijprogramma’s van 1998 zijn geanalyseerd met behulp van 
procedures voor ‘gecomputeriseerd coderen’. Deze methode is ontwikkeld door 
Laver en Garry (1998) en is betrouwbaarder en minder arbeidsintensief dan de 
handmatige inhoudsanalyse zoals toegepast bij de Manifesto data. Met behulp van 
deze methode zijn voor de partijen in 1998 posities op de volgende drie dimensies 
verkregen: links-rechts, sociale waarden, en milieu. Deze methode van inhouds­
analyse waarbij het aantal woorden die bij een dimensie horen worden geteld met 
behulp van de computer is innovatief en veelbelovend. De resultaten van het cross­
valideren met een andere dataset voor 1998 zijn goed. Daarom is deze methode 
wellicht geschikt om in de toekomst en in retrospectief partijposities te verzamelen.
De ‘Laver en H unt (1992) dataset’ is een expert dataset met informatie over 
partijposities op belangrijke dimensies, en informatie over partij posities op de 
belangrijkste ministeriële portefeuilles. Helaas waren deze data tijdens dit onderzoek 
alleen beschikbaar voor het toetsen van de coalitieformatie in 1989 en 1994. 
Daarom is deze verder zeer waardevolle dataset niet geschikt voor het toetsen van 
coalitieformatie vanaf 1946. De dataset is wel gebruikt als controle middel om te 
onderzoeken o f verschillende datasets en verschillende analysemethoden leiden tot 
verschillende partijposities.
De partijposities op de links-rechts dimensie uit de Laver & H unt dataset vertonen 
grote overeenkomsten met de links-rechts posities verkregen met de Manifesto data.
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De ‘sociale waarden’ dimensie in de expert data en de posities op bijvoorbeeld 
‘mensenrechten’ in de Manifesto dataset, en de ‘buitenlandse zaken’ posities in de 
expert data en de ‘externe relaties van een staat’ posities in de Manifesto dataset, ver­
tonen echter grote verschillen.
Kortom, het verkrijgen van partijposities die betrouwbaar en valide zijn, en daar­
mee het toetsen van coalitieformatietheorieën mogelijk maken, is niet gemakkelijk. 
De partijposities in dit onderzoek zijn het best haalbare, gezien de huidige databe­
standen, maar een kritische houding ten aanzien van de resultaten van deze stap in 
het onderzoek, en derhalve over de volgende stap - het toetsen - is dus noodzaak.
6. Een empirische toetsing van coalitieformatietheorieën
De hypothesen die zijn verkregen in de Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 worden in 
Hoofdstuk 6 getoetst. De eerste toetsing betreft het berekenen van de succesratio. 
D it is het aantal goede voorspellingen gedeeld door het totaal aantal casussen 
getoetst door de theorie. In de tweede fase wordt de voorspellingsefficiëntie berekend. 
D it betreft het aantal goede voorspellingen gedeeld door het totaal aantal coalities 
dat door de theorie is voorspeld. Dit laatste getal is vaak afwijkend van het totaal 
aantal casussen omdat veel theorieën in dit onderzoek per formatie niet één enkele 
coalitie, maar een verzameling coalities voorspellen. Een voordeel van dit criterium 
boven de succesratio is dat hierbij zowel het aantal goede voorspellingen als de voor­
spellende kracht worden gemeten.
De hoogste succesratio’s zijn gemeten voor de unidimensionale beleidsgerichte, 
en actorgerichte theorieën: respectievelijk gemiddeld .458 en .438. De laagste 
succesratio is voor de machtsgerichte theorieën: .375. De gemiddelde score voor de 
ruimtelijke theorieën is .425.
Het beeld verandert wanneer we de voorspellingsefficiëntie bestuderen. De beleids­
gerichte (.202) en met name de ruimtelijke theorieën (.269) scoren beter dan de 
machtsgerichte (.164) en actorgerichte (.122) theorieën.
Deze gegevens zijn echter niet voldoende om tot een eindoordeel te komen. In 
vergelijking met de hypothetische ‘ideale’ theorie zou de conclusie zijn dat alle 
theorieën moeten worden verworpen. Geen van de theorieën voorspelt alle coalities 
correct. In tegendeel, de beste theorie volgens de succesratio voorspelt slechts 11 van 
de 16 keer de juiste coalitie.
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Om  op basis van statistische criteria - ondanks het kleine aantal casussen - toch 
een oordeel te kunnen geven over de empirische kwaliteit van de theorieën, is 
besloten om coalitieformatie te simuleren. De toets betreft de vergelijking tussen het 
aantal juist voorspelde coalities in de 16 casussen, en het aantal juist voorspelde 
coalities - op basis van de kansverdeling gebaseerd op de theorie - bij een simulatie 
van 50.000 coalitieformaties. De nulhypothese stelt dat de simulatie op basis van de 
kansverdeling behorende bij een theorie hetzelfde aantal correcte coalitieformaties 
voorspelt als de theorie. Wanneer een theorie vaker correct voorspelt dan in 95% 
van de gesimuleerde gevallen, dan wordt de nulhypothese verworpen en voorspelt 
de theorie dus beter dan op basis van de kansverdeling zou worden verwacht.
Op basis van deze statistische toetsing blijken coalitieformatietheorieën die 
gebaseerd zijn op beleidsposities - zowel uni- als multidimensionaal - het beter te 
doen dan theorieën die geen beleidsvoorkeuren als gedragsassumpties gebruiken. De 
groepen theorieën met een hogere voorspellingsefficiëntie zijn dus ook de theorieën 
die het beter doen bij de statistische toets. Drie theorieën uit de klasse ruimtelijke 
theorieën voorspellen significant beter dan op basis van de bijbehorende kans­
verdeling kan worden verwacht. Deze theorieën zijn:
•  Heart-meerderheids oplossing
•  Protocoalitieformatie
•  Maximale satisfactie oplossing
7. Conclusies
De vraag: voorspellen ruimtelijke coalitieformatietheorieën coalitieformatie
beter dan niet-ruimtelijke coalitieformatietheorieën, kan nu worden beantwoord.
Van de in totaal 15 theorieën die zijn getoetst, zijn er zes theorieën die beter voor­
spellen dan op basis van kans kan worden verwacht. Van deze zes theorieën zijn er 
drie ruimtelijk, twee unidimensionaal beleidsgericht en één machtsgericht. Van deze 
theorieën hebben de ruimtelijke theorieën de beste voorspellingsefficiëntie score. 
Het antwoord op de bovenstaande vraag is daarom positief.
•  De ruimtelijke coalitieformatietheorieën voorspellen coalitieformatie beter dan 
de niet-ruimtelijke theorieën.
•  Een tweede bevinding is dat coalitieformatietheorieën die beleidsvoorkeuren 
bevatten beter voorspellen dan theorieën die niet gebaseerd zijn op beleids- 
voorkeuren. De unidimensionale beleidsgerichte theorieën hebben een hogere voor- 
spellingsefficiëntie en verwerpen vaker de nulhypothese dan andere niet-ruimtelijke 
theorieën.
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Naar aanleiding van de bevindingen in dit onderzoek zijn twee belangrijke 
onderzoekstaken ontstaan. De eerste betreft het tekort aan goede data over partij- 
posities. O m  in de toekomst coalitieformatie beter te kunnen toetsen, zullen beter 
datasets moeten worden ontwikkeld. De gecomputeriseerde inhoudsanalyse is hiervoor 
een geschikt instrument.
De tweede vraag betreft de coalitieformatietheorieën. Ook de ruimtelijke theorieën 
van coalitieformatie voorspellen nog steeds niet vaak goed. Nieuwe assumpties over 
coalitieformatie zullen dus moeten worden toegevoegd om de theorieën te verbeteren.
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